论公司机关关系的异化与重构——兼对“三权分立”公司机关关系理论之质疑

在公司存在控制股东的情况下,股东大会决议实际上只能反映控制股东的意志,沦为控制股东利益的代言人,而由股东大会选举产生的董事会和监事会也就变相地沦为控制股东的＂傀儡＂,三者之间根本就不可能形成理论上所说的公司机关之间的分权制衡关系。只有将监事会独立于普通股东大会,改由类别股东大会选举产生,同时实行监事资格制度,才能真正发挥其对董事会的监督功能。     

资本多数决立法完善之我见

资本多数决是各国公司法都共同确立的一项公司决议原则。所谓资本多数决，是指在股东大会或者股东会上，股东按照其所持股份或者出资比例对公司重大事项行使表决权，经代表多数表决权的股东通过，方能形成决议。根据各国公司法的规定，股东享有的表决权的大小与其所持有的股份多少或者出资比例大小成正比，股东持有的股份越多，出资比例越大，所享有的表决权也就越大。而股东大会是公司的权力机构，公司的一切重大事项都必须经过股东大会讨论决定，因此，多数股股东尤其是拥有控制权的多数股股东因享有较大的表决权，在股东大会（或股东会）…     

股东会通讯表决制度研究-兼评《上市公司股东大会规范意见》的相关规定

股东不出席股东会议而通过通讯表决行使自己表决权,参与公司决策,可以实现股东会结构"全员性"要求,也有利于公司、股东的利益.但是无论是中国证监会的<上市公司股东大会规范意见>,还是上市公司的实践,通讯表决只是作为股东会议的一种召开形式而存在,而不是股东行使表决权的一种方式.这一误区导致了实践中众多问题的存在,应还通讯表决以本来面目,修正<公司法>有关规定,建构我国的通讯表决制度.     

关于股东权的几点思考

能否切实地保护股东权益，直接影响到广大投资者的投资热情和切身利益，最终也会影响到股份公司制度所存在的制度价值。我国《公司法》第 4条第 1款明确规定：公司股东作为出资者按投入公司的资本额享有所有者的资产受益、重大决策和选择管理者的权利。第 102条规定：股份有限公司由股东组成股东大会，股东大会是公司的权力机构。第 112条规定：董事会对股东大会负责。这些规定，突出了对股东权的保护。但由于我国公司法立法时所面临的实际问题以及缺乏公司法立法的经验，加之受传统计划经济体制下的思维模式的影响，我国公司法在股东权的保…     

论股东大会召开的障碍排除

一、公司股东大会召开的障碍按照我国《公司法》设立的公司股东大会（包括股东会）或者按照《中外合资经营企业法》设立的董事会从性质上讲都是公司的权力机关，公司的一切重大事项都必须经股东大会讨论决定。在一般情况下大部分公司都能依照法律或公司章程按期举行股东定...     

股东大会决议瑕疵后果的实证分析

股东大会决议作为法律行为与共同行为存在显著的区别，共同行为的法律效力主要体现为对表意人具有约束力．而股东大会决议的法律效力则主要体现为对第三人即公司管理层具有约束力。从股东大会的组成、决策的会议形式和股东大会决议必须采纳多数决规则来看，股东大会的决策事项必须受到严格限制，即只宜对公司重大事项进行决策，而一般事项的决策宜由董事会承担。对股东大会决议瑕疵后果的处理必须贯彻类型化的思考模式．不同种类的股东大会决议的瑕疵后果不同。确认股东大会决议无效或者撤销股东大会决议难以起到其应有的保护公司中小股东权益的功能．因此．为强化对公司中小股东权益的保护。有必要建立和健全股东大会提案审查制度。     

公司法人治理结构的建立与完善

公司制是现代企业制度的有效组织形式,公司法人治理结构是公司制的核心。公司法人治理结构体现了分权制衡的机理,其设计的目的都是以权力制约权力,确保公司作不背离股东目标的有效率的运转。权力的分立与制衡、决策的科学与民主这一分立制衡的公司法人治理结构反映了现代法治社会的要求。我国公司法对公司法人治理结构的结构设计存在的诸多缺陷,造成公司实务中公司法人治理结构的形式化,我国立法机关应尽快修改与完善公司法有关公司法人治理结构的构建。     

我国上市公司股东大会会议制度研究

本文主要研究了上市公司中股东大会会议的运作,分析了公司治理的本质特征即民主,将我国《公司法》、《上市公司治理准则》、《上市公司股东大会规则》、《上市公司章程指引》中的股东大会的规定与国外一些国家的相关规定进行比较,建议我国公司法应该对上市公司股东大会会议运作的程序进行系统规定,改变我国这些规范性文件互相矛盾,重复、繁杂的状态,提供一套标准示范文本,保护股东的合法权利,节省公司治理成本,实现股东民主。     

保护中小股东权益对策谈

我国的现行公司立法确立了保护股东合法权益的原则 ,赋予股东享有所有者的资产受益、重大决策和选择管理者等权利 ,同时也明确要求股份有限公司的股东行使权利时必须“同股同权 ,同股同利”。但是 ,由于股份有限公司的资格性质非常典型 ,除法律特别规定外 ,其股份可以自由转让和买卖 ,因而股东的流动性很强 ,公司及其股东大会实际上被股东地位较为稳定的少数大股东所控制。广大中小股东尤其是公众个人股东没有条件 ,也没有兴趣出席公司的股东大会 ,难以在会上表达自己的意见和影响公司的决策 ,他们只关心自益权以及相关的查阅、质询权和诉权…     

西方国家议会立法改革趋势之探析——兼论政府在立法中的功能角色

20世纪以来在法律和政治理论上处于优越地位的西方国家议会，都已呈现出一种共同趋势，即作为立法机关的地位实际下降了。而政府在很大程度上主导、直至支配着立法。为应对此种变化，当代西方国家议会趋于在统一掌握立法最终审议权和控制权的前提下，广泛采用各种更灵活的立法形式。且越来越重视其民主监督功能的发挥，以期一方面强化政府立法的民主保障，加强对政府立法的监督和控制，以协调其立法民主与行政效率的动态统一；另一方面改革和完善议会制度。以实质性地强化其立法审议和立法监督能力。     

公司章程修改案两种裁判思路评析

目前法院处理公司章程修改案中出现两种完全不同的裁判思路:一种是主张尊重修改章程法定程序的效力,仅对程序的结果即股东会决议内容进行合法性审查;另一种则主张直接从程序入手,要求特定事项的章程修改必须经全体股东同意才有效。哪一种主张更合理,存在争议。通过梳理裁判思路背后的学理基础,发觉前一思路自由裁量依据不足,而后一裁判思路直接与公司法上的程序规则相冲突,具有合理性而又不具合法性。因此,需要从立法上根本解决公司章程修改案的司法裁判难题。具体而言,立法可以考虑借鉴西方发达国家超级多数决和类别表决制度来完善现行《公司法》上的多数决规则,从而增强其对中小股东的保护能力。     

股东会、董事会职权的兜底条款质疑

规定股东会职权的《公司法》第38条和规定董事会职权的第47条分别有一个概括性的规定：“公司章程规定的其他职权”,这种条款一般被称为兜底条款。这是2005年公司法修改的时候新增加的条款,立法者试图通过强化章程自治解决股东会和董事会职权规定不清的问题。然而,事与愿违,兜底条款不能全部实现立法的目的,甚至还由此产生了新的问题,即在章程没有规定时,无法判断有些事项究竞是股东会的职权还是董事会的职权。同时在股东会职权规定条款和董事会职权规定条款增加兜底条款实际上是不了解股东会和董事会功能定位所致,因此需要先对兜底条款作无害化解释,在下次公司法修改时删除。     

民主、自治与法治:“周期率”问题再思考——关于国家与社会治理的一场学术对话

"周期率"问题是1945年黄炎培与毛泽东延安窑洞对话中(即著名的"延安窑洞对")提出的一个重要话题。自谈话以来,成为迄今为止不断引起理论家和政治家们讨论的一个重要政治、法律、历史和实践问题。从国家治理视角看,黄炎培提出的周期率问题实质上是一个"国家治理效能的时空延展递减率"问题;从"地地得人,人人得事"这一句话中,可以发现黄炎培对"地方自治观"情有独钟;从毛泽东的"动商"以及反科层官僚主义的政治性格中,可以理解毛泽东为什么是一位坚定的"运动民主论"的开拓者和践行者;从邓小平的个人经历,以及他对"文革"的深刻反思中,可以理解邓小平"民主法治观"的政治关切所在;"地方自治观""运动民主观"与"民主法治观"实质上都是解决中国历史周期率问题的不同方案,如果能够实现三者间的通融即"通三统",我们将更有希望真正跳出历史周期率。     

Disputes about corporate expression absorption and their legal remedies

Corporate expression is the expression that a company gives to the outside in its capacity as a legal entity. Often referring to resolutions made by shareholder meetings and the board of directors, based on good faith and bound by contractual spirit, a company must be held liable for its expression. Corporate expression absorption refers to the corporate behaviors and situations wherein the majority voting shareholders and directors replace the will of the minority voting shareholders and directors within their own will. Among them, the majority voting shareholders at a shareholders’ meeting (shareholders’ general meeting) are decision-making shareholders, and directors, managers and other senior management staff that decide corporate affairs are called decision-making members. Corporate expression absorption consists of two sorts: absorption by shareholders’ meeting and absorption by the board of directors. Shareholders’ meeting is a company’s authoritative organization; when the voting rights of some shareholders exceed the statutory limit, they will be able to manipulate the expression of shareholders’ meetings and replace the will of other shareholders with that of their own. The expression absorption by the board of directors refers to the practice wherein the majority directors decide on important corporate matters in accordance with the majority rule. Thus, it can be seen that the corporate expression absorption is a double-edged sword, not only capable of uplifting operational efficiency but also likely to help decision-making shareholders achieve personal gains and transfer corporate interests. As for the disputes of corporate expression absorption, the following legal remedies might be adopted: (1) Limit the voting rights of decision-making shareholders. (2) Provide shareholders with veto power over specific events. (3) Ask the chambers of commerce (industry associations) to arbitrate specific events. (4) Preserve the market value of shares held by dissenting directors. (5) Expand cumulative voting; (6) Provide shareholders the right to exit. (7) Legal remedies for corporate deadlock. (8) Shareholders’ derivative lawsuits. __________ Translated from China Law, No. 4, 2005     

The Event and the Subject: The (IM)Possible Rehabilitation of Carl Schmitt

The subject is the bearer of the sovereign decision, according to C. Schmitt. This decision grounds on certain situational pragmatics, yet mainly is born out of a ‘null’; as the decision forms the political normalcy that follows after, it displays its nature as an ‘event’. This subject is simultaneously a legal and a political one; it is the founder of the Nomos. This founding subject has been eclipsed in alignment with its post-modernly acclaimed ‘death’. The subject is deemed to have been inherently divided, as long as its identity steadily postpones itself, is incessantly ‘differing’, according to the deconstructionist approach; or it is considered as fundamentally ‘passive’, meaning not so much ‘weak’, but rather dethroning the Western preoccupation with the active autonomous individual; or, it is maintained but intrinsically reversed, now held either as part of a fundamental ontological order and indirectly of the nature (Agamben), or, opposite to Kantian assumptions, as primarily captured in a radical heteronomy, which constitutes it as a proper ethical subject (Levinas). Crucial is how to develop a concept taking into account the eventfulness of the constitution of the subject, without effacing the political character of such constitution by reducing it to non-political discourses, i.e., to metaphysics, morals or economics; how to conceive of Derrida’s ‘democracy to-come’ as political event, namely both as secular act and in the same time as referring to extramundane fundaments (to a ‘political theology’?); how to go beyond the linearity of the liberalist ideology by equating the political event with a messianic miracle ‘without messianism’; how to ‘salute’ democracy?     

再议宪政

18世纪晚期以来,民主一直是人类政治生活的主题,民主化进程成了社会进步的主要评判标准,然而,实现了民主并不能保证没有了政治迫害,现实的民主远没有实现人类赋予它的使命。民主不能使任何个人的利益都得到切实的实现和保障。为了切实的保障个体的权利和利益,人类在反对一切特权民主的同时不得不对民主本身(民主本身也是一种特权,多数人的特权)加以限制,这就是宪政。那么宪政的真正涵义是什么?宪政的基本精神是什么?它与宪法到底是什么样的关系?宪政与民主到底是什么样的关系?本文将就这几个问题作出初步的回答。     

Financing the Athenian state: public choice in the age of Demosthenes

The present essay analyses Athenian finances during the fourth century BC, the ‘Age of Demosthenes’, from both the revenue and expenditure points of view. It examines how Athenians practiced the concept of ‘economic democracy’ on matters of public choice, and the sometimes ingenious solutions they adopted for financing public goods such as defense, education and ‘social security’. Ancient Athens, the ‘prototype’ political democracy, was advanced also in matters of public administration, finance and institutions, on which political democracy was based and without their smooth running could not have functioned.

Beyond Consensus: Law, Disagreement and Democracy

Nowadays democratic liberal societies face a rising challenge in terms of fragmentation and erosion of shared values and ethical pluralism. Democracy is not anymore grounded in the possibility of a common understanding and interpretation of the same values. Neverthless, legal and political philosophy continue to focus on how to reach consensus, especially through monist, objectualist, contractualist, discursive and deliberative approaches, rather than openly affording the issue of disagreement. Far from being just a disruptive force, disagreement and conflict are matters of fact that no reflection on democracy can underevaluate. They are the major issues through which to look at the intersection of law, politics and morals. The inclusion of dissent is a powerful tool for moral recognition of different understandings of justice. That is where legal procedures become crucial. Law is a fundamental element in the building of a democracy. But it is also particularly exposed to disagreement. Language indeterminacy, dogmatic concepts and value pluralism constitute the main elements that lead to alternative and conflicting interpretations of law in a democratic framework. Major legal progress in the past has come from different understandings of the same legal materials. In this article I argue that respect for disagreement should be a moral principle in democracy and that the role of legal disagreement is essential to understand the evolution and the future directions of democracy as the government of a political community. To do so, a link between respect for disagreement and legal interpretation and argumentation must be established in order to make room for reason and avoid extreme skepticism on the contribution of law to the enforcement of democracy.     

股东大会决议瑕疵诉前救济制度建构

股份有限公司股东大会决议瑕疵的诉前救济制度在我国立法中未有涉及,立法规定的空白导致了司法介入的困难,而该制度是中小股东权益保护中的一项重要内容。从股东大会决议瑕疵入手,挖掘股东大会制度中各程序性规定的得失,比较各国的经验性规则,提出适合我国国情的股东大会决议瑕疵之诉前救济方式,并为我国公司立法提供修正意见,以更充分地保护股东权。     

The Rule of Reasons. Three Models of Deliberative Democracy

In this paper, the author contrasts three models of deliberative democracy: a liberal one, a communitarian one, and an alternative to both. Rather than understanding deliberative democracy as the rule of principles of justice or of communal values, the third model conceives of it as the "rule of reasons." On the basis of a discussion of seven components of an "ethos of democracy" (the cognitive capacities of citizens, political virtues, the cultural, institutional and material conditions of democracy, political legitimacy, and the "ground" of democracy), the third view, which is based on a theory of moral and political justification, emerges as superior.