Israel: ethnocracy or multicracy?

Much of the recent academic literature that assesses democracy in Israel labels it either as incomplete or flawed, yet such literature employs minimal systematic analysis of how the state is actually governed. Since the 1990s, there has been a tendency to describe the Israeli political regime as an ethnocracy. This article argues that the term ‘ethnocracy’, when applied to Israel, has certain weaknesses and instead proposes the concept of ‘multicracy’ (multiformocracy) as a more appropriate term by which to describe Israel's political organization. It will demonstrate that existing Israeli democratic institutions do not control the state's policymaking in full and that several politically important processes are controlled or at least influenced by various other politically active forces. Whilst these forces can influence, stimulate, inhibit, and otherwise change governmental decisions and actions, they can be labeled as kratiae. While the capacity of Israel's democracy to govern is weak, these other kratiae can intervene in policymaking and the state's regime acts as democracy-dominated multicracy.     

Palestine’s Membership in the Commonwealth as a Contribution to a Lasting Peace in the Middle East

With the re-election of Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu for another four-year term as prime minister of Israel there is a real danger that the peace process has reached an irrevocable impasse. It is argued that bold moves must be considered by the international community to breathe life back into the peace process. To coax Netanyahu into negotiations real pressure must be brought to bear on his government to respect the international consensus on Palestinian statehood and to halt settlement activity in occupied territory. To coax the Palestinian leadership back into a negotiation process with Israel, membership in the Commonwealth should be considered as a stepping stone to membership in the United Nations, to be followed by Israel’s membership in the Commonwealth—but on condition that Israel agrees to abide by international law, and respect the international consensus on the two-state solution, completely freeze settlement activity, including in East Jerusalem, and on condition that Palestine agrees to enter into final status negotiations with Israel to conclude a peace treaty to resolve all remaining disputes.     

Boundaries delimitation: Palestine and Trans‐Jordan

The Struggle for Kurdistan was brought out by a Soviet historian of unusual ability named N. A. Khalfin. This was in 1963.

Kurdistan and the Kurdish Problem by M. S. Lazarev, Moscow, 1964

The Rising of the Kurds in 1880 (Vosstaniye Kurdov 1880 goda) by Dzhalile Dzhalil Dzhasimovich, Moscow, 1966;

The Economic Development of Persia by I. I. Palyukaytis, Moscow, 1966.

Mediaeval Philosophy of the Peoples of the Near and Middle East by S. N. Grigoryan, Moscow, 1966     

Unlikely relations: Israel,Romania and the Egyptian–Israeli peace accord

The history of Israel's turbulent relations with the Eastern bloc nations during the Cold War has one exception, Romania. Unlike other Warsaw Pact members, Romania did not sever relations with Israel following the 1967 war. Central to these relations was Romanian Communist leader Nicolai Ceausescu, who managed to establish himself as an important figure among both Arabs and Israelis. This article will examine Romanian–Israeli relations during the 1970s and especially Ceausescu's role in the Egyptian–Israeli peace negotiations. Recent Israeli and some Romanian documents released from the Israeli State Archive and the Begin Centre reveal much about Israel's attitude towards Romania and Ceausescu's involvement in the Middle East, and serve to shed light on a heretofore neglected aspect of Israeli foreign policy. Some of the main issues to be addressed are Ceausescu's influence on Egyptian and Israeli decision makers, Israel's prime motives in maintaining a close relationship with Romania, the importance of Romanian Jewry's position to Israel's policy vis-à-vis Romania and the extent to which these relations represented a back channel that facilitated some contact with the Kremlin. All these will be examined against the larger backdrop of the Cold War and the Arab–Israeli conflict.     

The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917–1923: British Imperialist Imperatives

The article sets the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the final confirmation of Britain's Palestine Mandate in 1923 within the context of national imperial concerns: in particular, anxieties over the security of the Suez Canal and the country's sea-route to its economic and military power-base in India. In 1917 strategic issues were paramount in the progressive annexation of Palestine by the Lloyd George coalition, this the essential territorial precondition for the pursuit of the Zionist project. In 1923 these global considerations were again to the fore when the new Conservative administration, less Zionist than its predecessor, decided finally to accept and implement the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine and the obligation therein to advance the cause of a Jewish national home. And throughout this period there was a widespread sense in official circles that Zionist settlers might perform as direct agents of Empire, acting as grateful, loyal, and developmental servants of the British imperial interest. Paradoxically, however – and largely on account of the ill-informed and reflexive manner in which plans were formulated in London – the entire exercise was, in the long-term, to prove a source of profound weakness to Britain's strategic authority in the East. Palestine policy, like so much imperial reasoning in the twentieth century, was to prove intrinsically delusional.     

Peace Pedagogy and Interpretative Frameworks of Distrust: State–Society Relations in the Colombian Peace Process

The Havana Peace Accords of 2016 sought to end five decades of internal conflict in Colombia. As well as disarming the FARC, they promise to bring state institutions to abandoned regions and enable citizen participation. However, there is an obstacle to this which has consistently been overlooked by Juan Manuel Santos' government: a chronic distrust in the state dating back to colonialism. This article draws on ethnographic research with the Colombian government's ‘peace pedagogy’ team, tasked innovatively with educating citizens about the Havana Accords and incorporating them in the co-production of peace. It shows that citizens' learning about state policies, and reception of state efforts to shape that learning, are filtered through pre-existing perceptions of the state: in Colombia, interpretative frameworks of distrust. This ethnography illuminates state–society relations in the Colombian peace process, offering implications for ongoing implementation of the Accords, and posing questions for other countries in transition, arguing that historically-constituted perceptions of the state should be taken into account when communicating government policies to society.     

Palestine: the return of the one‐state solution

The Cambridge History of Islam. Edited by P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, Bernard Lewis. Cambridge University Press, 1970. Volume I: The Central Islamic Lands. Pp. xviii, 815. Bibliog., Index. ££6.00. Volume II: The Further Islamic Lands, Islamic Society and Civilization. Pp. xxvi, 966. Plates, Bibliog., Index. £7.00.     

Decolonization in Reverse: The Iranian Oil Crisis of 1951–53

The decolonization process in the 1940s and 1950s in Middle Eastern states under Great Britain's informal influence did not aim at recognizing the same type of independence of these states as that enjoyed by Britain and the United States. In the 1940s Washington laid the groundwork for its leading role in Iran during and following the Iranian oil crisis, whilst London with the assistance of the Americans in part reasserted British influence after the crisis. The United States achieved a paramount position in Iran with the assistance of its oil companies and through cooperation with Great Britain, and at the expense of the latter and the Soviet Union.     

Nasser's Dilemma: Egypt's Relations with the United States and Israel, 1967–69

The article examines the American political efforts to bring about an agreement between Israel and Egypt between 1967 and 1969 and analyses the reasons for their failure. But it does not focus exclusively on the Americans; it also outlines the alternatives for Egyptian action during the period in question and looks at the political and military steps taken by Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. The main conclusion is that despite Egypt's dependence on the Soviet Union for economic aid and the rebuilding of the decimated Egyptian army, Nasser knew that the only route to a political process to regain Sinai ran through the United States. His diplomatic efforts were all derived from this insight. At the same time, the Egyptian president's attempts to exploit American pressure to his benefit, as he had done in 1957, was undercut by his overestimation of his bargaining chips, a mistake that was one factor in the collapse of the efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement in the region.