Psychologists and the judicial system

This article traces the rise, fall, and current ambivalence in the use of social science data and psychological experts by the legal system. Several reasons are discussed for the less than perfect marriage between psychology and the law: normative philosophy of constitutional adjudication; overriding principles of the rules of evidence; irrelevancy to the courts of much of social science research; seduction of psychologists by attorneys who persuade experts to testify as advocates for a particular position rather than as objective scientists. These problems are placed in legal and ethical frame-work and suggestions for remediation of these problems are offered.     

On the beginnings of foundational legal research into legal discourse

Conclusion The beginnings of foundational legal research require reflective access to the cultural dynamics which drive the social construction of legal reality. Such access is blocked by our naive immersion within commonsensical and policy-orientated attunements towards our experience of law.Since this very blockage is veiled by its own operation, a suspension of these standpoints is required. This allows us to begin to comprehend the way common sense institutes an ungrounded and superficial obviousness through a self-concealing and naively realistic interpretative schema. From here the positive character of foundational legal studies can itself emerge as the systematic interrogation of legal experience in relation to its what, how and forwhom structure. Foundational theorising is then redirected towards a more respectful and less exploitative relationship with the linguistic roots of our consciousness of law.I would like to thank Peter Goodrich for the useful comments made on the first draft of this article.     

Rediscovering artificial intelligence and law: an inadequate jurisprudence?

Headlines suggesting that Google scientists had developed the first computer programme capable of learning a wide variety of tasks independently, in what has been hailed as a significant step towards ‘true artificial intelligence’¹1 Accessed February 26, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/25/google-develops-computer-program-capable-of-learning-tasks-independently. may or may not presage a new era of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Nevertheless, they suggest a need to reconsider the story of AI in law. While significant changes have taken place in the application of information technology to law-work, these have resulted mainly from ordinary information technology processes such as data processing, data storage, retrieval and management in combination with the information rich, rapid and global communication and networking capabilities of the Internet. However, when information technology has been applied to deeper legal processes, which involve the very nature of law, the result has not been very successful. This is especially so in relation to the application of AI systems to law. Philip Leith blamed the meagre and unsatisfactory results of costly AI and law research on faulty jurisprudence and especially on almost exclusive reliance on analytical positivism and ignorance of user needs and requirements. Many involved with AI and law still refuse to acknowledge that there are underlying problems with the way they conceptualise the nature of legal reasoning. Does AI in law have a future then? This article explores recent nuanced approaches to AI and law research and suggests the need for rethinking the jurisprudence that underpins AI and law and in particular to consider the realist social economic and political context in which AI and law works.     

Law school accreditation in the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union: what steps for the future?

Legal education reform has recently emerged as a key component in the rule of law promotion in the former Soviet Union republics,1 1. See Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, Jr, Educating Russia's future lawyers—any role for the United States? (2000) 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 17, 18–19, arguing that the core building block of the rule of law rests on legal education. See John M. Burman, The role of clinical legal education in developing the rule of law in Russia (2002) Wyoming Law Review at 90, 101, stating that reform of the legal education is the most effective way of creating a culture of law. See Peter J. Sahlas & Carl Chastenay, Russian legal education: post-communist stagnation or revival? (1998) 48 Journal of Legal Education 194 at 194, arguing that “a system of legal education can do more than teach the society's rules to successive generations: it can inspire values of justice and promote social progress”. See also Mark Dietrich, Three foundations of the rule of law: education, advocacy and judicial reform, in: Law in Transition (London, EBRD, Autumn 2002), at p. 57, available at: http://www.ebrd.com/ pubs/law/lit/english/aut02.pdf. The author points out that reform of legal education is the single most important reform to be undertaken in the NIS region. If law students are not taught how to think critically, question authority and be guided by the ethical values of the profession while in law school, it is difficult to expect that they will become honest advocates, judges or prosecutors in the future. View all notes now sovereign and independent states collectively known, for the purpose of this paper, as the New Independent States (NIS). Scholarly articles and international forums2 2. See Europe and Central Asia Division of the Legal Department, World Bank, Selected Issues (2001) Challenges and Strategies. The World Bank Forum on Legal and Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 33; see also Dietrich, op. cit., at 58. View all notes suggest that legal education reform could be advanced by developing and implementing accreditation procedures for law schools, updating law school curricula, establishing transparent and rigorous grading standards, and retraining the law faculty. This paper discusses just one of these measures, namely the development and implementation of quality evaluation and accreditation procedures for law schools in the NIS region. In order to explore this issue in detail, the paper has been structured into six parts.

?Part I provides a brief overview of legal education in the Soviet Union, thus placing the issues tackled in this paper into a historical perspective. Part II describes the main changes occurring in the higher education system in general and legal education in particular in the NIS region after 1991, emphasising new challenges that privatisation of the higher education sector posed to the quality of legal education, thus triggering an urgent need for quality-assurance and accreditation mechanisms. The currently existent NIS practices of licensing, evaluation and accreditation of academic institutions, including law faculties within multi-disciplinary academic institutions, as well as separate law schools, are described in Part III. Parts IV and V adopt a comparative approach to accreditation by providing an overview of accreditation procedures in the United States, and the recent initiative and trends in quality evaluation and accreditation in Western Europe. Drawing upon the information provided in Parts I–V, Part VI offers concrete suggestions and recommendations for improving the implementation of accreditation procedures in the NIS region. The materials contained herein represent the opinions of the author and editors and should not be construed to be the view of either the American Bar Association or the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative. The views expressed herein have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the ABA and, accordingly, should not be construed as representing the policy of the ABA. Nothing contained in this report is to be considered as the rendering of legal advice for specific cases, and readers are responsible for obtaining such advice from their own legal counsel. This report is intended for educational and informational purposes only. Research performed on Westlaw country of West Group. View all notes     

The Place of Legal Positivism in Contemporary Constitutional States

The aim of the paper is that of discussing some recent antipositivist theses, with specific reference to the arguments that focus on the alleged incapability of legal positivism to understand and explain the complex normative structure of constitutional states. One of the central tenets of legal positivism (in its guise of methodological or conceptual positivism) is the theory of the separation between law and morality. On the assumption that in contemporary legal systems, constitutional law represents a point of intersection between law and basic moral values, antipositivists contrast legal positivism with two main arguments. First, on a more general level, the positivist theory of the separation between law and morality is questioned; then, and consequently, the neutrality thesis in the juristic study of law is rejected. The author discusses both these antipositivist arguments, and offers a brief defence of methodological positivism.     

Recovering the Indigenous Legal Traditions of India: Classical Hindu Law in Practice in Late Medieval Kerala

The collection of Malayalam records entitled Vanjeri Grandhavari, taken from the archives of an important Namputiri Brahmin family and the temple under its leadership, provides some long-awaited information regarding a wide range of legal activities in late medieval Kerala. The organization of law and the jurisprudence represented by these records bear an unmistakable similarity to legal ideas found in dharmastra texts. A thorough comparison of the records and relevant dharma texts shows that landholding Namputiri Brahmins, who possessed enormous political and economic power in the region, mediated the implementation of dharmastra into the legal system. From this comparison arise new understandings of law and legal categories such as custom and positive law. Moreover, such comparisons begin to elucidate the problems involved in Western assumptions that it is textual law, not its interpretation and application by humans, which controls behavior. The Vanjeri records demonstrate not only the importance of dharmastra as a historical document but also the manner and extent to which dharmastra provided the foundation for legal systems in Kerala as well as in other regions of India.     

Psychology,law, and the black community

Summary The present paper presented key applications of psychology and the law to the black community, embracing both civil and criminal law and legislation. The breadth of its focus preluded a more in-depth treatment of other areas relevant to black people which include issues related to psychiatric emergencies and involuntary hospitalization, child custody, and right-to-treatment litigation in prison and mental health facilities. In focusing attention on these applications and areas for activity, hopefully, I have not presented an unrealistic depiction of a responsive, socially sensitive, legal system capable and willing to exercise its powerful tools in the interest of the black community. To the contrary, there is considerable literature that identifies the historic role of the legal system in the enactments of laws to institutionalize and cement slavery, its failure to aggressively protect constitutional and civil rights of blacks, in imposing penalties differentially to blacks and whites in the criminal justice system, and more recently, conspiracies of law enforcement officials to deprive blacks of basic civil rights (Bell, 1975; Burns, 1973; Higgenbotham, 1973). The legal system, rather than being an effective instrument for justice and positive social changes, has often been a major source of racism. Thus, any meaningful attempts by lawyers or behavioral scientists in the interest of black people cannot ignore the racism that is embedded in the fabric of the legal profession and the behavioral sciences. Particular aspects of the law with significant social-psychological dimensions are: the cultural inertia, the archaicness of the law due to its roots in English common-law, historic and contemporary racism, conservatism associated with the principle of stare decisis, judicial elitism, and the substitution of administrative and judicial discretion for overt racism. Thus, in order for the legal system, or the field of psychology, to be reponsive to the needs of blacks and other oppressed groups, they must eradicate racism and injustice in their own ranks.Traditionally law has functioned as the hand maiden of the propertied class in our society. So it was to be expected that lawyers in the legislative halls, lawyers on the bench and lawyers in the executive branch of government would combine their talents to perpetuate by law this peculiarly American doctrine of racism predicated upon a claimed color inferiority.     

中华法系中“礼”“律”关系之辨正——质疑中国法律史研究中的某些“定论”

"中华法系"是在近代比较法研究中出现的概念,这个法系的核心价值观与根本制度是礼。但长期以来,学界在研究中将律作为中华法系的主干,而将礼束之高阁。有关礼的论述笼统而缺乏细致与具体,对礼在中华法系中的地位和作用认识严重不足。正是这种几乎将礼摒弃在法研究领域之外的做法,使我们对中华法系产生了一系列误解。比如将"重刑轻民"、"以刑为主"归纳为中华法系的特点等等。在中华法系的制度构成中,律只是各种法律中的"一端",其地位与作用都远远不能与礼相提并论。但律在中华法系中确实又有其特殊性,这就是在礼的指导下,"律义"经历了一个由法而儒的演变过程。但这个过程恰恰证明了,在中华法系中占据主导与主流地位的是礼,而不是律。     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Alice’s Adventures</Emphasis>, Abductive Reasoning and the Logic of Islamic Law

How does a Muslim jurist think the law and how, accordingly, he judges a fact? Using Alice in Wonderland as hermeneutical device to explore the logic of fiqh, this article identifies a divergence between Western and Islamic legal thinking in the application of abduction as key form of inference in the law of Islam. In particular, looking at the fact/law relation in symbolic terms, the article highlights how, while a dichotomy between fact and law characterizes Western legal thinking, fiqh upholds a connection between the “real” and the “right” (?aqq), where the effort (ijtihād) in understanding sharī‘ah postulates the actualization of the “rule” (?ukm) in God’s creation. Thus, if sharī‘ah pre-scribes the Law, not only is the rule discovered through the sources (u?ūl), but the right has to be justified through a verdict de-scribing the fact, for the law to be validly stated for the given situation. In this sense, abduction as explanatory “hypothesis” (Peirce) and “inference to the best explanation” (Harman) of sharī‘ah provides an account for the probabilistic nature of fiqh, its ramification (furū‘) through verdicts, as well as for the epistemic and narrative function of the tradition as core aspects of the logic of Islamic law. At the same time, doubts can be raised about the compatibility between this logic and the deductive logic of modern state law, as a sub-product of Western legal thinking.     

The Short-Lived Influence of the Napoleonic Civil Code in 19th Century Greece

During the Greek War of Independence (1821–1827) from the Ottomans—which had a nationalistic and liberal character—and for the first decades after the liberation, a number of liberal French-educated politicians and scholars attempted unsuccessfully to introduce the Napoleonic Civil Code (or some clone of it) as the Greek Civil Code. Despite the fertile political and intellectual ground for such an introduction, they failed to achieve their goal due to the temporary introduction of Justinian's Roman law as the Greek civil law. This led the Greek academic community to Pandektenrecht and the predominance of the 19th century German legal theory (boosted by its organized propagation on the part of a number of German-educated legal scholars).     

Economic analysis of the legal standard for deceit in English tort law

Scholars of law and economics have produced a huge amount of literature on how to design an optimal legal standard in tort law to regulate international torts. However, there are few works to use these theories in the analysis of tort law in an individual jurisdiction. In this paper, I apply a law-and-economics analytical framework to the study of the legal standards for deceit in English tort law with an aim to show that the law-and-economics approach could generate new insights valuable to broad our understanding of the law of deceit.

Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field

Scholars from diverse fields have begun to study the intersection of emotion and law. The notion that reason and emotion are cleanly separable—and that law rightly privileges and admits only of the former—is deeply engrained. Law and emotion scholarship proceeds instead from the belief that the legal relevance of emotion is both significant and deserving of (and amenable to) close scrutiny. It is organized around six approaches, each of which is defined and discussed: emotion-centered, emotional phenomenon, emotion theory, legal doctrine, theory of law; and legal actor.Drawing on the analytic value of the proposed taxonomy, any exploration of law and emotion should strive to identify which emotion(s) it takes as its focus; distinguish implicated emotion-driven phenomena; explore relevant and competing theories of the emotions; limit itself to a particular type of legal doctrine; expose underlying theories of law; and make clear which legal actors are implicated. Directions for future research are discussed and cross-disciplinary collaboration encouraged.

Individual Conceptual Structure and Legal Experts’ Efficient Communication

The article investigates characteristics of legal concepts as found in academic articles, focusing upon the knowledge base of legal experts. It is a cognitively oriented study of one of the semiotic basics of communication for academic legal purposes. The purpose is to study the structure of knowledge elements connected to the concept of “Criminal liability of corporations” from US law in and across individual experts in order to look for individual differences and similarities. The central concern is to investigate the conditions for the observable efficiency of semiosis in academic discourse. In a first basic section I discuss aspects relevant for a cognitively oriented study of academic discourse. The empirical part of the article consists of an analysis of text passages from two articles in American law journals. The results of the study support the assumption that high efficiency and precision of semiosis is due rather to the use of specific cognitive processing skills than to total identity of cognitive structures across individual experts.

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More Norms,Less Justice: Refugees,the Republic,and everyone in between

The paper argues for conflating refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) as two sides of a work-in-progress postcolonial state. To be sure, aliens, refugees, IDPs, and stateless persons are separate legal entities. Nevertheless, this fragmented normative regime stands testimony to more laws and less justice. Many Asian states have no domestic refugee law. India, a common law system, takes a case by case approach as refugees are given “temporary shelter on humanitarian considerations”. Ironically, a work-in-progress postcolonial state sustains even de jure citizens as de facto stateless persons; the erstwhile Indo-Bangla enclaves for more than half a century were an apt example. Surely, the raison d’être of international law on refugees is to end human suffering, if needed, by transcending the absence of positive laws. A constitutional and political desire to minimise human suffering alone could cut the rigour of such positivist legal narratives. The Delhi High Court seemingly walked that path in Koul v Estate Officer noting “refugees and IDPs appear to be similarly situated”. Rising terrorism has made states increasingly believe in a security narrative all the same. A simultaneous emergence of a demographic anxiety particularly in India’s North-eastern states increasingly pits aliens and refugees against the domiciled indigenous and tribal people.     

What Is Forensic Psychology,Anyway?

The issue of how forensic psychology is defined has taken on a new urgency in the context of an application to have forensic psychology designated a specialty by the American Psychological Association. To provide a historical perspective, I briefly review early attempts to apply psychological concepts to legal issues, beginning with the McNaughten trial in England in 1843. I then review current conceptualizations of forensic psychology, which have either a broad focus on all psychology–law interactions or focus more narrowly on clinical applications to the legal system. Potential advantages and disadvantages of each conceptualization are briefly discussed. After touching upon the major differences in the cultures of psychology and of law, I discuss three law-related areas of contemporary controversy: use of clinically based evidence in the courtroom, recovered memories of child abuse, and the use of the criteria-based content analysis technique to evaluate children's claims of sexual abuse. Issues concerning the education and training of psychology–law scholars and practitioners are briefly surveyed. I conclude that a broad conceptualization of forensic psychology is important in terms of relevant ethical standards, but that a more narrow distinction that differentiates between clinicians and researchers or legal scholars also is useful.     

Guest Editorial

IP law is an integral area of the law for any society and indeedhas been part of the legal landscape in some western nationsfor centuries. Many jurisdictions in the east however have relativelyyoung IP regimes. Does youth mean immaturity? Surely not. Ifanything, many Asian jurisdictions have the opportunity to leap-frogthe sometimes obfuscated jurisprudence of the west reachingmore sensible conclusions. The uniqueness and importance of the IP landscape in Asia     

His master’s voice: H.L.A. Hart and Lacanian discourse theory

H.L.A. Hart’s jurisprudence seems antithetical to Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Professor Schroeder argues that, in fact, Hart’s concept of law has surprising similarities to Lacan’s ‘discourse of the Master’. Both reject a command theory of law: subjects do not obey law out of fear. Moreover, both insist that the authority of law is completely independent from its content. Anyone seeking to develop a psychoanalytically sophisticated critical legal theory should reconsider Hart. As insightful as his concept of the symbolic is, Lacan has no expertise in legal systems and does not discuss positive law per se. Although he posited a theory of ethics in his Seventh Seminar and the seeds of a jurisprudence are implicit within his theory, he offers no account of legal right, justice or what Hart misleadingly calls ‘morality’. A Lacanian jurisprudence must, therefore, be supplemented by other sources. Moreover, legal positivists should not dismiss psychoanalysis. As insightful as Hart’s jurisprudence is, his theories of legal subjectivity and linguistics are simplistic and his concept of law too narrow. He describes only one aspect of legal experience: obedience to law. He ignores what most legal actors do: Hart’s concept of law excludes the practice of law. Although Lacan’s ‘master’s discourse’ surprisingly parallels Hart’s jurisprudence, Lacan does not restrict the symbolic to the master’s discourse. It requires three other ‘discourses’. Lacan, therefore, supplements Hart. Specifically, Lacan’s fourth discourse describes the excluded practice of law and provides the mechanism by which ‘morality’ can critique law.

Accountability in Governance: The Challenge of Implementing the Aarhus Convention in Eastern Europe and Central Asia

The signing of the 1998 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) radically extended international law on transparency and accountability in environmental governance. For the countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA) that have now ratified, the Convention could prompt profound democratic changes. This article, based on the authors' experiences, analyses changing cultures of governance in EECCA countries. The first so-called pillar of access to information sets in place rights that directly contradict the fundamental secrecy of the former Soviet Union countries. Some officials' reluctance to share environmental information may also be linked to the economic duress of the current transition period, where information may be an official's only asset. The second pillar of public participation also poses difficulties for officials for whom the highest praise is to be considered a professional. In their belief that no one knows better than they do, they are reluctant to spend time and resources to make decision-making transparent and to involve the public. The third pillar of access to justice breaks new ground for post-socialist countries still developing their judicial systems. Though several highly sophisticated NGOs have been successful in using courts, it remains difficult for an ordinary EECCA citizen to bring an environment-related legal action. Changing these attitudes and practices will be a long and troublesome process. The Aarhus Convention will not be truly implemented until openness, transparency and accountability in environmental decision-making become everyday habits.     

Expert witnesses,nonexpert witnesses,and nonwitness experts

The role and responsibilities of the expert winness is a controversial subject. This article emphasizes the legal rules (of evidence and procedure) governing the expert and the policy grounds on which they rest. As the law's policies for the use of expertise shift from stage as stage as litigation progresses, or differ between categories of legal cases (criminal vs. civil), or with a party's use of an expert (from being a nonwitness consultant to an expert witness at trial), the law expects the role of the expert to be reshaped accordingly. On some important issues, the law sends contradictory messages: What its formal rules announce is at war with its structure and practices. And these, in turn, sometimes are in tension with the demands of the expert's professional ethical codes. On other matters of importance to experts, the law is silent, because the rules were motivated by a need to control the behavior of parties and lawyers, not experts. The result of all this is to present those who would be conscientious expert witnesses with a need to resolve nearly impossible role conflicts and ethical dilemmas.American Psychology-Law Society, delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association. New Orleans, August, 1989. That address was titled Expert Witnesses: Psychology and Beyond