Human Dignity and Socio-Economic Rights

The South African Constitution numbers among a very few constitutions around the world which include justiciable socio-economic rights. One of the controversies surrounding judicial enforcement of such rights is the extent to which it is appropriate for courts to engage in policy choices in relation to the use of state resources in light of the doctrine of the separation of powers. The South African Constitutional Court has responded by developing an approach to adjudication of socio-economic rights in which the role of the court is to determine the reasonableness or otherwise of measures taken by the legislature and executive to implement such rights. However, the South African Constitution is also notable for its identification of human dignity as an underlying value and the explicit duty placed on the courts to interpret the rights protected under the Bill of Rights in conformity with this value. This article scrutinises the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional court in light of the Constitutional commitment to human dignity. It questions whether reasonableness review in socio-economic cases successfully balances human dignity with the appropriate degree of deference to the legislature and executive, in compliance with the doctrine of the separation of powers.     

国家权力与人的尊严

国家权力也有尊严,但不能高于人的尊严,更不能建立在侵犯人的尊严基础之上。侵犯人的尊严有私人间的个体侵犯、当权者的侵犯、"上位者"的侵犯、多数人的侵犯等等。国家权力直接侵犯或参与侵犯人格尊严往往危害更大,而最严重的侵犯人格尊严多发生在国家权力与民间联手之时。宪法保障人格尊严意味着国家权力不仅不能侵犯人的尊严,还有保障人的尊严之义务。     

State Powers and Human Dignity

国家权力也有尊严,但不能高于人的尊严,更不能建立在侵犯人的尊严基础之上.侵犯人的尊严有私人间的个体侵犯、当权者的侵犯、“上位者”的侵犯、多数人的侵犯等等.国家权力直接侵犯或参与侵犯人格尊严往往危害更大,而最严重的侵犯人格尊严多发生在国家权力与民间联手之时.宪法保障人格尊严意味着国家权力不仅不能侵犯人的尊严,还有保障人的尊严之义务.     

Human Flourishing, Human Dignity, and Human Rights

Rather than treating them as discrete and incommensurable ideas, we sketch some connections between human flourishing and human dignity, and link them to human rights. We contend that the metaphor of flourishing provides an illuminating aspirational framework for thinking about human development and obligations, and that the idea of human dignity is a critical element within that discussion. We conclude with some suggestions as to how these conceptions of human dignity and human flourishing might underpin and inform appeals to human rights.     

人格尊严的宪法意义

人格尊严是基本权利的价值核心。①就其本质而言,它是国家的目的,不能被当作国家及社会作用的手段,人对其基本权利的正当行使有自治和自决的权利。就其性质而言,它不是一项具体的基本权利,它与其他基本权利的关系也不完全类同于平等权与其他基本权利之间的关系。就其功能而言,与其他大多数基本权利不同,人格尊严兼有消极和积极两个方面的功能,两者相比,前者居于主导的地位。     

Maintaining Personal Dignity and Japanese Disable Welfare Legal System

二战后,日本残疾人即障碍者福利法制在生存权理念的指引下得以建立与发展.进入21世纪,日本障碍者福利法制在强调生存权理念之同时,更加注重维护个人的尊严理念,并将这一理念贯彻于障碍者福利法制的内容之中,日本障碍者福利法制出现了社会权与自由权相统一的倾向.     

维护个人的尊严与日本障碍者福利法制

二战后,日本残疾人即障碍者福利法制在生存权理念的指引下得以建立与发展。进入21世纪,日本障碍者福利法制在强调生存权理念之同时,更加注重维护个人的尊严理念,并将这一理念贯彻于障碍者福利法制的内容之中,日本障碍者福利法制出现了社会权与自由权相统一的倾向。     

The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity

Abstract. We argue that all human beings have a special type of dignity which is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well‐being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings are equal in fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of their possession of certain characteristics in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self‐consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives.     

Criminalizing Behaviour to Protect Human Dignity

The purpose of this article is to discuss the criminalization of conduct based on human dignity arguments. It proposes a modest version of integrating human dignity into discussions about criminalization. After a critical examination of both the notion of ??human dignity as an objective value?? and the assumption that the meaning of human dignity can be explained by referring to Kant??s moral philosophy, human dignity violations are characterized as severe humiliations.     

Migrants,State Responsibilities,and Human Dignity

This article addresses two questions: First, how does the value of human dignity distinctively bear on a state’s responsibilities in relation to migrants; and, secondly, how serious a wrong is it when a state fails to respect the dignity of migrants? In response to these questions, a view is presented about the distinction between wrongs that violate cosmopolitan standards and wrongs that violate the standards that are distinctive to a particular community; about when and how the contested concept of human dignity might be engaged; and, elaborating a three-tiered and lexically ordered scheme of state responsibilities, about how we should assess the seriousness of a state’s failure to respect the dignity of migrants.     

Human Dignity as a Sui Generis Principle

This paper argues that human dignity is a sui generis status principle whose function lies in unifying our normative orders. More fully, human dignity denotes a basic status to be preserved in any institution or process; it is a principle demanding determination in different contexts; and it has its most characteristic application where the legal, moral, and political place competing obligations on individuals. The implication of this account is that we should not seek to reduce human dignity to either a legal norm or a legal principle.     

Levinasian Ethics and Legal Obligation*

Abstract. This paper discusses the implications of the ethical theory of Emmanuel Levinas for theoretical debates about legal obligation. I begin by examining the structure of moral reasoning in light of Levinas's account of ethics, looking particularly at the role of the “third party” (le tiers) in modifying Levinas's primary ethical structure of the “face to face” relation. I then argue that the primordial role of ethical experience in social discourse, as emphasised by Levinas, undermines theories, such as that of H. L. A. Hart, that propose a systematic distinction between legal and moral species of obligation.     

人性尊严与农民平等权的保护

人性尊严伴随着人类的产生而产生,其之于人的如此重要作用,决定了它在宪法和人权保障中的核心地位。然而,农民的弱势处境导致其平等权利的落空,并在此基础上产生了侵害农民人性尊严这一社会现象,该现象的存在违背了人性尊严在主体、内容及目的方面的价值要求。因此,为消除其带来的不利影响,在尊重客观现实的前提下,课负农民、市民与国家以相应的义务,是保护农民平等权,进而维护农民人性尊严的现实路径。     

实然与应然——法律伦理之可能

法律伦理及法律伦理学是否可能取决于从法律伦理行为事实能否推导出法律伦理行为应该。然而,单纯从行为事实是推不出行为应该的,只有通过法律目的判断以及法律伦理行为事实和法律目的之关系判断才能从法律伦理行为事实如何推导出法律伦理行为应该如何。法律伦理行为之应该经由人们的实践活动可以变为现实,其具体保障在于法律伦理良心、法律伦理名誉及底线法律伦理的法律化。     

论现代法学教育中的法律伦理教育

现代法律教育必同时是开发受教育者的道德情怀,砥砺受教育者的伦理能力的过程。法律伦理包括法律制度赖以形成的内在的伦理结构和法律制度得以良好运行的外在的法律职业行为伦理两部分。法律伦理教育的目的是培养受教育者的伦理问题意识和提升受教育者的伦理推理能力与伦理选择能力。这一目的的实现有赖于法学教育理念的变革和教育方式的更新。     

Chinese and Western Thinkers' Analysis on “Human Dignity”

“人的尊严”是一个拥有丰富内涵的、被当代法律制度引入的哲学观点,探讨“人的尊严”的源与流,通过对中西思想家关于“人的尊严”的论述来考查它的产生、发展的流变历程.