二元规范理论下的法律原则检讨

当下法律原则理论的论争重心,已从"法律是什么"的概念分析,转向了司法实践中的原则裁判。自德沃金以来的"规则-原则"二元规范理论,对实际的司法裁判的解说力和作用力较为有限,也未能解决原则权衡这一关键性问题。"融贯性"命题和"籍由法政策权衡进行裁判"命题,是原则裁判理论的两大基石。但德沃金对融贯性命题的回答过于抽象,而阿列克希依比例原则和权重公式对权衡命题和原则理论的最新推进,却是一种不成功的自反性进化。这种自反性进化和理论反讽,表明作为一种"过度整合式"的裁判理论,原则裁判已然走到了穷途末路。     

从人权保护的视角考察宣告死亡制度

统摄现代法治社会的灵魂是人权,为失踪人设置的宣告死亡制度与人权保护紧密相关,人权的绝对性使宣告死亡的设置缺乏依据,而人权的相对性又使宣告死亡成为现代法治社会的良好制度,严格宣告死亡的条件,合理规定死亡的法律后果,使宣告死亡与人权保护相协调。     

Judicial Practical Reason: Judges in Morally Imperfect Legal Orders

I here address the question of how judges should decide questions before a court in morally imperfect legal systems. I characterize how moral considerations ought inform judicial reasoning given that the law may demand what it has no right to. Much of the large body of work on legal interpretation, with its focus on legal semantics and epistemology, does not adequately countenance the limited legitimacy of actual legal institutions to serve as a foundation for an ethics of adjudication. I offer an adjudicative theory in the realm of non-ideal theory: I adopt a view of law that has achieved consensus in legal philosophy, make some plausible assumptions about human politics, and then consider directly the question of how judges should reason. Ultimately, I argue that judges should be cognizant of the goods that are at stake on particular occasions of adjudication and that this requires treating legal requirements transparently, i.e., as sensitive to their moral justifications.     

David Dyzenhaus and the Holy Grail

Abstract
In his book Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems David Dyzenhaus aims to provide a cogent refutation of legal positivism, and thus to settle a very old dispute in jurisprudence. His claim is that the consequences for practice and for morality if judges adopt positivist ideas in a wicked legal system are unacceptable. He discusses the South African legal system as a case in point. I argue that this claim is not secured. Dyzenhaus has three arguments for his view. The first is that positivism cannot account for legal principles, and legal principles are the key source of morally acceptable adjudication. I show that his argument does not go through for sophisticated positivist accounts of "principles" such as those of J. Raz and D. N. MacCormick. Dyzenhaus's second argument claims to find a pragmatic contradiction in positivism, between the belief in judicial discretion and the belief in a commitment to legislative sources as binding fact. I argue that there is no such commitment in a form that supports Dyzenhaus's theory. His final argument is that wicked legal systems are contrary to the very idea of law and legality. I argue that a strong doctrine of deference to legislative authority cannot be bad in itself: It can only be bad relative to a certain content to legislation. Thus Dyzenhaus's claim begs the question against positivism.     

正义感、移情与司法裁判

司法裁判并非是一项纯粹理性的事业,属于情感范畴的正义感构成了法官裁判的重要视角,在裁判工作中发挥着认知和指引的关键性作用.从情感理论上来说,正义感的形成主要赖于移情这一情感现象,而移情的展开需以无偏私性和信息充分为必要条件,这样才可能导向正义的个案裁判.不过,正义感的运用并非不受理性的约束,它只是为裁判提供了一种行动计划和倾向,法官仍然要诉诸于以合法性思维为框架的法律理性论证.因此,司法裁判的作出最终依赖于正义感与法律理性论证之间的良性互动.     

基于法律原则的裁判

基于法律原则的裁判需依次解决以下三个问题:如何识别与个案相关的法律原则;如何处理原则与规则的适用关系,或者说在何种情况下,允许裁判者依据法律原则得出判决;如何解决原则之间的冲突问题,亦即能否籍由原则权衡获取法律上的“唯一正解”。现有的裁判理论对这三个问题作了不同回应,但欠缺可靠的操作程式。究其根源,是因为原则裁判的实质,是裁判者在规则穷尽之际,选择并依据法律体系内的价值判断为个案判决提供合理化论证;然而一旦涉及到价值判断,裁判就有主观、恣意和片面的可能。     

宪法解释中学说解释、历史解释和先例解释方法研究

宪法解释方法论是宪法解释的理论核心,也是现代宪法理论体系中极其重要的内容.宪法解释方法论是一个体系,其中包括了学说解释方法、历史解释方法和先例解释方法三种解释方法.学说解释方法强调通过体现在宪法文本中的宪法学说,来发现、理解和创造符合于宪法学说原则、精神的宪法含义;历史解释方法则认为在解释宪法时,应当把宪法的基本原则、精神和价值体系,与社会的发展变化情况有机结合起来;而先例解释方法常适用于单独的文本分析不能充分理解宪法条文时,借助于宪法解释机关过去做出的解释案例,以解释先例为基础来探究答案.这三种解释方法在我国宪法解释的理论与实务中,不仅具有理论研究的意义,而且也有实证的经验基础.     

Legal Principles and Legal Theory

Current legal theory is concerned with the presence of principles in law partly because they are at the core of Dworkin's criticisms of Hart's rule of recognition. Hart's theory is threatened by the possibility that the identification of some principles follows an extremely relaxed rule of recognition, or even no rule at all. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive test to ascertain what is the case in actual practice. On the other hand, the evaluative arguments which support Dworkin's proposal of principled adjudication are forceful but not conclusive. Moreover, since ultimate controversy over values is plausible, judicial discretion may sometimes be inevitable.     

Enforcing the Child's Right to Know Her Origins: Contrasting Approaches Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights

The justification of the child's right to know her origins andthe fundamental interests underlying it have attracted a lotof attention in recent years. This article goes one step furtherand assesses that right's enforcement in practice together withits guiding principles. It starts by restating what the rightconsists in and what interests it protects according to differentinternational human rights instruments. It then reveals theconflicts of rights that lie at the heart of the implementationof the right to know and explain its complexity. After consideringthe competing interests present, the article argues that noneof these interests and rights should be regarded as absoluteand suggests ways in which they can be balanced against eachother. The recent evolution in the European Court of Human Rights(ECtHR) case law with its more nuanced balancing of the competingrights is contrasted with the Convention on the Rights of theChild (CRC)'s focus on the child's paramount interest. The articleargues that these different approaches are reflected in nationallegal orders in Europe. By tracing the origins of this divergenceback to those conflicting international legal paradigms andby proposing abstract adjudication principles to guide the concretebalancing of competing rights, the article hopes to contributeto a better understanding and ultimate reconciliation of thechild's multiple identities – social and biological.     

The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change

Climate change gives rise to disputes and problems not easily addressed by existing legal doctrines and frameworks. This is because it is a polycentric problem; the assessment of future climate impacts must deal with uncertainty; climate change is socio‐politically controversial; and addressing climate change requires recognising a dynamic physical environment. As such, climate change can be thought of as legally disruptive in that it requires lawyers and legal scholars to reconcile the legal issues raised by climate change with existing legal orders. The legal disruption catalysed by climate change has not only led to the creation of new legal regimes but also given rise to a multitude of legal disputes that require adjudication. A study of some of these cases highlights the need for active and deliberate reflection about the nature of adjudication and the legal reasoning embedded in it when confronted by a disruptive phenomenon like climate change.     

南京国民政府时期的民事审判监督机制研究

民事审判监督机制是对民事审判活动进行监督和管理的制度及措施体系。南京国民政府时期非常重视民事审判监督工作,在借鉴西方的基础上设计了较为完备的民事审判监督机制,它既有深厚的理论根基,又有完整的框架体系,形成了多部门监督、大范围关注民事审判的格局。尽管南京国民政府时期社会动荡频繁,使民事审判制度的运作效果打了折扣,但是该时期民事审判监督机制的周密构建,为当时民事审判公正性的实现提供了制度保障,对当下我国民事审判监督制度的完善也具有一定的现实参考价值。     

法律原则适用与程序制度保障——以民事法为中心的分析

法律原则因为没有明确、具体的事实构成要件和法律效果而无法像法律规则那样为当事人提供行为准则,为法官提供裁判根据。适用法律原则处理个案纠纷就是法官以自己所“造”之法进行司法裁判,其适用困境的实质在于,以立法机关制定的(成文)法律规则为中心运行的司法制度(尤其是司法程序)难以为法官行使自由裁量权提供有效的正当性论证。在实体法、法律适用技术的范围内,以构建适用条件、适用规则,完善适用方法等方式来破解此困境,作用极为有限。重构司法程序制度,使当事人、社会能够以恰当的方式参与到具体的裁判过程以制约法官的裁量权,或许是解决此难题的可能途径。     

公众意见在裁判结构中的地位

从裁判依据的类型分析,公众意见只能作为一种事实依据,参与个案裁判。在常规案件中,公众意见作为一种准用的辅助性依据,可以通过弱的裁量成为合理化判决结论的说明性事实。在遇有法律漏洞的疑难案件中,与社会性主张相一致的公众意见,如果耦合法律体系中的法律原则或基本权利规范,可以籍由强的裁量充当个案推理的运作性依据,成为非常情形中正当化个案规则创制的立法性事实。在日趋多元化和复杂化的转型中国,法律系统必须在稳定性和灵活性、普遍正义和个案正义之间寻求一种平衡;判断公众意见的个案裁判地位,同样需在辅助性依据或运作性依据、说明性事实或立法性事实之间寻求一种平衡。     

Legal Argumentation and Justice in Luhmann’s System Theory of Law

The paper reconstructs Luhmann’s conception of legal argumentation and justice especially focussing on the aspects of contingency and self-referring operative closure. The aim of his conception is to describe/explain in a disenchanted way—from an external, of “second order” point of view—the work on adjudication, which, rather idealistically, lawyers and judges present as being a matter of reason. As a consequence of some surface similarities with Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy of justice, Teubner proposes integrating the supposed reductive image of formal justice described by Luhmann with the ideal conception of justice presented by Derrida. Here this kind of attempt is rejected as epistemologically wrong. In addition, Luhmann’s theory is argued to have other shortcomings, namely: the failure to understand the pragmatic function of principles, and the incapacity to describe the current legal questions linked with cultures and legal pluralism, which characterise our society.     

试论合并审理在商品房买卖合同案中的必要性

房地产开发项目停工后 ,商品房无法交付 ,按揭银行先起诉购房户要求提前收回贷款本息 ,购房户后起诉房地产商和按揭银行要求解除商品房买卖合同和商品房贷款合同。两案应否合并审理 ,司法解释未明确规定。笔者认为 ,两案应合并审理或中止商品房贷款合同案诉讼。不合并审理或中止诉讼 ,直接剥夺了司法解释赋予购房人要求房地产开发商直接返还购房贷款的权利。将导致两案判决发生直接冲突。合并审理或中止诉讼能提高审判效率 ,减轻当事人诉累。符合“商品房买卖司法解释”惩罚过错方并保护弱势群体购房户合法权益的宗旨和目的。     

我国民事自认的非约束性及其修正

我国于2001年设立了以英美法为样板的自认制度,但其并非诉讼体制转向当事人主义的一环,而是法院提高诉讼效率、简化审理的手段之一。从立法规定和司法运作来看,我国法上的自认具有非约束性特征,具体表现为适用对象泛化、成立场域扩大化与拘束效力单向化。这不仅导致当事人在庭审中倾向于一概否认对方陈述,抑制了辩论的活性,自认的争点压缩机能也随之丧失殆尽。从法律移植的便宜性、亲缘性而言,完善自认制度应当借鉴大陆法系的相关经验,并以辩论主义为理论基础。在以争点为中心的新型两阶段审理模式中,自认应限于争点整理程序期日,并以主要事实和重要的间接事实为对象,同时注重当事人排除争点的意思要素,以保障当事人自由主张和辩论。     

我国军事审判队伍建设研究述评

军事审判队伍作为军队法制建设的重要内容,一直受到军事法学界的普遍关注,军事审判队伍建设是军队干部队伍建设的重要方面,对军事审判队伍建设的研究不仅仅停留于军事理论研究的层面,也是军事司法实务部门关心的问题。     

论现代审前羁押制度遵循的普遍原则

原则作为规则的基础或本源是一种综合性、稳定性原理和准则,其特点是不预先设定任何确定的、具体的事实状 态,没有规定具体的权利和义务,更没有确定的法律后果,可称为规则的规则,是法律推理的权威出发点。审前羁 押制度遵循的普遍原则是指设置羁押制度时指导并使羁押制度具体化的原理和准则,是审前羁押制度以现代法 治理念为基础所形成的准则,归纳起来就是:程序法定原则、必要性原则、例外原则、比例原则、司法裁判原则和法 律救济原则。     

Does Legal Semiotics Cannibalize Jurisprudence?

Does Duncan Kennedy successfully cannibalize jurisprudence? He attempts to do it by demonstrating the inexistence of rightness in legal argumentation. If there is no right legal argument, then there is no right answer in adjudication, adjudication is not a rational enterprise and legal doctrine cannot be said to be a science. It can be shown that skepticism is self-defeating. Duncan Kennedy can avoid self defeat only because he actually believes in a lot of legal arguments. His thesis that judges decide questions of policy without any methodology that distinguishes them from legislators does not hold. Judicial reasoning is subject to constraints that do not affect legislators. It must be based on the sources of law and is limited by rules of procedure. Even when the judges have ‘interstitial’ legislative powers they are, unlike the legislator, bound to fit the system and their decisions are considered in procedure from the perspective of the right answer doctrine. The only work that can convincingly refute the skeptic argument against legal science is the reconstruction of jurisprudence as a scientific enterprise. Such work is beyond the scope of any single paper. The article aims to give some inspirations for such a task.