The Inevitability of Moral Evaluation*

According to contemporary legal positivism, law claims to create obligations. In order for law to be able to create obligations, it must be capable of having authority. Legal positivism claims that for law to be capable of having authority, it only has to meet non‐moral or non‐normative conditions of authority. In this paper it is argued that law can only be capable of having authority if it also meets certain normative conditions. But if something must meet certain normative conditions in order to be capable of having authority and if it must be capable of having authority in order to be law, then it is only law if it is conceivable that it meets these normative conditions and this can only be ascertained by means of an evaluation. Therefore, legal positivism's claim that determining what the law is does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations (the separation thesis) is incompatible with its claim that law must be able to create obligations. Further, an analysis of Hart's concept of law shows that it is not only possible that the identification of the law depends on moral evaluation, as Hart claims, but that it is conceptually necessary that it does.     

Investors’ Rights in (Crypto) Custodial Holdings: Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation)

Ruscoe v Cryptopia Ltd (in Liquidation) is a landmark decision of the New Zealand High Court that considers for the first time in a comprehensive way whether cryptocurrencies are property at common law and to what extent account holders’ (interests in) cryptocurrencies are protected from the claims of the insolvent crypto‐exchange's creditors. The ruling relies on a body of case law from various common law jurisdictions and, to a significant extent, on the findings of the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts. In tackling complex areas of legal uncertainty, it provides an authoritative conceptual benchmark for future court decisions and normative initiatives.     

An Analysis of Consequentialism and Deontology in the Normative Ethics of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Bhagavadgītā</Emphasis>

This paper identifies the different normative ethical arguments stated and suggested by Arjuna and Krishna in the Gītā, analyzes those arguments, examines the interrelations between those arguments, and demonstrates that, contrary to a common view, both Arjuna and Krishna advance ethical theories of a broad consequentialist nature. It is shown that Krishna’s ethical theory, in particular, is a distinctive kind of rule-consequentialism that takes as intrinsically valuable the twin consequences of mokṣa and lokasaṃgraha. It is also argued that Krishna’s teachings in the Gītā gain in depth, coherence, and critical relevance what they lose in simplicity when the ethical theory underlying those teachings is understood as a consequentialism of this kind rather than as a deontology.     

'Trade mark use' in Europe: revisiting Arsenal in the light of Opel and Picasso

Legal context: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in the case ofArsenal Football Club v. Reed led to uncertainty regarding thepractical scope of a trade mark proprietor's property rights. Key points: The uncertainty resulted from a failure of the ECJ to addressclearly the issue of what constitutes infringing trade markuse. The ECJ ignored the question of the High Court as to whetheruse of a trade mark as an indication of origin is necessaryfor establishing infringement. They instead established an ambiguousstandard for what constitutes infringing trade mark use, suggestingthat only use that jeopardises the essential function of a trademark is an infringing use. This ambiguity has had problematicimplications for subsequent interpretations of trade mark law,particularly in the Court of Appeal in Arsenal and the Houseof Lords in R v Johnstone. Two relatively new ECJ cases may help clarify the issue. InOPEL, the ECJ suggested that infringing use of a trade markmust be use that is perceived by the relevant public as a designationof origin. The Picasso decision limits the effect of the Arsenaldecision on the relevance of confusion in non-sale situationsto the facts of Arsenal. In particular, it stresses the pointthat when assessing likelihood of confusion in the context ofan opposition to an application for registration the court shouldfocus on the perception of the relevant public at the pointof sale. Practical significance: The benefit of these two cases is that they create some clarityfor legal practitioners and the Courts when addressing the questionof what constitutes infringing trade mark use.     

The Power to Bequeath

What should happen to a property holding after the death of its owner? One conventional answer to this question is that the owner can legitimately designate the beneficiary of a posthumous transfer through a written will. Yet this aspect of property ownership has received little in the way of philosophical attention or moral justification. Philosophers tend either to accept bequest as a conventional feature of property ownership or reject its legitimacy on egalitarian grounds. Dissatisfied by both approaches, this paper: (i) provides a conceptual individuation of bequest, drawing a distinction between it and other sorts of property transfer, such as inheritance; (ii) shows how the canonical, historical accounts of private property ownership have failed to justify bequest; (iii) outlines what any plausible justification of bequest will require, which I argue is an account of the posthumous interests such transfers serve; and (iv) concludes by briefly sketching the normative relevance of my justificatory account of the power to bequeath.     

Justification Under Uncertainty

There is a controversy as to the moral status of an action in the face of uncertainty concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant (according to an applicable moral standard): According to the objective conception, the right action is determined in light of the truth, namely the actual state of affairs (regarding the pertinent fact), whereas according to the subjective conception, the right action depends on the epistemic state of the agent, namely her (justified) belief (concerning the pertinent fact). A similar debate concerns the law, with respect to uncertainty regarding a legally significant fact. In this paper, I argue that moral and legal normative concepts are ambiguous and include two aspects: The ideal aspect, which is concerned with the constitutive feature of the normative standard, and the pragmatic aspect, which determines the correct action under uncertainty. With regard to each aspect, a different conception is appropriate: The objective conception should govern the ideal aspect and the subjective conception the pragmatic aspect. And the relevant aspect (and therefore the appropriate conception) depends on the question under consideration regarding the pertinent normative standard: what is its constitutive feature or whether an action is right (according to the applicable normative standard) in the face of uncertainty.     

Puzzles on Defending others from Aggression

We all agree on the justification of defending ourselves or others in some situations, but we do not often agree on why. Two main views compete: subjectivism and objectivism. The discussion has mainly been held in normative terms. But every theory must pass a previous test: logical consistency. It has recently been held that, at least in the case of defending others from aggression, objective theories lead, in some situations, to normative contradiction. My aim is to challenge the idea that only objective theories have this uncomfortable feature. In fact, any plausible theory justifying the defense of others, whether subjectively or objectively, can lead to situations of normative inconsistency. Therefore, the logical test is not the most fitting one for choosing between different theories of private defense.     

The Common Core between Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law: A Structural Account

Legal scholars and theorists have recently drawn a more sustained attention to the link between international human rights law (hereafter IHRL) and international criminal law (hereafter ICL). This concerns both positive and more normative accounts of the link. Whether positive or normative, the predominant approach to constructing the link is substantive. This overlap is normatively justified in similar terms by reference to a subset of moral human rights. In this paper, I offer an alternative to the substantive approach. After identifying two flaws in the substantive approach (the problem of threshold and the problem of ethical neutrality), I defend what I call a structural account by focusing on duty‐holders. I start by reconstructing two structural characteristics common to IHRL and ICL qua international legal regimes: who has the authority to address violations of IHRL and ICL, and who can be liable for those violations. I then infer that public authority (functionally construed) constitutes the common structural core of IHRL and ICL. I rely on the extraterritorial application of IHRL and on the collective dimension of ICL violations to further support the argument. I finally offer an argument explaining the normative point of those structural features. I hold that IHRL and ICL (their adjudicative and liability regimes) are both necessary (but clearly not sufficient) to render this exercise of public authority legitimate to its subjects.     

Karl Renner and (Intellectual) Property—How Cognitive Theory Can Enrich a Sociolegal Analysis of Contemporary Copyright

This article deals with copyright regulation meeting the quite rapid societal changes associated with digitization, and it does so by reinterpreting Karl Renner's classical texts in the light of contemporary cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors and embodiment. From a cognitive theory perspective, I focus on the notion that the legal norms only appear to be unchanged—the Renner distinction between form and function. This includes social norms, technological development, and changes in social structures in general, which create a social and cognitive reinterpretation of law. This article, therefore, analyzes the contemporary push for copyright as property, which I relate to historical claims for copyright as property as well as de facto legal revisions in intellectual property faced with the challenges of digitization. Of particular relevance here is what Renner described in terms of property as an “institution of domination and control,” and thus the increased measures for control that are added to a digital context in the name of copyright.     

The Syntax of Principles: Genericity as a Logical Distinction between Rules and Principles

Much has been said about the logical difference between rules and principles, yet few authors have focused on the distinct logical connectives linking the normative conditions of both norms. I intend to demonstrate that principles, unlike rules, are norms whose antecedents are linguistically formulated in a generic fashion, and thus logically described as inclusive disjunctions. This core feature incorporates the relevance criteria of normative antecedents into the world of principles and also explains their aptitude to conflict with opposing norms, namely that their consequents are fulfilled to varying extents more frequently than those of rules. I conclude that the property of genericity should be predicated to the norm antecedent of principles, more precisely to the hypothetical action. This is of paramount importance to explain, in terms of logical implication and exclusion, the expansibility of competing principles, in contrast with the exclusive character of conflicting rules.     

Legal Indeterminacy and/as Professional Expertise

One of my concerns here has to do with what I perceive as the possible elision of the normative possibilities of law– and, therefore, the possibility of a more democratically meaningful understanding of justice in the space provided by law. It is an attempt to think seriously about the claim that ``law provides a terrain of contestation on which the powerless can hold the powerful to account by insisting that [the] legitimating rhetoric [of liberal legalism] be turned into action.'     

Marriage and Divorce in the Supreme Court and the Law Commission: for Love or Money?

The case note considers the impact of the Supreme Court decision in Radmacher v Granatino regarding pre‐nuptial and other classes of nuptial agreement, together with recent proposals of the Law Commission for reform of the law relating to marital property agreements generally. It explores in particular the question of what, if any, core obligations of marriage cannot – or should not – be excludable by agreement.     

Regulation by Blockchain: the Emerging Battle for Supremacy between the Code of Law and Code as Law

This paper critically examines the intersection and interactions between conventional law produced and enforced by national legal systems (ie the ‘code of law’) and the internal rules of blockchain systems, which take the form of executable software code and cryptographic algorithms operating across a distributed computing network (‘code as law’).  In so doing, it seeks to identify whether, and to what extent, ‘regulation by blockchain’ will successfully avoid governance by conventional law.   It identifies three different ways in which the code of law is likely to interact with code as law, based primarily on the intended motives and purposes of those engaged in activities in developing, maintaining or undertaking transactions upon the network.  It argues that these different classes of case are likely to generate different kinds of dynamic interaction between the blockchain code and conventional legal systems, and critically examines the normative foundations of these emerging and anticipated interactions.     

Deduction and Justification in the Law. The Role of Legal Terms and Concepts

Abstract. Legal terms, such as “ownership,”“contract,”“validity,”“negligence,” are used as middle terms in legal deduction. The paper distinguishes two problems regarding this use. One is the logical function of terms for deduction within a normative system. Specific problems dealt with in this connection are meaning, definition, and economy of expression. The other problem connected with middle terms is the “moulding” and possible manipulation of the meaning of legal terms, for arriving at desired conclusions in a given scheme of inference. It is indicated how the moulding of contested legal concepts, if not restricted, will obscure the ratio of legal rules. This problem is relevant, inter alia, to arguments ex analogia in the law.     

The legal profession's beautiful myth: surveying the justifications for the lawyer's obligation to perform pro bono work

This article considers some of the substantive and normative claims underlying the performance of pro bono work by lawyers – that lawyers have always done pro bono work and that it is an essential element of what it means to be a lawyer. Following a brief survey of global pro bono activity, the article considers some of the drivers for pro bono work. It identifies three main streams of thought regarding the obligation to perform pro bono work, characterised as the historical arguments, the public service argument, and the ‘lawyer as gatekeeper’ or monopoly argument. Following an analysis of each position, the article concludes that while the historical evidence for a pro bono tradition is not strong, and that the public service and monopoly arguments are open to dispute, there is nonetheless a very strong ‘mythical’ force associated with pro bono work. Its power may thus lie as much in its ability to motivate altruism among lawyers, as it does in any historical or theoretical basis.     

The Constitution's Gift? A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European Union1

Abstract: Our aim in this article is to consider whether the Union's deliberation over and decision‐making on constitutional norms, can contribute to render it more democratic. From a normative perspective, the way a constitution is forged has deep implications for its democratic legitimacy. In light of recent events, we consider how procedural changes in constitution‐making might contribute to rectify the Union's democratic deficit. To do so we first develop a thin model of constitution‐making based on the central tenets of deliberative democracy. Through this we seek to outline how a legitimate constitution‐making process will look from a deliberative democratic perspective. Second, we distil out some of the core characteristics of the Intergovernmental Conference (hereafter, IGC) model and assess this against the normative model, to establish the democratic quality of the IGC model. Third, we assess the current Laeken process by means of spelling out the central tenets of this mode of constitution‐making, and we assess it in relation to the normative standards of the deliberative model. In the fourth and final step, we consider what contribution constitution‐making might make to the handling of the EU's legitimacy deficit(s). We find that the Laeken process, in contrast to previous IGCs, was explicitly framed as a matter of constitution‐making. It carried further the democratization of constitution‐making, through its heightened degree of inclusivity and transparency. However, when considered in relation to the deliberative‐democratic model, it is clear that the Laeken Constitutional Treaty cannot be accorded the full dignity of a democratic constitution. The Constitutional Treaty can however lay the foundations for We the European people to speak.     

Theory of Custom,Dogmatics of Custom,Policy of Custom: On the Threefold Approach of Polish‐Russian Legal Realism

Proceeding from the insights of Petra?ycki, Polish‐Russian legal realists (PRRs) distinguished legal theory, legal dogmatics, and legal policy. Legal theory describes legal phenomena in a value‐free way and formulates causal laws concerning those phenomena. Legal dogmatics and legal policy are, by contrast, value‐laden sciences involving the subject's—i.e., the scientist's—own attitudes toward existing or imagined phenomena: Dogmatics evaluates behaviors based on the subject's adoption of given normative sources (NSs) as binding, while legal policy evaluates the effects produced by given NSs based on causal laws and on the subject's goals (for Petra?ycki, these goals come down to that of fostering love, or benevolence). PRRs then conceptualize custom as a representation of people behaving in a certain way (R_c): We have a custom on the threefold condition that (a) R_c is believed true by a given X, (b) R_c causes the existence of a given normative psychical experience (NPE) in X, and (c) X expressly refers to—or would refer—to R_c in justifying an NPE. PRRs use the term customary law to refer to legal experiences (i.e., NPEs involving a sense of entitlement) caused and justified by an R_c. From a theoretical perspective, both the subject's adoption of custom as a binding NS and its truth are irrelevant. It is only the presence of a customary NPE in the X under study that matters. From a dogmatic perspective, by contrast, what matters is (a) whether the dogmatician—qua subject—adopts custom as a binding NS, (b) whether it is true that people behave in a given way b_w, and (c) whether b_w resembles the behavior that is deontically qualified in the norm under dogmatic evaluation. Finally, from a legal‐political viewpoint, PRRs hold that customary law in modern societies, owing to its conservative nature, should be eradicated for the goal of removing inequalities and fostering benevolence.     

Is Law Unbounded? Property Rights and Control of Social Groupings

This review essay follows up on a suggested model for resolving problems of neighborhood externalities and exclusionary associational patterns in metropolitan areas. The model is based on a property rights regime of “alienable entitlements,” as articulated by Lee Anne Fennell in The Unbounded Home (2009). The essay frames this model as promoting a groundbreaking approach to the fundamental quandary over the role of law as a tool for broad-based social change and asks if legal rules can fully absorb the multiple types of societal effects that influence the nature of contemporary homeownership. It assesses the normative desirability and practical feasibility of controlling social exclusion through property rights.