China’s view of the war threat and its foreign policy

In analyzing China’s foreign policy since 1949, people tend to take for granted the nature of China’s concern for its national security as the predominant factor in the development of its foreign policy without distinguishing changes in the functions of this factor. The evidence given in this article argues that at least as early as the late 1970s, leaders in Beijing, predominantly Deng Xiaoping, no longer held Mao’s view of the inevitability and imminence of world war, and of the Soviet threat to China’s national security. Therefore I propose that from the beginning of the Deng era in 1978, national status enhancement or muscle building through modernization had replaced national security as the persistent and principal theme in China’s foreign policy. We should not interpret the main reason for China’s increased push for the formation of an international antihegemony united front as its increasing concern about the Soviet threat to its national security. In turn, we may conclude that when China abandoned this united front foreign policy to adopt the Independent Foreign Policy in 1982, it was neither because of a new global reality that was shaping the reorientation of its foreign policy nor because only in 1982 did China rediscover the Soviet threat.     

The insecurity of security: The PLA’s evolving doctrine and threat perceptions towards 2000

China currently enjoys a peaceful national security environment, yet the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for an unsettled future that involves various conflictual contingencies around China’s periphery. The PLA’s force structure, deployments, expenditures, and training are all being geared to a new doctrine that emphasizes peripheral defense in support of a diversified range of potential regional threats to China’s definitions of its national security. This articles examines these perceived threats and delineates the doctrinal changes in Chinese military thinking in recent years. It also discusses ways in which China’s new military posture may disrupt international politics in the Asian region. He is author ofThe Making of a Premier: Zhao Ziyang’s Provincial Career (1984) andBeautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990 (1991).     

Beijing’s perception of the international system and foreign policy adjustment in the post-cold war world

This study, applying an international system-centered approach, represents a modest attempt to analyze Beijing’s official perception of the change in the international system from the Cold War bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union to a new post-cold war multipolar world, and to examine China’s foreign policy adjustment in recent years. It argues that Beijing’s perception of a multipolar system is a matter of normative truth rather than an empirical or analytical assessment. Because the multipolar system is its goal, Beijing “perceives” it. While working hard to encourage a multipolarity, Beijing in fact finds a unipolar reality in the post-Cold War era and has accommodated to it through its foreign policy adjustment. He will join the faculty of Colby College at Maine in the fall of 1993.     

China’s vietnam policy: The road to normalization and prospects for the Sino-Vietnamese relationship

Americans have both underestimated and exaggerated China’s ability to influence developments in Asia. Many saw the normalization of relations between China and Vietnam in 1991 as a sign of China’s growing regional dominance. This article reexamines the process of normalization against the background of historical twentieth-century relations in order to present a more balanced perspective of China’s Vietnam policy. The author examines China’s role at the 1954 Geneva Conference, in 1973 at the Paris Peace Talks, during the deterioration of relations in the 1970s that culminated in the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979, and finally, along the road to normalization. Understanding that Sino-Vietnamese cooperation depends less on China’s leverage over Vietnam than on the convergence of interests between the two countries, the author then explores the major issues in Sino-Vietnamese relations in the 1990s.     

In Pursuit of an Alternative Model? The Modernisation Trap in China’s Official Development Discourse

This article contributes to the debates on China’s socio-political transformations by tracing the link between China’s modernization and nationalism, and analysing their mutual interplay. Many recent studies discuss post-Mao China’s development as a unique model challenging earlier development approaches. Instead, the argument pursued here points to the dependence of China’s dominant development thinking on the paradigm of modernization and its symbolic celebration in official discourse and public rituals. By tracing the impact of the modernization paradigm in the influential annual publication China Modernization Report and in the 2009 National Day mass parade, the article shows how and what kind of Chinese nation is produced. I argue that China’s ostensibly unique development model is constrained by the modernization thinking underlying it. Analysis of the discourses on modernity and ‘scientific development’ and the symbolism associated with them reveals a series of dichotomies and oppositions underpinning China’s nation-building. China’s pursuit of modernization relies on the suppression of other possible development paths within China and subsumes Chinese development experiences under those of the generalised West, thereby restricting development alternatives to those allowed within a hierarchical view of the world.     

Reciprocity in Sino-American economic relations

He is the author ofChange, Continuity and Commitment: China’s Adaptive Foreign Policy (forthcoming, University Press of America).     

Nation Branding as Nation Building: China’s Image Campaign

This paper illustrates the links between China’s nation building exercises and its efforts to promote the country as a ‘brand’. By using the examples of the Shanghai Expo, China’s national image films and the revival of Confucius, I show how Chinese soft power is both inward and outward looking. Understanding this dual role of soft power is important in comprehending the underlying motivations behind China’s attempts to create and manage its identity as orderly, prosperous and legitimate.     

China’s environment: Foreign trade and investment and international organizations

Not only is China’s environment in decline, but China’s contribution to global environmental deterioration is significant. Because of the global implications of China’s environmental pollution, international action is needed. Foreign trade and investment should be encouraged to incorporate environmental concerns and technology transfer, especially in the area of energy efficiency. Continued and enhanced international cooperation as well as loans and investment through international and regional organizations should also contribute to improving China’s and the global environment. Finally, China should assist in this process by continuing domestic economic reform and the open door policy. Environmental and economic benefits will result from efforts in these three areas.     

China’s economic system and its accession to the WTO

In moving towards becoming a market economy, China has made dramatic strides since embarking on reforms in 1978, but liberalizations have been accompanied by inflationary booms followed by bouts of social instability. These last account for much of the caution in China’s approach to joining the World Trade Organization, which is seen as critical to securing further foreign direct investment, foreign technology and access to foreign markets—all necessary to economic growth and development. There is a reluctance to make firm commitments to abide by WTO rules on a schedule faster than that expected of developing countries. Perhaps the commitments required could be undertaken in confidence-building stages. Albert Keidel III is president, Rock Creek Research Inc., economic consultants, Bethesda, Maryland, and teaches on China’s economy in the Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.     

The politics of implementing China’s nuclear doctrine,Part II: 1969-Present

The growing industrial base in northern China necessitates China’s obtaining the capability to defend those areas from Soviet attack. Consequently, since the late 1960s, the PRC has been assimilating modern technology into the Maoist view of warfare. The politics of implementing the resulting People’s War Under Modern Conditions doctrine has at times been subject to intense political warfare with adverse consequences for China’s nuclear force posture. PRC leadership decisions also reflected the need to improve conventional and tactical nuclear forces to increase the credibility of the PLA’s deterrent.     

Flawed Mediation and a Compelling Mission: Chinese Diplomacy in the Six-Party Talks to Denuclearise North Korea

This paper examines China’s role in the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral initiative with the aim of denuclearising North Korea. As North Korea’s behaviour has become increasingly provocative, evidenced by the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents and the newly unveiled uranium enrichment plant at Yeonbyon, China’s indecision in dealing with the deteriorating situation has dramatically undermined Beijing’s ability to continue successfully to play the leading mediator role. Yet if China fails to take decisive action now, the consequences could be dire. Further deterioration in North Korea’s behaviour could trigger a nuclear arms race, severely hamper regional economic development and even create a geopolitical split in East Asia, leading to a confrontation between the US, South Korea and Japan acting together on one side, and China, Russia and North Korea aligned on the other. The factors that have prevented China from making further progress in the diplomatic process are many and various and this paper will reveal the complexity of the North Korean issue for China. Foreign academics and policy makers have tended to attribute China’s indecision over North Korea to China putting its own security interests first. But this is far too simplistic a picture of the complex relationship that China has with North Korea. There are a host of factors at work that need to be taken into account to understand the present impasse in the diplomatic process. These factors include China’s emotional ties to North Korea and empathy with its position as the weakest party in the Talks, the conflicting attitudes within the Chinese government itself towards the North, and the competing interests and lack of trust between the different stakeholders. It seems that for the foreseeable future, the North Korean issue will continue to plague Chinese foreign policy until all the parties involved act as a collaborative body to reach a consensus on how to resolve the situation.     

Balance of Factional Power in China: The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

The Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held on 15–21 October 2007 in Beijing, produced some interesting changes to the balance of power among different factional groups in Chinese politics. Compared to the balance of power among factional groups generated as a result of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP five years earlier, the four major factional groups had different experiences. In terms of power index, the Shanghai Gang, a factional group affiliated with Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, declined substantially; the Qinghua Clique, graduates of the Qinghua University, also declined significantly; the Princelings, children of former high-ranking officials, however, increased a great deal; and the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group, a factional group closely associated with General Secretary Hu Jintao, witnessed substantial expansion. In terms of group cohesion index, both the Shanghai Gang and the Qinghua Clique shrank significantly; the Princelings increased somewhat; and the CCYL Group expanded substantially.

Chinese debate on military strategy: Trends & portents

The 1980s have witnessed an intense debate by China’s strategic community over a military strategy in response to what Beijing sees as a shifting, but still complex and potentially troublesome, security environment. though the debate is yet to conclude, the broad contours of the new doctrine have been sketched out. Acknowledging that both superpowers are increasingly constrained by economic, political, and military factors in their contest for supremacy, Chinese analysts continue to warn against lowering armed guard at a time when the focus of the arms race is shifting to new frontiers: outer space and oceans. They would like China to strengthen its national defense rather than rely an arms control to mitigate threats to its security. China is continuing its defense modernization program, which will reshape its force structure and enhance its conventional and nuclear capabilities. and the author ofChinese National Security and Nuclear Arms Control [M. E. Sharpe, forthcoming].     

Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East China Sea Gas Exploration

The Sino-Japanese dispute over the East China Sea maritime resources was triggered by the unsettled maritime boundary and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The dispute has been ascribed by many to intensified competition between China and Japan over energy supply. However this article attributes the fundamental cause of the conflict to power politics and political distrust, which are deemed to have the key role in preventing the two governments from finding a solution. The article analyses the origin and the causes responsible for the Sino-Japanese dispute over the East China Sea gas exploration, and then proceeds to investigate the diplomatic dialogues to reveal the key obstacles in the process.

Peaceful and Sustainable Development? Middle-Management Entrepreneurship and Transnational Competence in China

With deeper integration into the global economy and expanded penetration by multinational firms and other nonChinese actors following accession to the WTO, skills in bureaucratic entrepreneurship are not likely to be sufficient by themselves to bring about China’s sustainable development. In today’s interdependent and highly competitive trade, economic-cooperation, and resource-limited environment, sustainable development requires that subnational managers also possess transnational competence in collaborating with, negotiating with, and transforming foreign counterparts. However, survey research among Chinese executives based in Shanghai revealed that only a small proportion of the reporting current and future managers recognized the growing importance for China of an interculturally competent workforce. Without increased attention to enhancing the transnational competence of government and state-enterprise managers, peaceful and ecologically sound development will be difficult to sustain given the demands of multinational production chains, global resource constraints, and the challenges involved in managing transnational relations in the interest of China’s long-term economic progress.

South Korea-China economic relations: Trends and prospects

Since the establishment of official diplomatic ties in 1992, bilateral economic relations between Korea and China have rapidly improved. The economic dynamism in China is expected to continue in the future. As continued economic development of China gains momentum, the economic relationship between the two countries will further be strengthened. However, future bilateral economic cooperation will take a path that differs significantly from the past. Both the quantity and quality of economic relations will increase and improve. In particular, Korea’s investment in China, which tends to be concentrated in the manufacturing sector, will broaden out to nonmanufacturing sectors, with the strategic motive of gaining access to China’s huge domestic market. His publications includeNortheast Asian Economic Cooperation: Perspectives and Challenges (KIEP, 1991).     

North Korea’s Resurgence and China’s Rise: Implications for the Future of Northeast Asian Security

Today, Northeast Asia’s security situation is changing rapidly. North Korea is reviving and China’s power is growing at an alarming rate. While the U.S. continues to suffer diplomatically and militarily in the Middle East and from international terrorism, China’s and North Korea’s power is likely to futher increase, polarizing the Northeast Asian security structure, with South Korea, Japan (and Taiwan) all allied with the U.S. versus North Korea allied with China. The liberal democracies should pursue peace with North Korea and China to preclude the situation from aggravating, but should be ready in the longer term to meet, in diverse ways including strengthening their alliances, the challenges posed by rising powers.

China’s Multidimensional Environmental Issues a Fundamental Challenge for China’s Future Development – a Critical Assessment

China’s environmental degeneration carries fundamental political, economic and social implications for its future development and its international reputation. The complexity of the challenge is underlined by the variety of environmental issues China is confronted with. Among them we can identify water shortage, desertification, industrial and urban air pollution, acid rain, and extreme weather patterns. China is already a major polluter and its growth focus as well as the rapid urbanization process we can observe will further increase the pressure on the environment. China’s ability or inability of formulating an environmental friendly development strategy is of critical importance for its future development.     

China’s Contemporary Political Leadership,Foreign Policy,and Their Chineseness

There have been several profound features embedded in the contemporary Chinese political leadership, all having their roots in the Chinese centuries-long traditions or the modern/contemporary creative practice, together with their shaping impacts upon China’s foreign policy or remarkable reflections in her external behavior. They are: reforms inherently differentiated; central idea of “maintenance”, notion of “biological circle governing universe”, paradox in the question of equality, the emphasis on morality, overwhelmingly domestic function of foreign policy, firm belief in the Chineseness per sue and its overwhelming importance, and political prudence in the perennial context of “Strong China, Weak China.” China is facing enormous domestic historical challenges and substantial international pressure, while a generally peaceful China can be assured at least from her self-regarding realistic perspective.     

The limits of coercive diplomacy: The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war

In 1979, China waged a brief but bloody war with Vietnam, with the hopes of punishing Hanoi for its invasion and occupation of Cambodia the previous year. Beijing’s attempt at coercive diplomacy was an embarrassing failure, however, resulting in tens of thousands of casualties for both sides. This article, using Alexander George’s models of coercive diplomacy and crisis management, examines the reasons for China’s failed coercion and confirms that the most important variable was the omnipresent military threat from the Soviet Union, which prevented China from successfully escalating the crisis to its advantage.