The Use of Radio-Frequency Identification Tags for Labeling Dentures—Scanning Properties

Abstract:  The inclusion of radio-frequency identification (RFID)-tags within dental prostheses has been suggested as means of effectively labeling such devices and permitting rapid and reliable identification of the wearer. Previous studies have suggested that patients will accept denture labeling and recognize the need for such systems. However, they demand systems that are aesthetic, durable, and secure. One concern over the use of RFID-tags is that they could be scanned by third parties without the patient's knowledge. This study categorizes the scanning patterns of RFID-tags both in vitro and in vivo to provide data for patients for the consent process and for forensic dentists to ensure that they are scanning prostheses optimally. The results demonstrate that the RFID chips can only be read when the interrogator is in close proximity to the denture and thus should alleviate any concerns over privacy issues. However, evidence obtained from both the literature and experiments suggests that authorities must agree upon a unified standard for chip and reader specifications and protocols in order to avoid cases in which RFID-tags may fail to be read by an incompatible reader.     

无线射频识别技术应用中的隐私法律问题研究

在信息时代的背景下,无线射频识别技术（Radio Frequency Identification,简称为RFID）为人们的生产和生活带来极大的便利。然而一刀双刃,RFID技术也必然会带来众多的冲击与隐忧,特别是对个人隐私权的侵害问题。因此,应当借鉴欧美的先进立法经验,建立RFID隐私保护的立法;逐渐强化以政府为主导的行业自律建设;并不断增强公民对RFID隐私权的自我保护意识。     

US concept wars,civil liberties and the technologies of fortification

The horrific events of September 11, 2001 led to calls for the deployment of state-of-the-art security systems and the creation of an “invisible shield” to protect America. Such proposals immediately triggered debate about the constitutional ethics of surveillance in the United States. While there has been widespread support for the surrender of some cherished civil liberties in the war against terror, surveillance, especially the visual variety, is still seen to be innately un-American. Technologies like biometric face recognition systems, critics argue, are not consistent with the values of an open society and should consequently be considered with great caution. The widespread introduction of such invasive technology, pundits claim, would signal a victory for the terrorists.Many American commentators fail to recognize, however, that the United States, far from being the open society they imagine, has long been characterized by exclusion. Moreover, such exclusion is increasingly enforced by the same high technology of which biometrics is a part. In fact, for at least a decade before the declaration of the war on terror, the United States has been undergoing a multifaceted process of fortification both within its cities and at the US-Mexican frontier. Investigation of this phenomena reveals the central role of the US’s longest running concept war, the war on drugs. This paper argues that within this narrative biometric surveillance and the creation of “an invisible wall” should not be regarded as a break with American traditions but as the next organic phase of an ongoing process of fortifying the United States.     

Public security versus privacy in technology law: A balancing act?

Technology invades a person's privacy but this has been justified in law on public security grounds. The more technology advances, the more difficult it is to control its privacy intrusive use. This paper argues that there are a number of difficulties posed by such use concerning the respect of one's privacy. The meaning of ‘public security’ is not entirely clear and there are various laws which authorise the invasion of privacy for public security reasons. Technology is developing at such a fast pace and in a more diffused manner without taking on board its privacy implications whilst technological privacy enhancement mechanisms are not catching up. The law of privacy is not sufficiently elaborate and is slow in coming to terms to deal with these novel situations posed by rapid technological advances. The paper thus develops universally legally binding minimum core principles that could be applied indiscriminately to all privacy intrusive technology.     

Data retention in the UK: Pragmatic and proportionate,or a step too far?

On 6 April 2009 new legislation came into force, for the first time putting Internet service providers' duty to retain significant amounts of data (relating to customers' email and Internet usage) on a compulsory, as opposed to a voluntary footing. It is a topic which has provoked intense protest from the privacy lobby and fuelled months of “Big Brother” headlines in the press. For the industry it raises operational challenges – how to facilitate storage and retrieval of colossal amounts of data. In this article we consider the policy background to the regime, the detail of the UK implementation and the practical implications for communications service providers. We weigh up the privacy and human rights concerns against the business case put forward by the Government. We also examine the Government's proposals – announced at the end of April – to significantly extend and “future proof” this regime in the form of its Intercept Modernisation Programme.     

E-Government users’ privacy and security concerns and availability of laws in Dubai

The purpose of the study was to review privacy and security concerns and their impact on e-government adoption in Dubai. The research analyzed the literature on e-government, security and privacy concerns of e-government adoption and the legislative provision relating to privacy and security protection. A survey on e-government user concerns on privacy, security and ease of use was also carried out. The data for the survey in this research were collected from 190 respondents in Dubai. The results of the analysis revealed that perceived security, privacy and perceived ease of use were important constructs in e-government adoption. The analysis of legal framework showed that the Federal Constitution, the Penal Code, the new Data Protection Act and the Computer Crime Act could be used to address various privacy and security concerns. Thus, it is important that the policy makers facilitate an appropriate awareness campaign of the existence of both information privacy and security to attract more participation towards the e-government services.     

The introduction of data breach notification legislation in Australia: A comparative view

This article argues that Australia's recently-passed data breach notification legislation, the Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth), and its coming into force in 2018, makes an internationally important, yet imperfect, contribution to data breach notification law. Against the backdrop of data breach legislation in the United States and European Union, a comparative analysis is undertaken between these jurisdictions and the Australian scheme to elucidate this argument. Firstly, some context to data breach notification provisions is offered, which are designed to address some of the problems data breaches cause for data privacy and information security. There have been various prominent data breaches affecting Australians over the last few years, which have led to discussion of what can be done to deal with their negative effects. The international context of data breach notification legislation will be discussed, with a focus on the United States and European Union jurisdictions, which have already adopted similar laws. The background to the adoption of the Australia legislation will be examined, including the general context of data privacy and security protection in Australia. The reform itself will be then be considered, along with the extent to which this law is fit for purpose and some outstanding concerns about its application. While data breach notification requirements are likely to be a positive step for data security, further reform is probably necessary to ensure strong cybersecurity. However, such reform should be cognisant of the international trends towards the adoption of data security measures including data breach notification, but lack of alignment in standards, which may be burdensome for entities operating in the transnational data economy.     

Direct comparison of post-28-cycle PCR purification and modified capillary electrophoresis methods with the 34-cycle “low copy number” (LCN) method for analysis of trace forensic DNA samples

The investigation of samples with low amounts of template DNA remains at the forefront of forensic DNA research and technology as it becomes increasingly important to gain DNA profile information from exceedingly trace levels of DNA. Previous studies have demonstrated that it is possible to obtain short tandem repeat (STR) profiles from <100 pg of template DNA by increasing the number of amplification cycles from 28 to 34, a modification often referred to as “low copy number” or LCN analysis. In this study, we have optimised post-PCR purification techniques applied after only 28 cycles of PCR, as well as using modified capillary electrophoresis injection conditions and have investigated the progressive application of these enhanced approaches. This paper reviews the characteristics of the profiles obtained by these methods compared with those obtained on the same samples after 34-cycle PCR. We observed comparable sensitivity to 34-cycle PCR in terms of the number of profiles with evidence of DNA and the number of allelic peaks per profile and we noted improved peak height and area magnitude with some sample types. Certain parameters reported to be adversely affected in 34-cycle LCN investigations, such as non-donor allele peaks and increased stutter peak ratio, were reduced by this approach. There are a number of advantages for trace samples in progressing from the standard 28-cycle process to the post-PCR processing method as compared to 34-cycle PCR method, including reduced sample consumption, reduced number of PCR amplifications required, and a staged approach to sample processing and profile interpretation.     

South Africa's PNR regime: Privacy and data protection

There has been an increase in the collection and use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for security purposes globally. Though academic analysis of this trend has remained focused largely on the North American and European context, the Government of South Africa has been using PNRs since 2014 for security purposes. South Africa was the first country on the African continent to implement such a regime and is one of only thirteen states internationally to link its Advanced Passenger Information (API) and PNR systems. While there has been little attention on South Africa's use of PNRs, an inquiry into the country's PNR practices reveals striking privacy concerns, including the potential permanent retention of PNR data and a failure of the state to fully disclose if, and under what conditions, PNR data can be shared with other states. While South Africa has implemented a PNR regime that is comparable to the highest international standards, the data protection requirements appear to be far less developed. In fact, South Africa's PNR regime remains enigmatic as all indications and mention of PNR are elusive and scattered across government publications. As such, this paper aims to provide an introduction into the elements of South African PNR use, including the implications as they relate to law, data protection, and privacy.     

Restrictions on cryptography in India – A case studyof encryption and privacy

The developments of technology in communications industry have radically altered the ways in which we communicate and exchange information. Along with the speed, efficiency, and cost-saving benefits of the digital revolution come new challenges to the security and privacy of communications and information traversing the global communications infrastructure. As is with any technology the misuse of technology is noticed similarly the encryption technology. Encryption and other advanced technologies may be used, with direct impact on law enforcement and therefore some restrictions are necessary in the interests of national security. The problem, however, is ensuring that the restriction is legitimate and solely for in the interests of national security, the state not being allowed to interfere and keep a track on individuals' activities and private lives without sufficient cause. The individual needs encryption to protect their personal privacy and confidential data such as medical information, personal financial data, and electronic mail. In a networked environment, such information is increasingly at risk of being stolen or misused. Therefore, encryption is critical to building a secure and trusted global information infrastructure. Digital computers have changed the landscape considerably and the entire issue, at its simplest level, boils down to a form of balancing of interests. The specific legal and rights-related problems arising from the issue of cryptography and privacy in the Indian context are examined in this paper.     

The retention of personal information online: A call for international regulation of privacy law

New technologies permit online businesses to reduce expenses and increase efficiency by, for example, storing information in “the cloud”, engaging in online tracking and targeted advertising, location and tracking technologies, and biometrics. However, the potential for technology to facilitate long term retention of customers' personal information raises concerns about the competing right of individuals to the privacy of their personal information. Although the European Commission has recently released a proposal for regulation to “provide a data subject with the right to be forgotten and to erasure”, neither the OECD Privacy Guidelines nor the APEC Privacy Framework includes any requirement to delete personal information. While New Zealand includes a “limited retention principle” in the Privacy Act 1993, apart from one limited exception the privacy principles cannot be enforced in court. Taking New Zealand privacy law as an example, this paper examines the issue of retention of customer data, explains why this is a serious problem and argues that although it could be addressed by appropriate amendments to domestic laws, domestic privacy legislation may not be sufficient in an online environment. In the same way as other areas of law, such as the intellectual property regime, have turned to global regulatory standards which reflect the international nature of their subject matter, international privacy regulation should be the next stage for the information privacy regime.     

Sorting out smart surveillance

Surveillance is becoming ubiquitous in our society. We can also see the emergence of “smart” surveillance technologies and the assemblages (or combinations) of such technologies, supposedly to combat crime and terrorism, but in fact used for a variety of purposes, many of which are intrusive upon the privacy of law-abiding citizens. Following the dark days of 9/11, security and surveillance became paramount. More recently, in Europe, there has been a policy commitment to restore privacy to centre stage. This paper examines the legal tools available to ensure that privacy and personal data protection are respected in attempts to ensure the security of our society, and finds that improvements are needed in our legal and regulatory framework if privacy is indeed to be respected by law enforcement authorities and intelligence agencies. It then goes on to argue that privacy impact assessments should be used to sort out the necessity and proportionality of security and surveillance programmes and policies vis-à-vis privacy.     

Citizen acceptance of police interventions: an example of CCTV surveillance in Las Vegas,Nevada

Efforts to install crime cameras in public are sometimes met with resistance from segments of the community who raise concerns over personal privacy. Drawing on an example from Las Vegas, NV, this paper explores community acceptance of CCTV cameras placed in a high-crime public location. In doing so, the paper applies a theoretical model that describes the mechanism by which private citizens accept interventions developed by police or other security officials. The paper analyzes specific privacy concerns raised by camera opponents and classifies the methods that police used to address those concerns and gain community support.     

Defence against the dark artefacts: Smart home cybercrimes and cybersecurity standards

This paper analyses the assumptions underpinning a range of emerging EU and UK smart home cybersecurity standards. We use internet of things (IoT) case studies (such as the Mirai Botnet affair) and the criminological concept of ‘routine activity theory’ to situate our critique. Our study shows that current cybersecurity standards mainly assume smart home environments are (and will continue to be) underpinned by cloud architectures. This is a shortcoming in the longevity of standards. This paper argues that edge computing approaches, such as personal information management systems, are emerging for the IoT and challenge the cloud focused assumptions of these standards. In edge computing, data can be stored in a decentralised manner, locally and analysed on the client using federated learning. This can have advantages for security, privacy and legal compliance, over centralised cloud-based approaches, particularly around cross border data flows and edge based security analytics. As a consequence, standards should start to reflect the increased interest in this trend to make them more aspirational and responsive for the long term; as ultimately, current IoT architectures are a choice, as opposed to inherent. Our paper unpacks the importance of the adoption of edge computing models which could enable better management of external cyber-criminality threats in smart homes. We also briefly discuss challenges of building smart homes that can accommodate the complex nature of everyday life in the home. In addition to technical aspects, the social and interactional complexities of the home mean internal threats can also emerge. As these human factors remain unresolved in current approaches to smart home cybersecurity, a user's security can be impacted by such technical design choices.     

Introduction: Adoption, affiliation, and family recomposition-inventing family continuity

This special issue deals with adoption practices and family recomposition in different societies in the past. Children's survival and family continuity were of major concern, and individual interests were linked, if not subordinated, to family groups. There were many different ways to perpetuate assets and power within the framework of the family. In Europe, systems that stress the importance of patrimonial arrangements houses are generally associated with the Roman conception of property, whereas systems favoring egalitarian redistribution within enlarged kinship groups have affinity with “barbarian” customs. In Japan, China, or on the Pacific atolls, we find other kinds of family systems, but in all of them adoption, affiliation, or family recomposition give priority to family continuity and well-being, inventing solutions to conflict, penury, infertility, and death. No future could be imagined without children, and the succession of generations was secured by these practices, resulting in early geographical, social, and family mobility for children and sometimes young men and women.     

The principle of security safeguards: Unauthorized activities

The principle of information security safeguards is a key information privacy principle contained in every privacy legislation measure, framework, and guideline. This principle requires data controllers to use an adequate level of safeguards before processing personal information. However, privacy literature neither explains what this adequate level is nor how to achieve it. Hence, a knowledge gap has been created between privacy advocates and data controllers who are responsible for providing adequate protection. This paper takes a step toward bridging this knowledge gap by presenting an analysis of how Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners have evaluated the adequacy level of security protection measures given to personal information in selected privacy invasive cases. This study addresses both security measures used to protect personal information against unauthorized activities and the use of personal information in authentication mechanisms. This analysis also lays a foundation for building a set of guidelines that can be used by data controllers for designing, implementing, and operating both technological and organizational measures used to protect personal information.     

Electronic signatures and security issues: An empirical study

Security concerns with regard to the use of electronic signatures in the electronic environment seem to represent a potential barrier to their usage. This paper presents an empirical study that examines businesses' perceived security concerns with the use of the electronic signature technology for executing contracts and commercial transactions and whether such issues represent a disincentive for their usage. The findings of the study reveal that there are significant security concerns in the business community with regard to the use of electronic signatures. However, such perceptions seem to be primarily driven by a lack of awareness and understanding. Advising prospective users of electronic signatures about the kind of safeguards that could be put in place to minimise risks associated with their usage can be a useful step towards overcoming their fears and hesitance.     

Protecting your confidential information

DATA PROTECTION There are two sides to the issue of Data Protection namely:

• &#x02022;⊎ Protection of Company Information; and
• &#x02022;⊎ Protection of Personal Information.

The proliferation of computers within government, business and the public generally has provided certain individuals with enormous potential power over the people and the information gathered in the many databases in existence throughout the world. The cross matching capabilities of these systems at terrific speeds has given rise to genuine concerns as to the purposes to which this information will be put and the possible abuses.In Australia (unlike the US) there is not constitutional protection of privacy and the only remedy available to either companies or individuals is via the common law for breach of confidence or the unauthorised disclosure of a trade secret.In this article I intend to raise some of the issues faced by both the corporation attempting to restrict access and abuse of confidential information together with the protection of individual privacy in the face of increased central data collection.