企业社会责任议程的管制：现状与启示

企业社会责任议程的管制可分为企业自我管制、政府管制、公民社会管制三种模式。当前，间接立法管制成为各国首选，软法措施日益盛行，公民社会通过诉讼方式管制企业社会责任议程成为新亮点。中国企业社会责任议程的法律制度化问题尚处于初级阶段，政府必须对现有的政府／企业／社会关系框架进行重新思考，强化民众通过诉讼获得正义的权利，并以“市场的自发对抗”补充“国家的立法干预”，跳出“强政府、弱社会”的路径依赖。     

Stalemate in the States: Agenda Control Rules and Policy Output in American Legislatures

This article examines how the power of majority‐party leaders to set the legislative voting calendar influences policy change in American state legislatures. By generating an opportunity for party leaders to exercise gatekeeping or negative agenda control, such rules introduce an additional partisan veto player into a system of governance. This addition typically increases the size of the core or gridlock interval, which drives policy change downward. Using both traditional data on bill passage counts and new data on Affordable Care Act compliance, I find strong support for these claims. More specifically, when I calculate core sizes that are sensitive to agenda rules, I find that agenda‐control‐adjusted core size is negatively correlated with policy change, as expected. Moreover, even when I match states on their overall preference dispersion or polarization, the ability of party leaders to exercise negative agenda control is strongly negatively associated with policy change.     

Agenda Power,Executive Decree Authority,and the Mixed Results of Reform in the Brazilian Congress

This article examines how institutional change in the use of extraordinary legislation affects delegation of power and unilateral action in new democracies. From 1988 to 2001, Brazilian presidents were able to reissue decrees indefinitely and thus had substantial legislative power. In 2001, Congress amended the constitution so as to restrict the president to a single reissue of each lapsed decree. This reform has had mixed results: although it ended the practice of infinite reissues, it induced Presidents Cardoso and Lula to use more decrees than previous executives had. Presidential agenda power, rather than being reduced, has been sharpened. By analyzing patterns of presidential initiatives from 1995 to 2005, we demonstrate the mixed results of this constitutional reform.     

Predicting Bureaucratic Control: Evidence from the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments

The extent to which politicians control bureaucracies that are delegated authority over public policy involves fundamental positive and normative issues for the study of politics. Considerations related to such issues have stimulated a great deal of debate about whether the legislature exercises control over bureaucratic performance. However, establishing the measurable empirical conditions under which elected officials do and do not assure agency responsiveness remains unsettled.
In light of this state of affairs, we try to determine whether it is possible to develop a general means of predicting control, or at least of predicting what we term intent to control, based on the assumption that legislators' preferences toward agency responsiveness reflect the nature of the policy environment. Our application to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 finds strong empirical evidence that statutory provisions vary predictably, depending upon whether legislators possess the requisite technical ability and are likely, or wish, to be held politically accountable. Our results indicate that control varies for reasons that fit well with our understanding of how elected officials deal with complexity and their own political situations. Our findings also imply that subtle, but measurable, differences in the specific policy environment are crucial for understanding control.     

Agenda Control in the Israeli Knesset during Ariel Sharon's Second Government

How do multi-party coalition governments share agenda power? In principle, coalitions might allocate agenda power among their members by distributing special proposal rights, distributing special blocking rights, or both. The literature has prominent models embodying each polar possibility, with Laver and Shepsle's model envisaging that each party in a coalition has the ability to propose any bill(s) it wishes within the jurisdiction of a ministry it controls; and Cox and McCubbins' cartel theory envisaging that each party has the ability to block bills, thus necessitating collective bargaining over the overall agenda. This paper shows that agenda-setting in Israel is not consistent with the ‘ministerial dictatorship’ version of the Laver–Shepsle model but is consistent with the Cox–McCubbins model.     

The Limits of Electoral Control: Evidence from Last‐Term Politicians

In modern democracies, politicians' accountability is often linked to the disciplining mechanism of electoral control. For politicians in their final term, this mechanism is impaired. Using a novel data set covering 910 members of the UK House of Commons active within the period 1997–2010, we investigate how reduced electoral control affects last‐term MPs' trade‐off between work effort inside parliament, leisure, and outside interests. Our main contributions lie in providing the first explicit consideration of (1) MPs' final‐term intra‐/extraparliamentary work balance and (2) MPs' reasons for leaving parliament (i.e., retirement, career change, electoral defeat). These extensions provide important fresh insights concerning the boundaries of elections' disciplining power.     

Legislating Crime Policy from the White House: Presidential Success with Congress in the Passage of Federal Crime Control Policy

Previous research has found that presidents, in general, have the power to influence congress in the passage of federal crime control policy. What has not been fully explored is whether presidential supported bills are more likely to influence congress to pass federal crime control bills. Therefore, this study draws upon the theory that presidents influence congress to test the hypothesis that president supported legislation on crime will achieve greater success in congress than non-supported bills. Analysis of legislative, presidential and congressional data from 1946 through 1996 suggests support for the theory that presidential supported bills are 2.8 times more likely (or 185% more likely) to become law.     

Uncertainty and technological innovation: evidence from developed and developing countries

Economic Change and Restructuring - Uncertainty will not only harm the economy but may also provide an opportunity for technological innovation. It is well established from past studies that...     

憲政:理想與行動

1923年1月29日,孫中山發表了「中國革命史」一文,說:「從事革命者,於破壞敵人勢力之外,不能不兼注意於國民建設能力之養成,此革命方略之所以必要也。余之革命方略,規定革命進行之時期爲三:第一爲軍政時期,第二爲訓政時期,第三爲憲政時期。」憲政不僅是孫中山先生的理想,也是中囯共產黨人的理想。關於憲政的學術解釋很多,但是其基本含義一般都包括兩個方面:一是依照憲法和法律進行治國理     

Point blank against itself: Evidence and inference about guns,crime, and gun control

This essay considers the empirical foundations for some of the more important and controversial conclusions concerning guns, crime, and gun control advanced in Gary Kleck’s highly influential treatise,Point Blank. We reveal significant flaws in his original data analyses and identify problematic linkages between his evidence and his inferences. We suggest alternative interpretations for some of Kleck’s findings.     

Evangelizing Congress: The Emergence of Evangelical Republicans and Party Polarization in Congress

The realignment of evangelical voters is well‐documented, but religion's impact within Congress is less clear. New data on home churches of members of Congress shows that the realignment of congressional evangelicals, combined with their growth and distinctly conservative legislative behavior, has significantly contributed to party polarization in Congress. Controlling for other factors, evangelicals are significantly more conservative than members of other religious traditions. This conservatism also has second‐order effects on the polarization of the House, where their more partisan proposals comprise a larger share of the roll‐call agenda when Republicans are in the majority. Moreover, evangelical Republicans in Congress differ significantly from evangelical Democrats in terms their geography, denominations, and experiences prior to Congress.     

Fiscal Federalism in Transition: Evidence from Ukraine

Effects of fiscal federalism on redistribution and economic growth are analyzed for Ukraine, a country with large regional differences. Since there is virtually no such empirical literature, except a study of the German case, and since there are several potential flaws, the results must be interpreted in a very tentative way. We find that this relatively poor, disorganized country with little democracy has effectively redistributed income from relatively wealthy to relatively poor regions and thus promoted regional economic convergence, and even dampened the recession in both types of regions. We also find that the evidence does not reject the view that relatively poor regions used the transfers in a growth-conducive fashion, and the paper argues that the findings may have implications beyond the case of Ukraine. But the analysis is tricky, uncertain, and merely a small step to an interesting research issue.     

War for the Floor: Partisan Theory and Agenda Control In the U.S. House of Representatives

This article extends recent research on partisan agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives to the issue of procedural control of the legislative agenda via special rules. In particular, we draw out a facet of cartel and conditional party government theories that has not been addressed in prior analyses: the simultaneous interrelationship between positive and negative agenda control. Using roll‐call data on two procedural matters—votes to order the previous question on a special rule and votes to adopt a special rule—over the 1953–2002 period, we found that, in the area of procedural control of the floor agenda, the majority party's amount of agenda control depends to a significant degree upon the party's homogeneity and power.     

Class and self-reported juvenile delinquency: Evidence from Turkey

This study examined the relationship between social class and self-reported various juvenile delinquent acts in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. Data included 1,710 high school students using a two-stage stratified cluster sample. Such uncommon measures of social class as students' perceptions of their family economic status, the type of place where middle school was finished, home ownership, and car ownership were employed as well as often used measures of social class. The findings indicated that most of these new measures were not related to delinquency and that the class variables had low explanatory power. Various indicators of social class also presented contrary results. While some indicators of class showed that the relationship between class and delinquency was positive, other similar measures indicated the opposite.     

Law or Finance: Evidence from Finland

Although it is widely acknowledged that the benefits of corporate governance reform could be substantial, systematic evidence on such reforms is scant. We both document and evaluate a contemporary corporate governance reform by constructing 18 measures of shareholder and creditor protection for Finland for the period 1980–2000. The measures reveal that shareholder protection has been strengthened whereas creditor protection has been weakened. We also demonstrate how the reform is consistent with a reorganisation of the Finnish financial market in which a bank-centred financial system shifted from relationship-based debt finance towards increasing dominance by the stock market. We find evidence that the development of shareholder protection has been a driver of the reorganisation, whereas the changes in creditor protection have mirrored market developments.     

Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia

How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measuresof the political power of firms and regional regulatory captureusing microlevel data on the preferential treatment of firmsthrough regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period1992–2000. Using these measures, we find that: (1) politicallypowerful firms perform better on average; (2) a high level ofregulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that haveno political connections and boosts the performance of politicallyconnected firms; (3) capture adversely affects small-businessgrowth and the tax capacity of the state; and (4) there is noevidence that capture affects aggregate growth.

"oligarchy ... throws a close network of dependence relationshipsover all the economic and political institutions of present-daybourgeois society without exception... ." —Vladimir Lenin,"Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism" (1916)