State Structure and Variations in Corporatism: The Swedish Case*

The question addressed in this article is: Why are some countries more corporatist than others? It is argued that neither pure micro-, nor pure macro-explanations can account for the great variation in the degree of corporatism (however measured) among western countries. Instead, an institutional variant is put forward, where the structure of the state at the time of the formation of working-class organizations is taken as the main independent variable. It has been shown that the development of collaborative or confrontational labor movements was decided by the reaction of the existing political elites to the demands from the working class in the pre-World War I period. Where suffrage came late, and where the class system was rigid. a radical/revolutionary orientation would dominate the working-class movement, hindering corporatist arrangements, and vice versa. The problem with this argument is that it does not fit the Swedish case. Although democracy was introduced comparatively late and although the class system was rigid, Sweden has been considered the nearly ideal-typical case of corporatism. It is argued that the deviant Swedish case can be explained by the specific structure of the pre-democratic Swedish state - centralized, but not closed; bureaucratic and professional but not especially authoritarian; differentiated but not without central coordination of policy.     

The 1979 Local Elections in Norway

The result of the 1979 local elections in Norway showed that a strong Conservative wind was blowing over the country. The Conservative Party (Høyre) made an average progress of 8.5 per cent, compared with the previous local election results in 1975. The big loser was the Centre Party, which suffered a decrease of 2.8 per cent as an unweighted average. The governing party of Norway, the Labour Party, experienced only minor changes compared with the 1975 results, but compared with the last Storting election in 1977, the party's vote dropped from 42.2 to 36.1 per cent. Besides the Conservatives, gains were registered by the Liberal Party (Venstre) and the right-wing Progress Party (Fremskrittspariet, formerly Anders Langes Parti). A local election in Norway has traditionally seen a good many local non-partisan election lists. In this election, however, such lists won only 2.3 per cent of the vote, thus confirming a decline in their strength and a process of politicization that have been observed during all elections in the 1970s.     

The Scandinavian Model and Women's Interests: The Issues of Universalism and Corporatism*

Theorizing about women and politics and discussions of women and the welfare state have often neglected contextual factors, such as institutional and country-specific variables. By problematizing the following three concepts—the Scandinavian model, universalism, and corporatism—this article seeks to focus attention on system variations and their possible consequences for women.     

Corporatism and the Microeconomic Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy: The Swedish Model Revisited*

The aim of this paper is to advance the research into the workings of ‘corporatist’ societies by adding a microeconomic dimension and outlining how such a revised model is applicable to recent Swedish experience. Sweden is often regarded as a corporatist society., that is, one in which policy is the outcome of a ‘social partnership’ between encompassing groups coordinated by government. This corporatist approach, resting on the existence of a macro-economic social contract between peak organizations, is complemented here by an analysis of the micro-level incentives and mechanisms conducive to operating within the corporatist cooperative framework. These characteristics are seen as together constituting what I term the solidaristic market economy, a system of economic relations different in fundamental respects from the two with which we are familiar. While Swedish reality docs not correspond exactly to the economic model set out, the case is made that it is as reasonable to extrapolate from Swedish experience to the solidaristic market economy (and vice versa) as to learn from U.S. experience about the competitive market economy and from the Soviet Union about the command economy. Complemented by these micro-characteristics, corporatist analysis of economic relations under social-democratic regimes is thus seen as explaining the resilience of the ‘Swedish model’. Rather than in constant peril as critics suggest, the encompassing interest organizations and the patterns of relations among them are characterized by continued solidity in keeping with the operating principles of the solidaristic market economy.     

Consociational Democracy and Corporatism in Switzerland

The Swiss concept of Konkordanzdemokratie (consociational democracy)is examined in this article. The author traces the developmentof this practice from its earliest origins to its current manifestation,focusing especially on the role that religion and linguisticdifferences have played. The influence of the emerging "politicalmarket" is also examined as is the disappearance of traditionalpolitical cleavages. The article concludes with the author'sspeculation on the future relationship between Swiss "consociationaldemocracy" and the European Community.     

Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway

In a paper published in this journal, Cowen (2002) argues that whenever compliance with norms is supported by the forces of esteem, there is “too little” norm compliance. In this paper, we show that Cowen’s logic is flawed – that when the operation of esteem-based norms is formally modelled, no such general a priori conclusion follows. We investigate the conditions that would be necessary to ensure that esteem incentives for public goods contributions generate optimality in public goods supply, and indicate on that basis the conditions for voluntary sub-optimal and supra-optimal public goods provision in the esteem context.     

Decision-Making Involvement and Socioeconomic Resources in Norway: A Normative-Empirical Analysis*

The relationship between socioeconomic resources and political participation has been the subject of considerable normative-empirical debate. The present article addresses the problem on the basis of Norwegian survey data (N = 1,170) with the intent of testing both the resource-involvement relationship and the possible consequences of value over-representation among the most active citizens. The analysis of resource-involvement dependency in relation to Robert Dahl's norm-set for ‘non-cumulative resource distributions' shows only two resources to be of potential difficulty for pluralist expectations: education and gender. Other expectations as to resource-involvement inequality prove to be nonfounded for Norway. A further test of the consequences of pedagarchal and patriarchal over-representation shows the former to imply a general ‘progressive’ bias in political values, while the latter has no clear-cut ideological implications.     

Local Political Recruitment in Crisis? A Comparison of Finland and Norway

Beginning with the assumed problem of high turnover among local councilors in Norway, the article compares local political recruitment processes in Finland and Norway. Turnover in Norwegian local councils has proven surprisingly stable at 60–65 percent for a series of elections, whereas it has been significantly lower at 35–45 percent in the other Nordic countries, including Finland. Turnover among Norwegian councilors is mainly due to voluntary retirement. According to theories of political recruitment and representation, lack of motivation among candidates poses a threat to the democratic quality of political systems, because it undermines the voters' ability to exercise democratic control over politicians. The authors argue that rotation in office need not constitute a democratic problem. On the contrary, empirical evidence is presented to show that participation in political council work may in itself have a politically activating effect on the participants. Very few candidacies can be described in terms of political ambition. Instead, motivation is often created and cultivated through participation. Furthermore, rotation in office may lead to the diffusion of political competence and may therefore constitute an alternative source of democratic control.     

Leeway for Personal Impact: The Case of Foreign-Policy Making in Norway*

Setting their focus on the role of decision-makers at intermediate and higher levels of a country's foreign policy administration, the authors analyze contextual factors that may determine the impact of decision-makers' personal characteristics on foreign policy. The article highlights the dynamics of these factors in the case of Norwegian foreign policy-making in the mid- and late 1970s. Over time, there has been a general relaxation of formal bureaucratic constraints, including the use of internally recruited political appointment, compounded by the growth of non-traditional international public affairs. The Foreign Minister's leadership style appears to have served as a catalyst to create an environment in which middle-to-upper level administrative leaders and political appointees have had greater opportunity than previously to garner influence and make it felt.     

Macroeconomic Policy and Government Popularity in Norway 1963–1986*

Following the mainstream modelling of ‘politico-economic interaction’, the author reviews the major analyses of the Scandinavian countries. Noting that empirical findings diverge, both for the reaction function and the popularity function, the article estimates these relations on Norwegian data. For the popularity function, the analysis suggests that rates of inflation have a weak, but statistically significant impact on the popularity of governments. For the recent non-socialist governments, the analysis suggests greater impact of unemployment and real wage growth as well. The results for the reaction function support the mainstream notion that declining rates of inflation and increasing unemployment tend to cause more expansionary government policies. The estimated equations do not support the proposition that the election cycle or governments position on the opinion polls influences economic decision-making. Finally, the findings are discussed in the light of traditional normative positions     

Corporatism and Planning in London in the 1980s

This study confirms the existence of corporatist forms of interest intermediation at the micro level of four local planning authorities in London. In all four boroughs distinctions could be drawn between local business associations and metic, non-local firms. The former displayed most of the institutional characteristics outlined by Schmitter in his original definition of corporatism. In contrast the non-local or metic firms did not exhibit all these institutional characteristics at the level of local government. The conditions under which they bargained with local planning authorities (LPAs) were often influenced by statutory and other requirements handed down from central government. These requirements were themselves often the result of corporatist interest intermediation at the level of the central state. Both local business associations (LBAs) and metic production organizations (MPOs) were required by (LPAs) to implement planning policies. This process has increased in importance during the Thatcher era. Economic decline has made the local planning authorities even more dependent on private organizations for implementation than before. Local LBAs and MPOs were granted privileged access to the planning system. Only the LBAs were granted representational monopolies for their very local areas in this process. MPOs developed representational oligopolies but because they were so few in number they could be in conflict with one another over the rights to develop a particular site. In return for these representational privileges both the LBAs and MPOs were expected to moderate their demands for major departures from the approved local plans. The methods used to intermediate interests to the local planning systems were primarily informal. Although a small number of formal meetings were held each year between external organizations and the LPAs they represented a minority of the contacts between them and representatives of both LBAs and MPOs. Informal bargaining took place in two ways. First, there were issue specific negotiations over particular developments. The second type of contact was long-term, non-issue specific and primarily concerned with network building. Both types of bargaining were relatively secret and involved only the top echelons of the organizations concerned.     

Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement

Abstract The ongoing use of the concept of 'corporatism' in industrial democracies has been stretched to include overlapping but still distinctive realities, which in turn often produce different 'lists'of corporatist economies. Consequently, this analysis sets out to disentangle the concept of corporatism and to suggest a replacement. It includes a comparative classification of 24 long–term industrial democracies in terms of the corporatism scores given by 23 different scholarly analyses. The divisions in scoring certain important but problematic cases (such as Japan) can be explained by noting differing emphases in the term. I then propose an alternative, more focused summary measure of economic integration which is clearly linear and which has no 'problem cases'. Precise scores on economic integration are given for four time periods from the late 1960s through the mid–1990s. It will be seen that the industrial democracies have always been dichotomised between integrated and non–integrated (or 'pluralist') economies.