Assessing the Future Threat: ISIS's Virtual Caliphate

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) Virtual Caliphate shows no signs of diminishment. With the group's loss of territory and with social media platforms increasingly policed, Telegram, a messaging application, remains ISIS's key platform for disseminating propaganda and recruiting new members. Telegram's security features, cross-platform construction, and secret chat option offer a secure environment for interaction between ISIS and its supporters. On Telegram, ISIS manipulates an environment rich with addictive properties, creating online spaces that encourage group identity, shared opinions, and dominant ideologies, while exploiting an individual's need to be a part of the group. This research investigates how Telegram is used by ISIS and its supporters and assesses what kind of threat the use of Telegram poses for the future.The research is supported in part by the Office of Naval Research “Documenting the Virtual Caliphate” #N00014-16-1-3174. All opinions are exclusively those of the authors and do not represent the Department of Defense or the Navy. This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

Terrorism and fear: do terrorists really want to scare?

There is a widespread tendency among academics, state institutions and international organisations to regard intention to cause fear and intimidation as a key definitional characteristic of terrorism. This article argues that such a conceptualisation of terrorism is unfounded. A survey of mainstream terrorist doctrines (propaganda by the deed, foco theory–urban guerrilla warfare and armed propaganda, and jihadist doctrines) and writings of several pre-eminent terrorist ideologues provides little evidence to suggest that the main tactical goal of terrorism is to spread fear and intimidation. Rather, regardless of their ideological orientation and the historical period in which they operated, terrorists seem to be preoccupied with similar goals: mobilising what they regard to be their constituency, avenging their fallen comrades, extracting retribution for their allegedly wronged constituency, or, simply, with the physical destruction of their perceived enemies. This survey is complemented with a number of “crucial case studies”, where “most-likely cases” of terrorist justification of indiscriminate attacks and a detailed analysis of terrorist literature, which explicitly deals with the question of “fear”, are used to test the validity of the claim that terrorists aim to cause fear and intimidation. In both type of cases the hypothesis is invalidated. In cases of justification of indiscriminate attacks, there is no evidence to suggest that the aim of the terrorists is to spread fear and intimidation. Moreover, in the case of one particular terrorist ideologue who explicitly addresses the question of fear, the analysis of the texts indicates that fear among a population is not seen as an aim to be achieved but as an obstacle for mass mobilisation: an obstacle, which can only be overcome by the terrorist tactics. Thus, in this particular “most-likely case” the aim of terrorist tactics turns out to be encouraging masses for insurrection rather than intimidating them.     

Propaganda,effect, and the cold war: Gauging the status of america's “war of words”

The article examines the interrelationship among propaganda, effect, and the Cold War during congressional debates over America's first peacetime propaganda program. Although the rise of the communication research paradigm affected the production of statistical evidence to measure the effectiveness of America's Cold War propaganda, this case study argues that the “war of words” metaphor further heightened the need for empirical proof of America's status in that conflict, Just as with any physical battle that relies on body counts and land measurements to determine the success of America's war efforts, the criteria for measuring the status of America's “war of words” were driven by a similar demand for “objective” proof. The longevity of the Cold War helped ensure the institutionalization of the communication research paradigm, which rejected the use of anecdotal evidence as support for the program's impact.     

Propaganda and United States foreign policy: The case of panama

Abstract

This paper probes the use of propaganda by the U.S. government as a device for generating domestic public support for its invasion of Panama. The findings indicate that the government did succeed in influencing domestic public opinion. What accounted for the success? First, through the propaganda technique of selection, the U.S. government carefully chose those “facts” that supported its predetermined objective of removing General Manuel Noriega from power. Concomitantly, it concealed the information that would have undermined the veracity of its story: (1) the fact that Noriega was its Frankenstein monster; (2) its poor record on democracy in Panama; (3) the fact that there was no serious threat to American lives or interests; (4) the enormous human and material carnage occasioned by the invasion; and (5) the various violations of international law. Further, the traditional sources of public influence—the Democratic party, major opposition party to the Republicans, and the American press—failed to provide competing perspectives. In fact, they joined the government's propaganda bandwagon. The result was that the American public became convinced that the Bush administration's “official story” was the truth.     

Security and Power through Interdependence: On the Morality of Globalisation

Rising wealth—the progress from a “state of nature”—is contingent upon an ever wider division of labour. The web of mutual dependence and co-operation thus created has since long transgressed state borders. But as of late this global net of interdependence has become tightly woven. Being thus dependent on others seems at odds with the prime aim of national security, which is to preserve identity and full freedom of action. However, this definition of national security is no longer functional in this era of globalisation. Broad and useful interaction with others enhances national security; while isolation undermines it. There is a moral aspect to this: “identity” demands the “significant other”; and a diversified and wider identity thus calls for a wide interface with many such “others”. Wide interaction is also contingent on the participants being seen as trustworthy. It thus depends on—and creates—a culture of mutual responsibility.     

Harold Dwight lasswell (1902–1978): In memoriam

Abstract

This is a study of various aspects of Marxist‐Leninist propaganda, in terms of the problems encountered in this field by any extremist ideology and movement.

The nature of ideology is briefly analyzed in order to outline the basic problem faced by an ideology that claims to have the “only solution” to all of the world's problems: a built‐in gap between the ideology and reality that, with the passage of time, becomes more obvious and more embarrassing. Some techniques used by Marxist‐Leninist propaganda in order to solve this problem are then discussed, in particular the building of an imaginary mental environment for believers in the ideology that is in large measure based on a redefinition of part of the vocabulary. The use of redefined words as a cryptic, internal language by the initiated is also briefly discussed.

The parallel use of seemingly sophisticated arguments and of disinformation techniques, the peculiar, but frequently used, extremist debating style, the claims of a “scientifically derived” ideology, and the acceptance of apparent absurdities by those who have a psychological need to believe in them are, likewise, briefly analyzed. The paper also notes the susceptibility of many persons, particularly of many intellectuals, to Marxist‐Leninist propaganda and the indirect influence that, through their assistance, Marxist‐Leninists have been able to exercise in the Western World.     

From a Sub-Continental Power to an Asia-Pacific Player: India’s Changing Identity

This article aims to argue that identity is an important variable in determining the motivational disposition of the Indian state’s external security behavior. It offers a constructivist explanation to India’s increasing engagement with the Asia-Pacific region and argues that India’s deepening engagement with the region is a reflection of its desire to craft a new external identity for itself – the identity of an “Asia-Pacific player.” The desire for an “Asia-Pacific identity” is in part precipitated by Indian political elite’s perception of a crisis in India’s external identity immediately after the end of the Cold War, along with its intuitive desire for recognition within the international system. This ongoing identity shift offers to explain many visible changes in India’s post-Cold War foreign security behavior.     

Adversary Group Decision-Making Regarding Choice of Attack Methods: Expecting the Unexpected

Anticipating whether an adversary group will continue to use their usual (“conventional”), expected attack methods is important for military and counterterrorism practitioners tasked with protecting the security of others. Conventional attack methods are by their nature easier to plan and prepare for whilst “innovative” methods may take those responsible for security and counterterrorism by surprise and, as such, may have more impact and more serious consequences. The present study aimed to develop understanding of how, when, and why adversary groups might decide to use conventional attack methods or opt to do something innovative instead. A literature review was conducted and findings were applied to develop a thorough understanding of the decision-making process that underlies an adversary group's choice of attack method. Identified are three stages preceding the execution of an attack: a) “strategic direction”; b) “incubation”; and c) “planning and preparation,” plus “overarching” and “contextual” factors that can influence the process at each stage. It is suggested that it is these factors and how they influence decision-making that result in innovative methods being used to execute an attack, or convention prevailing. Findings can aid practitioners and policy-makers in counterterrorism, security, and law enforcement, to support their understanding, evaluation, and countering of current and future threats.     

German–American Intelligence Relations, 1945–1956: New Evidence on the Origins of the BND

Under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a certain amount of documents relating to a German–American intelligence co-operation that began almost immediately after the German surrender of May 1945; it lasted until 1956 when the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) was founded, today's German foreign and military intelligence service. The Americans assembled, supervised, and largely financed what is often referred to as the “Gehlen organisation,” named after its leader, former Wehrmacht general, Reinhard Gehlen, who was chief of the BND until his retirement in 1968. Whilst the existence of this co-operation had been known since the 1940s, largely due to Soviet subversion and propaganda, very little reliable information and virtually no original source material was available before the release of this, somewhat redacted, material in 2002 and 2007. This article provides a sketch of how former Wehrmacht officers, and even a number with an ominous SS past, who might well have been war criminals, came to work, first for United States military intelligence and, from 1949, for the CIA. It looks at some of their operations during those turbulent post-war years, which include the Berlin airlift and German rearmament in response to the Korean War. The potential of those newly declassified documents, unfortunately, cannot be corroborated from other sources as long as German and Russian archives remain closed. Despite its manifold limitations, this material provides an exciting window into transatlantic intelligence history.     

De-antagonising the Other: Changing Constructions of the Taliban and the Possibility of Reconciliation

Shortly after 9/11 any kind of engagement, let alone reconciliation, with the Taliban was considered absurd. Recently, however, Afghan as well as Western elites have announced that they are now willing to talk to parts of the Taliban in an attempt to begin a reconciliation process in Afghanistan. This article focuses on the discourse theoretical framework developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and illustrates the merits of such an approach for explaining how such a shift became possible. It argues that the turn to reconciliation with the Taliban was enabled by a transformation of the discursive construction of the Taliban. The article focuses on the discursive dynamics of the (de)coupling and differentiation of signifiers as a central mechanism of meaning production. It argues that antagonistic identity constructions in the context of the global war on terror formed the discursive background against which the Taliban were first articulated as part of the terrorist “Other”, which made any engagement impossible. From 2009 onwards, however, it can be observed how the signifier “Taliban” was decoupled from the identity of the “terrorist”, how it transcended the antagonistic frontier and came to be seen as an entity worthy of engagement.     

Has-Been,Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy

In December 2003, the European Union presented its “security strategy”, endorsed by all member states, to provide guidance for Europe’s common foreign security and defense policy. In substance, this document is not an expression of a growing strategic rift between Europe and the United States. One of the purposes it serves, however, is defining Europe’s own, separate “identity”. It reflects the increasing awareness that Europeans need to employ their power more effectively in the service of international peace and security, as much as politically possible. Disagreements on key issues remain in Europe, however, and the practical implications of the security strategy still need to be worked out.     

Immoderation: comparing the Christian Right in the US and pro-Islamic movement-parties in Turkey

This article will discuss the “immoderation” of religious political actors – defined as the continuation of a relatively closed and rigid worldview – through a cross-religious comparison of the Christian Right coalition within the Republican Party in the US with the pro-Islamic movement-parties in Turkey. By adapting a “most different systems approach”, this study will question the similar evolution of two religious political actors in two dissimilar political regimes. In particular, it will question the processes and types of immoderation by looking into (1) “behavioural immoderation”, immoderation for the strategic purpose of forming a small yet ideologically pure supporter base, and into (2) “ideological immoderation”, immoderation as a result of a continued advocacy for a moral role for the state without a full embrace of political pluralism. In this, it will argue that religious political actors are strategic actors who try to guarantee their organizational survival amidst changing costs and benefits of moderation vis-à-vis immoderation. Through its discussion of “immoderation” and through its cross-religious comparison, this study will aim to contribute to the inclusion-moderation literature.     

The security-prejudice nexus: “Islamist” terrorism and the structural logics of Islamophobia in the UK

ABSTRACT

A growing body of evidence documents that Islamophobia is a significant social issue in the UK. This evidence also reveals an empirical link to “Islamist” terrorism, revealing a nexus between security and the social emergence of prejudice. Drawing on critical approaches to security and applying them to the case of the UK in 2017, this article explores this nexus conceptually and empirically. To do so, it examines the discourses of various governance institutions (including the media, the political elite, and security professionals) as they respond to “Islamist” terrorist events. It argues that these governance institutions individually and collectively – and often unwittingly – stigmatised and securitised “Muslim” identity. The structural emergence (i.e., the institutionalisation) of Islamophobia in the UK, this article contends, can largely be understood through these processes. This article therefore offers an illustration of some of the logics of how prejudice is embedded in societal structures, which has normative implications for how these processes might be successfully contested.     

Autocratic legitimation in Iran: Ali Khamenei’s discourse on regime “insiders” and “outsiders”

The article analyses Ali Khamenei’s discourse on insiders and outsiders in the Islamic Republic of Iran, arguing that it shows the leader of an electoral revolutionary regime striving to counter elite fragmentation and growing democratic demands. It studies identity demarcation as a tool of autocratic legitimation. In a political system where the possibility to access political positions depends on supporting a belief-system, all cadres share a basic identity, which rulers can exploit to draw boundaries between “us” and “them”. The analysis reveals how Iran’s leader capitalizes on the existence of an insider-outsider divide to promote ideas about an imagined “we” of the regime. The “we” is portrayed as an Islamic we, fully committed to his rule. The article maintains that Khamenei developed this discourse in response to the challenge of the Iranian reform movement. It analyses, first, the context in which the discourse emerged and, second, the discursive strategy itself, to substantiate the claim. It concludes that the discourse had two essential aims in the containment (1997–2003) and crushing (2009–2010) of the pro-democracy reformist and Green movements: to de-legitimate Khamenei’s opponents through othering and to legitimate the counter-mobilization of repressive agents.     

Theorising the “suspect community”: counterterrorism,security practices and the public imagination

This article considers Hillyard’s first application of the term “suspect community” to the Irish in Britain in the era of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and its more recent application to Muslims in the global war on terror. A review of the application of the term “suspect community” and research in the field points to the problems associated with constructing an entire population and to problems of misidentification. Ethnographic and other evidence illustrate the stigmatisation, alienation and violence that results from its deployment. Given these difficulties and Greer’s objections to the use of the term “suspect community”, a redefinition of the concept of “suspect community” is proposed, borrowing from Anderson’s concept of the imagined community. The “suspect community” is not merely the product of legal and security apparatuses, but the product of a larger cultural apparatus or “imaginary”. It is redefined as “a community created in and by the securitised imagination and enacted in a processes of ‘othering’ through a range of security practices of counter-terrorism”. The “suspect community” is not an embodied community, but an imagined one, whose boundaries are permeable and shifting and in the eye of the beholder. Its operations are distinct from Islamophobia or anti-Irish racism, yet racism, Islamophobia and other forms of subordination may well be implicated in the process of “othering” the suspect. The effect of being “suspect” on the performance of identity and citizenship is indicated in the conclusion.     

Ethnicity,Colonial Legacies,and Postindependence Issues of Identity Politics in North-East India

The idea of indigenousness has been evoked to legitimize group exclusive claims including separate territories in North-East India. By analyzing experiences in Meghalaya and Manipur, the article argues that the colonial ethnic categorization that produced “ethnic conglomerates” has generated a number of problems leading to conflict in the postindependence period. First, certain composite identities have been formed by bringing together under a single umbrella a range of distinct indigenous groups' identity, often leading to the suppression of smaller identities within the larger group. Thus, the smaller groups struggle to have their own identities recognized. Furthermore, the imposed ethnic categorization has enabled the contemporary political class, which has simply perpetuated the colonial system, to use cultural identity and “indigenousness” instrumentally to their own advantage.     

Authority in statebuilding as communicative practice. The Joint Working Group on the Constitutional Framework in Kosovo

Post-war constitution-making touches the future identity of the concerned society. In externally led democratization, it can turn into a challenging negotiation process between international and so-called local actors. But who can claim the authority to define and interpret identity and fundamental norms of society, and on what grounds? Based on an analysis of the “Joint Working Group on the Constitutional Framework” held in spring 2001 in Kosovo, the article argues that external actors have a structural disadvantage in the authoritative communication with local actors, even if equipped with a strong international mandate. While external actors can set the opportunity structures to negotiate constitutional politics, local actors will use every chance to publically claim authority on their behalf in the process. Guided by the theoretical framework of interpretative authority (Deutungsmacht), the article concludes that we have to understand authority in statebuilding primarily, not as an attribute of actors, but as an outcome of communicative practices.     

Ingredients of a Successful Track Two Negotiation

During three days in 2003, an Israeli–Palestinian group met in London to negotiate the draft of the “Geneva Initiative,” which offered a potential final status agreement between Israel and Palestine. In this article, I analyze the video recording of these unofficial negotiations and examine how the framing and conduct of the talks enabled significant progress toward reaching an agreement. I describe six main framing techniques used by the mediators: calling the meetings an “exercise,” which reduced restraints on the participants and enhanced their flexibility, avoiding deep historical issues to focus solely on future‐oriented pragmatic solutions, allowing the participants to discuss any topic they chose while deliberately avoiding crucial narrative issues, convincing the participants that this track two negotiation was crucial for the future of official Israeli–Palestinian relations, accentuating the parties' understandings and agreements with each other, and building a sense of superordinate group identity among the participants, to encourage cooperation. These components were the key “ingredients” for the first — and still the only — (unofficial) detailed proposal for an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement. They provide lessons that could improve the success of other track two negotiations.