A Strategy for the ISIS Foreign Fighter Threat

American efforts against the ISIS foreign fighter threat largely have failed because they underestimate the malignance of ISIS recruits. This article proposes a modified strategy comprising three aspects: 1) a counter-narrative stressing ISIS's attacks on Sunni Muslims, questioning their religious credentials, and accurately describing conditions in ISIS-controlled territory; 2) a comprehensive effort to disrupt ISIS recruitment on social media; and 3) countering foreign fighter mobility through a comprehensive international effort to identify foreign fighters, suspending their passports, and revoking their citizenship. Unfortunately, even these efforts will only be a partial fix for the vastly larger problems of jihadism and radical Islam.     

The Impact of Military Interventions on the Integration of Muslim Immigrants in Western Countries, 1990–2013

While there is an indication that some democratic institutions and public policies have been effective in integrating ethnic minorities, social classes and immigrants in Western countries, recent studies show that they have not succeeded equally in incorporating Muslim immigrants. This difference begs the question of what particular circumstances are required for Muslim integration in the West. This article uses the level of violence between Muslim immigrants and host societies as an indication of their social cohesion or lack thereof. Conducting a quantitative analysis of 16 Western countries for the period 1990–2013, we find that militarised interstate disputes between Western states and predominantly Muslim countries substantially increase the likelihood of violence between Muslim immigrants and the respective host societies. Multicultural policies and consensual political systems mitigate these adverse effects. This study demonstrates a continued utility of democratic institutions and public policies towards promoting social cohesion, especially when the host states are engaged in military action in Muslim countries.     

“Virtual Planners” in the Arsenal of Islamic State External Operations

This article explores virtually planned attacks, an innovation by the Islamic State (IS) in its global campaign of terrorism. It argues that the United States and its allies have successfully combined military, intelligence, and law enforcement activities with border security measures in Turkey to reduce IS’ ability to send foreign fighters home to conduct attacks against the West. IS leaders have responded by relying on a team of virtual planners. These individuals use encrypted online messaging applications, such as Telegram Messaging or WhatsApp, to gather local recruits, provide them with technical expertise, and pick the target. Historically, virtually planned attacks in Europe and the United States have not been as successful as those executed by foreign fighters. But attacks in Southeast Asia may provide a forewarning of what is to come.     

Regulation and Self-Regulation: The Role of Media Commissions and Professional Bodies in the Muslim World

This article examines the state of media regulation in Arab and other Muslim countries. Whereas most countries in Europe, including the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and some of the African societies in transition have developed media commissions of different types, most Muslim countries are so far reluctant to ease the dominating state control of the media, especially in the audiovisual sector. A majority of journalists associations in the Middle East and North Africa still need to distance themselves from governments and ruling parties. Their major task is to ensure observance of ethical standards, a task in which they have to struggle with the desires of governments and parliaments to make excessive use of the judiciary to sanction journalists. So far, Muslim countries have yet to develop their own models for restructuring the changing media sector and for creating a viable system of checks and balances that would control the media in a democratic way. Governments should aim to develop a common understanding among regulatory bodies and media practitioners and thus to provide for common concepts of ethical standards. In these efforts, much can be learned from the wide range of experiences gained by the transitional societies of Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa during the last decade.     

Foreign policy in the Muslim world: A dialogue between state and society

In the wake of the demise of communism and the advent of the 1990–1991 Gulf War, there is concern among some Western elites about a possible Islamic challenge to the prevailing international order. This paper explores the validity of that concern by looking at patterns of interaction and the notion of foreign‐policy change in four countries in the Muslim world—Iran, Egypt, Algeria, and Indonesia, as well as some developments in the larger Muslim world. Juxtaposing social change on foreign policy, the article postulates that economic realism is the definitive force in the international relations of these states; “militant Islam” is more a tool of radical diplomacy than a manifestation of transnationalism; and ties between states in the Muslim world display a regional regime‐style orientation. Domestic Islamization is found to be a force, which, overall, is contributing to accountability and, therefore, rationalization in the foreign‐policy realm.     

Social Network Analysis of German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq

ABSTRACT

Why do Westerners become foreign fighters in civil conflicts? We explore this question through original data collection on German foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, and test three sets of hypotheses that revolve around socioeconomic integration, online radicalization, and social network mobilization. We conduct link analysis to map the network of German foreign fighters prior to their mobilization, and marshal evidence to assess the validity of competing explanations. We find only modest support for the integration deficit hypothesis, and meager support for the social media radicalization theory. Instead, the preponderance of evidence suggests that interpersonal ties largely drive the German foreign fighter phenomenon. Recruitment featured clustered mobilization and bloc recruitment within interconnected radical milieus, leading us to conclude that peer-to-peer networks are the most important mobilization factor for German foreign fighters.     

试析文莱对外关系的特点

1984年1月1日独立后,文莱从本国实际出发,积极利用各种有利条件发展对外关系。在政治交往中,广泛参与各种国际组织和地区性组织,发展与世界各国的友好关系;在经济层面上,利用本国的资源优势扩大与世界各国的经济往来;同时加强与穆斯林世界的友好交往,从而在国际交往中获得主动,维护国家利益。     

“Talk about terror in our back gardens”: an analysis of online comments about British foreign fighters in Syria

The phenomenon of foreign fighters has become a central issue to the ongoing conflict in Syria. This article explores how members of the public answer the question ‘Why do British citizens join the conflict in Syria’ on social media sites and in response to online news articles. Building upon research on everyday narratives of security and terrorism, we analyse 807 comments, and in doing so, we argue that online comments are important in producing the discursive environment for making sense of British foreign fighters and what should be done in response to them. We find that there is a tendency to view British foreign fighters as being purely motivated by religion, and there is also a belief that British foreign fighters should be responded to through exceptional measures. We discuss the implications of such perceptions, and we highlight how problematic misconceptions about Islam and Muslims are not just disseminated through elite and media discourse, but through everyday narratives published by members of the public online.     

On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’: Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980-2010

This article provides a review of the history of jihadi foreign fighters in Afghanistan over the last 30 years. It details the post-9/11 period and the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. forces, focusing on the ethnic origin of the foreign fighters and how different groups engaged in different aspects of the conflict. Additionally, the piece explains that while the foreign fighters who came to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan included, among others, Uzbekistanis (not Afghan Uzbeks), Turks, and Arabs, there was also a significant force of Pakistanis—of both Pashtun and Punjabi origins—that joined, bolstering the Taliban army.     

Foreign Fighters—Recent Trends

Beginning with a historical perspective on foreign fighters, this article then seeks to clarify ambiguities and biases that shape how we often analyze the foreign fighter phenomenon. The central focus is then on the evolving trends and activities of the movement. A new generation of fighters has emerged who are comfortable as terrorists, recruiters, trainers and media propagandist, among other specialties. The author concludes by assessing the significance of the problem today.     

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

Different theories about the impact of aid make distinct predictions about citizens’ attitudes toward foreign aid in recipient countries. We investigate their preferences toward aid and government projects in order to examine these different theories. Are citizens indifferent between development projects funded by their own government versus those funded by foreign aid donors, as aid capture theory suggests? To address this, in an experiment on a large, representative sample of Ugandan citizens, we randomly assigned the names of funding groups for actual forthcoming development projects and invited citizens to express support attitudinally and behaviorally. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to show behavioral support in favor of foreign aid projects compared to government programs, especially if they already perceive the government as corrupt or clientelist or if they are not supporters of the ruling party. They also trust donors more, think they are more effective, and do not consistently oppose aid conditionality. This experimental evidence is consistent with a theory that we call donor control which sees donors asbeing able to target and condition aid so that it is not fungible with government revenues and thus to be able to better direct it to meet citizens’ needs.     

The Unseen Terrorist Connection: Exploring Jihadist Links Between Lebanon and Australia

A defining feature of Australian jihadism over the past decade has been the predominant involvement of individuals of Lebanese descent, along with Australian citizens engaging in jihadist activity in Lebanon. This article outlines the separate relevant cases of jihadist activity in Australia and Lebanon, and examines various explanations for this unique situation. It finds long-distance nationalism, target selection, and training locations to be inadequate explanations, despite their utility in other cases where ethnic diaspora associations converge with jihadist activity. The marginalisation and disadvantage faced by Lebanese-Australian Muslims proved to be an influence, but could not account for the difference between the small numbers involved in jihadism and the tens of thousands facing comparable social circumstances. The most direct explanation for this phenomenon proved to be the intimate personal connections between the radical networks straddling the two countries. A network analysis is therefore conducted, distinguishing between operational and social connections, in order to give greater insight into this threat.     

Ties that Bind: Dynamics of Group Radicalisation in Italy’s Jihadists Headed for Syria and Iraq

In recent years, thousands of radical citizens and residents from Europe have joined the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) in Syria and Iraq. Unlike other European countries, Italy has traditionally been characterised by the prevalence of individual pathways of radicalisation over group mechanisms. Nevertheless, recent cases show interesting indications of the increasing role of small groups based on pre-existing personal relationships (family and friendship ties). This kind of bond can be particularly salient for IS, a jihadist “proto-state”, which needs not only ‘foreign fighters’ but also new ‘citizens’ of different sexes and ages, including entire families.     

Solitude in Europe for the communists

The Russian government sincerely believes that Assad’s removal from power would trigger the expansion of jihadism and instability in the Caucasus and southern Russia. Moscow is deeply concerned about the rise of Islamists in the Middle East, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia's efforts to support the most radical factions in Syria. At the same time, the obvious absence of the ideological background behind current Russian-Syrian relations makes them a trade item. Thus, official guarantees that the jihadists will not export their revolution elsewhere accompanied by promises to preserve some Russian economic positions in post-Assad Syria will probably create the necessary ground for the emergence of a compromise stance on Syria (including the issue of foreign intervention).     

Sovereignty and the Foreign Fighter Problem

Sovereignty is the bedrock of international law. If security requires that the United States transgress sovereign borders to attack foreign fighters and their support networks hiding in third countries, then the U.S. should adopt a strategy to amend international law accordingly. One should not be too quick, however, to disregard a robust notion of sovereignty, a concept that has helped avert conflict among the world's major powers. The United States needs a strategy for sovereignty's future that is based in the emerging security context and a prioritization of American interests. Instead, the United States and the rest of the world are meandering toward a less robust sovereignty with weaker and more ambiguous international law. The U.S. and its global interests would be better served by strong and clear international rules that increase predictability and that confer legitimacy to action against dangerous enemies.     

Why Japan and Russia have failed to solve the territorial dispute: the 1956 Joint Declaration and the mechanism of political coherence

Despite the several chances of agreement, Japan and Russia have failed to solve the dispute over the Northern Territories/South Kuril Islands. The 1956 model seems to be the most plausible method, but the lack of political coherence of the central politics and the will of negotiation became the factors that hinder the two countries from reaching an agreement. By reviewing the conflicting footprints and strategies of the two countries, the authors argue that the more democratized and diffused a political system is, the more difficult it is to come to an agreement in negotiations. This intensifies the existing theory of foreign policy decision-making process emphasizing the influence of domestic constituents.     

缅甸政局中的地缘政治因素

一个国家或地区的地缘政治地位和地缘安全地位与作用在很大程度上是由该国家或地区的地缘要素决定的。不同时期的政治学家和学者基于不同的世界经济与政治条件以及不同的历史视角，形成了各自不同的地缘政治理论。虽然这些地缘政治理论大多来自于大国，也大多成为大国谋求世界霸权的理论依据与参考.     

Commodities and economic growth

The process of social integration of the people associated with immigrant organisations, and the social (and potentially religious) change that comes with it, present the organisations with the difficult challenge of justifying their legitimacy to various societal actors. This is certainly true of Muslim organisations in Western immigration societies. In Germany, this process is quite clearly reflected within the community of established organisations, which play a part in creating intergenerational change. This is not to say, however, that they will be the only relevant – or even the predominant – actors involved in establishing Islam in Germany in the future, despite their roots in their countries of origin, nor that they will automatically become redundant over time.     

The Muslim Middle East: Is There a Democratic Option?

American counterterrorism strategy defines as “moderate” or “mainstream” any Muslim who does not support the jihadi extremists, which sets the bar very low and does not consider the question of how widespread such support actually might be. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda is not the lunatic fringe of Sunni Islam—it is the fanatic core of Sunni Islam, and shares much of its ideology with other organized Islamic groups and, for that matter, much of the Muslim faithful. “Moderate” Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are moderate only in relative terms, are mostly antidemocratic, and are more correctly considered nonviolent enemies of the U.S. This being the case, a democratic opening in the Muslim Middle East is all too likely to bring to power profoundly antidemocratic groups that are virulently and possibly violently hostile to the U.S. A possible alternative strategy is one stressing good government, with gradual democratization as societies decompress.     

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Emerging ‘Shia Crescent’

To form a more prudent foreign policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood, we must understand it not only as a domestic actor, but also as a major regional player. In fact, the Brotherhood has a complex relationship with Iran and the Shias, which blurs the lines of the so-called Shia Crescent. This article addresses the Muslim Brotherhood's foreign/regional policy by analyzing its attitude toward the Shias and Iran, thus placing it within the context of the emerging regional order. Addressing the complex relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Shias/Iran will help to clarify the regional fallout were the Brotherhood to gain control of a major Sunni Arab state. This is a vital issue for policy makers who are considering the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Brotherhood.