Target Hardening and Terrorist Signaling: The Case of Aviation Security

In this article, we examine the relationship between hardening a target and the value that a terrorist group derives from attacking it. We use a simple expected value framework to compare how the expected value of attacking a hardened target varies between a violence-based approach, where terrorists are presumed to be maximizing the physical damage done to the target, and a signaling-based approach, where terrorists are presumed to be maximizing the symbolic value of their attack. We argue that, if it is proper to understand terrorist attacks as costly signals of terrorist strength or determination, hardening a target actually increases the expected value of attacking a target (relative to its value before hardening), even if the attack fails. We go on to examine the evolution of aviation security, and trace how al-Qaeda's views of airplanes and airports as targets have changed since 9/11. As aviation targets were hardened with increasingly onerous security measures, al-Qaeda began to see even attacks that did not result in detonation as successes, in large part because of what they signaled about al-Qaeda's abilities, and the ability of al-Qaeda to impose costs on the U.S. and other countries even in the absence of explosions.     

Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?

The current study uses the content analysis method while focusing on identification of repeated patterns of behavior by suicide terrorists and the society within which they grow and develop. The present study presents a typology—a classification into categories, each represented by a prototype, of suicide terrorists in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also identifies prerequisite factors (as without these factors, there is little opportunity for a particular prototype to emerge) and supporting factors (which may assist in the emergence of the prototype, but are not essential) for each of the suicide terrorist prototypes. The suggested typology is based on a convenient sample: details which have been published in the literature describing suicide terrorists. The typology suggests four categories of suicide bombers: religious fanatic, exploited, avenger, and nationalist fanatic. This typology is based on the main motive of the perpetrator, and different trajectories which each suicide bomber undergoes from recruitment to detonating the bomb. The major difference among the four categories lies in the prerequisite factors and their relative importance in comparison to the supporting factors.     

The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict

Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and interstate conflicts are so costly, why are states willing to initiate seemingly ruinous wars to fight terrorist groups? This essay proposes an explanation to address this question using current theoretical and empirical research on terrorism and interstate violence. Recent work indicates that while terrorists appear weak compared to states, terrorists can wield significant coercive power in smaller geographic areas. I argue that if these areas are strategically crucial to the government, such as areas with oil wells or mineral deposits, terrorist activity may precipitously weaken states relative to their rivals. I therefore argue that even if groups are only capable of killing at low levels, terrorism may lead to macrolevel power shifts, which may contribute to interstate violence.     

Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non-Radicalization

Although much has been written about how and why individuals become terrorists, very little research has focused on why individuals choose not to become involved in political violence. Some assume that these non-radicalized individuals simply have not had the same life experiences as terrorists. Yet one only has to explore areas of conflict, such as the Gaza Strip, northwest Pakistan, or the southern Philippines, to wonder why more individuals have not joined local militant groups. This article presents a conceptual model ofnon-radicalization in an attempt to move the discussion forward on this topic. It argues that it is impossible to understand radicalization pathways, or design policies to preempt them, without a complementary knowledge ofwhy individuals resist the influence ofviolent extremism.     

Conceptualizing the effects of mass‐mediated terrorism

Abstract

In summer 1985, a TWA plane was hijacked by Shiite terrorists to Beirut creating what turned to be one of the most impressive spectacles of the mass‐mediated “theater of terror.” After the event the American media were blamed for fanning the crisis atmosphere, giving the terrorists the publicity they craved, abetting the terrorists by reporting U.S. military movements, holding a brutal competition among themselves to get exclusive footage or interviews, harassing the hostages’ families, negotiating directly with the terrorists, milking the hostages still held by the terrorists for political and ideological declarations, and propagandizing the terrorists’ anti‐U.S. and anti‐Israel messages. The resulting debate that followed these accusations, illustrates the lingering argument regarding media and terrorism. While some claim that “the media are the terrorists’ best friends. The terrorist act by itself is nothing. Publicity is all”,¹ others argue that the media are avoiding the “real terror” for ideological reasons, averting Western public opinion from U.S. terrorism by underreporting its share in Third World Terrorism.² The ideological loadings of definitions and arguments are combined with confused interpretations of media effects and public opinion to yield an endless, futile debate. The purpose of the paper is to conceptualize basic effects of mass‐mediated terrorism by relating media effects studies to the case of terrorism and public opinion.     

Competing to Kill: Terrorist Organizations Versus Lone Wolf Terrorists

Are organizationally linked suicide attacks deadlier than those launched by lone wolf terrorists? This article elaborates a perpetrator-based distinction among suicide terrorist attacks between organizations and lone wolf terrorists, who operate in the absence of a financially or physically supportive terrorist organization. The expectation is that terrorist organizations would serve as commitment tools that increase the loyalty of suicide bombers to their missions through material and non-material incentives. Findings demonstrate that when terrorist organizations are involved in the planning and execution of suicide terrorist attacks, not only do they increase the lethality of these attacks but they also accentuate the tactical advantages of suicide terrorism. These findings suggest that despite the recent upsurge and concern about lone wolf terrorism, the lethality and security impacts of suicide terrorism continue to be driven by terrorist organizations.     

The phenomenon of conservative terrorism

In his studies of loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland, Steve Bruce introduces the concept of ‘pro‐state’ terrorism, whereby terrorists carry out attacks in order to eliminate threats which they believe should have been eliminated by the state's security forces. This article argues that whilst the actions of loyalist terrorists may have a pro‐state element, they can more properly be seen in the wider context of conservative terrorism.     

Why Violence Abates: Imposed and Elective Declines in Terrorist Attacks

Previous scholarship on variations in violence within a given terrorist organization has primarily focused on factors that lead to the inception or destruction of that organization. However, violence varies substantially even during the “prime” of an organization's life. This article aims to understand why violence varies in the short term within many organizations, and places a special focus on declines in violence. Specifically, I argue that terrorists face countervailing incentives in terms of how much violence to use, and that when declines in violent activity do occur, they can be divided into two types: a) elective declines, which are usually temporary and used for organizational or reputational recovery; and b) imposed declines, which are dictated by changes in the relative capability of an organization, and are more likely to be permanent. The causal pathways to each type of decline are discussed, and a plausibility probe, consisting of case studies of three terrorist organizations, is then developed to substantiate this theory. The findings have notable implications for counterterrorism policy, as they illustrate not only when and why terrorists choose to curtail violent attacks, but also the conditions that determine whether declines in violence are temporary or permanent.     

Choose Your Weapon: The Impact of Strategic Considerations and Resource Constraints on Terrorist Group Weapon Selection

ABSTRACT

Historians of terrorism note that modern terrorists rely almost exclusively on two weapon types: the gun and the bomb. However, the comparative use of these weapons differs from one terrorist group to the next. We exploit this variation to examine how the tactical decisions of terrorists respond to both strategic aspirations and resource constraints. We argue that a group’s goals (a strategic consideration) and size (a resource constraint) provide a parsimonious explanation for weapon selection. Because firearms inherently expose the shooter to higher risk, are more precise, and must be used if a group aspires to maintain social order, they are unlikely to be used by groups with limited recruits in a campaign of violence. We test this theory using data on over 350 terrorist organizations. Our analysis shows that strategic considerations and resource constraints both impact tactical choices, although groups with the most expansive goals, those which transcend national borders, as well as militias, are two interesting exceptions to our theory. Our research has implications for the use of disaggregated tactical data and in furthering our understanding of the rationality of terrorism.     

Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists

The conventional wisdom is that terrorists tend to target democracies because they are uniquely vulnerable to coercion. Terrorists are able to coerce democracies into acceding to their policy demands because liberal countries suffer from two inherent counterterrorism constraints: (1) the commitment to civil liberties prevents democracies from adopting sufficiently harsh countermeasures to eradicate the terrorism threat, and (2) their low civilian cost tolerance limits their ability to withstand attacks on their civilian populations. This article tests both propositions of the conventional wisdom that (a) terrorists attack democracies over other regime types because (b) liberal constraints render democracies vulnerable to coercion. The data do not sustain either proposition: illiberal countries are the victims of a disproportionate number of terrorist incidents and fatalities, and liberal countries are substantially less likely to make policy concessions to terrorists, particularly on issues of maximal importance. A plausibility probe is then developed to explain why democracies have a superior track record against terrorists. The basic argument is that liberal countries are comparatively resistant to coercion—and hence inferior targets—because they are superior counterterrorists. Liberalism's commitment to civil liberties and low civilian cost tolerance are, in the aggregate, actually strategic assets that help democracies prevail in counterterrorist campaigns, thereby reducing the incentives for terrorists to target this regime type. These findings have important implications for how democracies can defend their liberal values and physical security in the age of terrorism.     

Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings, 1970–1998

Counterterrorism strategies involving the killing of terrorists are a prominently used but controversial practice. Proponents argue that such strategies are useful tools for reducing terrorist activity, while critics question their effectiveness. This article provides empirical insight into this strategy by conducting a series of negative binomial regression and Tobit estimations of the impact of killing Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) terrorists as well as members of the Catholic community on counts of PIRA bombings and targeting activity in Northern Ireland for the period 1970–1998. We consider the impact of discriminate and indiscriminate killings (where only PIRA militants are killed versus those in which both militants and civilians are also killed) on subsequent PIRA improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. Our findings illustrate that while total and discriminate counterterrorism killings have little to no effect on PIRA IED attacks, indiscriminate counterterrorism killings increased PIRA bombings overall and prompted the Provisional IRA to specifically target civilians in IED events. We conclude by discussing the scholarly and policy implications of these findings.     

A Balanced Force Structure To Achieve a Liberal World Order

In addition to preexisting threats such as the rise of China, the United States now faces a protracted struggle against Islamist terrorists. The military component of the nation's security strategy requires a balanced force that can be employed across the spectrum of conflict. The Iraq War has shown the “1-4-2-1” force-sizing construct—maintaining a force able to defend the homeland, operate in and from four forward regions, simultaneously defeat two regional adversaries, and achieve a result such as regime change in one of them—to be unattainable. But by spending 4.5 percent of GDP on defense and with the right force mix, America will be able to lead coalitions against terrorists, restore order to unstable regions, do peacekeeping in regions of vital interest, deter aggression, and win a war if deterrence fails. The benefits of the resulting world order far outweigh the costs.     

Identification of Risk Factors Generating Terrorism in Pakistan

Terrorism is a complex issue and various researchers have identified numerous causes and conditions that generate or are capable of generating terrorism. In the last decade, terrorist attacks claimed 36,495 lives and injured 27,985 people in Pakistan as a result of 3,482 bomb blasts and 281 suicide attacks. The aim of this research was to establish the major risk factors generating terrorism, based on the opinions of security officials who dealt directly with the Pakistan security situation. Sixty-five causes identified from the literature and interviews with security officials were modeled and transformed into a questionnaire. A nationwide response from security officials who were directly involved in dealing with apprehended terrorists was obtained. The population was selected proportionately from high, medium, and low security zones of Pakistan. Out of 500 questionnaires sent, 103 valid responses were received. The results helped establish the 13 major risk factors associated with generating terrorism. It was observed that addressing these 13 major risk factors would mostly resolve the other minor risk factors as well. Findings of this research might be beneficial for countries affected by terrorism, and countries with prioritized and rationalized allocation of funds in their budgets for substantially overcoming terrorism.     

Insights into Selected Features of Pakistan’s Most Wanted Terrorists

This article attempts to provide insights into selected features of Pakistan’s most wanted terrorists using a dataset of 895 high-profile terrorists provided by the Counter Terrorism Wings of the Criminal Investigation Departments of regional police offices of Pakistan. It identifies spatial patterns of terrorist supply at subnational levels. The educational background of terrorists has also been analyzed. Noteworthy variations are observed in the supply of different types of terrorists across the geographical landscape of Pakistan. Findings also reveal that though terrorists are relatively more educated than the population group they emerge from, there is a higher probability of them emerging in districts with lower socio-economic performance.     

南海地区安全：打击海盗与反恐合作

南海地区不仅具有重要的战略地位，而且是世界上最繁忙的国际航道之一，其安全正面临着海盗与恐怖分子的威胁。随着国际海事局有关海盗定义的修订，要维护南海地区的安全仅依靠南海周边国家的力量是不够的，特别是马六甲海峡。因此，海峡沿岸国要求海峡使用国共同分摊维护安全的经费负担，并提供有关培训、设备和信息情报等援助。这种情况说明，维护南海地区安全必须由南海周边国家及南海航道使用国共同合作，只有通过密切的国际合作，才能有效地打击海盗与恐怖主义活动，真正地维护南海地区的安全。     

Creating the National/Border Security Nexus: Counter-Terrorist Operations and Monitoring Middle Eastern and North African Visitors to the UK in the 1970s–1980s

Abstract

This article looks at an earlier episode in the history of the UK border security apparatus by examining how the immigration control system was used in the 1970s and 1980s to detect potential terrorists from the Middle East and North Africa. Using recently opened archival records, it shows that the UK government introduced a strict system of visa checks, interviews, and other measures to nearly all Middle Eastern and North African visitors to the UK to prevent the entry of suspected terrorist personnel. By using these highly arbitrary measures, it became the modus operandi of the UK authorities to treat all Middle Eastern and North Africans as potential terrorists until convinced otherwise.     

Mincing Words: The Three Layers of the AKP’s Narrative on Kurdish Politics

Abstract

In 2009–2015, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) put forward several initiatives to end insurgency in Kurdish majority areas. However, successive “openings” failed to make progress. The electoral and international goals of the AKP gradually became incongruent with the peace process, and the AKP espoused heavy-handed tactics in July 2015. The ups and downs of the process in 2009–2015 show that it was already fragile. Some causes of this fragility were external to the AKP, such as the opposition parties’ eagerness to use the process to poach nationalist voters and the PKK’s violence. However, I argue that the contradictory nature of the AKP’s narrative was also a crucial factor. The party’s earlier narrative required the strict separation of two layers: security policies to fight terrorists and democratization policies to address the legitimate grievances of citizens. However, the intersubjective strategies that it experimented later required a gray area between these two fields. The AKP, instead of changing strategies, has constructed a three-layered, contradictory narrative.     

From car bombs to logic bombs: The growing threat from information terrorism

The vulnerability of the critical infrastructure has led to increasing concern that it will be the target of terrorist attacks. This article explores definitional aspects of information terrorism and identifies two groups likely to find information terrorism attractive: conventional terrorist groups and information culture groups. As computer sophisticated youth move into the ranks of conventional terrorist groups, the groups will increase their reliance on computer technology, and information terrorism will be incorporated into a hybrid tactical repertoire. Information culture groups, however, confine their attacks to cyberspace. In contrast to the powerful group dynamics of the traditional underground terrorist group, networked groups, particularly information culture terrorists, may only be in contact electronically, and are subject to a radically different group psychology, virtual group dynamics, that significantly affects their decision making and risk taking, and has dangerous security implications.     

Securitising proliferation, failing security governance: the European Union’s role in India and Pakistan’s nuclear rivalry

In 2003, the European Union declared the threat of weapons of mass destruction ‘potentially the greatest threat to our security’ and increasingly called for the issue of nuclear proliferation to be managed within its preferred multilateral security governance frameworks. In spite of this, and the increased securitisation of proliferation, the EU has fundamentally continued its historical record of failing to engage with India and Pakistan’s nuclear rivalry, and has not been able to move significantly beyond a relationship with South Asia based on trade and aid. This is deeply problematic given the regional instability posed by the Indo-Pakistani enduring rivalry, and the fact that Pakistan is not only an unstable nuclear weapons state, but has been known to harbour international terrorists and nuclear proliferators. Given these conditions, as the EU acknowledges, the stakes of failing to engage could not be higher. A deeper analysis of EU engagement, however, demonstrates that EU security governance is limited, ineffectual, inconsistent and largely perceived as neo-colonial in what is the world’s most likely nuclear flashpoint. If the EU is to be considered a global actor in security governance, a key objective of the Treaty of Lisbon, then this needs to be redressed.