Manufacturing the Jihad in Europe: The Islamic State’s Strategy

ABSTRACT

As the Islamic State (IS) caliphate in the Middle East has collapsed, it is seeking to extend its influence elsewhere, particularly in Europe where there are existing inter-communal tensions to exploit. IS has deployed the management of savagery doctrine through acts of terrorism as part of its strategy to increase polarisation by exacerbating fear and distrust among communities, encouraging sympathies for far-right actors among non-Muslims and potentially alienating counterterrorism policies by governments, pushing Muslims out of what it terms the ‘grey zone’. The desired outcome is to drain state resources and showcase Europe as hostile to Muslims, promoting the notion of a ‘war on Islam’.     

Support for Terrorism: The Role of Beliefs in Jihad and Institutional Responses to Terrorism

ABSTRACT

Passive support for terrorism refers to expressions of sympathy for acts of terrorism and/or the justifications (ideology) used by terrorist groups to legitimise their beliefs and actions. One form of passive support is whether Muslims feel terrorists have valid grievances. Appealing to a sense of grievance is a key way that violent Islamists attempt to recruit fellow Muslims to their cause. Using survey data collected from 800 Muslims living in Australia, this paper examines factors that lead Muslims to believe that terrorists have valid grievances. Factors examined include beliefs in jihad and attitudes towards counterterrorism policing and laws. Other variables included in the analysis are social identity, age, gender, income, religious denomination (Sunni vs. Shia), religious commitment, i.e., Mosque attendance, and recent contact with police. The most significant predictor of passive support for terrorism was found to be particular beliefs in jihad. The perceived legitimacy of counterterrorism laws and trust in police were also important. Implications for countering extremist ideology and generating community cooperation in counterterrorism will be considered.     

伊斯兰圣战的理论渊源与实质

伊斯兰圣战是当今国际政治舞台上一个引人注目的现象 ,是国际局势动荡不宁的一个重要因素 ,许多国际冲突和纠纷无不与之有或多或少的联系。伊斯兰圣战在伊斯兰教中占有重要地位 ,《古兰经》和《圣训》对此都有阐述。伊斯兰圣战的实质就是维护和传播伊斯兰教 ,它同时具有征服异教和反抗压迫的双重特性。     

试析当代伊斯兰圣战观

在当代伊斯兰现象中,圣战无疑是最引人注目的,它几乎就是伊斯兰威胁的代名词。本文从纵向和横向两个角度分析伊斯兰圣战观的演变情况。从历史纵向看,当代穆斯林对于圣战概念的理解与经典解释的侧重点不同;从横向比较看,当前的伊斯兰运动对于圣战的态度,出现了本土化和国际化两大潮流。据此认为,伊斯兰圣战的内涵随着时代和地区的不同而发生着变化,统一的圣战观并不存在。     

Islamic State in Focus

Islamic State has rapidly become a new threat to the international community.It is now staging terrorist attacks in a long list of Western countries including Canada,Australia and France.Compared to Al Qaeda,Islamic State is characterized by the following:1)Its ultimate goal is to find Utopia.This attracts jihadists from around the world;they are following a call to settle the historical feud between Islam and Christianity.It is also stirring up sectional strife between Sunnis and Shiites.Its demagogy has thus far recruited 15,000Jihadists from over 80 countries;2)It has been competing with Al-Qaeda in trying to launch terrorist     

Egyptian Cinema as a Tool in the Struggle Against Islamic Terrorism

The cinema has been used by Egyptian regimes, from the monarchy until Mubarak, to resist the political agenda of Islamic radicals and terrorists. Edward Said and others describe Islamic terrorists’ images in the Western media as “Western fantasies.” Nevertheless, for Egyptian intellectuals, terrorists were and remain a stark reality. In Egypt, the entire state apparatus was set in motion to fight Islamic terrorism. The state was unprepared for the massive popular uprising of 2011. While the direction that Egyptian culture will follow after Mubarak remains unclear, an important objective is to study pre-revolutionary Egyptian cinema and to understand its ideological tendencies.     

也论当代伊斯兰教的"圣战"观--兼与叶青先生商榷

《现代国际关系》2006年第1期发表了叶青先生《试析当代伊斯兰圣战观》。该文明确提出:伊斯兰教“并不存在”“统一的圣战观”。①本文则认为:伊斯兰教追求和平但不回避战争,不应否认“统一的”伊斯兰“圣战”观的存在。伊斯兰“圣战”观具有一般“圣战”观的根本特征:以“战”为实,以“圣”为名,强调战争的自卫性,在战争目的的神圣性下强调战争手段的道德性。伊斯兰教的“圣战”观可能被极端化,而且根源就在于伊斯兰教自身。但是,这种极端化的“圣战”观完全背离了伊斯兰教的本义。     

Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad

Using twice-yearly data from 1991 to 2003, we analyze the incidents of suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad within Israel and the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Given the exploratory nature of the question, we have first estimated the relevant coefficients by using a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Ratio and then checked their robustness by reestimating the model with the help of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) as an interrelated system. The results indicate that the two groups deliberately use suicide bombings as strategic weapons within the larger Israeli-Palestinian political milieu. With the Western world locked in an armed struggle with the militant extremists of Islam based on millenarian ideologies, this study emphasizes the need to develop appropriate analytical capabilities to distinguish among terrorist groups and their motivations, ideologies, and tactics.     

Women and Support for Terrorism in Pakistan

ABSTRACT

While there have been many scholarly inquiries about the sources of support for terrorism among Muslim publics, to date, scholars have generally not asked whether or not gender predicts support for Islamist militancy. Instead, most scholars and officials assume that “men of military age” are the most important segment of interest. Instead, gender is usually treated as a “control variable” rather than a “study variable,” reflecting the paucity of interest in this subject. This is likely an important scholarly and policy-analytic oversight. Many terrorist groups have women’s wings and women-oriented publications and other outreach programs because they understand the important role that mothers, wives, and sisters play in a male family member’s decision to take up arms with a terrorist group. In some conflicts, women also join as combatants. In this paper, we seek to address these scholarly lacunae by examining gender-wise support for two militant groups based in and operating from Pakistan: the Afghan Taliban, which has no female outreach program, and the sectarian Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, which does. We leverage a dataset drawn from a relatively large national survey of Pakistanis collected in 2011 to model support for these groups using gender as an independent variable along with other demographic and control variables. We find that females are significantly more likely to support the sectarian group with a women’s outreach-wing. In contrast, there is no significant gender effect on support for the Afghan Taliban. We argue, from these results, that gender deserves more attention in understanding who supports and participates in Islamist militancy.     

State Capacity and Terrorism: A Two-Dimensional Approach

Conventional wisdom suggests that dissident groups use terrorism when they face an overwhelmingly more powerful state, yet attacks in developing countries have predominated in the post-Cold War era, suggesting that terrorism is an increasingly weak state phenomenon. Cross-national studies of terrorism find mixed results for how common measures of state capacity influence terrorism. We argue that these indeterminate findings are due in part to a partial understanding of both what constitutes state capacity and how different aspects of state strength or weakness relate to the propensity of groups to use terrorism. We decompose state capacity into two dimensions that we theorize are particularly relevant to dissident groups: military capacity, or the ability to project conventional military force, and bureaucratic/administrative capacity. Our analysis supports the claim that terrorist attacks are more frequently targeted at states with large, technologically sophisticated militaries but less frequently targeted at states with higher bureaucratic and administrative capacity. We also compare two militarily capable states, France and Russia, that have had different recent experiences with terrorism to help illustrate the causal mechanisms involved. Evidence from our models and cases suggest that states can be capable in different ways, and these various capabilities create differing incentives for using terror as a strategic and tactical tool.     

Running the Blockade: Information Technology,Terrorism, and the Transformation of Islamic Mass Culture

Arab media is no longer limited to state-sponsored sources, opening a door of opportunity to the Muslim world. Islamic terrorist groups leverage information technology to form resilient, networked organizations that influence how many Muslims perceive events and U.S. political goals. This article looks at the connection between information technology and cultural transformation in the Middle East. It focuses on how information technology—as the major weapon system in the battle of ideas—has been used effectively by Islamic extremists and less so by the U.S. Important conclusions are drawn regarding the necessity of culturally-attuned uses of information technology.     

The Islamic State and the New Tribalism

This article focuses on the apocalyptic zeitgeist of the Islamic State through the lens of what we call the New Tribalism. It finds that IS emerged from the Al Qaeda (AQ) milieu, but soon split with AQ as the messianic excitement surrounding Al-Baghdadi and his teachings grew. In common with previous millennial/messianic movements in all three “Peoples of the Book”—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—IS soon evolved beyond the laws of the normative faith (antinomianism). We hold that for this reason, despite its claims of faith and fealty, IS has left the Islamic Umah behind, becoming a malign sectarian group of its own whose dynamism and successes are attracting a global audience and support from Muslims in almost every country. This helps to explain such abhorrent practices as forced conversion, sexual servitude, the destruction of historic artifacts, and mass executions. We find that the American invasion of Iraq was the vital first step in a series of events, which gave birth to IS. A thorough review of IS history and political culture traces these historic moments in time.     

Characteristics of the ＂Islamic State＂

The extreme organization that calls itself the ＂Islamic State＂ has alarmed the world with its rapid rise and grave damage while drawing sharp censure from numerous directions. In his speech on the strategy of dismantling the ＂Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,＂ American President Barak Obama＇ s called it ＂a terrorist organization, pure and simple.＂ 1 Rooted in Middle East turmoil, facilitated by the irresponsible policies of the great powers and nearby countries, the ＂Islamic State＂ （also known as ISIS or ISIL） stands out from among regional terrorist organizations in a number of vital characteristics. ISIS, disowned by the A1-Qaeda, nevertheless challenges it and seems to gain the upper hand. What lies behind its success are at least two powerful characteristics： its religio-political ambition to establish a recognizable country, and its ability to entice the zeal of Western jihadists.