Political crises,strategic choices,and terrorism: The rise and fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros

In this article we offer a first attempt at providing a set of universal grading criteria for determining on what basis, and how far, an item of discursive content can be considered “terroristic.” In doing so, we draw loosely on the existing COPINE scale for child abuse images. The scale described in the article is not intended to reflect actual risk of engagement in terrorist violence, nor is it intended to have evidential validity in relation to offenses in certain jurisdictions relating to “terrorist publications.” Rather, by formalising assumptions which seem already to be latent in the literature on terrorist use of the Internet, it aspires to serve as a starting point for a more methodologically coherent approach to relationships between content—particularly online content—and terrorism.     

Desperate times and desperate measures: false-representation and distortion of terrorism in post-9/11 superhero films

In the wake of 9/11 there has been a marked increase in depictions of terrorism in Hollywood film. This shift has been particularly significant in superhero films. This genre of films has not historically relied upon terrorist narratives, but this article highlights contemporary ideological overlaps between terrorist and superhero narratives that explain why they have been more frequently presented together in contemporary film. In particular, both rely upon what Giorgio Agamben and other scholars refer to as a “state of exceptionality” and they feature ideological categories, such as those delineated in the work of Teun Van Dijk. This article analyses these themes using the methods of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. The article finds the growing number of depictions of terrorists in superhero films problematic because they deny terrorists rationality or political consciousness. The article analyses the binarism that this creates, finding that the proliferation of terrorist narratives in superhero films ultimately is detrimental because it proliferates a shallow and misleading understanding of terrorism which can undermine popular understanding of terrorism.     

Making sense of terrorism: a narrative approach to the study of violent events

ABSTRACT

How does violence become understood as terrorism? In this article, we show how a narrative approach to the study of violent events offers a conceptually productive way to understand the process of “seeing” an event as a terrorist act, one that explicitly integrates the phenomenology of violence. While the collective practice of defining terrorism in academia and the policy arena has struggled to produce a universal definition, we identify a set of “common sense” characteristics. We argue that if the framing of violent events prominently features these characteristics as discursive anchors, this primes processes of sensemaking toward interpreting violence as terrorism. While terrorism markers are often articulated as being pragmatic and apolitical indicators of terrorist acts, we show that they are indeed at the core of political contests over historical and physical facts about violent events. The narrative approach we develop in this article underscores that intuitive leanings toward interpreting violence as terrorism are a sign of political agency precisely because they are produced through the stories political agents tell.     

Terror of the talk: a new framework for countering terrorism within the institutionalisation of the terrorism industry

The “terrorism industry” that has been constructed by the war on terror has become institutionalised in the past decade, contributing in part to a significant increase in the overall public perception of terrorism and a dilution in meaning of the term “terrorist.” A linear regression analysis of the relationship of poll data collected from American citizens and frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks shows that this increased awareness has occurred despite the fact that terrorist attacks on American soil have decreased over the past decade. Considering the often-stated purpose of terrorists is to inspire fear, a central goal of the industry and the government should be to diminish these effects. However, the frequent and offhand use of the term “terrorist” fails to contextualise and counter the varied dispositions and motivations of terrorists and other non-state actors. To reduce public worry while working within the boundaries of the institutionalised terrorism industry, the study of terrorism should be conducted, and counterterrorist policies designed, using a new interdisciplinary framework that would allow the terrorism industry and the government to move beyond the binary designation of “terrorist” and “non-terrorist” to a greater spectrum of classification, from terrorists and violent non-state actors, to guerrillas, insurgents or criminals. A more nuanced framework could reduce public fear of terrorism and increase the effectiveness of counterterrorist policies.     

The security-prejudice nexus: “Islamist” terrorism and the structural logics of Islamophobia in the UK

ABSTRACT

A growing body of evidence documents that Islamophobia is a significant social issue in the UK. This evidence also reveals an empirical link to “Islamist” terrorism, revealing a nexus between security and the social emergence of prejudice. Drawing on critical approaches to security and applying them to the case of the UK in 2017, this article explores this nexus conceptually and empirically. To do so, it examines the discourses of various governance institutions (including the media, the political elite, and security professionals) as they respond to “Islamist” terrorist events. It argues that these governance institutions individually and collectively – and often unwittingly – stigmatised and securitised “Muslim” identity. The structural emergence (i.e., the institutionalisation) of Islamophobia in the UK, this article contends, can largely be understood through these processes. This article therefore offers an illustration of some of the logics of how prejudice is embedded in societal structures, which has normative implications for how these processes might be successfully contested.     

Analysing the European Union's responses to organized crime through different securitization lenses

In the past 30 years, organized crime (OC) has shifted from being an issue of little, or no concern, to being considered one of the key security threats facing the European Union (EU), the economic and political fabric of its society and its citizens. The purpose of this article is to understand how OC has come to be understood as one of the major security threats in the EU, by applying different lenses of Securitization Theory (ST). More specifically, the research question guiding this article is whether applying different ST approaches can lead us to draw differing conclusions as to whether OC has been successfully securitized in the EU. Building on the recent literature that argues that this theoretical framework has branched out into different approaches, this article wishes to contrast two alternative views of how a security problem comes into being, in order to verify whether different approaches can lead to diverging conclusions regarding the same phenomenon. The purpose of this exercise is to contribute to the further development of ST by pointing out that the choice in approach bears direct consequences on reaching a conclusion regarding the successful character of a securitization process. Starting from a reflection on ST, the article proceeds with applying a “linguistic approach” to the case study, which it then contrasts with a “sociological approach”. The article proposes that although the application of a “linguistic approach” seems to indicate that OC has become securitized in the EU, it also overlooks a number of elements, which the “sociological approach” renders visible and which lead us to refute the initial conclusion.     

Terrorists going transnational: rethinking the role of states in the case of AQIM and Boko Haram

This study moves beyond theories emphasising “state failure” as the cause for terrorist “spill-over”. The aim is to offer new theoretical and empirical considerations concerning the determinants of terrorist groups’ geographical strategies. The main argument this article presents is that transnationality for nationalistic terrorist organisations can be costly. This is the case due to the mobility, social and strategic costs of operating beyond controlled territories. Hence, the article proposes an interpretation of these decisions as being mainly generated by states’ counterterrorism strategies. Using data gathered from the GTD Dataset and secondary sources such as specialised reports and strategic documents, the article explores the argument by presenting observations and empirical findings on two groups, AQIM and Boko Haram.     

What Is a Terrorist Group? Conceptual Issues and Empirical Implications

Researchers increasingly conduct quantitative studies of terrorist groups, which is an important advance in the literature. However, there has been little discussion of what constitutes a “terrorist group,” regarding conceptualization or measurement. Many studies of terrorist groups do not define the term, and among those that do, definitions vary considerably. The lack of clarity leads to conceptual confusion as well as sample selection issues, which can affect inferences. To address these issues, this article offers an in-depth analysis of the term and its use. It explores definitions in the literature, and then discusses different samples used. Empirically, the article demonstrates how sample selection can affect variable values. It also shows that a non-representative sample, such as the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization list, can lead to inaccurate generalizations. Ultimately, I present a straightforward “inclusive” definition, and argue for its practicality. Other suggestions are made for a more effective and cohesive research program.     

The subjective and objective violence of terrorism: analysing “British values” in newspaper coverage of the 2017 London Bridge attack

This article examines how ?i?ek’s analysis of “subjective” violence can be used to explore the ways in which media coverage of a terrorist attack is contoured and shaped by less noticeable forms of “objective” (symbolic and systemic) violence. Drawing upon newspaper coverage of the 2017 London Bridge attack, it is noted how examples of “subjective” violence were grounded in the externalisation of a clearly identifiable “other”, which symbolically framed the terrorists and the attack as tied to and representative of the UK Muslim community. Examples of “systematic” violence were most notable in the ideological edifice that underpinned this framing but also in the ways in which newspaper reports served to draw upon British values in the aftermath of the attack. This directed attention away from the contradictions within the UK, towards narratives that sought to “fix” these contradictions through eradicating the problem of “the other” and/or by violently protecting the British values “they” seek to undermine. As a consequence, newspaper coverage worked to uphold the illusion that “peace” could be achieved by eradicating terrorism through further forms of objective violence, including, internment without trial; the “ripping up” of human rights; and closer surveillance of Muslim communities. Indeed, it was this unacknowledged violence that worked to maintain British values in the press' coverage.     

Deterring the terrorist: A psychological evaluation of different strategies for deterring terrorism

This article seeks to evaluate different anti‐terrorism strategies from a psychological perspective. Two major deterrent strategies are identified: the Denial Strategy and the Reintegrative Strategy. It is the contention of this article that both these strategies may be thought of as practical applications of different theories of crime deterrence. The Denial Strategy effectively mirrors early theories of crime deterrence, which concentrate on minimising the benefits, and increasing the costs, of crime through legal sanctions. By way of contrast, the Reintegrative Punishment Strategy represents a modern and more sophisticated theory of deterrence, which recognises the cost of non‐legal sanctions to the terrorist and the need to reintegrate the terrorist back into society. This article discusses the relative psychological merits of both these strategies, focusing on the normal psychology of the terrorist. In the course of this examination two major defects of the Denial Strategy are established and it is argued that the Reintegrative Punishment Strategy of deterring terrorism has greater psychological validity because it confronts the issues of the alienation and reintegration of the terrorist. These findings highlight the dangers of policy‐makers neglecting the psychology of the terrorist.     

De-antagonising the Other: Changing Constructions of the Taliban and the Possibility of Reconciliation

Shortly after 9/11 any kind of engagement, let alone reconciliation, with the Taliban was considered absurd. Recently, however, Afghan as well as Western elites have announced that they are now willing to talk to parts of the Taliban in an attempt to begin a reconciliation process in Afghanistan. This article focuses on the discourse theoretical framework developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and illustrates the merits of such an approach for explaining how such a shift became possible. It argues that the turn to reconciliation with the Taliban was enabled by a transformation of the discursive construction of the Taliban. The article focuses on the discursive dynamics of the (de)coupling and differentiation of signifiers as a central mechanism of meaning production. It argues that antagonistic identity constructions in the context of the global war on terror formed the discursive background against which the Taliban were first articulated as part of the terrorist “Other”, which made any engagement impossible. From 2009 onwards, however, it can be observed how the signifier “Taliban” was decoupled from the identity of the “terrorist”, how it transcended the antagonistic frontier and came to be seen as an entity worthy of engagement.     

A Review of: “Rogelio Alonso. The IRA and Armed Struggle.”

ABSTRACT

In the conceptual literature on terrorism, there is no shortage of answers to the question: “What is terrorism?” Indeed, the terrorism literature has been heavily criticized for a deluge of definitions. And yet the booming quantitative terrorism literature generally examines a narrow set of “what is terrorism?”: how country-level factors explain variation in the number of terrorist attacks. This article demonstrates the variety of ways in which scholars currently operationalize terrorism and compares them to the ways it could be operationalized. I replicate studies using alternative operationalizations of terrorism to examine the consequences of the terrorism literature’s collective bet to focus on attack counts at the country level. Finally, I discuss the implications of the narrow set of operational choices with an eye towards how a greater variety of approaches would produce a more robust research agenda.     

Homegrown Terrorism in the West

The London bombings in 2005 led to the perception that the terrorist threat had changed from external to internal. This became conceptualized shortly after as “homegrown terrorism.” This article deals with the meaning and scope of this phenomenon. We begin by tracing an ambiguity in the term “homegrown,” which is both about belonging in the West and autonomy from terrorist groups abroad. A quantitative study of Islamist terrorism in the West since 1989 reveals an increase in both internal and autonomous terrorism since 2003 and that most plots are now internal—but not autonomous. Finally we suggest that an increase in autonomous terrorism is a transitory phenomenon.     

A shifting enemy: analysing the BBC’s representations of “al-Qaeda” in the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 attacks

This article seeks to explore how the BBC made sense of the al-Qaeda phenomenon in its flagship “News at Ten” bulletin during the aftermath of the September 11^th 2001 attacks. Using Critical Multimodal Discourse Analysis, it shows how the BBC’s representations function as a dynamic and continually shifting site upon which a range of fears, identities, discourses and forms of knowledge and power struggle and contend, and through which a number of different “al-Qaedas” manifest themselves. In particular, three shifting modes of visual and verbal representation are identified within the BBC’s coverage which each correspond to a separate understanding of al-Qaeda: the “Islamic” mode, the “Personalised” mode and the “Elusive” mode. These representations both draw upon and challenge the dominant discourses surrounding Islam, non-state terrorism and the identities of terrorist suspects, providing audiences with a variety of often conflicting ways of seeing and speaking about this entity. As such, the article provides insight into the complex nature of the BBC’s representations of al-Qaeda during its coverage of the September 11^th 2001 attacks, and shows how such complexity serves, albeit inadvertently, to legitimise the far-reaching counterterrorism policies that were enacted in the aftermath of these attacks.     

Ten “Rs” of Social Reaction: Using Social Media to Analyse the “Post-Event” Impacts of the Murder of Lee Rigby

This article provides a case study analysis of social reactions to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013. Informed by empirical data collected by systematic monitoring of social media platforms, the analysis identifies a number of online behaviours with offline effects—labeled the ten “Rs”—that collectively constitute the process of social reaction to the crime. These are defined as: reporting; requesting; responding; recruiting; “risking”; retaliating; rumouring; remembering; reheating; and “resiliencing”. It is argued that the ability to observe these behaviours through the application of qualitative social media analysis has considerable potential. Conceptually, the analysis provides new insight into the complex and chaotic processes of sense-making and meaning attribution that arise in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. It illuminates how patterns of social reaction on social media are nuanced and complicated, with different segments of the public interpreting the same developments very differently. In addition, the findings and the conceptual framework outlined have implications for policy and practice development in terms of establishing a more effective and evidence-based approach to the consequence management of “post-event” conflict dynamics and social reactions.     

Immigrants and undesirables: “terrorism” and the “terrorist” in 1930s France

This article investigates French understandings of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” in the period of the late Third Republic when a series of assassinations, murders and bombings suggested that France was dangerously exposed to the threat of terror. The article deconstructs contemporary understandings of the phenomenon, showing that, if a variety of actions were labelled “terrorist”, the term was deployed in particular in relation to matters of foreignness. It was believed that immigrants, refugees and foreign secret agents imported terrorist violence to France. French citizens did not – could not even – perpetrate terrorism. Parallels may be drawn between discussions of citizenship in the wake of twenty-first century acts of terrorism and manifestations of such violence during the 1930s when notions of terrorism, Frenchness and foreignness were intimately connected.     

Terrorism and fear: do terrorists really want to scare?

There is a widespread tendency among academics, state institutions and international organisations to regard intention to cause fear and intimidation as a key definitional characteristic of terrorism. This article argues that such a conceptualisation of terrorism is unfounded. A survey of mainstream terrorist doctrines (propaganda by the deed, foco theory–urban guerrilla warfare and armed propaganda, and jihadist doctrines) and writings of several pre-eminent terrorist ideologues provides little evidence to suggest that the main tactical goal of terrorism is to spread fear and intimidation. Rather, regardless of their ideological orientation and the historical period in which they operated, terrorists seem to be preoccupied with similar goals: mobilising what they regard to be their constituency, avenging their fallen comrades, extracting retribution for their allegedly wronged constituency, or, simply, with the physical destruction of their perceived enemies. This survey is complemented with a number of “crucial case studies”, where “most-likely cases” of terrorist justification of indiscriminate attacks and a detailed analysis of terrorist literature, which explicitly deals with the question of “fear”, are used to test the validity of the claim that terrorists aim to cause fear and intimidation. In both type of cases the hypothesis is invalidated. In cases of justification of indiscriminate attacks, there is no evidence to suggest that the aim of the terrorists is to spread fear and intimidation. Moreover, in the case of one particular terrorist ideologue who explicitly addresses the question of fear, the analysis of the texts indicates that fear among a population is not seen as an aim to be achieved but as an obstacle for mass mobilisation: an obstacle, which can only be overcome by the terrorist tactics. Thus, in this particular “most-likely case” the aim of terrorist tactics turns out to be encouraging masses for insurrection rather than intimidating them.     

“New Terrorism” = Higher Brutality? An Empirical Test of the “Brutalization Thesis”

This article focuses on the so-called “brutalization” of terrorism. The brutalization thesis as part of the larger theoretical concept of “new terrorism” argues that “new terrorism” is more brutal than “old terrorism.” Many scholars claim that the 9/11 attacks mark the beginning of a new era of terrorism that has lifted international as well as domestic terrorism to a new level of violent brutality. Others argue that this process had already started in the early 1990s. After discussing possible ways to operationalize a brutalization of terrorism, for example focusing on suicide bombings or terrorist attacks against soft targets, this article tests the empirical credibility of the brutalization thesis regarding both potential starting points. Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only three out of nine indicators increased significantly during the 1990s, partially backing the idea of a general brutalization, whereas increasing numbers of suicide attacks and beheadings after 9/11 support the notion of a qualitative change in terrorism and its brutality connected with the idea of maximizing media and public attention. Yet, these developments are regionally limited and the brutality of this “new terrorism” exceeds the levels known from the zenith of “old terrorism” in the 1970s and 1980s in only a few cases.     

A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist

A conceptual framework is presented for addressing psychological issues in the development of the terrorist. In particular, the authors suggest that viewing terrorism as a process may lead not only to better conceptual development in analyses of the terrorist, but may also lead to the development of more practical and efficient counterterrorism initiatives. Additionally, viewing terrorism in this way may finally lead to the formation of a clear and unambiguous position for psychology within an interdisciplinary approach to analyses of both terrorism and the terrorist.     

Damned If You Do,Damned If You Don't: Performative Power and the Strategy of Conventional and Nuclear Defusing

This article seeks to initiate a new round of strategic intellectual innovation in an era when threats posed by non-state terrorist organizations and their state supporters do not resemble Cold War threats. Based on an interpretative sociological reading of the concepts of power, security, and rationality, it argues that a “damned if you do, damned if you don't” dilemma is to the post-Cold War era what the danger of surprise attack or unintended nuclear war was to the Cold War: the defining structural threat of international politics. The dilemma leaves states confronting asymmetrical warfare with the choice of reacting with force to a terrorist act or practicing appeasement. Neither approach, however, can achieve the goal of putting an end to terrorism. Deterrence sustains the dilemma by providing a rationale for why force should be used and why self-restraint is irrational. This article proposes a third option, defusing, which may be accomplished by denial (preventing provocateurs from dragging states into the use of force) and restructuration (transforming the structure and rules of the situation). Defusing relies on “performative power”—the capacity to project a dramatic and credible performance on the world stage and to decouple social actors, their audiences, and their most deeply held strategic beliefs. The force of the argument is illustrated by examples from the global “war on terror,” the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2008–09 operation “Cast Lead” in Gaza, and the Iranian nuclear crisis.