Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence From Propaganda Output

The United States has used unmanned, aerial vehicles—drones—to launch attacks on militants associated with Al Qaeda and other violent groups based in Pakistan. The goal is to degrade the target's capacity to undertake political and violent action. We assess the effectiveness of drone strikes in achieving this goal, measuring degradation as the capacity of Al Qaeda to generate and disseminate propaganda. Propaganda is a key output of many terrorist organizations and a long-standing priority for Al Qaeda. Unlike other potential measures of terrorist group activity and capacity, propaganda output can be observed and measured. If drone strikes have degraded Al Qaeda, their occurrence should be correlated with a reduction in the organization's propaganda output. The analysis presented here finds little evidence that this is the case. Drone strikes have not impaired Al Qaeda's ability to generate propaganda.     

The Palestinian intifada: An analysis of a popular uprising after seven months∗

This study challenges the conventional wisdom that the Internet is a reliable source of operational knowledge for terrorists, allowing them to train for terrorist attacks without access to real-world training camps and practical experience. The article distinguishes between abstract technical knowledge (what the Greeks called techne) and practical, experiential knowledge (mētis), investigating how each helps terrorists prepare for attacks. This distinction offers insight into how terrorists acquire the practical know-how they need to perform their activities as opposed to abstract know-what contained in bomb-making manuals. It also underscores the Internet's limitations as a source of operational knowledge for terrorists. While the Internet allows militants to share substantial techne, along with religious and ideological information, it is not particularly useful for disseminating the experiential and situational knowledge terrorists use to engage in acts of political violence. One likely reason why Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists have not made better use of the Internet's training potential to date is that its value as a source of operational knowledge of terrorism is limited.     

Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know?

ABSTRACT

Although militant groups have been present in Bangladesh since the 1990s, the country catapulted to international media attention on July 1, 2016, after an attack on a café in the upscale neighborhood of the capital Dhaka. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack which killed 29 people, mostly foreigners. The attack came in the wake of a series of attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, foreigners, liberal activists, authors, and publishers by both an AQIS affiliate and ISIS. The government denied the existence of militant groups tied to international terrorist organizations. Despite these developments and instances of Bangladeshis joining the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there has been very little in-depth discussion about who these militants are and what is driving Bangladeshis to militancy. This article addresses this lacuna. This paper examines the common traits of alleged Bangladeshi militants and explores the factors of radicalization. Drawing on media reports of the profiles of the alleged militants, between July 2014 and June 2015, and between July 2016 and August 2017, the article finds that most of the Bangladeshi militants are young, educated males increasingly coming from well-off families. We have also found evidence that four factors—social relationships, use of the Internet, personal crises, and external relations—appear most frequently in the narratives of Bangladeshi militants.     

A Means of First Resort: Explaining “Hot Pursuit” in International Relations

This article provides a new theory of hot pursuit—the use of military force by a state against a nonstate actor across borders—in international relations. Drawing from the literature on civil-military relations, I argue that attitudes on limited use of force in peripheral areas will vary between civilian and military, with the latter preferring to treat hot pursuit as a policing operation, whereas the former will treat it as a military one. The logic of my argument is that militaries are oriented structurally and culturally to fight conventionally and against state near-peer adversaries. Threats emanating from nonstate actors, while at times perceived to be existential, require “pin-prick”-style targeted airstrikes, raids by commando forces, or policing operations along a state's periphery. I draw on an original dataset of “hot pursuit” (1975–2009) I collected and examine two recent case studies: India's hot pursuit of ethnic militants into Myanmar and Turkey's pursuit of Kurdish militants into Iraq and Syria.     

Superficial,not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy

Abstract

Surveys such as the European Commission's Eurobarometer regularly reveal high levels of public support for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This paper argues, however, that public support for ESDP is only superficial, not substantial. First, there is no homogeneous ‘European’ public support for ESDP. Second, security and defence, as covered by ESDP with its focus on global crisis-management, rank very low among Europeans’ priorities. Third, Europeans are very sceptical about the appropriateness of military means, and hence a core element of ESDP, as a legitimate instrument in international affairs. These reservations are likely to have constraining effects on ESDP's future development. At the same time, there are compelling reasons for the further development of ESDP. Therefore, Europe's political elites should initiate a public diplomacy campaign inside the EU in which the case for Europe's further evolution as a strategic security and defence actor is made. ESDP operations are the most promising starting points as they illustrate both the normative and the ‘realist’ necessities of European engagement in global security affairs.     

Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?

This article presents results of a survey of 141 Pakistani families of slain militants. This survey collected data about the militants and their households. While derived from a convenience sample, these data are unprecedented and offer a glimpse into the backgrounds of militants and the families who (mostly) supported their decision to join the jihad. Most militants served and died in Kashmir and seem to be “high quality” militants in that they, like their heads of household, are well educated and not predominantly coming from seminaries, as is often claimed. This analysis suggests that while the militants merit attention, so do the families that produce militants.     

Changing the Rules of the Game: Comparing FIFA/UEFA and EU Attempts to Promote Reform of Power-Sharing Institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina

This article compares two international attempts to promote reform of power-sharing institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina: failed European Union-led efforts to promote reform of the country's constitution, which was established by the 1995 Dayton Agreement; and the recent successful reform of Bosnia-Herzegovina's institutions of football governance, promoted by the game's international and European governing bodies, FIFA and UEFA. The article outlines the history of these two reform processes and seeks to explain why FIFA and UEFA have been more successful in promoting reform in this post-conflict setting than the EU. It argues that, in contrast to the EU, which has been vague about the precise reforms expected of Bosnia-Herzegovina's politicians, leaving the details to be negotiated by domestic political elites, FIFA and UEFA were more precise in their demands and were also willing to capitalise on popular frustration with the governance of the sport and to bypass nationalist elites who stood in the way of reform.     

Al-Qaeda's Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network

Al-Qaeda is commonly described as a highly flexible and adaptable non-state network, making it difficult for states to combat. Although these features are associated with networks in theory, they are not inherent to networks in practice, and rely largely on organisational learning. A network that fails to learn is not likely to adapt successfully. This paper explores the learning implications of al-Qaeda's transnational network structure, focusing on decentralisation and reduced hierarchical control following the loss of its Afghanistan base. Drawing from organisational theory research, the paper uses an exploration–exploitation framework to offer hypotheses about how learning is evolving. It suggests a wider space for exploration, rendering a dispersed, decentralised al-Qaeda more innovative, balanced by a weakened ability to exploit resources and expertise. Networked al-Qaeda militants are described as ‘innovative improvisers’ with high creative potential but low professionalism. By delving into the mechanisms of learning, the paper builds knowledge of what specific circumstances affect al-Qaeda's purported agility as an actor. Further research is recommended on how states might respond to innovative improvisers. Such research should extend beyond popular proposals for ‘networked’ national security to innovation and learning in their own right.     

Beyond FATA: Exploring the Punjabi Militant Threat to Pakistan

Pakistan has a long history of patronizing militant proxies, and in recent years it has become a victim as well as a supporter of terrorism. The evolution of the jihadist insurgency in Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pashtun militants leading it, efforts to counter the insurgency, and the overall strategic threats to the state have merited significant study. With some notable exceptions, less attention has been paid to the role Punjabi militant organizations and their splinters have played in bringing the insurgency to Pakistan's heartland. The involvement of these actors in the revolutionary jihad against the state gives the FATA-based actors leading this insurgency power projection capabilities throughout the country. This article helps to fill that knowledge gap by bringing a more detailed level of analysis to the understanding of how anti-state Punjabi militant networks function at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. In doing so, it illustrates that the introduction of new loci of jihad at the macro-level, simultaneous integration and atomization among militant groups at the meso-level, and greater portability of fighters at the micro-level impedes covert control by Pakistani intelligence services and decreases the utility of even sincere counterterrorism efforts by the Pakistani state.     

BORROKA—The Legitimation of Street Violence in the Political Discourse of Radical Basque Nationalists

The present article analyzes the discourse employed by the left-wing nationalist movement in Spain's Basque Country to legitimize the use of street violence for political ends. I distinguish four “faces” of legitimation (“ex ante” vs. “ex post,” “for us” vs. “for others”) and argue that in a situation of radicalization of politically inspired (terrorist) violence, the discourse developed to justify violent action is principally meant for the organization's own following, and less to communicate with the outside world. Basque militants claimed that their strategy of political and military radicalization in the 1990s had been responsible for recent political successes of their movement.     

Let's talk Turkey! US influence on EU–Turkey relations

Turkey is of paramount importance to the United States and to the European Union. The United States is not only the first and foremost partner of both the EU and Turkey. It is also amongst the most committed supporters of Turkey's European integration. In support of Turkey's EU membership bid, Washington has set forth a variety of arguments and has attempted to influence EU decisions at different points in time. US advocacy throughout the 1990s was key to kick-starting Turkey's accession process. By contrast, US influence on Turkey's EU accession decreased visibly in the twenty-first century. The style of US advocacy goes some way towards explaining why this has been the case. When American advocacy has prioritized quiet, behind-closed-doors diplomacy it has tended to be more effective. When instead US officials have relied on loud public diplomacy, European reactions have been generally negative. More importantly however, it is the content of American arguments that has affected their relative impact on European perceptions of Turkey. Depending on whether the US has spoken to the rights-, the interest- or the identity-based logic of enlargement, the influence of the United States on Turkey's EU membership prospects has varied. On the grounds of this analysis, this article concludes by outlining broad policy suggestions regarding how the United States could contribute more effectively to Turkey's European integration.     

Neorealism,Security Cooperation,and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma

Most neorealists argue that relative decline constitutes a systemic incentive for European security cooperation. Although this claim is broadly accepted, I argue that the relationship between relative decline and European security cooperation is complicated by a number of factors. First, European calculations about relative decline bear both a global and a regional (that is, intra-European) component. If a European country is to effectively mitigate relative decline, cooperation is not sufficient. It is just as important that cooperation develops in a way that underscores that country's comparative strengths and minimizes its weaknesses. In this regard, European countries are often in direct competition with each other. Secondly, when Europeans are thinking about their relative power position, some countries matter more than others: a given European country may accept to incur a relative loss vis-à-vis another country (European or otherwise) but not others. These calculations are further complicated by issue linkage. Some countries may accept relative losses on some issues (for example, security) in exchange for gains on others (economic). This article examines how intra-European considerations of relative gains affect the way in which Europe's main powers seek to cope with relative decline and assesses how those considerations affect security cooperation in a European Union (EU) framework. In doing so, it aims to unpack the otherwise vague notions of relative decline and European security cooperation.     

European diplomatic practices: contemporary challenges and innovative approaches

Abstract

As the aim of this special issue is to show practice approaches at work in the case of European diplomacy, this introduction provides readers with a hands-on sense of where the conversation about practices and European diplomacy currently stands. By introducing the key terms and overviewing the literature, the article contextualises the guiding questions of the special issue. It starts by reviewing how practice approaches have evolved in IR debates. It then describes European diplomacy’s nuts and bolts in a post-Lisbon setting. It continues by focusing on specific practices and analytical mechanisms that contribute to understand European diplomacy’s transformations and the role of security. While the debate about practices goes beyond the case of diplomacy, the latter has become a showcase for the former and this special issue continues the debate on practices and diplomacy by zooming in on the European Union.     

Tactical Means,Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception

This analysis surveys Al Qaeda's employment of denial and deception (D&D) and shows that it uses D&D on tactical and operational levels in order to achieve strategic results. It defines denial and deception and explains how they relate to Al Qaeda, overviews Al Qaeda's changing network structure and seeks to summarize how Al Qaeda employs D&D throughout its operations. This paper is structured to show that denial and deception are institutionalized factors that manifest themselves through all aspects of bin Laden's organization and that the traditional conception of D&D—that nonstate actors are incapable of employing deception as an element of grand strategy—is incorrect.     

Identity and morality in the Italian red brigades

The article provides a brief background to the activities of the Italian Red Brigades, then examines the group's development in terms of three phases ‐ social, existential and survivalist. A perceived social and political identity in the early 1970s gave the organization an illusory security and the self‐confidence to step up the attack on the state. As the level of violence increased the BR became separated from their social base and created an auto‐identity based on self‐delusion and political alienation. Armed struggle was simplified to existential abstractions of myth and symbol. By the early 1980s the effects of legal and police repression, popular rejection and internal conflict reduced the remaining militants to a strategy of simple survival. The irreversible degeneration of the group's morality accompanied the process of social estrangement.     

The European Budget and the Principles of Solidarity and Added Value

By presenting a proposal for the EU's fifth Financial Perspective, now named Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), in June 2011, the European Commission started negotiations on the European Union's budget policy and financial programming that are expected to end in December 2012. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the MFF negotiations will be extremely difficult because a settlement can only be achieved by consensus. That means that all 27 member states and the European Parliament will have to agree. Two principles might be taken as guidelines to facilitate a compromise: the principle of European solidarity and the principle of European added value. The task will be to define a concept that combines both principles so that it can become the main argument and narrative for explaining the complex budget negotiations, enabling the European Union to avoid a stalemate.     

Imperial re-bordering of Europe: the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy

Debates on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) pivot on questions about what kind of political community the EU is becoming and what are the limits of its power projections in the EU's Neighbourhood. Indeed, with this new ambitious and ambiguous policy the EU's external relations are expanding from purely economic to cultural, political and security functions. The EU's desire and need to export its values and norms beyond its borders raises a set of ontological questions about the nature of the EU.     

Seeking CSDP Accountability Through Interparliamentary Scrutiny

The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) requires parliamentary accountability. At present, as CSDP-related decisions are increasingly taken in the framework of the UN or the EU, neither the European Parliament (EP) nor national parliaments are able to hold decision-makers accountable. Interparliamentary cooperation can provide added value in bringing about parliamentary scrutiny of CSDP. Nevertheless, despite an official agreement, the EP and national parliaments have different views on what such interparliamentary cooperation entails. There are five conditions – cooperation and complementarity among parliaments, conferential dialogues, coordinated agendas, and comprehensive and comparative scrutiny – that have to be fulfilled to create added value for interparliamentary cooperation on CSDP matters.     

The European Union and Belarus: democracy promotion by technocratic means?

Is Belarus an enviable constant in international relations: a maverick, isolated from the West and inseparable from the East? On the surface, there seems to be business as usual: Lukashenko's regime remains unchallenged; Belarus’ relations with the European Union – spasmodic at best; while its absorption into Russia's Eurasian project continues apace. Yet, some critical disjunctures – manifested in government tacit resistance to Russia's influence, and more instructively, in people's growing affinity with Europe – may indicate a sea-change transformation in the very fabric of society. This article, utilizing extensive and subject-focused research, conducted in the country between 2009 and 2013, examines the nature and causalities of the occurring change. It argues that democracy promotion, in Belarus’ case, may work better when depoliticized and inculcated, through norms, regulations, and practices of international order, into the daily lives of individuals. Through its continued technocratic, inclusive, and sector-level engagement, European Union governance, even under the conditions of limited bilateral dialogue, have succeeded in fostering much-needed space for reciprocal learning and critical reasoning, which may have far greater transformative potential than manufacturing a single collective will for democracy building.     

A Bloodless Guerrilla Warfare: Why U.S. White Leftists Renounced Violence Against People During the 1970s

Between 1968 and the late 1970s, a significant number of U.S. white leftist groups escalated their protest to armed struggle. After experimenting briefly with violence, they opted for low-intensity armed propaganda that targeted property and avoided hurting people. By contrast, European leftist groups and anti-colonial organizations in the U.S. made extensive use of antipersonnel violence. Why did U.S. leftists eschew attacks against civilians? Scholarship does not explain this case, as it focuses either on the internal dynamics of a single group or on structural variables. Conversely, this article addresses this question through a historical reconstruction and a multilevel analysis. The research identifies the critique and ensuing de-solidarization by the radical milieu as the main factor accounting for the restraint of violence. This article demonstrates that the radical milieu censored and isolated armed groups as soon as they escalated and began to endanger human lives. Therefore, in order to safeguard the solidarity pact with their constituencies, violent fringes moderated their repertoires of action. This article employs primary sources and original interviews with militants to support this claim and to assess the relevance of three concurrent factors: the trauma generated by the “townhouse incident,” the deterrence by law enforcement, and the militants’ socio-economic background.