Weak States,State Failure,and Terrorism

It is common to hear the assertion that weak or failed states are fertile ground for terrorism. Yet terrorist groups have emerged from, and operated within, countries which have strong, stable states and a variety of systems of government. Terrorist organizations operate in weak and failed states but it is not necessarily the condition of weak or failed statehood which explains their presence. Moreover, it is not necessarily the weakest states which do host such groups. Therefore, this condition is not a sufficient explanation for their presence. While weak or failed states might provide an enabling environment for certain types of terrorist groups to operate, additional explanatory variables need to be identified.     

The Homegrown Threat: State Strength,Grievance, and Domestic Terrorism

Scholars maintain that, similar to insurgency, terrorist violence is precipitated by both relative deprivation and state weakness. Yet aggrieved minority groups within a country should turn to terrorism when they are weak relative to the state rather than strong. Empirical evidence shows minority group discrimination and fragile political institutions to independently increase domestic terror attacks. But it remains unclear whether grievances drive domestic terrorism in both strong and weak states. Using data from 172 countries between 1998 and 2007, we find that for strong states the presence of minority discrimination leads to increased domestic terrorism, while for weak states the presence of minority discrimination actually leads to less domestic terrorism. Consequently, increasing state capacity may not be a panacea for antistate violence, as nonstate actors may simply change their strategy from insurgency or guerrilla warfare to terrorism. Efforts to reduce terrorist violence must focus on reducing grievance by eliminating discriminatory policies at the same time that measures to improve state capacity are enacted.     

自杀性恐怖主义的行动模式 及其根源

作为恐怖组织常用的一种行动模式,自杀性恐怖主义在历史上就长期存在,尤其是九一一事件的发生,更使得自杀性恐怖主义成为恐怖组织在恐怖袭击中惯用的一种手段。相比其他形式的恐怖袭击,自杀性恐怖主义具有简单、廉价、机动性强、引起的社会恐慌大以及造成的人员伤亡严重等特征。自杀性恐怖主义在世界多地都已经发生过,被各种类型的恐怖组织广泛使用,针对的对象多样化,并且具有相对固定的行动流程。目前学术界从个体、组织、社会、文化和环境等方面对于自杀性恐怖主义的产生原因进行了分析。从个体的角度来看,一个人是否愿意进行自杀性恐怖袭击,最为重要的是当事人的理性计算,即个人通过自杀性恐怖袭击获得的好处是否能为自己带来更大的个人收益、是否可以增进家庭的福利、是否可以增加所在共同体的利益。在未来的反恐与应对中,国际社会可以通过增强重要设备的科技含量、增加双方对话与谈判的可能性、加强公共外交的力度、增进各国间的相互合作等方式以应对自杀性恐怖主义威胁。     

State Capacity and Terrorism: A Two-Dimensional Approach

Conventional wisdom suggests that dissident groups use terrorism when they face an overwhelmingly more powerful state, yet attacks in developing countries have predominated in the post-Cold War era, suggesting that terrorism is an increasingly weak state phenomenon. Cross-national studies of terrorism find mixed results for how common measures of state capacity influence terrorism. We argue that these indeterminate findings are due in part to a partial understanding of both what constitutes state capacity and how different aspects of state strength or weakness relate to the propensity of groups to use terrorism. We decompose state capacity into two dimensions that we theorize are particularly relevant to dissident groups: military capacity, or the ability to project conventional military force, and bureaucratic/administrative capacity. Our analysis supports the claim that terrorist attacks are more frequently targeted at states with large, technologically sophisticated militaries but less frequently targeted at states with higher bureaucratic and administrative capacity. We also compare two militarily capable states, France and Russia, that have had different recent experiences with terrorism to help illustrate the causal mechanisms involved. Evidence from our models and cases suggest that states can be capable in different ways, and these various capabilities create differing incentives for using terror as a strategic and tactical tool.     

体系压力、威胁认知与韩国在中美之间的战略选择

随着中国综合国力的增长以及中美在亚太主导权竞争的加剧,作为地区重要的中等强国,韩国如何在中美之间进行战略选择日益成为学界关注的重要问题。本文以韩国加入亚洲基础设施投资银行(AIIB)、韩国部署萨德反导系统、韩国在南海问题上的行动为例,分析了韩国在中美之间战略选择的特点及决策影响因素。研究发现,第一,"安全上靠美国,经济上靠中国"的战略定义不足以全面说明韩国在中美之间的战略选择特点,韩国的战略选择具有多样性。第二,体系压力、自身的安全认知是影响韩国在中美之间战略选择的重要因素。其中,对于韩国来说,抵御来自朝鲜的安全威胁优先于防范中美博弈给韩国带来的安全风险。具体来说,如果某一议题涉及朝鲜威胁,韩国通常采取跟随美国的战略;如果不涉及朝鲜威胁,韩国则会选择迎合一方但不损害另一方的"对冲"战略。     

John Mueller. Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats,and Why We Believe Them

The history and identity of fundamentalism is complex. Religious fundamentalism names an ideological perspective found in most, if not all, major religions and is currently associated with variant forms of extremism and religiously-motivated acts of violence, including terrorism. Following a discussion of religious extremism per se, a typological paradigm of religious fundamentalism that attempts to demonstrate the ideological development from what might be referred to as an “initial” and relatively benign fundamentalism into extremism and thence to terrorism, will be presented. A discussion of a model of fundamentalism as applied to Islam will provide a comparative basis for assessing Christian fundamentalism and extremism, so setting the scene for an applied exploration of religious extremism and terrorism with particular reference to Christian contexts and examples.     

美国《2005年度全球恐怖主义形势报告》简介

2006年4月28日,美国国务院公布了《2005年度全球恐怖主义形势报告》①(以下简称“报告”),对过去一年国际恐怖主义的发展趋势和恐怖主义威胁的性质进行了战略评估,分析了恐怖主义的庇护所、美国的反恐政策以及恐怖分子试图获取大规模杀伤性武器的情况。这是自“9·11”事件以来     

Terrorism in Colombia: Logic and Sources of a Multidimensional and Ubiquitous Phenomenon

This article examines contemporary uses of terrorism in Colombia. Combining an historical analysis with the most complete database available on political violence, we illustrate how terrorism in Colombia constitutes a specific strategy that can be distinguished from other manifestations of violence. We argue that Colombia's non-state armed groups have turned terrorism into a pivotal element of their repertoires of action. These parties have not only increased their reliance on this strategy and introduced more refined forms such as de-territorialized terrorism, but also have specialized in particular terrorist attacks that suit their general objectives. While paramilitary groups rely mostly on massacres and forced disappearance, guerrillas concentrate on agitational terrorism including kidnappings and indiscriminate bombings.     

Challenging the State: Effect of Minority Discrimination,Economic Globalization,and Political Openness on Domestic Terrorism

Discrimination against minority groups is a robust predictor of domestic terrorism. However, economic and political openness might further facilitate mobilization of such aggrieved sections of a larger population. This study relates economic and political openness to minority discrimination in explaining vulnerability to domestic terrorism. Terrorism is a rational choice when a minority’s deprivation of public good provisions increases, while global economic integration and limited political openness facilitate rebel mobilization. Using data on 172 countries, I find strong support that countries discriminating against minority groups are more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks when their economic and political systems open up.     

Global Threats and American Strategies: From Communism in 1955 to Islamism in 2005

America's current security threats—the insurgency in Iraq, Islamic terrorism, and Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons—seem strange and unprecedented. Parallels can be drawn, however, between the security threats of 2005 and those of fifty years ago. The U.S. foreign policy developed to confront the communist threat offers lessons as we develop strategies to combat today's threat. Two contemporary perspectives on strategic issues—one conservative/realist, one neoconservative/idealist—apply lessons of the Cold War to today's U.S. foreign policy, but each has serious flaws. A third, neorealist perspective, suggests that by leveraging the divisions already present in the Muslim world, the United States can win the global contest against Islamic terrorism. However, this would require a transformation in American strategy that will not be easily achieved.     

Threats at Home,Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of Coups and Revolutions

I analyze a two-level game in which a leader bargains over the spoils of international bargaining with a domestic opposition that can threaten her with a coup or revolution. While fighting an international war shrinks the domestic pie, it also alters the distribution of domestic power. This has three main implications. First, if war will undermine the opposition, fighting may be so attractive that leaders demand more for peace than foreign states are willing to give, leading to war. Second, if war will bolster the opposition, leaders accept harsh terms to avoid fighting—strategic selection that has implications for the observed relationship between war and political survival. Finally, prospective shifts in the distribution of domestic power caused by war can reduce the effects of international asymmetric information, though the result may be to increase or decrease the chances of war.     

International Cooperation,Spoiling, and Transnational Terrorism

Do interstate relations influence the sources and targets of transnational terrorism? A considerable body of recent research suggests that the answer to this question is yes, and that one state may sponsor terrorist attacks to weaken the bargaining positions of other states. We suggest, in contrast, that positive or cooperative actions invite terrorist attacks from a different source: nonstate groups wishing to spoil interstate cooperation that they oppose. We assess this argument with a dyadic dataset using monthly data on transnational terrorist attacks and cooperative and noncooperative actions between states. Our results suggest that spoiling in response to interstate cooperation is an important determinant of transnational terrorism.     

Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes

The crisis bargaining literature sees demands as endogenous to crises. However, despite the parallels between military and economic coercion, sanctions researchers have preferred to analyze economic coercion after demands have been issued, and have not explored sufficiently the possibility that when senders formulate their policy objectives, they consider the international constraints imposed by the capabilities and interests of target states. I complement the sanctions literature by deriving the implications of strategic goal formulation in a game theoretic model of economic coercion that assumes endogenous demands. The model explains the inconsistent empirical relationship between sanctions costs and outcomes as well as the paradoxical tendency of senders to select into difficult disputes. I find that threats are not always more effective than sanctions and suggest what an optimal sanctions policy might look like.