ABSTRACTThe United States was at least partly culpable for the failure of denuclearisation agreements with North Korea concluded during the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in the 1990s and early 2000s. American failure to implement commitments in a timely manner arose from a combination of domestic and presidential politics, the constraints imposed by international partnerships, and bureaucratic structures and procedures. For its part, North Korea implemented its commitments faithfully until its leadership’s increasing disenchantment with American tardiness and perceived lack of good faith. 相似文献
The Middle East, one of the most turbulent regions in the world, has embarked on another round of chaos since America waged the Iraq war in 2003, new players vying to fill the power vacuum, entrenched hatred multiplying with new wounds. Ecstasy turned into agony as Americans watched the war unfold. U.S. think tank researchers and politicians, reflecting on the war and U.S. Middle East policy, urged the Bush administration to adjust the policy and break the strategic impasse. Under grave pressure from home and abroad, the White House finally began to respond. Against this backdrop, the year 2007 witnessed the most intensive and extensive shift of U.S. Middle East policy in recent years and a drastic return of realism in America＇s foreign policy. These policy changes rippled in the Middle East, precipitating policy changes of other powers and transformation of the geopolitical landscape. The Middle East, as we can see, is heading toward a new age of pain and growth. 相似文献
Tensions have long been a feature of the international relations of the Middle East. After the 2011 Arab uprisings, regional instability is being driven by a confluence of three interrelated developments. First, the weakening role of the United States as a power balancer in the Middle East, combined with the larger global context, has provided assumptions about threats and new opportunities for local and other actors to pursue strategic and foreign policy objectives that have deepened tensions and regional competition. Second, there has been a juxtaposing of power multipolarity with ideological multipolarity, itself a source of increased instability, with two of the regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, fanning opposing sectarian flames to further their respective strategic objectives. Third, this strategic competition is being played out in several newly weakened or collapsing states such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Similarly, the regional powers’ competition in previously weakened states, such as Lebanon and Iraq, has intensified due to the acquisition of new, sectarian dimensions. These developments are likely to perpetuate instability and tensions in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.
