The intifada: Palestinian adaptation to Israeli counterinsurgency tactics

In December 1987 the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip significantly changed the nature of the Palestinian threat to Israel and pushed the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians into the forefront of the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict. This article examines the effects of the Israeli counterinsurgency tactics on the Palestinian strategy from the period of 1967 through 1987. It proposes that the implementation of Israel's counterinsurgency policy since 1967 was a crucial factor in creating the conditions for revolution and influencing the Palestinians’ adaptation of their tactics, culminating in the intifada.     

Conflict over Israel: The Role of Religion,Race, Party and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1997–2002

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the contours of support for the state of Israel in the House of Representatives from 1997 to 2002. In an analysis of votes and cosponsorship decisions, we find that when Congress considers innocuous resolutions of support for Israel, support is consensual and nonpartisan. However, as the violence escalated between Israel and the Palestinians in the 106th and 107th Congresses (1999–2001), the House increasingly considered bills and resolutions that directly engaged the Palestinian issue and forced legislators to take a side in the ongoing conflict. This transformed the politics of support for Israel and increased the level of conflict among legislators. With that, new partisan, ideological, religious, and racial cleavages emerged. Democrats, liberals, and African Americans started to identify with the Palestinians—not Israel—as the oppressed group. At the same time, religious and ideological conservatives and Republicans started to identify with Israel as a just state under attack from lawless individuals considered to be outside the Judeo-Christian tradition. At least with regard to Israel, this suggests that the development of U.S. foreign policy, which is often characterized as an elite-driven pursuit of national interests, is heavily marked by domestic ethno-religious forces.     

Ethics,terrorism and counter‐terrorism

Traditionally, the Talmudic Orthodoxy always postulated the reestablishing of a Jewish state only by an act of God's grace at messianic times. The establishment of Israel by secular Jews thus caused real consternation among Orthodox sects. Ultra Orthodox sects did not even recognize Israel as a Jewish entity. However, the occupation of the West Bank, the site of the ancient Jewish kingdoms, in 1967 was seen by many Orthodox Jews as a sign of redemption and also an opportunity to take an active, even a leading, role in a “true Zionist” enterprise of fulfilling God's promise to Abraham that the whole land will belong to his offspring. The settling of the West Bank was congruent with the government's political aims. This led the government to provide deep financial and massive military support to settlers, both the religious population that follows a radical nationalistic policy enveloped with messianic motifs, and other settlers, attracted by the substantial perks. The violent conduct of the militant religious sector among the settlers provides a radical threat to Israel's character, and even its existence. Above and beyond that provided by the military and economic burden of the West Bank settlements themselves.     

De-terrorising the Palestinian national struggle: the roadmap to peace

This article follows the representation of Palestinian nationalism as a history of terrorism. This representation was produced in the Israeli media and academia, and broadcast by the state's political elite in international arenas. In the West, this image was accepted in many circles and affected the chances of the Palestinians having a fair hearing in the peace negotiations which began after the 1967 war. The article follows the construction of the equation of Palestinian nationalism with terrorism, assesses its impact on the peace process, and suggests the deconstruction of this narrative as the best way forward in future negotiations.     

The Internal Israeli Conflict: The Past, Present, and Future of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Settlements

On October 14 and 15, 2004, just days before the Israeli government submitted to the Knesset a draft legislation to authorize the evacuation of Jewish settlers from Gaza Strip and some settlements on the West Bank, a two‐day conference titled “Past, Present, and Future of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Settlements: The Internal Israeli Conflict” was held at Harvard Law School. The conference was sponsored by the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and the United States Institute of Peace. This interdisciplinary conference's six panels, whose proceedings are summarized in the series of articles that follow, explored the religious, ideological, psychological, political, legal, and international dimensions of the conflict. Presenters included former and current Israeli and American government officials, experts on resettlement policies and compensation mechanisms, and scholars from a variety of disciplines. While presentation topics covered a range of issues relating to the settlements, three broad themes arose from the conference. First, participants agreed that it is important, if not fundamental, to understand the perspectives of the national religious settlers who are the driving force behind the settlement movement. Exploring the settlers’ diverse interests, fears, and identities is necessary in order to see why relocation is so threatening to them. The Israeli government can lessen opposition to withdrawal by showing the settlers empathy and reassurance, but only if government officials first achieve a true understanding of the settlers’ concerns. Participants also argued that a reframing of the relocation in ideological terms could be another critical component of a solution to this problem. It may be necessary for the leaders of the settlement movement to develop a new narrative or modify the existing one in order to legitimize their relocation. Part of this narrative will involve the concept of “a greater good”— the government must reassure the settlers that their sacrifice is for a higher cause. Several participants noted that Israel needs to show the settlers “tough love.” When the relocations begin, many expect that there will be violence and that disturbing images will be broadcast throughout Israel and around the world. Internal disruption could put the government led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his Likud party coalition in jeopardy. The government must not waver in the face of this crisis, conference participants argued. In fact, the threat of violent and disruptive resistance by settlers and their allies can be part of the solution, not just the problem. The government and relocation supporters can use this extremism to justify decisive measures and to redefine the problem for the broader population to convince them that the stability of the country is at stake. Another major conclusion of conference participants was that, while the Israeli settlement issue has unique features, there is much to be learned from comparative analysis. Other countries have dealt with settlement situations, and their experiences offer invaluable lessons. In particular, participants contrasted Israel's settlements in Gaza and the West Bank with French settlements in Algeria and English settlements in Ireland. Some pointed to the French withdrawal from Algeria, which was politically painful but ultimately successful, as an example of “tough love” that Israel should follow. Finally, the involvement of third parties to help solve this conflict is indispensable. Participants noted that while much of Israel feels alienated from the European Union and the United Nations, the Israeli government is highly sensitive to the concerns of the United States, as evidenced by Sharon's decision to show the Gaza withdrawal plan to the U.S. government before he had even raised it with his cabinet and the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. International participation could help legitimize withdrawal and reduce Israeli responsibility for Gaza's future. Third parties can apply political pressure to encourage an accountable and responsible Palestinian leadership. They may also be called upon to provide some sort of financial aid. The participants acknowledged the complexity of the settlement problem and recognized that easy solutions do not exist. Yet, if the Israeli government works toward understanding the settlers’ perspectives, learns from comparative analysis, and involves third parties appropriately, the likelihood of a successful outcome increases greatly.     

The Arabs in Israel: Identity,criminality and the peace process

The basic datum that criminality among the Palestinian Arabs of Israel is nearly double the average among the population in general begs some hard questions and answers. It is suggested here that, besides the regular crimes endemic in Israeli society of which Arabs and Jews alike partake, there is a category of criminal activity that is peculiar to the Arabs, under the heading of ‘ideological’, namely nationalistically and/or religiously induced. It is suggested here that the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians does not necessarily reduce the rate of criminality among Israeli Arabs. Quite the contrary, in some cases it might increase criminal partnerships between Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line divide even when the peace process is alive and kicking; and when it is not, things might even get worse with the Israeli Arabs increasingly identifying with their brethren across the border in their struggle against the right‐wing government of Israel from which they are totally alienated.     

U.S. Senators' Support for Israel Examined Through Sponsorship/Cosponsorship Decisions, 1993–2002: The Influence of Elite and Constituent Factors

This paper explores Senate policy-making toward Israel from 1993–2002. Previous scholarship suggests that congressional policymaking toward Israel is heavily influenced by the ethnic and religious identification of both legislators and their constituents, not simply by legislators' abstract perceptions of the national interest. Other literature de-emphasizes the likelihood that constituent interests will affect Congressional foreign policy making. We test for an impact of both elite and constituent characteristics on Congressional support for Israel, using sponsorship–cosponsorship decisions in the 103rd–107th Congresses. Israel's strongest supporters in this period are shown to be Jewish, conservative, Republican, and evangelical senators. Notably, elite characteristics (partisanship, ideology, and religion) matter more than constituency factors, with the exception of the Jewish population in senators' home states. While Jewish and conservative senators have long been vocal supporters of Israel, evangelical and Republican senators have not historically taken such a strong pro-Israel stance; hence they are relatively new additions to the active pro-Israel coalition. Thus the pro-Israel coalition shows both continuity and change as it has broadened to include new partners. However, we suggest that this coalition is not necessarily stable and may undergo further evolution in the future.     

Influencing Negotiation Willingness in the Middle East: The Potential Contributions of Private Actors

Numerous efforts to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through diplomacy have taken place over the last four decades. To shed light on this dilemma in this article, the role that private actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can play to enhance the negotiation willingness of nonstate armed groups was examined. It was argued that the NGOs in particular could play key roles in promoting the negotiation willingness of nonstate actors and also in influencing their internal dynamics and increasing their cohesion. Specifically, we examine two pairs of efforts to resolve the conflict in Israel and Palestine: the “Road Map” and the track two Geneva Initiative of 2003, and the Olmert Peace Plan and Jimmy Carter's visit to the Middle East in 2008. In the first pair, NGO efforts yielded unexpected results. The Palestinians were ready to compromise even though the deal offered by the Israelis did not seem very generous. In the second pair, the reaction of the Palestinians to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's generous peace offer seemed especially puzzling, illustrating, the internal dynamics between the Palestinian factions. Negotiation willingness was closely related to cohesion, and that cohesion plays an important role in conflict negotiations. President Jimmy Carter's efforts in 2008 to enhance cohesion among the Palestinians illustrated the potential that NGOs have to complement official negotiations.     

Religious Rage: A Quantitative Analysis of the Intensity of Religious Conflicts

ABSTRACT

The conventional wisdom that religious conflicts are more intense than other types of conflicts is tested in this study using a cross-sectional time series analysis. The statistical test evaluates the intensity of 278 territorial conflict phases in the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset. The results indicate support for the assumption that religious conflicts are more intense than other types of conflicts; however, the relationship disappears when the relevance of religion is taken into account. Furthermore, this study evaluates the relationship of conflict intensity with the type of religion involved in the conflict and determines that no religion exhibits a significantly higher or lower intensity than the others.     

Muslim fundamentalists as social revolutionaries: The case of Israel

The Muslim movement in Israel has been growing in leaps and bounds since the 1980s and has deeply affected the socio‐political fabric of the Arab minority in Israel.

These Arabs, who are leaning more and more towards the Islamic movement, are thus protesting both against Israeli society and politics, and against the Socialist propensities of the Communist Party which has reflected their concerns since Israel was founded in 1948.

The Islamic movement, which has taken over so far, six mayorships in Arab‐Israeli villages and townships, has revolutionized society in those localities mobilizing the masses, instilling in them a new sense of identity and purpose and uniting them behind Islamic and national goals.     

Death is in the eye of the beholder: a study of casualty count framing in the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict

The 2014 Israel–Gaza war was the third of a string of conflicts to erupt between the State of Israel and Hamas in neighbouring Gaza and quickly became the deadliest for both sides. Even with the extensive media attention this crisis received, calls for more objective reporting were widespread, as locating sources that were not clearly influenced or reflective of political biases seemed near impossible. This paper seeks to explore the role “cultural proximity” plays in informing casualty count reporting in times of conflict. Qualitative content analysis is conducted on news coverage of the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict in the American daily newspaper, The New York Times, and the Israeli daily newspaper, Haaretz, to assess whether significant differences exist in the way casualty figures are addressed across varying degrees of political and cultural involvement. This research reveals that variations in casualty count reporting do indeed exist across cultural and national contexts, and deems this subject worthy of further research.     

Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa

Theoretically, the “mobilization hypothesis” establishes a link between religion and conflict by arguing that particular religious structures are prone to mobilization; once politicized, escalation to violent conflict becomes more likely. Yet, despite the religious diversity in sub-Saharan Africa and the religious overtones in a number of African conflicts, this assumption has not yet been backed by systematic empirical research on the religion–conflict nexus in the region. The following questions thus remain: Do religious factors significantly impact the onset of (religious) armed conflict? If so, do they follow the logic of the mobilization hypothesis and, if so, in which way? To answer these questions, this article draws on a unique data inventory of all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008, particularly including data on mobilization-prone religious structures (e.g., demographic changes, parallel ethno-religious identities) as well as religious factors indicating actual politicization of religion (e.g., inter-religious tensions, religious discrimination, incitement by religious leaders). Logit regressions suggest that religion indeed plays a significant role in African armed conflicts. These findings are compatible with the mobilization hypothesis, and stress the impact of conflict-prone religious structures, and particularly, the fact that overlaps of religious and ethnic identities are conflict-prone. Future research should investigate the religion-ethnicity-nexus in more detail.     

Structural Sources of Post-Communist Market Reform: Economic Structure, Political Culture, and War

Why did some post-communist countries implement more thorough market reforms than others? Four different structural explanations are considered: (1) relative size of economic interest group coalitions hurt by market reform; (2) predominant religious traditions, which may incorporate norms and institutions more or less favorable to market reform; (3) variation in historically based national economic and political expectations, in which greater pre-communist political and economic achievements may create collective rationales for more aggressive institutional and policy reforms; and (4) duration of large-scale military conflict, which may distract and undermine reformist governments. These explanations are tested both directly, and mediated through plausible process predictors—democratization, party ideological moderation or extremism, strength of the presidency, and party system concentration. The 28 post-communist countries are examined over shorter and longer time spans—2 years after the fall of the old regime and a decade or so after the fall. The two political culture variables—predominant religious tradition and national economic and political expectations—provide the most statistically significant and powerful predictors. War is also a significant and powerful predictor. Relative size of economic interest group coalitions is estimated to have little impact. Among the process variables, democratization and party ideological moderation have the most consistently significant and powerful impacts. One implication is that middle-range theories of political culture, which can be more firmly grounded in rational calculation and historical context, may be a promising way to remedy the weaknesses of political culture theories operating at the broader level of religion or civilization.     

The Intersection of Religion,Race, Class,and Ethnicity in Community Conflict

This brief essay explores some ways of defining what we need to know — but don't — about conflict within and between communities where there are strong identity differences based on religion, culture, gender, and race. Its particular focus is on the role that religion and religious leaders play in attempting to resolve identity-based conflict.     

American military presence in Europe

Despite the efforts put into negotiations, they have created a self-perpetuating cycle of disappointment, frustration and empty dialogue. With contradictory Palestinian and Israeli agendas – Palestinians negotiating for an independent state, an end to occupation, etc., and Israel negotiating primarily over security concerns – one must question the reason behind prolonged negotiations. Is US mediation, accused by many of extreme bias towards Israel, to blame? Or are negotiations an Israeli objective to execute a particular political agenda? In spite of the international community's recognition of establishing an independent Palestinian state, the current reality on the ground undermines any creation of one. This reality was allowed only by the strategic prolonging of negotiations. A particular focus on the proceedings following the Oslo Accords explains how Palestinian--Israeli negotiations have been used to pursue a specific objective.     

The lost revolution of West Germany's terrorists

ABSTRACT

The ubiquity of military service and armed conflict in the contemporary Israeli experience has stimulated intense Jewish theological discourse in matters relevant to armed conflict. Warfare and its conduct, subjects that for almost two millennia constituted one of the great lacunae of rabbinic instruction, are now addressed in a swelling tide of detailed and erudite publications.

The present essay outlines the contours of that discourse. Focusing on contemporary analyses of issues that in the western tradition fall under the rubric of ius ad bellum, it examines the means whereby attempts are made to apply traditional Jewish taxonomies of conflict to modern Israeli circumstances.

In addition, the essay addresses four specific issues: (1) The identities and affiliations of the discourses principal participants; (2) The formats and styles of their discussions; (3) The principal issues with which they are concerned; and (4) The potential implications, operational as well as intellectual, of the developments described.     

The nature of Islamic fundamentalism in Israel

This article focuses on the nature of Islamic fundamentalism in Israel. The interplay of Islamic fundamentalism's attitude toward the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict and the extent of the movement's integration into Israeli political life is explored. In addressing these themes, the history of Israeli Islamic fundamentalism is reviewed from the pre‐state period through the present, as are effects of both internal and external factors on the movement's development. In general, the movement has followed a pragmatic line, although its future endeavors and nature will undoubtedly be influenced by the continuing peace process.     

The Question of Religion and World Politics

ABSTRACT

In this essay we introduce this special volume on the role of religion in world conflict. We develop a common definition of religion which focuses on five ways religion can influence society and politics: (1) as a basis for identify; (2) as a belief system that influences behavior; (3) through formal religious doctrines; (4) as a source of legitimacy; and (5) through its religious institutions. We discuss why the issue of religion has in the past received little attention from social scientists. Finally, we develop a set of common questions which the other authors in this volume address. These questions are designed to create a better understanding of the role religion plays in world conflict as well as how international relations theory can help us understand this role.