The Economic Cost of March 11: Measuring the Direct Economic Cost of the Terrorist Attack on March 11, 2004 in Madrid

This article attempts to measure the direct costs that the terrorist attacks of 3/11 had on the economy of the region of Madrid. The evaluation has been made applying conservative criteria, and the results obtained have to be considered as minimum. The result indicates that the terrorist attacks caused a loss of nearly 212 million euros to the regional economy of Madrid, equivalent to 0.16 percent of the regional GDP (0.03 of the national GDP). This confirms that the immediate economic dimension of a terrorist attack such as the one of 3/11—apart from human catastrophic consequences—is relatively low.     

Making Palestinian “Martyrdom Operations”/“Suicide Attacks”: Interviews With Would-Be Perpetrators and Organizers

Knowledge about the ways in which suicide attacks are recruited and prepared and on the motivation of suicide bombers and the factors that influence the decisions of organizers of suicide attacks has so far been sketchy and sporadic, derived mostly from media sources. In this study, 15 Palestinian would-be suicides and 14 organizers of suicide attacks participated in semi-structured interviews designed to fill this lacuna. The paper focuses on the self-reported feelings and behavior of the suicide bombers from recruitment to dispatching, as well as on the organizers' self-reported views and decisions concerning suicide attacks.     

When Terrorism Goes to Sea: Terrorist Organizations and the Move to Maritime Targets

Terrorist groups are often relatively conservative in their choice of strategy, tactics, and targets, and it is worth asking what characteristics are associated with unconventional behavior. In this article we explore the question of why terrorist organizations move to one type of unconventional attack that has been a focus of concern of policymakers in recent years, namely attacks on maritime targets. Through an investigation of the organizational capacity and ideology of terrorist groups that committed maritime attacks between 1998 and 2005, we argue that this kind of violent behavior is driven by capability. Certain organizational characteristics of terrorist groups—territorial control, involvement in the drug trade, organizational size, and connections with other groups—provide groups with the capabilities that make maritime attacks both realistic and desirable. Terrorist groups' ideology—what they believe, and what their goals are—does not have the same impact, with the possible exception of groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. Our findings have implications for future research.     

自杀性恐怖主义的行动模式 及其根源

作为恐怖组织常用的一种行动模式,自杀性恐怖主义在历史上就长期存在,尤其是九一一事件的发生,更使得自杀性恐怖主义成为恐怖组织在恐怖袭击中惯用的一种手段。相比其他形式的恐怖袭击,自杀性恐怖主义具有简单、廉价、机动性强、引起的社会恐慌大以及造成的人员伤亡严重等特征。自杀性恐怖主义在世界多地都已经发生过,被各种类型的恐怖组织广泛使用,针对的对象多样化,并且具有相对固定的行动流程。目前学术界从个体、组织、社会、文化和环境等方面对于自杀性恐怖主义的产生原因进行了分析。从个体的角度来看,一个人是否愿意进行自杀性恐怖袭击,最为重要的是当事人的理性计算,即个人通过自杀性恐怖袭击获得的好处是否能为自己带来更大的个人收益、是否可以增进家庭的福利、是否可以增加所在共同体的利益。在未来的反恐与应对中,国际社会可以通过增强重要设备的科技含量、增加双方对话与谈判的可能性、加强公共外交的力度、增进各国间的相互合作等方式以应对自杀性恐怖主义威胁。     

“New Terrorism” = Higher Brutality? An Empirical Test of the “Brutalization Thesis”

This article focuses on the so-called “brutalization” of terrorism. The brutalization thesis as part of the larger theoretical concept of “new terrorism” argues that “new terrorism” is more brutal than “old terrorism.” Many scholars claim that the 9/11 attacks mark the beginning of a new era of terrorism that has lifted international as well as domestic terrorism to a new level of violent brutality. Others argue that this process had already started in the early 1990s. After discussing possible ways to operationalize a brutalization of terrorism, for example focusing on suicide bombings or terrorist attacks against soft targets, this article tests the empirical credibility of the brutalization thesis regarding both potential starting points. Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only three out of nine indicators increased significantly during the 1990s, partially backing the idea of a general brutalization, whereas increasing numbers of suicide attacks and beheadings after 9/11 support the notion of a qualitative change in terrorism and its brutality connected with the idea of maximizing media and public attention. Yet, these developments are regionally limited and the brutality of this “new terrorism” exceeds the levels known from the zenith of “old terrorism” in the 1970s and 1980s in only a few cases.     

Delegating Terror: Principal–Agent Based Decision Making in State Sponsorship of Terrorism

State sponsorship of terrorism, where a government deliberately provides resources and material support to a terrorist organization, is common in the international system. Sponsorship can provide significant strategic and political benefits for a state, but there are inherent international and domestic risks associated with delegating foreign policy to these actors. Using principal–agent analysis, I develop a model that evaluates the impact of potential costs and benefits on a state’s decision to sponsor terrorism. I test my model by using a novel dataset on sponsorship behaviors that ranges from 1970 to 2008. The results of my analysis support the validity of the principal–agent model in explaining sponsorship, as states will be more likely to engage in sponsorship when the strategic benefits of weakening the targeted state are high and the risks of international reputation loss and domestic dissatisfaction are low.     

Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 2003–2010: Disaggregating Targets Can Reveal Insurgent Motives and Priorities

Extending data reported by Mohammed Hafez in 2007, we compiled a database of 1,779 suicide bombers who attempted or completed attacks in Iraq from 2003 through 2010. From 2003 through 2006, monthly totals of suicide bombers show a pattern different from the pattern of non-suicide insurgent attacks, but from 2007 through 2010 the two patterns were similar. This biphasic pattern indicates that suicide attacks sometimes warrant separate analysis but sometimes are just one tactic in a larger envelope of insurgent violence. We also show that only 13 percent of suicide bombers targeted coalition forces and international civilians, primarily during the early years of the conflict, whereas 83 percent of suicide bombers targeted Iraqis (civilians, members of the Anbar Awakening Movement, Iraqi security forces, and government entities) in attacks that extended throughout the duration of the insurgency. These results challenge the idea that suicide attacks are primarily a nationalist response to foreign occupation, and caution that “smart bombs” may be more often sent against soft targets than hard targets. More generally, our results indicate that suicide attacks must be disaggregated by target in order to understand these attacks as the expression of different insurgent priorities at different times.     

从“阿拉伯之春”到“占领”运动——全球抗议周期中的框架转型及其效果

2010年年底以来发生在西亚北非的\"阿拉伯之春\"以及以美国\"占领华尔街\"运动为代表的系列\"占领\"运动,被国内外学术界视为构成新一轮全球抗议周期的组成部分。作者从社会运动理论有关主框架和抗议周期之间的关系出发,考察了\"阿拉伯之春\"和系列\"占领\"运动之间的联系与异同。\"阿拉伯之春\"中一个具有创新性的\"变革\"主框架的出现,构成此轮抗议周期兴起并具备强大动员能力的重要原因;而当系列\"占领\"运动在借鉴\"阿拉伯之春\"的话语和象征体系的基础上提出了一种\"占领\"主框架时,抗议周期在主框架上经历了从\"变革\"到\"占领\"的转型过程。然而,与\"变革\"主框架相比,\"占领\"主框架在经验的可信度、经历的可测量度和观念的重要性上存在明显不足,这是系列\"占领\"运动的动员能力无法与\"阿拉伯之春\"相比的重要原因。鉴于从\"阿拉伯之春\"到系列\"占领\"运动之间的意义和象征体系的转型并不成功,大致可以预料,除非新的社会运动对话语体系进行创造性的改造,否则,这一波全球抗议周期将趋于式微。     

Diplomacy,terrorism, and national narratives in the United States–Iran relationship

The United States and Iran have failed repeatedly in the last thirty years to normalise diplomatic relations. Each attempt to open a dialogue has been set back by acts of terrorism or perceptions thereof, and the small openings for diplomacy were quickly shut. The difficulties of normal diplomacy should be understood in light of the national narratives that guide each country's international behaviour, narratives that include strong admonitions on terrorism and sow distrust. One method to overcome the obstacles thrown up by these national narratives is to explore their dynamics and attempt to write a new, common narrative.     

Contemporary art and unconditionality: ‘the genus of art’ in the art criticism of Chiba Shigeo

This article examines art criticism of the 1980s that sought to address the context and continuity of postwar Japanese avant-garde art. The emphasis is placed on the notion of ‘the genus of art [rui to shite no bijutsu]’, which the art critic Chiba Shigeo discussed in his Gendai bijutsu itsudatsushi (1986). Chiba argued for an autonomous current of postwar Japanese art separate from Western art history but the argument has been largely overshadowed by his ostensible nihonjinron. The term ‘the genus of art’, therefore, has not yet received an adequate critical treatment. The article rephrases this notion as a call for a more inclusive definition of art designed to challenge the conditions that regulate non-Western art. Rather than simply being a nationalist polemic against Western art history from a marginalized place, Japan, ‘the genus of art’ was intended to revitalize and redefine the aims of the avant-garde within the context of ‘contemporary art’. By fleshing out the textual details of ‘the genus of art’ and situating the notion within a larger discourse that interrogated the semiotic role of ‘Japan’ in a global exhibition context, the study repositions Chiba's writing as a potential argument for unconditional acceptance, or unconditionality, as one important ethical contribution of contemporary art.