Internal Report Submitted to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies

Dissident Irish Republicans have increased their violent activities in recent years. These “spoilers” reject the 1998 Good Friday Agreement power-sharing deal between Unionist and Nationalist traditions in Northern Ireland. Instead dissident IRAs vow to maintain an armed campaign against Britain's sovereign claim to Northern Ireland and have killed British soldiers, police officers, and civilians in recent years. These groups have small political organisations with which they are associated. The assumption across the political spectrum is that, whereas Sinn Fein enjoyed significant electoral backing when linked to the now vanished Provisional IRA, contemporary violent Republican ultras and their political associates are utterly bereft of sympathy. Drawing upon new data from the Economic and Social Research Council 2010 Northern Ireland election survey, the first academic study to ask the electorate its views of dissident Republicans, this article examines whether there are any clusters of sympathy for these irreconcilables and their modus operandi. The piece assesses whether there are any demographic, structural, ideological, religious, or party trends indicating Republican dissident sympathies. It also assesses the extent to which dissidents are seen as a threat and examines whether this perception is shared evenly across Northern Ireland's two main communities.     

Terrorist Skin,Peace-Party Mask: The Political Communication Strategy of Sinn Féin and the PIRA

The article analyses the political communication strategy adopted by Sinn Féin in order to legitimize the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) terrorist campaign during their transition from violence into mainstream politics. Their endeavours to portray a triumphant republican movement in spite of the huge gap between strategic aims and achievements are examined. The political and social rehabilitation of violent Republicanism, and how their leaders have evolved from pariahs to celebrities, is also assessed. The role of the media and political elites, as well as the political discourse of the PIRA and Sinn Féin, is analysed in order to examine how the republican movement has tried to rewrite its past in an attempt to gain political and social legitimacy. Consequently, the myths reproduced by republicans to disguise their failures as historical compromises, reproducing a more benign interpretation of history which distorts the causes and consequences of terrorism, are critically assessed. The article will focus on the struggle for the legitimacy of the terrorist campaign and the propaganda system which, in the words of Garret FitzGerald (Irish Prime Minister between 1981 and 1987), has managed to turn the republican movement into the “peace party” despite murdering thousands of human beings.     

Geography,Globalization, and Terrorism: The Plots of Jemaah Islamiyah

Globalization and terrorism have become connected in many people's minds. I argue that the technologies of globalization, such as cheap transportation and telecommunications, do not in many circumstances liberate terrorist groups to attack throughout the world or necessarily grant them more power vis-à-vis states. In politically open environments, terrorist networks can behave much like legitimate jet-setting transnational organizations. When terrorist groups face state hostility, many of the tools of globalization become unavailable to them, and their activities become dependent on routes over any advantageous topographical features along states' boundaries, such as thick jungle, treacherous mountains, and tiny, isolated islands. This not only limits the territorial scope of the group's activities, but also means that the lack of these advantages can lead to failure. To illustrate this argument, I trace how the Southeast Asian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) planned two plots in 2000 and 2001: the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Indonesia, which succeeded, and the Singapore plots in 2001, which failed. The technologies of globalization were a great deal of help to JI during periods of political openness, but when it came under political pressure, the importance of geography and borders returned, particularly with regard to logistics.     

Mainstream Revolutionaries: Sinn Féin as a “Normal” Political Party?

Despite the seismic shift of Sinn Féin from being the “mouthpiece” of the Provisional Irish Republican Army to the largest nationalist force in Northern Ireland, the party continues to project its objectives within the revolutionary politics and tradition of 1916. Whilst various groups across the island of Ireland stress their loyalty to Irish independence and allegiance to their republican forefathers, 2016 also plays host to devolved assembly elections in Northern Ireland. The centenary of the Easter Rising is therefore a poignant moment to reassess republican politics, more specifically, the relationship between the armed revolutionary tradition and constitutionalism. Within the post-peace process era Sinn Féin have been accused of maintaining an autocratic culture and an intra-party framework that is more representative of a clandestine revolutionary organisation than a political party. Yet, simultaneously, Sinn Féin have not been immune to the pressures experienced by other modern political parties, bound by the laws of electoral competition and driven by office-seeking priorities. In order to explore Sinn Féin within the modern political arena, this article firstly examines the broader debate surrounding how armed groups make the transition into constitutional politics. Secondly, public opinion survey data is used to judge the basis of Sinn Féin's electoral appeal. Finally, internal party documents are used to examine party structure, intra-party democracy, and professionalisation in order to judge the extent to which Sinn Féin have completed the transition from being a “mouthpiece” to their armed counterpart, towards being a “normal” political party.     

Rebel's dilemma: The changing relationship between the IRA,Sinn Féin and paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland

The 40‐month period which has followed the introduction of the IRA's 1994 cease‐fire has witnessed the most intensive vigilante campaign ever carried out by the movement. A commitment to vigilantism has profoundly affected the evolution of both the policy and structure of Sinn Féin and the IRA. However, vigilantism bears costs for the two organizations and several serious attempts have been made by senior figures to end the practice. This article sets out to understand and describe the dynamics of militant republicanism's fluctuating commitment to vigilante violence, and in particular to understand the complex issues vigilantism has raised within Sinn Féin and the IRA in the past three decades. The article concludes that the two organizations are now irretrievably committed to vigilantism, and short of major RUC reform, they will be unable to end what has become a politically‐damaging policy.     

“Us” and “Them”: Ulster Loyalist Perspectives on the IRA and Irish Republicanism

This article draws on data from one-to-one interviews with members and former members of the Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence Association, Red Hand Commando, Ulster Political Research Group, and the Progressive Unionist Party to explore the dynamic and fluid perceptions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin among Ulster loyalists. The article will explore how attitudes and perceptions are influenced by the shifting political landscape in Northern Ireland as Ulster loyalists come to terms with the new realities created by the peace process, security normalization, decommissioning, and the rise in the threat of dissident republican violence. The article will also demonstrate that these perceptions are not purely antagonistic and based on the creation of negative, stereotypical “enemy images” fuelled by decades of conflict, but pragmatic, bound to societal and local events, and influenced by intragroup attitudes and divisions, in addition to the expected conflictual ingroup vs. outgroup relationships. Finally, the article will explore how loyalists employ republicanism and the transformation of the Provisional IRA in particular, as a mirror or benchmark to reflect on their own progress since 1994.     

Revolution in the city: On the resources of urban guerrillas

Authors who address the topic of rural guerrilla warfare argue that the ability to engage in political violence is predicated upon support from the local population and the capabilities of guerrilla organizations. We examine the applicability of these arguments for modern urban guerrilla warfare. We find that the Provisional Irish Republican Army draws on individual, organizational and environmental resources, and that the impact of these resources on the IRA has changed over time. Of these resources, the most important appear to be a combination of individual and organizational resources. Organizing into a cell structure in 1977 made the IRA dependent on only the passive support of the Northern Irish Nationalist population, and a high level of political awareness among IRA guerrillas guarantees that the IRA maintains this passive support.     

Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims

Most observers believe that the 'democratic rules of the game' provide a peaceful means for resolving political conflicts. This may be true but not all groups or even single individuals in democratic societies need play by these rules. This analysis uses two data sets: one that classifies most countries of the world based on how they were ruled in the mid-1980s, and the other on the frequency with which their nationals either perpetrated or were victimized by terrorists attacks, to investigate the relationship between terrorism and democracy. The findings suggest that stable democracy and terrorism go together. An analysis of the data reveal that terrorist attacks occur most often in the world's most stable democracies, and that, further, both the perpetrators and victims of those attacks are citizens of the same democracies.     

‘THEY HAVEN'T GONE AWAY,YOU KNOW’. IRISH REPUBLICAN ‘DISSIDENTS’ AND ‘ARMED STRUGGLE’

The shift by the provisional Republican movement towards constitutional politics in Northern Ireland has caused splits among Republicans. The formation of the Continuity and Real Irish Republican Armies, pledged to continue ‘armed struggle’ against British rule in Northern Ireland, was predictable, given the historical propensity of Republicans to divide amid claims of ‘betrayal’ by the leadership. The odds against militarist Republican ‘dissidents’ appear overwhelming, as they lack weapons, members and support. Sinn Féin has carried most of the Nationalist constituency on its transition towards constitutionalism and the Irish Republic has abandoned its claim to Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, continued political uncertainty over the province's political future has contributed to the maintenance of a long-standing militaristic tradition within Irish republicanism.     

Ferocious Times: The IRA,the RIC,and Britain's Failure in 1919–1921

The 1916 Rising was, in military terms, a shambolic failure. Despite the fact that Britain was locked in a gruelling struggle with Germany, the Rising was still utterly crushed within a week. How then, in the aftermath of victory against Germany, did Britain fail to win the subsequent struggle with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) between 1919 and 1921? This article assesses some of the key factors that played out in the conflict, drawing particular attention to the IRA's focus on the Royal Irish Constabulary and the consequences of this, and then later, how distorted perceptions of the proximity of success ultimately undermined British commitment. One of the most remarkable features of the conflict was the widespread belief among many on the British side (and more than a few in the Republican camp) that the IRA was on the verge of total defeat when the truce was declared in 1921. The IRA had suffered heavy casualties and were running low on weapons and ammunition. Yet, somehow the movement prevailed. This article aims to shed light on how and why that happened.     

Talking with terrorists,talking with governments: insurgent perspectives on legitimisation and engagement

ABSTRACT

It is often claimed that “talking to terrorists legitimises terrorism”. But analysts too often assume that insurgents seek standard forms of liberal-legalistic legitimisation through engagement with the state. From a Weberian perspective, however, liberal-legalistic legitimacy is one of a myriad of symbolic and practical grounds for legitimisation. This paper takes a political sociological approach to the problem of legitimacy in “terrorist” conflicts through a comparative analysis of Irish republican and Basque separatist efforts to end the campaigns of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA). There are three principal findings. First, violent insurgents often reject liberal-legalistic legitimatisation and instead seek recognition of their capacity to shape the trajectories of conflicts – and therefore recognition of their centrality to ending them. Second, the pursuit by violent insurgents for recognition of capacity often comes into conflict with their non-violent allies’ pursuit of liberal-legalistic legitimisation, which can hinder peace-making. Finally, the pursuit of these forms of legitimisation structure peace processes in that armed groups seeking recognition demand direct talks with governments, while legitimacy-seeking non-violent insurgents emphasise engagement with political parties and non-violent organisations. The relative balance between symbolic goals thus shapes the practice of peace-making in such conflicts.     

For Whom the Bell Tolls: Democracy and Development in South Asia

This paper suggests that there are many contrary pulls, some old, and others new, operating on socioeconomic development in the South Asian region. It argues that September 11th, 2001 has been a defining and defiling moment for the region, since the consequences of the terrorist attacks on the US will weaken democracy in the subcontinent. Consequently, the region will lose its historical advantage of not being militarised by outside poles, or interests, and this will undermine democratic mechanisms that facilitate alleviation of poverty and inequality. This paper investigates the disjunction between mainstream and grassroots perceptions of India's poverty, arguing that localised democratic government, attention to the institutional architecture of countries, and enabling participation of the poor and the discriminated offer the only way to deal with economic and social inequality.     

Terrorism and democracy: What recent events disclose

This paper is the second in a series of analyses which explore relationships between terrorism and democracy. In this instance, the authors use the Rand‐St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism for 1994, as well as the US State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism collection of events for 1995. The authors use these data sets to determine if there is a linkage between the occurrence of terrorist attacks and the type of incumbent political regime in the countries where they are perpetrated. The two classifications of political regimes were drawn from Robert Wesson's 1987 study Democracy: a Worldwide Survey and the Freedom House Publication Freedom in the World for 1984–85 and 1994–95, in order to evaluate the impact of regime change on the incidence of terrorist events. Our principal finding, consistent with earlier work, is that terrorist events are substantially more likely to occur in free and democratic settings than in any of the alternatives. We do discover, though, that change in and of itself makes a difference. Countries which underwent regime change in the period under consideration were more likely to experience terrorism than countries which did not.     

Boxing and Politics in Slovakia: 'Meciarism' Roots,Theory, Practice

This article argues that 'Meciarism' represented an inevitable phase on Slovakia's way towards democracy and a market economy - it was the 'Slovak must'. 'Meciarism' as a distinct phase of development was determined by the fact that state-building and democratic transition took place at the same time and were fostered by peculiar traditional features of Slovak political culture. The first substantive section of the article introduces the theory and practice of 'Meciarism'. The attempt to clarify core features and their ideological roots is illustrated by a selection of examples that depict the reality of 'Meciarist rule' and the coalition government's political style. The second section investigates the political environment on the civic level, which was favourable to the emergence of 'Meciarism', and argues that 'civic incompetence' was the main reason for Prime Minister Meciar's political success. Finally, the third section explores the historic origins of 'Meciarism'. It shows how distinctive historical conditions and constellations shaped Slovak society's political culture to such an extent that 'Meciarism' was an inevitable feature of the first years of national independence.     

Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis

During the late 1970s, Turkey experienced a major campaign of political terrorism that was waged by a multiplicity of leftist, ultranationalist, and separatist groups. Between 1976 and 1980, more than 5000 people lost their lives in hundreds of terrorist incidents. The steady escalation of violence amidst a major political and economic crisis undermined the country's fragile democratic system and paved the way for a military coup in September 1980. This study examines the origins and growth of the terrorist movement in Turkey, the main characteristics of political violence, and the causes of the dramatic escalation of terrorism in the late 1970s. The study suggests that although state-sponsored terrorism against Turkey facilitated the rapid proliferation of leftist, rightist, and separatist armed extremist groups, the drift into total terrorism was largely the product of domestic political and social developments.     

‘THE OLD DAYS ARE OVER’:1 IRISH REPUBLICANISM,THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE DISCOURSE OF EQUALITY

This article examines the current role of equality as a key discourse in the language of Sinn Féin. It explores this within the context of the consociational character of the Good Friday Agreement and the discursive nature of Republican ideology. The article argues that mainstream contemporary Republicanism (in the shape of Sinn Féin) is reforging its political agenda and doing so by rearticulating key elements of Republican thought and northern Nationalist political culture. Republicanism has always contained within it radical-universalist and ethnic particularist dimensions. It could be argued that the consociational nature of the Good Friday Agreement has placed a political premium for parties to emphasize their role as ethnic community advocates. The article will suggest that Sinn Féin has been employing the language of equality in order to marry its appeal as a party of communalist leadership with universalized principles. While the rhetoric of Nationalist aspirations remain, this process has ensured that equality has emerged as the meta-discourse for Sinn Féin as it moves away from armed anti-partitionism.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.     

The Irish republican army: An assessment of sectarianism

Although the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been active for more than 25 years, interpretations of the motivation of the IRA are varied. For some, it is a sectarian organization engaged in a tit‐for‐tat campaign with Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. For others, it is a guerrilla army waging a military campaign against the British presence in Northern Ireland. This article assesses the degree to which the IRA was or was not engaged in sectarian activity between July 1969 and December 1993. Although the Irish Republican Army killed more than 340 Protestant civilians in this time period, this examination suggests that the IRA, in general, was not a sectarian organization.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

Ethnic and Regional Politics after the Asian Economic Crisis: A Comparison of Malaysia and South Korea

This article explores the impact of the Asian economic crisis on the Malay-Chinese and Kyongsang-Cholla regional political cleavage structures in Malaysia and Korea respectively. The weakening of previously intractable cleavages and the rise of cross-cutting cleavages have the potential to contribute to democratic consolidation, by enhancing democratic uncertainty or 'organised uncertainty'. The analysis of post-crisis election results shows that Malaysia's traditional ethnic linkages between political elites and voters became more flexible after the crisis and created a strong cross-cutting dimension to the political cleavage structure. In contrast South Korea's regional cleavages remained fundamentally undisturbed and may even have been reinforced by the crisis, notwithstanding evidence of defections from regionally dominant parties.