TURF WAR AND PEACE: LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES SINCE 1994

This article uses the pattern of Loyalist violence since the cease fires of 1994 as the starting point for observations about the current roles of paramilitary organizations, the criminal economy and the power of megalomania.     

Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

Most of the research on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland has concentrated on either the historical origins of paramilitary organizations or the background characteristics of individuals who engage in this activity. Less attention has been given to analyzing public attitudes in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland toward the use of paramilitary violence as a political tool within this society. In this paper we argue that one of the reasons for the intractability of the conflict and the current impasse over the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons is the widespread latent support for paramilitary activity among the civilian population in both these societies. Overall, the results suggest that only a lengthy period without political violence in Northern Ireland will undermine support for paramilitarism and result in the decommissioning of weapons.     

When Protection Collapses: Post-Demobilization Trajectories of Violence

The implementation of peacebuilding activities, including the demobilization of non-state illegal actors, does not necessarily bring about a reduction in violence. While there are several theories that address the causes of persistent violence, there are few that adequately explain why rates of violence can rapidly increase in a post-demobilization context. Using the method of process tracing, this article explores the case of Córdoba Department, Colombia, where rates of violence have increased after the demobilization of paramilitary groups (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC]) in 2005. We argue that the AUC created and maintained a monopolistic illegal protection system during its years of operation, and this type of local order was able to contain violence. After demobilization, the protection system was disrupted and as a consequence, new competition between post-demobilization criminal organizations for existing illegal rents developed, petty crime became pervasive, and revenge killings spiked, thus contributing to increased rates of violence in the post-demobilization period. Our theory about the breakdown of protection finds support in other AUC-dominated regions of Colombia.     

Terrorism in Colombia: Logic and Sources of a Multidimensional and Ubiquitous Phenomenon

This article examines contemporary uses of terrorism in Colombia. Combining an historical analysis with the most complete database available on political violence, we illustrate how terrorism in Colombia constitutes a specific strategy that can be distinguished from other manifestations of violence. We argue that Colombia's non-state armed groups have turned terrorism into a pivotal element of their repertoires of action. These parties have not only increased their reliance on this strategy and introduced more refined forms such as de-territorialized terrorism, but also have specialized in particular terrorist attacks that suit their general objectives. While paramilitary groups rely mostly on massacres and forced disappearance, guerrillas concentrate on agitational terrorism including kidnappings and indiscriminate bombings.     

Interpretations of political violence in ethnically divided societies

This article challenges traditional interpretations of political violence in Northern Ireland. Based on a series of ethnographic studies undertaken in republican and loyalist communities in Belfast, Northern Ireland, I argue that it is the question of state legitimacy, not materialism, culture or religion, that is core to understanding the underpinnings and history of political violence in Northern Ireland. Research findings suggest that communal support for and tolerance of paramilitary groups and their tactics are underpinned by security‐related concerns and a crisis of legitimacy which renders the state unable to claim a monopoly on the use of force. In contradistinction to counter‐insurgency theorists, I argue that the basis for paramilitarism is not created by fear of reprisal or intimidation. Rather, intra‐communal fears of identity loss and threats (both perceived and real) from the outgroup have created a space for republicanism and loyalism in both its political and paramilitary forms.     

Right‐wing terrorism in South Africa

This article reviews the background to the rise of the right wing in South Africa and argues that there has always been a strand in Afrikaner politics with a proclivity to violence. The transformation in South Africa began in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, alienating conservatives and those in the security forces who were still in the grip of the militarist doctrines espoused during the P.W. Botha era. Hit squads, dirty tricks and efforts to destabilise neighbouring governments were part of the state's response to the rise of black militance in the 1980s. Terrorism was also practised by paramilitary right‐wing groups, the biggest of which was the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). Eventually the right‐wing counterrevolution failed, in large measure because potentially the most effective of the paramilitary forces, led by retired General Constand Viljoen, rejected the option of violence and sought instead a negotiated accommodation     

Violence in development: the logic of forced displacement on Colombia's Pacific coast

A progressive piece of legislation in 1993 granted collective land rights to Colombia's black communities living in the rural areas of the Pacific coast region. This measure aimed partly to support sustainable development strategies in the region through territorial empowering of local communities. Yet 14 years later, the escalation of the country's internal conflict into the Pacific region has created unprecedented levels of forced displacement among rural black communities. Once referred to as a ‘peace haven’, the Colombian Pacific coast is now characterised by new spaces of violence and terror, imposed by warring guerrilla and paramilitary groups, as well as the armed forces. This article examines the nature of the externally induced violence in the region and shows how specific economic interests, in particular in the African Palm sector, are colluding with illegal groups that are used to spread fear and terror among local residents, to make them comply with the requirements of these economic actors.     

Loyalist Women Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland: Beginning a Feminist Conversation about Conflict Resolution

Research on war, conflict, and terrorism has traditionally focused on the motivations of male combatants to participate in political violence. Such a focus has largely ignored the role of women who wield political violence. This article revisits one of feminist International Relations (IR) most basic questions, “Where are the women?” and encourages an expanded view of security and conflict resolution that asks how combatant women might contribute to current scholarly understanding of conflict and conflict resolution processes. I argue that the thirty-year conflict remained intractable in part because of the exclusion of those Loyalist women who wielded political violence, seriously limiting the British and Irish governments' ability to understand and resolve the conflict. Included in the analysis is interview data collected in an eight-month empirical study conducted by the author in 2006 with thirty women who identify as past or present members or supporters of Loyalist paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland. The unique perceptions of Loyalist women combatants of four cross-border agreements between 1974 and 2006 are used to illustrate how a feminist approach to conflict resolution can serve as an innovating starting point in theorizing about and attempting to resolve conflict.     

How ex-combatants talk about personal security. Narratives of former paramilitaries in Colombia

Previous literature on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) argues that a lack of personal security may lead ex-combatants to re-engage in violence. The present article takes a deeper look at what happens when ex-combatants are faced with insecure situations. More specifically, it asks about the narratives ex-combatants construct with relation to personal security. This article is based on 62 semi-structured interviews with former members of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC). After their demobilisation, 1385 ex-members of this paramilitary group have been killed between 2003 and 2010. In this climate of violence against the demobilised, many ex-combatants feel exposed to potential threats and claim to respond to these threats with anonymity, good citizenship or isolation. When faced with imminent threats, they mention relocation, self-defence and group protection as consequential strategies. The latter two narratives may lead ex-combatants to re-engagement in violence. State protection is a hypothetical narrative since most ex-combatants do not trust in authorities. The bottom-up approach applied in this study allows one to identify the security alternatives from their perspective. Considering the security-related skills and experiences of ex-combatants, this is an important element in the post-demobilisation period. Furthermore, the mentioned set of mostly non-violent coping strategies challenges the dominant view that ex-combatants are predisposed to violence.     

Class conflict,state terrorism and the Pakistani military: the Okara Military Farms dispute

In their dispute with their tenants, in what is known as the Okara Military Farms dispute, army landlords in the Punjab province of Pakistan resorted to state terrorism conducted by paramilitary troops, in alliance with other state agencies, in an unsuccessful attempt to break farmer resistance to attempts to remove their security of tenure. Analysis of the dispute provides strong support for the argument that state violence can, in some instances, be categorised as a specific form of terrorism. The article, therefore, aims to contribute to the growing literature on state terrorism which has been neglected as a legitimate and important topic for scholarly inquiry.     

‘AN IMPERFECT PEACE’: PARAMILITARY ‘PUNISHMENTS’ IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Since the beginning of the Troubles, alternative forms of justice have emerged in many working class areas of Northern Ireland. Such justice operates outside the formal state system and is undertaken by paramilitaries. This article explores the nature of this informal justice including an identification of activities liable for ‘punishment’, the procedures involved and the types of ‘punishment’ meted out. Moreover, this article examines the pattern of paramilitary ‘punishments’ in the pre- and post cease fire periods.     

Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western Europe

Abstract

A distinctive feature of the security landscape in western Europe of the post-Cold War era is that the dividing line between internal and external security has become increasingly obsolete—mainly as a consequence of the growing importance of transnational as well as other challenges to security which defy the distinction between domestic and international security. This article examines this convergence of internal and external security agendas from the perspective of the coercive apparatus of western European countries, pointing to a militarisation and externalisation of policing, and an internalisation and ‘policisation’ of soldiering: while police forces are taking on military characteristics, and are extending their activities beyond the borders of the state, military forces are turning to internal security missions, and are adopting certain police features. Moreover, agencies which have traditionally been located at the interface between police and military forces, i.e. gendarmerie-type or paramilitary forces, are assuming an increasingly important role.     

In the shadows of war and peace: making sense of violence after peace accords

This article addresses an urgent but largely sidelined issue in the study of peace processes: that high levels of violence—usually framed as ‘crime’—are often ubiquitous in societies experiencing peace processes, even after the signing of peace accords. From South Africa to El Salvador, Guatemala to Northern Ireland, rising interpersonal violence has come to characterise the ‘peace’. This violence often takes place in the context of ambitious post-conflict development efforts. The article argues that even the seemingly non-political violence after peace accords is intimately linked to war, as well as the peace process—in both the causes of violence and in the types of violence that perpetrators use. In order to conceptualise post-peace accord violence, the article presents a framework of violence based on the perpetrators of violence and the types of violence (social, economic or political) that occur. This unpacking of post-peace accord violence emphasises the interconnectedness of political and non-political violence, and stresses the importance of security for development.     

THE PROCESS OF DEMILITARIZATION AND THE REVERSIBILITY OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The process of militarization has permeated Northern Ireland society both overtly and in more subtle and pervasive ways. Since the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, reductions in state military personnel and infrastructure have been made and several acts of paramilitary decommissioning of weapons carried out. However, the political culture and discourse remains combative and bifurcated as the democratic institutions and processes struggle to achieve viability. Support for the Agreement has faltered as the raised expectations of improvements in quality of life, particularly in communities worst affected by the Troubles, have not been met. Vacuums such as the rolelessness amongst former combatants and gaps in policing have contributed to internecine conflict. As in South Africa, there has been a transition from political to criminal violence in local communities. A formal process of demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration of former paramilitary actors, combined with training in political skills would resolve some of these issues and ensure the irreversibility of the peace process itself.     

Communal conflict,NGO s,and the power of religious symbols 1

This article describes the activities of an indigenous NGO in Ahmedabad, India in attempting to prevent communal violence. It attempts toexplain why the use ofreligious symbols seems to be particularly potent in causing slum riots. Finally, it discusses various lessons learned for international and indigenous NGOs which are attempting to counteract communal violence.     

Electoral violence prevention: what works?

Elections are in theory democratic means of resolving disputes and making collective decisions, yet too often force is employed to distort the electoral process. The post-Cold War increase in the number of electoral authoritarian and hybrid states has brought this problem into relief. In recent years the prevention of electoral violence has played an increasingly large role in the democratic assistance activities undertaken by international agencies, following increased awareness within the international community of the specific security challenges that elections entail. However, there has to date been little systematic evaluation of the success of different electoral violence prevention (EVP) strategies in reforming electoral institutions so as to enable them to maintain the peace during the electoral period. This article assesses the effectiveness of two common types of international EVP activity. Using a new global dataset of EVP strategies between 2003 and 2015, this article finds evidence that capacity-building strategies reduce violence by non-state actors, whereas attitude-transforming strategies are associated with a reduction in violence by state actors and their allies. The findings are relevant both for understanding the dynamics of electoral violence, and also for policymakers and electoral assistance providers in the international community who have responsibility for the design of democratic assistance projects in states at risk of electoral violence.     

Al-Qaeda and Anarchism: A Historian's Reply to Terrorology: Response to Commentaries

The Lehi, a fringe Jewish paramilitary group created in 1940, conducted a concerted terrorist campaign against the British authorities in Palestine during and after World War II, proclaiming that its activities were undertaken in the name of national liberation. Lehi was founded and led by Avraham Stern, also known as “Yair.” Scholar, intellectual, and poet, Stern developed a fundamental ideology of national and messianic Jewish terrorism, which became the ideological basis not only for the work of the Lehi, but also for later Jewish terrorist activism. The present article examines the intellectual foundations of Lehi terrorism and how its intellectual and ideological principles influenced Lehi's most controversial activities—internal terrorism and the execution of its own members. In conclusion, the author traces the impact of Stern's intellectual legacy on later generations of Jewish terrorists.     

Contemporary radical right‐wing violence in Canada: A quantitative analysis

Despite the presence of radical right‐wing movements, groups, and individuals in Canada, a paucity of academic research on this topic exists. Concurrently, the majority of material on this particular area has employed either journalistic or ethnographic methodologies. What remains is several thesi and dissertations and a couple of excellent case studies describing not only membership, but also the most salient activities of radical right‐wing groups and parties. These studies, however, have been short on examining these actors’ proclivity to engage in violence. In contrast, this article, uses an events data methodology to show the dynamics of radical right‐wing violence in Canada over the last three decades. The author then maps out the attributes of this particular type of violence and where possible specifies its correlates. This work is a part of a larger project on violence in Canada.     

Urban Irregular Warfare and Violence Against Civilians: Evidence From a Colombian City

Defining terrorism and explaining how it occurs remains a contentious issue. This article attempts to generate new understandings on these topics by applying the work of Ehud Sprinzak's delegitimatization model to the Sea Shepherds. Evidence presented in the article suggests that the Sea Shepherd's present level of political violence passed through gradual phases. In this respect, it is possible to suggest that Sprinzak's model has applicability for maritime organizations, as well as terrestrial based groups. However, we also note that on the one hand, it may be possible to argue that in some respects the Sea Shepherds may constitute either a “blind spot” in the literature on terrorism and political violence, because its actions could in some circumstances be considered activism, militant direct action, piracy, vigilantism, terrorism, or eco-defense, which makes it very difficult to classify. On the other hand, that both the Sea Shepherds and the whalers may both engage in illegal activities, but are not prosecuted, may indicate that states and the international community may have neither the will nor the means to enforce laws against them. Therefore, they may be turning a blind eye to their actions. Throughout the article we maintain that the Sea Shepherds constitute an example of a gray area phenomenon. Despite the ambiguity surrounding their legal status and academic interpretations of their actions, the results of nearly three decades of the organization's activities, including its 2007 campaign to disrupt Japanese Antarctic Whaling, suggest that the Sea Shepherds may be best categorized as a vigilante group, because they claim they are seeking to enforce a legal status quo because of states' and the international community's inabilities or unwillingness to do so.