Following the Party in Time of War? The Implications of Elite Consensus

Prominent perspectives in the study of conflict point to two factors that exert substantial influence on public opinion about foreign intervention: (1) news about casualties and (2) signals from partisan elites. Past work is limited, however, in what it can say about how these two factors interact. We present an experiment designed to understand the surprisingly common scenario where elites send competing messages about whether the public should support war or oppose it—and these messages do not coincide with party divisions. We find that partisans are generally insensitive to news about casualties, but they become noticeably more sensitive when they perceive within-party disputes over support for the war. Independents, however, respond to news of casualties irrespective of what messages elites send. These findings shed light on when and how the public responds to competing and unclear cues and speak to the role of public opinion in determining conflict outcomes and democratic foreign policy-making more broadly.     

Challenging U.S. Policymakers' Image of an Isolationist Public

A persisting question in international studies is whether academic research can have an impact on the making of foreign policy. Much research has shown that policy decisions can be greatly influenced by misperceptions, just as much as by objective factors. The article describes an effort by academic researchers to challenge U.S. policymakers' image of an actor in the U.S. foreign policy process—the American public. The study's focus was a widely held assumption in the U.S. foreign policy community that the American public in the wake of the Cold War was entering a renewed phase of isolationism, similar to the interwar years. The study first interviewed policy practitioners on their perceptions of the public, then performed a comprehensive review of existing polling data, and finally conducted new polls with input from policymakers themselves. The net result of the elite interviews and the analysis of public attitudes revealed a significant gap in all areas, which is presented in synopsis. Interviews with policy practitioners reveal two key dynamics that could well contribute to policymakers' misreading the public: a failure to seek out information about the public and a tendency to assume that the vocal public is representative of the general public. Indications that the study did have some impact on the thinking of policy practitioners are discussed in the conclusion.     

What Makes Terrorism Salient? Terrorist Strategies,Political Competition,and Public Opinion

This article analyzes the determinants of terrorism saliency in public opinion. It is usually assumed that after a terrorist attack, terrorism becomes automatically salient. However, this assumption is only true in those countries where terrorist attacks are exceptional events. In democracies that have suffered domestic terrorism for decades, the evolution of terrorism saliency does not only depend on the frequency or intensity of terrorist attacks. In this article it is claimed that the tactics carried out by terrorist groups (the type of victim, especially) and the dynamics of political competition (especially the ideology of the incumbent) are also factors that explain the evolution of terrorism saliency. The article also analyzes how these two factors interact with citizens’ predispositions to explain variation in their reactions to terrorist threat. The empirical test relies on a novel database from monthly public opinion surveys in Spain from 1993 to 2012.     

The public opinion–foreign policy paradox in Germany: integrating domestic and international levels of analysis conditionally

Abstract

Does public opinion influence foreign policy? International relations theory is divided on whether foreign policy outputs follow public opinion in advanced democratic countries. Using the case of cold war and post-cold war Germany, I offer an integrated realist theory of the effect of public opinion on foreign policy. I test the theory and the generalizability of the hypothesis of a public opinion–foreign policy nexus using process tracing as well as a time series analysis between the years 1973 and 2002. Using new measures, results here contradict literature on expected public opinion and policy outputs in the cold war period yet are supported after. I find that the predicted effect of public opinion on foreign policy outputs to be confounded by such factors as security threats.     

The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism? 1

In political disputes, issue frames set parameters for debate and shape which view dominates. This study expands issue framing research to examine the influence of frames on the perception of future terrorist threats as well as subsequent support for related counterterrorism policies. We test several hypotheses using data from an experimental field poll. We find that issue frames clearly influence perceptions of threat. However, our frames, which posit specific terrorism threats, only have a limited influence on respondent preferences for counter-terrorism policies. We consider a variety of explanations for these results and provide direction for future research.     

European security policy for the people? Public opinion and the EU's Common Foreign,Security and Defence policy

The democratic foundations of European integration in the foreign and defence realm are increasingly being debated. This article looks at the question of democratic legitimacy from one particular angle, by examining public opinion as measured in Eurobarometer surveys between 1989 and 2009. Based on reflections about the relation between polling results and wider questions of democracy, it examines three aspects of public opinion: general support for a common foreign and a common defence policy; differences among support rates in EU member states; and what roles Europeans would prefer for European armed forces. It turns out that general support for a common foreign policy is high, whereas the desirability of a common defence policy is much more contested. Moreover, citizens across Europe would prefer European armed forces to take on traditional tasks, as territorial defence. An EU defence policy that goes beyond strict intergovernmentalism and is directed towards protecting international law and universal human rights would thus require a significant communicative effort to become accepted.     

What do ESDP actors want? An exploratory analysis

Abstract

This paper analyzes the preferences of European defense actors vis-à-vis the European security and defense policy (ESDP) with a view to identifying the main ideational points of convergence and fault lines that structure this policy domain. In an exploratory analysis that relies on an original data-set compiled from systematic interviews conducted with 73 ESDP actors in France, the UK, Germany, and Brussels, we address two research questions. First, what do ESDP actors think about ESDP? Second, can we classify their preferences according to sociological factors that underpin the ESDP domain? To conceptualize the belief system of ESDP actors, we propose a typology that distinguishes (1) the social context in which ESDP actors are embedded and (2) the specific ESDP aspects about which preferences are shaped. Our results suggest that both national and occupational variables play an important role in explaining the preferences of ESDP actors.     

Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy,Opinion Polling,and the Possible Limits of “Crafted Talk”

The strategy of “crafted talk” (or framing) suggests that a politician uses public opinion to anticipate the most alluring, language to convince the public to follow a politician's own preferred policy (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000 Jacobs, L. R. and Shaprio, R. Y. 2000. Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  [Google Scholar]). This manipulatory behavior by presidents has important consequences in the realm of constructing foreign policy, especially if the policy involves military service personnel, international prestige, or foreign conflict. However, no scholar has investigated White House archival data to examine the theoretical nuances of presidential “crafting” talk when constructing arguments for foreign policy. This article examines three case studies using internal polling memoranda and focus group results concerning the Vietnam War under President Johnson, the signing of the INF Treaty with the Soviet Union under President Reagan, and the Gulf War under President Bush. In each of the three cases, public opinion places serious constraints on presidential framing of foreign policy. Implications for the effectiveness of political framing and the limits of presidential persuasion are discussed.     

The "Essential Domino" of Military Operations: American Public Opinion and the Use of Force

It is a commonly held belief that the foreign policy issue to which the American public is most sensitive is the use of military force. Because American public opinion regarding the use of force is highly palpable, salient, and organized, and because decisions regarding the use of force are some of the most important decisions the nation ever has to consider, the analysis of public opinion regarding military involvement is academically significant and policy relevant. The indication from policymakers is that American military operations require public support. As a result, scholars and analysts have come to realize that public opinion is the "essential domino" of military operations. The relationship between mass American public opinion and the use of military force has become, therefore, the focus of numerous studies and surveys. There are currently several competing explanations—schools of thought—in the literature on why the mass public supports the use of force. This article is an attempt to identify the most prominent schools of thought on public opinion and the use of force, and the central factors associated with each school. Such a review is important to generating policy–relevant guidance pertaining to public opinion and the use of force—an objective made more pressing by the current war against terrorism.     

A more martial Europe? Public opinion,permissive consensus,and EU defence policy

EU defence policy has been extremely popular over the past three decades, averaging around 75% public support. In fact, no other policy domain is as popular and robust as the idea of pooling national sovereignty over defence. However, public support for EU defence has been dismissed as mere “permissive consensus”, rather than genuine support. Scholars have often assumed that public opinion towards European integration is passive and shallow, especially over foreign policy issues, where the public has limited understanding of the complexity of issues. Consistent with contemporary findings about the complexity of comparative foreign policy attitudes, the authors contest the permissive consensus logic and demonstrate that European publics have held coherent preferences over the use of force at the European level. The authors conclude that the slow progress of integration in this area is due to the reluctance of elites rather than to the reticence of Europe’s citizens.