如何看待巴西对中国产品实施反倾销措施问题

中国是世界上最大的发展中国家,而巴西是南美洲最大的发展中国家。近年来,中巴两个发展中大国之间的经贸关系迅速发展,双方的合作也日益加深。但随着双边经贸关系的发展,双方的贸易摩擦也在增多,突出地表现为巴西频繁对中国商品采取反倾销措施。对于如何看待这个双方经贸关系发展过程中出现的问题,还必须对巴西一贯擅长打“贸易战”、中巴产品之间存在的一些竞争行为、巴西相关压力集团的施压以及“跟风”等因素进行深刻地分析。同时,有效化解目前形势的做法还在于中方认识到并妥善解决中巴关系中存在的一些问题,在理解的基础上,以长远的眼光,寻找有效的途径智慧地解决双边贸易摩擦问题。     

Immunizing Iraq Against al-Qaeda 3.0

Iraq still faces the same economic challenges that contributed to the rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. And unless these challenges are resolved, the likelihood of future political stability is low. The extremely high level of unemployment and underemployment among Iraq's youth, combined with massive corruption, is contributing to widespread poverty and radicalization. The Iraqi government's efforts to deal with these challenges are hamstrung by the expectation that current low oil prices will continue for a decade or more. These obstacles will constrain state-led development efforts severely. Iraq needs to execute successfully anti-corruption and pro-youth employment strategies that draw on the experience of other states, but are crafted to meet Iraq's unique conditions.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

Spatial Rivalry and Coups Against Dictators

Dictators' survival depends on the effectiveness of their coup-proofing tactics. Yet coup-proofing strategies can become ineffective in the presence of certain structural conditions that enhance the resources, organizational power, and coordination capacity of the army. One such structural condition is the presence of spatial rivalry, international rivalry over disputed territory. Autocratic incumbents invested in spatial rivalries need to strengthen the military in order to compete with a foreign adversary. The imperative of developing a strong army puts dictators in a paradoxical situation: to compete with a rival state, they must empower the very agency—the military—that is most likely to threaten their own survival in office. This logic suggests that authoritarian regimes engaged in spatial rivalries will be more vulnerable to coups. Indeed, relying on the most comprehensive coup dataset to date, this article reveals that rivalry over territory is a robust predictor of coups against autocrats. The findings carry implications for research on civil–military relations, international rivalries, and organizational dynamics within authoritarian regimes.     

Deadlock in the Fight Against Terrorism

Terrorism has introduced non-state actors onto the global stage. Terrorist groups exploit international conflicts and continually evolve their structure and methods,so as to render the international community powerless to defend itself effectively. To protect themselves against terrorists some countries solely focus on defense,leaving terrorist groups free to expand. The international community needs to urgently address factors affecting the fight against terrorism including double standards.     

Violence Against Civilians: A Disaggregated Analysis

Disaggregated approaches to conflict research have led to new insights into the patterns and processes of political violence in developing countries. This article uses the most comprehensive subnational political violence data (ACLED) to observe where and when violence against civilians occurs within civil wars. Several new conclusions are evident from an event-based analysis of civilian violence: retribution or collateral damage are poor explanations for attacks on the unarmed. Instead, civilians are targeted because they are accessible; rebel groups kill more civilians, often in an attempt to create new frontlines for conflict. However, governments are also responsible for high rates of civilian death, yet they often “contract” this violence out to militias. This analysis confirms that there are multiple violent groups within civil war spaces, and small opposition groups commit higher levels of violence against civilians in local spaces. The strength of a violent group compared to its competition shapes how much civilian violence it commits. The results suggest that theories that emphasize civilian support and retribution as a basis for violence against civilians have overlooked the importance of how multiple violent opposition groups compete within civil wars, and how civilians suffer as a result.     

America's Struggle Against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement

One consequence of using labels such as the “global war on terrorism,” “the long war,” “the global struggle against violent extremism” or any name that dissociates the conflict from the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi movement is that Americans lack the necessary framework for assessing U.S. policies. Misconceptions concerning the war proliferate on both the Left and the Right because of the absence of an analytical framework to provide precise vocabulary identifying the origins and objectives of the enemy. The current war and the sources of Al Qaeda's conduct can only be understood by examining the complex history of Arabia, the U.S.-Saudi alliance, and a particular historical cycle of corruption, decadence, violent purification, and moral restoration that characterizes the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi narrative.     

加强国际合作打击跨国腐败

一 腐败是当今国际社会的一大公害。几乎所有国家都程度不等地存在腐败问题,其中不少国家腐败十分严重,发展成为影响政治和社会稳定,妨害国家经济发展的主要破坏性因素之一。在全球化潮流发展和国际交往扩大的形势下,不少国家的腐败分子乘机出国,以在国外“避难”,或在国外从事洗黑钱等肮脏勾当。因此,腐败与反腐的斗争日趋国际化。联合国为推动国际反腐合作做出了积极努力。近年它所通过并由绝大多数会员国签署生效的《联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约》和《联合国反腐败公约》是国际反腐斗争的行动纲领,标志着国     

Norms and Military Power: nato's War Against Yugoslavia

Norms are fundamental constitutive elements of modern military power. Because norms influence military behavior and force structure, contemporary Western military power is produced only by interaction of normative and material factors. Two norms—the civilian casualty avoidance norm and Western societies' demand that their military forces take minimal casualties, or the force protection norm—more strongly influenced the origin, conduct, and outcome of nato's 1999 war against Yugoslavia than the material disparities of mismatched adversaries. Many actors, including the Yugoslav government and the Kosovo Liberation Army, notice the linkage of norms to Western military force structures and operational behavior and therefore strategically use norms instrumentally against states that adopt them. Such strategies generate technological and tactical responses, leading in turn to counter-responses—a dynamic interaction of material and normative factors that increasingly influence military operational outcomes.     

美国与伊斯兰世界矛盾的变化及其影响

2006年,国际格局调整加快,世界热点问题升温,大国协调进一步展开,中国外交硕果累累。2007年,世界将进入深度调整,国际形势总体趋向缓和,但局部紧张可能加剧,尤其是伊朗核问题有可能升级,中国外交则在面对新机遇的同时有可能遭遇更复杂的挑战。鉴此,《现代国际关系》编辑部于2007年1月6日举办“2007年国际大势前瞻”研讨会,特别邀请30多位京内外专家学者在总结、回顾2006年国际形势的基础上,着重对2007年国际形势及中国外交的变化趋势进行前瞻性分析。现将研讨会主要观点辑录如下,以期有助于读者更准确把握国际形势走向。     

援越抗法和1954年日内瓦会议

2004年是关于印度支那问题的日内瓦会议召开50周年。这次会议是新中国成立以来首次以大国身份参加的大型国际会议,也是新中国在国际事务中发挥重要作用的开始。重温这段历史对学习毛泽东主席、周恩来总理的外交思想,继承和发挥我国外交事业的光荣传统,开创外交工作的新局面,都有重要意义。一、历史背景回顾1945年越南八月革命胜利后,于9月2日成立了越南民主共和国。但法国不甘心丢掉这块广阔的殖民地,遂于1946年12月出动大军,对越南发动了大规模入侵,并占领了海防、河内等大城市,封锁了中越边界。与此同时,又返回老挝、柬埔寨,恢复其殖民统…     

国际恐怖主义问题与反恐怖斗争合作(续)

国际反恐怖斗争 20世纪70-80年代,恐怖主义活动热点比较明确,攻击的目标也主要是集中在某些国家。在这一时期,国际反恐怖斗争还未形成普遍合作的趋势。甚至可以说,有些并未遭受恐怖活动困扰的国家对于国际恐怖主义问题采取的是“冷眼旁观”的态度。进入90年代后,恐怖主义活动的进一步扩大蔓延迫使许多国家不得不改变态度和看法,如英国2001年通过的新的《反恐怖主义法》,就把禁止国际恐怖主义组织在英国进行募资、宣传等活动列入此法中。此前因许多恐怖主义组织能在英国公开活动,使英国与许多国家产生矛盾。如斯里兰卡泰米尔猛虎组织在英国就开办有公司及办事处;许多阿拉伯国家也对英国不引渡一些伊斯兰极端主义组织的头目,并允许他们公开活动表示强烈不满。法国在70年代对不针对本国的国际恐怖主义分子也是“睁只眼,闭只眼”,不对他们采取行     

评美国对伊动武的战略意图及其危害性

美国不顾国际社会的强烈反对 ,执意对一个主权国家动武 ,必然有其深刻的战略意图。这场战争不过是美国经济、政治、军事上的需要而做出的战略选择。然而 ,这种战略意图为全球化和“地球村”带来了难以估量的危害。     

Vicarious Retribution in US Public Support for War Against Iraq

US public anger and desire to avenge the September 11, 2001 terror attacks were redirected toward Iraq partly because of its identity as an Arab and Muslim state. Online panel survey data reveal that citizens who were relatively angry about the terror attacks were more belligerent toward Iraq, an effect that was strongest among those who perceived Arabs and Muslims in monolithic terms. The angry desire to avenge 9/11 was more persistent for those who saw Arabs and Muslims in that light, and its effect on war support was partially mediated by worsened feelings about Arabs and Muslims in general. These findings help explain why public belligerence toward Iraq shot up right after 9/11, before President George W. Bush began alleging that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction and had ties to al Qaeda.     

UN Troop Deployment and Preventing Violence Against Civilians in Darfur

ABSTRACT

Does the presence of UN peacekeeping force lower civilian fatalities at the local level? If it does, is it because of their coercive military capacity or for other reasons such as their roles in monitoring and reporting violent atrocities? To explore these questions, I study the deployment of peacekeeping units in Darfur and its impact on violence against civilians. Using original geocoded data of UN deployments before and after the intervention, I examine what aspects of such deployments impact one-sided civilian killings by government and rebel groups. Results indicate that deploying UN peacekeepers in an area restrains belligerent from targeting civilians. However, the military capacity of peacekeepers is not a significant predictor of violence against civilians. While their ability to defend themselves is extremely important for peacekeepers, these findings caution against the militarization trend in UN peacekeeping and seek to reshift focus on other substantive aspects of peacekeeping.     

Fragile Proxies: Explaining Rebel Defection Against Their State Sponsors

Foreign governments frequently intervene in armed conflicts by sponsoring rebels against their adversaries. A sponsorship is less costly than a direct military intervention, but rebels often defy orders, desert fighting, or turn guns against their sponsors. Under what conditions do rebels defect against their sponsors? Drawing on organizational theory, I argue that as rebel organizations become less centralized and formalized, the rebels are likely to defect against their sponsors. This occurs because non-centralized organizations have weak central leadership and allow for dispersed decision-making, both of which narrow the manipulative capacity of sponsors. Due to these disadvantages, non-centralized rebel movements are less accountable to their sponsors, cannot credibly commit to rapidly change their policies in response to changes in the sponsor’s demands, and suffer from frequent and destructive quarrels between the top and lower echelons. Using multilevel logistic models for panel data, I test my argument on a novel dataset. My quantitative analysis shows that rebel structure is a robust predictor of defection.