Comment on ‘terrorism and democracy’

The December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 raises an important legal problem for decision‐makers contemplating retaliation against such acts of terrorism. Conceivably, retaliation could conflict with and help erode international norms of self‐defense. Counter‐terrorist experts and government officials espousing the use of force have minimized, if not ignored, this potential conflict and its negative impact on world order. On the other hand, the 1986 US raid on Libya and the 1985 Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunisia reveal that under limited circumstances force would be deemed appropriate. The informal adjudication of these incidents by relevant international actors suggests a tolerance for the resort to force in the US case and ambivalence in the Israeli case. The US and Israeli cases guide a subsequent discussion of the conditions under which the use of force against terrorist bases in response to terrorist attacks could be legitimated. The resort to force against such activity, it is argued, would have to meet the test of necessity, including: (1) a previous and ongoing series of terrorist attacks, and demonstrated responsibility for those attacks by the actor, state or non‐state, against whom force is used; (2) immediately expected or imminent terrorist attacks endangering human life; and (3) the absence of non‐forcible remedies effective in terminating the terrorist threat. In addition the amount of force would have to be proportional, limited to targets responsible for specific terrorist activity and limited by the objective of terminating that threat.     

A Critical Perspective on Terrorism: Case Study of Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl in Iran

ABSTRACT

An extensive body of traditional terrorism research exists where the focus is on Iran as a terrorist state and a terrorism sponsor. This article explores an alternative terrorism narrative by examining the non-state actors, Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl. The deficiency of information in the literature is addressed by applying the first and second-order critique approach of Richard Jackson’s knowledge, power and politics theoretical framework in contrast with the traditional terrorism studies approach. A first-order critique seeks to destabilise the accepted knowledge that Iran is both a terrorist state and a terrorism sponsor. This provides the grounds to study other aspects of “knowing” in relation to the second-order critique, where a critical ground outside the discourse suggests that Iranian officials have declared that the non-state terrorist actors of Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl constitute a threat to Iran’s political stability. The outcome of the analyses here bridges the gap between the new aspect of terrorism, the non-state actors, and critical terrorism studies in order to contest the traditional discussion of terrorism in Iran. The rationale behind new terrorism varies and necessitates that new meanings and strategies be adopted in relation to Iran.     

The old terrorism: a dataset, 1860 – 1969

ABSTRACT

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, research on terrorism has grown exponentially. Data limitations, however, have made temporal generalization difficult. Most terrorism datasets extend back only to the 1970s, which inhibits the ability to quantitatively examine earlier waves of terrorism. To address this limitation, this article presents a dataset of over 250 terrorist organizations formed between 1860 and 1969. These data, which have global coverage, include country-year information on group formation, allowing scholars to examine the relationship between various country-year factors and the emergence of terrorist organizations. To illustrate their usefulness, these data are used to examine the relationship between democracy and terrorist group formation. Following several recent studies, the empirical analysis reveals a curvilinear or inverted u-shaped relationship between terrorism and democracy.     

A Smaller Military To Fight the War on Terror

The defense budget can be reduced and the U.S. military downsized because (1) the nation-state threat environment is markedly different than it was during the Cold War, and (2) a large military is not necessary to combat the terrorist threat. In fact, the Islamist terrorist threat is relatively undeterred by the U.S. military presence abroad, and U.S. forces abroad, particularly those deployed in Muslim countries, may do more to exacerbate than to diminish the threat. The arduous task of dismantling and degrading the terrorist network will largely be the task of unprecedented international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, not the application of large-scale military force. To the extent the military is involved in the war on terror, it will be special forces in discrete operations against specific targets rather than large-scale military operations.     

Isn't it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?

Abstract

The attitude of Turkish officials toward the US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey for over four decades has been static. Officials have understandable arguments, based on their threat analysis, as to why these weapons should be retained in Turkey. However, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the international security environment has undergone radical changes. The classical deterrent value of nuclear weapons no longer applies with these emerging threats. At the same time, there is an increased probability of unauthorized use of crude radiological devices or nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. In addition to increased security at storage sites, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with drawing-down US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries including Turkey.     

Excerpts from research study ‘weapons of mass destruction and terrorism: Proliferation by non‐state actors’

In the wake of the Cold War, a new world disorder seems to be emerging wherein the legitimacy of many states is being challenged from within by increasing non‐state calls for self‐determination from the likes of religious cults, hate groups, isolationist movements, ethnic groups and revivalist movements. These movements often prey on the insecurities of the population, offering to fill psychological, sociological, political or religious security needs of those who would join them. Religious oriented groups appear to share a common ideological thread that rejects existing social, economic and political structure demanding a structural revision of the world, a world where they become the authoritarian, dominant influence. Emanating from these movements will be the ‘Post Modern Terrorists’ who possess a ‘ripeness’ to threaten use of weapons of mass destruction.

This article concerns asymmetric warfare: terrorism, specifically Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism. It argues that the terrorist WMD threat will emanate from non‐state groups operating under a veneer of religion and ethnic‐racist hate. These groups, plus the occasional cult, are the most likely candidates to threaten use of weapons of mass destruction in a mass casualty causing ‘super‐terrorist act’.     

From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists' Achilles Heel

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to uncover a primary source of vulnerability in the global Jihadist terrorist network. It offers a critical examination of the traditional money lead for countering global Jihadist terrorism, and concludes that in this case, it is not the most effective method. Rather, the concept of transnational mobility, both as it relates to socialization into and professionalization within the Jihadist network, is identified as the lifeblood of the network, and thus an arguably more appropriate focus for countering strategies. Issues surrounding travel document security are analysed within an overarching dichotomous framework of offensive/defensive counter-terrorism strategies, emphasizing the need for active penetration by intelligence forces into the terrorist networks and relevant mobility-related realms.     

The European Union and Mutual Assistance: More than Defence

Abstract

The first activation of the European Union’s “Mutual Assistance Clause”, following the 13 November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, demonstrated that this article can be used very flexibly, not just to help defend French territory but also its expeditionary operations. But if flexibility is an asset, improvisation is not. In order to maximise the potential of the clause, the role of the EU institutions needs to be clarified, in addition to that of the member states, and new capacities must be created at the EU level, notably in intelligence and planning.     

Nuclear Terrorism: What Can We Learn from Los Alamos?

ABSTRACT

The international security community is increasingly concerned about the nexus between indiscriminate terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials. Many nuclear terrorism threat assessments focus primarily on terrorist motivations to employ an atomic bomb, the availability of nuclear know-how and technology, and the opportunity for clandestine organisations to acquire fissile material. Scholars and experts, however, often neglect to elaborate on the challenges for terrorist organisations in organising and implementing the construction and detonation of a crude atomic bomb. This will most likely be a complex project. This article will therefore explore the organisation of such an endeavour. To be precise, we will highlight the impact of the organisational design of the terrorist group. The organisational design determines the division of tasks and how coordination is achieved among these tasks. It therefore has a strong impact on the functioning of any organisation, especially an innovative and complex terrorism project. Building on a case study of Los Alamos, we inductively infer that terrorist organisations face an inherent effectiveness-efficiency trade-off in designing a nuclear armament project.     

Terrorism Analysis and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: The Missing Element

ABSTRACT

The decision in the case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project raised important issues about civil liberties in the United States (2010), including freedom of speech and freedom of association, in relation to U.S. foreign policy actions. While the decision has the potential to infringe on certain liberties, the decision itself was based on very limited information on the nature of terrorism, the foreign terrorist organizations involved, and the processes by which terrorist groups can be induced to peacefully re-enter domestic political systems. There are also concerns about what can be the arbitrary designation of groups as foreign terrorist organizations. These issues raise serious questions about the role of the Supreme Court in the overall political system and judgments in cases involving terrorism and foreign policy.     

Brides,black widows and baby-makers; or not: an analysis of the portrayal of women in English-language jihadi magazine image content

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the depiction of women in image content from 39 issues of official English-language magazine publications produced by designated terrorist organisations that follow a jihadist ideology. Research on the role of women in jihadi organisations has found that women are active at all levels within terrorist groups. This includes creating and disseminating terrorist content; planning, co-ordinating and carrying out attacks; and, supporting fighters as wives, mothers and homemakers. Our analysis, however, found that women are almost never depicted within the images of terrorist organisations’ official magazines. We argue that this airbrushing is a deliberate attempt to reinforce traditional gender roles and strengthen existing gender hierarchies within terrorist organisations, and we make a number of suggestions for future research in this understudied field.     

The framing of radicalisation in the Belgian societal debate: a contagious threat or youthful naivety?

ABSTRACT

Following the terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015 in Paris and 22 March 2016 in Brussels, radicalisation has become the topic of lively debate in Belgium. However, little research has been done on the different perspectives which people use to communicate about radicalisation in Belgium. Therefore, an inductive framing analysis of 2,271 excerpts, taken from various newspaper articles, policy documents and social media, was performed to precisely reconstruct all the frames and counter-frames that are used to define the issue. The results were validated through seven interviews and two workshops with a variety of stakeholders (imams, youth workers, academics, journalists). This resulted in the reconstruction of four problematising frames and eight deproblematising counter-frames. In addition to presenting and illustrating these frames, this paper discusses how the framing analysis can help gain insight into the social construction of radicalisation in the wake of the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks.     

Terrorist Assassination and Institutional Change in Repressive Regimes

ABSTRACT

Missing from the political violence literature is an in-depth and systematic examination of the effects of terrorist assassination on state political institutions in repressive regimes. By broadening the scope and depth of empirical research into terrorist assassinations, the potential exists to enhance our understanding of the outcomes of assassination by terrorist actors as well as our overall understanding of political violence in repressive regimes. Utilizing survival analysis and data from the Global Terrorism Database, the Polity IV Project, and the Political Terror Scale, this project focuses on the post-terrorist assassination institutional outcomes in repressive regimes. While the effects are long-term, the most repressive regimes are the most likely to experience political institutional shifts in the wake of terrorist assassinations. The direction of the institutional shifts is mixed, but results indicate that the level of state repression in existence prior to a terrorist assassination matters to post-terrorist assassination outcomes.     

Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France

This article seeks to explain why two states faced with a similar terrorist threat, perceiving it in a similar way, and drawing the same broad implications for their counterterrorist investigations, have nevertheless put in place significantly different types of organizational reforms in response to that threat. The study shows that although France and Britain have embraced a common preventive logic in the face of Islamist terrorism, the changes that they have made to the coordination of intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecution in that context have differed because of contrasting organizational routines and interinstitutional conventions in the two states. An analysis of the British and French cases shows that law enforcement can be preventive but that western states are likely to pursue different ways of bringing security agencies and the law together to prevent and prosecute terrorism. The organizational and institutional factors that give rise to such divergent practices have important consequences for the ability of a state to develop a coordinated operational response to terrorism and convict terrorist suspects of crimes in a court of law.     

Why al-Shabaab Attacks Kenya: Questioning the Narrative Paradigm

ABSTRACT

This article questions the current narrative paradigm and argues that al-Shabaab attacks Kenya for strategic and highly rational reasons, beyond sharing a border and having bases in southern Somalia closer to major population centres than Ethiopia or Uganda. Al-Shabaab targets Kenya more than other frontline states because of the opportunity spaces linked to Kenya’s international status and visibility, its relatively free and independent media that widely publicizes terrorist attacks, a highly developed and lucrative tourist sector that provides soft targets, the comparatively high number of Kenyan foreign fighters within the group’s ranks, the presence of terror cells in Kenya, expanding democratic space, and high levels of corruption. These variables play into al-Shabaab’s motivations and aid planning and execution of terrorist acts that aim to fulfil the group’s quest to survive by maintaining relevance. In order to address this predictable menace, we offer a number of measures that Kenya needs to take, including reducing corruption in order to properly invest in intelligence efforts and relevant homeland security measures, thereby making it possible for Kenya to sustainably and effectively combat al-Shabaab.     

An analysis of spatial correlates of terrorism using risk terrain modeling

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to identify correlates of terrorism in space. It examines whether places with terrorist incidents show similar patterns with respect to the physical features across landscape, and tests the spatial influence of various features of environment on the incidence of terrorism. Drawing on the locations of violent terrorist offenses committed between 2008 and 2012, the study in Istanbul applies the Risk Terrain Modeling framework to terrorism. It uses data on police incidents and infrastructure (e.g., government buildings or parks). The analysis employs GIS techniques and an event count model, and combines all risky layers in a composite map to understand where the risk is higher. The study suggests a concentration of 1153 violent terrorist incidents relative to key physical factors by identifying seventeen potential risk factors, eight of which were significantly correlated in the model. Regardless of terrorists’ intent, the significantly associated establishments increase the risk in the surrounding areas where these features are located. The coexistence of leisure places such as bakeries, religious facilities, or eateries results in higher risks. While the environmental backcloth may constitute a risk for terrorism, its components may also help forecast the locations of terrorist incidents in the future.     

Hegemonic masculinity and terrorism: the case of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan

ABSTRACT

Recent years have seen an increase in the study of the relationship between gender and terrorism. This article analyzes the relationship between hegemonic masculinity and terrorism through the case of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or PKK) and its leader Abdullah Öcalan. Using the method of narrative analysis, the study first examines the concept of hegemonic masculinity. The study attempts to make sense of how the concept of hegemonic masculinity operates within the PKK. To achieve this goal, the study demonstrates the major functions of hegemonic masculinity within terrorist organisations. Accordingly, it is argued that the perspective of masculinity studies can be used to gain a better and highly instructive understanding of political violence and terrorism.     

Political parties and the formation of terrorist groups

Where do modern terrorist group come from? How do they begin? This article establishes that most often they emerge from political parties. An effort is made to identify the relevant types of parties and the internal party dynamics which may have led to terrorist activity. Also, it is asserted that party‐terrorist group links are most likely to occur in nations whose political systems are going through episodes of regime transformation.