Rethinking the repression-dissent nexus: assessing Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood's response to repression since the coup of 2013

This article examines the repression-dissent nexus in Islamist social movements. Several studies have overwhelmingly focused on the effects of repression on protest volume, level, and tactics. However, understanding the responses of individual members to regime repression and how they relate to the movement's collective response is rarely discussed. By analysing the response of the Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood to regime repression since the coup of 2013, this article explains the effects of repression on opposition movements. It argues that to understand the impact of repression on these movements, we need to differentiate between the collective and individual responses to repression. These two levels of analysis are crucial to better understand the repression-dissent nexus. Also, the article contends that collective and individual responses to repression cannot be explained by focusing solely on the structural and institutional factors (i.e. organization, ideology, leadership, etc.). Members’ personal experiences, memory, emotions, and trauma play a key role in shaping their response to repression. The article thus accounts for both the formal and informal effects of repression on Islamists.     

The Agenda-Setting Impact of Major Presidential TV Addresses

New media dramatically increase citizens' access to information and decrease governments' ability to control the flow of communication. Although human rights nongovernmental organizations have advocated that access to independent news media will improve government respect for human rights, recent empirical studies have shown this is not always the case. We posit that media independence and the presence or absence of democratic characteristics, in particular political competition, have substantial effects on government repression because these factors determine the degree to which the government is vulnerable to public pressures. The model developed here includes three equations that encompass the impact of interaction between and among the news media, citizens, and government. The first equation specifies the influences on the news media's decision whether or not to perform a “watchdog” role regarding government repression. The second equation represents public reaction to the news media's coverage of government repression (i.e., protest). Here access to news media via traditional and new media is an important factor. The third equation represents government repression. Solutions to the system of equations are derived for four scenarios (a) Democracy and media independence are both present, (b) democracy is present but media independence is absent, (c) democracy is absent (autocracy) and media independence is present, and (d) democracy is absent (autocracy) and media independence is absent. We then consider interesting properties of the anticipated behavior from the government, media, and general public through case illustrations for the Netherlands and Myanmar/Burma.

[Supplementary material is available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Political Communication for the following free supplemental resource: two additional case illustrations (Tanzania and Brazil).]     

How authoritarian rulers seek to legitimize repression: framing mass killings in Egypt and Uzbekistan

How do authoritarian rulers legitimate repressive actions against their own citizens? Although most research depicts repression and legitimation as opposed strategies of political rule, justified coercion against some groups may generate legitimacy in the eyes of other parts of the population. Building upon this suggested link between legitimation and repression, this article studies the justifications of mass killings. To this end, framing theory is combined with recent research on the domestic and international dimensions of authoritarian rule. We contend that frames are directed towards specific audiences at home and abroad. Moreover, given the common threats at the global level and the diffusion of repressive tactics, we assume that learning processes influence discursive justifications of repression in authoritarian regimes. We provide an analysis of government rhetoric by comparing the protest crackdowns of Rabi’a ‘Adawiya Square in Egypt and Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan, taking into account the audiences and the sources of the frames that justify repression. In both cases, we find the terrorism frame to emerge as dominant.     

Testing EU Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Since 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been confronted with increasing challenges stemming from the Arab uprisings. Internally, they have had to face popular mobilisation and discontent, triggering a mixed reaction, including economic handouts, patronage, limited political and economic reforms as well as military intervention and repression. Externally, they have actively intervened in support of the protest movements in Syria and Libya and enthusiastically facilitated President Saleh's departure from Yemen. At first sight these responses may seem schizophrenic. Upon closer inspection, however, managing instability by shoring up friendly regimes on the inside and expanding the GCC's influence outside represent two sides of the same coin.     

Means,Motives and Opportunities in Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization

Building on the most important theoretical tools from the literatures on social movements and nationalism, we propose a model of the intensity of nationalist political behavior in which a community's means, motives, and opportunities assume the central roles in the initiation and escalation of nationalist contentious politics. We then test this model using multinomial logit on original data from the seventeen autonomous communities of Spain over a twenty-year period. The results demonstrate that the means, motives, and opportunities assume vital, yet nonlinear, roles in determining a community's level of electoral, violent, and nonviolent contentious activity. The findings also show that there are crucial differences in what accounts for the moves to electoral contention, to protest, and to rebellion. Several of these factors are uniformly escalatory on the intensity of contention—especially repression, social mobilization, and regime change—while others, most importantly democracy, have a moderating effect on the generation of conflict. The results further imply processes of a diffusion of rebellious activities and of an organizational-level substitution effect between violent and nonviolent forms of political behavior. At the aggregate community level, however, escalation in contention involves a “cumulative effect” rather than a classic “substitution effect.”     

Globalization and Political Violence, 1970–2008

The question of globalization's effect on social harmony continues to be fiercely debated. We use a comprehensive measure of globalization (the KOF index) designed to capture the intensity of connectivity among countries along economic, social, and political dimensions. Our results suggest that globalization, particularly economic and social globalization, predicts a lower risk of civil war and political repression, but economic globalization predicts lower repression even after unit heterogeneity is accounted. When country fixed effects are accounted, political globalization's effect is problematic for human rights, suggesting that politically influential states escape the constraining effects of globalization on political repression. Indeed, globalization generally shows up as more important than per capita income, a variable often found to be one of the most robust determinants of political violence. The results taken together support those who argue that increased globalization may enhance prospects for social progress, not social resistance and political violence as skeptics claim.     

‘I'm glad I'm not a Saudi woman’: the First Gulf War and US encounters with Saudi gender relations

On 6 November 1990, nearly 50 Saudi women staged a protest against the ban on women operating motor vehicles in Saudi Arabia. Occurring in the midst of the First Gulf War, the women's protest was a political statement about the harsh restrictions placed on women in the Middle Eastern country which both reflected and influenced Saudi society’s encounter with their American allies during the war. When United States (US) military personnel flooded into Saudi Arabia during the war, they were shocked at the way American servicewomen were treated by their Saudi allies and the second-class status of Saudi women throughout the country. This article explores Americans' reactions to their encounter with Saudi gender relations during the war and argues that the poor treatment of women in Saudi Arabia—which Americans dubbed ‘gender apartheid’—caused many Americans to question the longstanding US alliance with the conservative Muslim country. In doing so, US journalists, military personnel, scholars and the general public began to demand that concern about women's rights should be integrated seriously into US foreign policy towards the Muslim world.     

A Review of: “Fred Schreier. WMD Proliferation: Reforming the Security Sector to Meet the Threat.”

ABSTRACT

Previous research has argued that political inequality between ethnic groups increases the likelihood of both nonviolent and violent protest. In this study, I focus on civil resistance campaigns and argue that the probability that these large-scale, organized movements will take violent over nonviolent forms increases with the share of a country’s population that is excluded from political power on the basis of ethnic affiliation. I expect this to be so because ethnically exclusive regimes are more likely to counter political demands with violent repression, which increases the cost and decreases the anticipated success of nonviolent relative to violent resistance. I test this proposition in a global sample of countries for the period 1950–2006 and find, first, that high levels of ethnic exclusion make civil resistance campaigns more likely to occur violently than nonviolently. Next, to assess the mechanism at play, I conduct a mediation analysis and show that almost half of the effect of ethnic exclusion on violent campaign onset is mediated by the latent level of violent repression in a country. This result suggests that political authorities’ repressive strategies are key to explaining why regime opponents do not always opt for nonviolent forms of civil resistance.     

Social media and protest mobilization: evidence from the Tunisian revolution

This article explores how social media acted as a catalyst for protest mobilization during the Tunisian revolution in late 2010 and early 2011. Using evidence from protests we argue that social media acted as an important resource for popular mobilization against the Ben Ali regime. Drawing on insights from “resource mobilization theory”, we show that social media (1) allowed a “digital elite” to break the national media blackout through brokering information for mainstream media; (2) provided a basis for intergroup collaboration for a large “cycle of protest”; (3) reported event magnitudes that raised the perception of success for potential free riders, and (4) provided additional “emotional mobilization” through depicting the worst atrocities associated with the regime's response to the protests. These findings are based on background talks with Tunisian bloggers and digital activists and a revealed preference survey conducted among a sample of Tunisian internet users (February–May 2012).     

Now That Was A Riot!: Social Control in Felonious Times

ABSTRACT

In early 2017, dozens of US states introduced legislation designed to further criminalize confrontational protest tactics through expanding the scope of felony prosecutions and summoning the specter of the “riot” to depoliticize political action; indelibly linking it to criminal violence. This shift towards felonies and rioters took the form of legislation, intelligence reports, prosecutions, and rhetorical attempts at nearly every level of government. Demonstrations and campaigns were recast as felonious conspiracies, and the participants, rioters. In doing so, demonstrators were denied legibility as political actors, and instead held up in courts and newspapers as anti-social, irrational, and unruly criminal mobs. These legalistic, rhetorical, and strategic maneuvers can be critically interpreted through a mixed methodological approach embedded within Discourse Analysis and Autoethnography, and interpreted through a genealogical, social control framework. Through a close reading of these rhetorical shifts and their implications for policing and political repression, social movements adopting revolutionary nonviolence can increase resiliency through focusing on creating power, not simply challenging it.     

End Matter

One of the most intriguing, yet forgotten, terrorist groups in history is the Galleanists, an innovative group of militant Italian anarchists active in the United States during the early part of the twentieth century. They introduced tactics and strategies that are widely used today in the world of terrorism. This article examines the rise and fall of the group, and discusses how America's experience with it holds many lessons for understanding today's global terrorist threat.     

The election trap: the cycle of post-electoral repression and opposition fragmentation in Lukashenko's Belarus

Recent work on competitive authoritarianism has not explored the full consequences of electoral participation for opposition movements. While prominent work argues that the government must employ a mix of side-payments and repression to fragment opposition to its rule, Belarus’ history since the ascension of President Alexander Lukashenko in 1994 shows that the opposition has been repressed after most parliamentary and presidential elections without any substantial co-optation. I argue that electoral contestation and subsequent post-electoral repression have led to the Belarusian opposition's fragmented state. This state is grounded in competition for foreign aid, which creates a need among Belarusian opposition leaders to demonstrate their ability to mobilize support through campaigns. Invariably, successful opposition leaders emerge as the principal challengers to the regime, leading to their arrest or exile. Repression then fosters division within anti-government movements and restarts the cycle for new aid-seeking parties and leaders. A quantitative test establishes that repression concentrates in post-electoral periods and a qualitative assessment shows that opposition fragmentation stems from the arrest or exile of opposition leaders. The empirical findings provide contrasting evidence to work on co-optation in autocracies while suggesting an adverse effect of foreign democracy assistance around the world.     

The Political Cultures of Israel's Radical Right: Commentary on Ehud Sprinzak's The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right∗

Between 1968 and 1974 Italy was subjected to an unusually virulent campaign of right‐wing terrorism and subversion. An illustrative episode associated with this so‐called ‘strategy of tension’, which was characterized by the systematic use of covert ‘false flag’ operations, was the 17 May 1973 grenade attack outside Milan police headquarters that resulted in four dead and over 40 injured. Although the perpetrator, Gianfranco Bertoli, claimed to be an ‘individualist anarchist’ and had in fact established contacts with certain anarchist and leftist groups, subsequent judicial investigations revealed that he had been an informant and infiltrator for the Italian military intelligence service, that he had long maintained links with various anti‐communist and neo‐fascist organizations, and that he apparently received ‘cover’ and some type of logistical support prior to the attack from one or more ‘international secret services’. Although many aspects of the crime still remain murky, in all probability Bertoli was an agent provocateur acting on behalf of clandestine, quasi‐official intelligence apparatuses rather than a solitary anarchist engaging in violent ‘propaganda of the deed’.     

Does Canadian Multiculturalism Survive through State Repression?

Emma Ambrose and Cas Mudde argued in this journal that the absence of far-right parties in Canada can be attributed, among other factors, to “strong state repression of dissent” on multiculturalism policy. This article provides numerous examples of such dissent, to show that the state repression invoked by Ambrose and Mudde does not exist. The article also argues that certain “supply-side” explanations for the absence of a strong far-right apply to the Canadian case. It notes, in particular, how Steven Harper's Conservative government occupied much of the political space that might otherwise have been available for far-right challengers.     

‘Local is lekker’: Nation,narration and the sABC's Afrikaans programmes

Abstract

This article provides an exploration of the role of the SABC's Afrikaans language programmes in contemporary South African constructions of national identity. It examines the programmes’ engagement with the construction of (a) national identity by addressing the SABC's mandated obligation towards nation building, and exploring how the broadcaster's Afrikaans programmes are positioned in this regard. The article suggests that the SABC's task to ‘narrate the nation’ is complicated not only by the theoretical dilemmas faced by the terms ‘nation’ and ‘nation building’, but also by the broadcaster's historical ties to the apartheid government. This matter is further complicated for the Afrikaans-language programmes on SABC, given the language's binary position as both ‘unifier’ and ‘oppressor’.     

Social network analysis and counterinsurgency: a counterproductive strategy?

Social network analysis has been adopted by a number of governments in their counterinsurgency campaigns. By using network analysis, security agencies claim they can render militant groups impotent by targeting ‘nodal points’ or key links in insurgent networks. The article makes three arguments on the potentially counterproductive nature of social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaigns. Firstly, social network analysis may be ‘too successful’ in stripping militant movements of a cadre who could negotiate a peace accord. Secondly, social network analysis-assisted campaigns fail to address the root causes of violent conflict. Thirdly, by denuding communities of social capital and social entrepreneurs, social network analysis – as a counterinsurgency tool – may condemn communities to underdevelopment and failed post-war reconstruction. In short, the ‘magic weapon’ of social network analysis might actually prolong the conflict it is supposed to help quell. The article employs the government of Sri Lanka's social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaign as a case study, though it also has application to other cases. It concludes by considering if social network analysis can be put to more constructive uses, specifically in the rebuilding of communities after violent conflict.     

The International Security Involvement of Federated States: Comparing Massachusetts,Illinois and Flanders

Application of the federal principle of shared sovereignty to external security policies directed against foreign states can easily give rise to a situation in which the federation ceases to be an indivisible subject in an international setting. This can in turn lead to conflicts between the two levels. A comparison of three instances of sanctions adopted by federated states–the sanction policies of Massachusetts in support of the democratisation of Myanmar/Burma (1996–2000), the divestment policies of Illinois in opposition to the governmental policies of Sudan (2006-), and the participation by Flanders in Belgian and European sanctions in protest against the Freedom Party's participation in the Austrian government (2000)–confirms this thesis.     

Identity and morality in the Italian red brigades

The article provides a brief background to the activities of the Italian Red Brigades, then examines the group's development in terms of three phases ‐ social, existential and survivalist. A perceived social and political identity in the early 1970s gave the organization an illusory security and the self‐confidence to step up the attack on the state. As the level of violence increased the BR became separated from their social base and created an auto‐identity based on self‐delusion and political alienation. Armed struggle was simplified to existential abstractions of myth and symbol. By the early 1980s the effects of legal and police repression, popular rejection and internal conflict reduced the remaining militants to a strategy of simple survival. The irreversible degeneration of the group's morality accompanied the process of social estrangement.