‘THEY HAVEN'T GONE AWAY,YOU KNOW’. IRISH REPUBLICAN ‘DISSIDENTS’ AND ‘ARMED STRUGGLE’

The shift by the provisional Republican movement towards constitutional politics in Northern Ireland has caused splits among Republicans. The formation of the Continuity and Real Irish Republican Armies, pledged to continue ‘armed struggle’ against British rule in Northern Ireland, was predictable, given the historical propensity of Republicans to divide amid claims of ‘betrayal’ by the leadership. The odds against militarist Republican ‘dissidents’ appear overwhelming, as they lack weapons, members and support. Sinn Féin has carried most of the Nationalist constituency on its transition towards constitutionalism and the Irish Republic has abandoned its claim to Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, continued political uncertainty over the province's political future has contributed to the maintenance of a long-standing militaristic tradition within Irish republicanism.     

A Review of: “Alfred G. Gerteiny. The Terrorist Conjunction: The United States,the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,and Al-Qa'ida”

Since the advent of the Good Friday peace agreement, violence associated with dissident Irish Republican groups continues to present major security challenges. While there has not been a tragedy on the scale of the 1998 Omagh bombing, the level of violent dissident Republican (VDR) activity has risen steadily in frequency since then, and in 2010 reached unprecedented levels. This article presents findings from the VDR Project at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University. The research is based on the extensive identification, collection, and analysis of open source material examining the nature and extent of VDR activity from 1997 to 2010. The project analyses data on VDR activity across this period as well as the individuals taking part in these violent events. The data suggests that while originally recruitment was predominantly southern based it is now more focused on Northern Ireland. Analysis of the data also indicates that the VDR leadership continues to recruit individuals with skill-sets to serve the movement's aims.     

Monitoring the Peace?: Northern Ireland's 1975 Ceasefire Incident Centres and the Politicisation of Sinn Féin

During the Provisional IRA's (PIRA) 1975 ceasefire, two different sets of incident centres were established across Northern Ireland in order to monitor and avert escalation of violence between Republicans and Security Forces. While one group of offices was run by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and administered by clerks in the Northern Ireland Civil Service, very quickly Sinn Féin (taking advantage of their decriminalisation in 1974) established their own incident centres to coordinate their communication with the government. This article argues that the establishment of the Sinn Féin incident centres set a precedent for the future political activity of the Provisional Republican Movement; that their activity during the 1975 ceasefire played an important formative role in the evolution of the group's political strategy; and that this experience, acquired from the work done during the 1975 truce, was of far greater influence than is appreciated in current accounts.     

Fighting Talk: The Statements of “The IRA/New IRA”

With the advent of the new violent dissident merger, “The IRA/New IRA,” the group and its affiliates have had to legitimise their new existence. They have utilised the maintenance of paramilitary activity to achieve this. However, they have also produced a number of organisational statements, justifying their position, tactics, and strategies. This article analyses the evolution of these statements, both pre and post-merger from 2007 to 2015. 126 individual statements and four magazines are analysed using grounded theory. This analysis found that the statements have a dual strategy, aiming to foster trust in the movement and distrust in their perceived enemies. One of the dominant ways in which the group aims to foster trust is by proposing their possession of an historical mandate from the republican forefathers of 1916, as well as the internally lauded paramilitaries from The Troubles-era Provisional Irish Republican Army. The focus of the distrust narrative has been on the “constitutional nationalism” of Sinn Féin. However, it also pours scorn on the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and capitalism, across the island of Ireland. The analysis of these statements can provide us with an understanding of the future direction of the group, as well as giving us insight, which can inform the development of any counter-narrative.     

George Michael. The Enemy of My Enemy. The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right

This article presents an empirical analysis of a unique dataset of 1240 former members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). We highlight the shifting sociological and operational profile of PIRA's cadre, and highlight these dynamics in conjunction with primary PIRA documents and secondary interview sources. The effect of these changes in terms of the scale and intensity of PIRA violence is also considered. Although this is primarily a study of a disbanded violent organization, it contains broad policy implications beyond the contemporary violence of dissident movements in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. We conclude with a consideration of how a shifting sociological profile impacts upon group effectiveness, resilience, homogeneity, and the turn toward peaceful means of contention.     

Safe Territories and Violent Political Organizations

This article assesses how the concept of safe territory can expand our understanding of the persistence of, and eventual disengagement from, violence by violent political organizations. The explanatory utility of this concept is demonstrated through an analysis of the cycles of political violence perpetrated by the Red Brigades in Italy and the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. This work offers two main illustrative hypotheses. First, the opportunities provided by safe territories are not necessarily conducive to the continuation of political violence, although they facilitate its persistence over a long period of time. Second, the presence of safe territories, regardless of the ideology of the violent political organization, tends to enforce disengagement from political violence at the group, rather than the individual, level. Finally, the analytical intent in introducing the concept of safe territory is to contribute to spatial understandings of political violence.     

Marching Down the Garvaghy Road: Republican Tactics and State Response to the Orangemen's Claim to March their Traditional Route Home after the Drumcree Church Service

This study outlines the background and circumstances of the dispute over the Orange Order's claim to the right to parade down the Garvaghy Road after their annual Drumcree church service. This dispute has soured community relations in Northern Ireland and caused deep embarrassment to the British government, Unionists and many other groups for over five years now. However, it is the analysis of this article that such embarrassment and bad community relations was the desired outcome for one of the major participants in the dispute, the Republicans. It is argued that they deliberately set about conducting protests against Orange parades in the most confrontational manner possible. Their aim was to create a substitute for bombs and guns, an ongoing form of violence which they could use for political advantage during the talks known as the peace process. Whilst there is undoubtedly a long-established degree of nationalist resentment against the Orange Order on which Republicans were able to play, the open confrontations on the Garvaghy Road in recent years took much deliberate manipulation to become the violent clashes of today. The dispute is thus an example of terrorist tactics in which conventional terrorist violence is replaced by street violence. It is also an example of a case in which a weak and uncomprehending state made matters worse by trying to bargain with the perpetrators of violence.     

Mainstream Revolutionaries: Sinn Féin as a “Normal” Political Party?

Despite the seismic shift of Sinn Féin from being the “mouthpiece” of the Provisional Irish Republican Army to the largest nationalist force in Northern Ireland, the party continues to project its objectives within the revolutionary politics and tradition of 1916. Whilst various groups across the island of Ireland stress their loyalty to Irish independence and allegiance to their republican forefathers, 2016 also plays host to devolved assembly elections in Northern Ireland. The centenary of the Easter Rising is therefore a poignant moment to reassess republican politics, more specifically, the relationship between the armed revolutionary tradition and constitutionalism. Within the post-peace process era Sinn Féin have been accused of maintaining an autocratic culture and an intra-party framework that is more representative of a clandestine revolutionary organisation than a political party. Yet, simultaneously, Sinn Féin have not been immune to the pressures experienced by other modern political parties, bound by the laws of electoral competition and driven by office-seeking priorities. In order to explore Sinn Féin within the modern political arena, this article firstly examines the broader debate surrounding how armed groups make the transition into constitutional politics. Secondly, public opinion survey data is used to judge the basis of Sinn Féin's electoral appeal. Finally, internal party documents are used to examine party structure, intra-party democracy, and professionalisation in order to judge the extent to which Sinn Féin have completed the transition from being a “mouthpiece” to their armed counterpart, towards being a “normal” political party.     

The Coercive Weight of the Past: Temporal Dependence and the Conflict-Repression Nexus in the Northern Ireland “Troubles”

After 40 years, we still know very little about how state repression influences political dissent. In fact, to date, every possible relationship, including no influence, has been found. We argue that part of the problem concerns the current practice of treating every repressive event as if it were substantively equivalent, differentiated only by scope (large/small) or type (violent/nonviolent). We advance existing work by arguing that the influence of repression is contingent on when it occurs within the temporal sequences of political conflict. Using new events data on the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1974, results show that when dissent has been decreasing in the recent past, repressive action inspires an increase in dissident action. When dissent has been increasing, however, repression has the opposite effect, decreasing challenging activity. These results provide important insights into resolving a recurrent puzzle within the conflict-repression nexus as well as understanding the interaction between government and dissident behavior.     

Reloading the Armalite? Victims and Targets of Violent Dissident Irish Republicanism, 2007–2015

The centenary of the 1916 Rising marks a time of peaceful commemoration, across the island of Ireland. However, several violent dissident republican groups wish to seize it as an opportunity to re-organise in an attempt to bolster and legitimise their sustained paramilitary campaign. This study seeks to provide a greater understanding of how this paramilitary activity has manifested from 2007 to mid-2015. We do this by assessing target selection, through analysis of the Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) events database. The data suggest that civilian targets are the most regularly attacked. However, when exclusively analysing targets of detonated explosives, the data show that police, security personnel, and their infrastructure are more consistently targeted. The target selected can and does have an effect on attack method. These findings can both assist in protecting the potential targets of VDR attacks and contribute to the development of a strong nationalised, and localised, counter VDR narrative.     

The Irish republican army: An assessment of sectarianism

Although the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been active for more than 25 years, interpretations of the motivation of the IRA are varied. For some, it is a sectarian organization engaged in a tit‐for‐tat campaign with Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. For others, it is a guerrilla army waging a military campaign against the British presence in Northern Ireland. This article assesses the degree to which the IRA was or was not engaged in sectarian activity between July 1969 and December 1993. Although the Irish Republican Army killed more than 340 Protestant civilians in this time period, this examination suggests that the IRA, in general, was not a sectarian organization.     

Bosnia on the Border? Republican Violence in Northern Ireland During the 1920s and 1970s

Unionist politicians have argued that Republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/Unionist community in those areas. These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing Republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing from a wide range of theoretical literature and archival sources, it demonstrates that Republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.     

Bringing in the rogues: political violence,the British government and Sinn Fein

The article explores the relationship between the British government and the Irish Republican movement. In contrast to the established view, it argues that the British government had never had any objection to the inclusion of Republicans into a political settlement, and that – therefore – there was no need for any significant changes in government policy during the 1990s. Far from being an obstacle to inclusion, the British government's political strategy not only provided an incentive for the IRA to cease its military campaign, but also the opportunity to follow it up with an equitable political process, resulting in the Belfast Agreement.     

Crossing the limen: terrorist prisoners and the politically liminal process of imprisonment

Being processed through prison, for the politically violent, can be understood to be a liminal occurrence. Drawing upon the experiences of imprisoned Republicans in Northern Ireland, this study contrasts internment and imprisonment and situates these militants within the conditions of liminality – the role of comradeship; the liminal as dangerous and polluting; their being hidden and stripped. The study explores how imprisonment seeks to refashion militants by undermining the frames for their militancy. Liminality is suggested as an alternative conceptual tool for critically reflecting upon counter-terrorism.     

Just the Two of Us? Civil Conflicts,Pro-State Militants,and the Violence Premium

Quantitative literature discussing violence in civil conflicts tends towards a typical model of engagement between governments and revolutionaries. Whilst recent work has shown the significant impact of multiple anti-government groups, a further feature remains understudied—the role of pro-state militants. This article theorizes a “violence premium” when such groups arise, which leads to all connected groups devoting greater energy to conflict than they would in isolation. Employing duration analysis and data from The Troubles in Northern Ireland, where Republicans act as revolutionary insurgents, Loyalists as pro-state militants, and the British Army as government forces, the violence premium is empirically confirmed. Both Loyalists and Republicans deviate from their underlying strategies to attack more frequently when violence by their rivals increases, with Republicans and the British Army engaging in the same way. An extended analysis, accounting for the status of the victim, shows that the violence premium resulting from interaction between Loyalists and Republicans targeted only the civilian population of Northern Ireland, elucidating the sectarian component of The Troubles. These results show that including all conflict parties and considering how they are linked are important features in studies that aim to determine the net level of violence in civil conflicts.     

The Ulster Defence Regiment and the Question of Catholic Recruitment, 1970–1972

This article aims to consider the factors which led to a serious under-representation of Catholics within the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) during the Northern Ireland “Troubles.” A considerable number of UDR members were implicated in collusion with loyalist paramilitaries in their targeting of Catholic civilians throughout the conflict. Further, neither the British political nor military establishment made any significant moves towards addressing Catholic grievances regarding the UDR during the crucially formative years of 1970–1972. Despite this, Catholic under-representation has often been discussed with sole or particular reference to Republican paramilitary targeting of Catholic members of the force; this is in order to dissuade any further such involvement on the part of this demographic. The validity of such assertions will be examined in this article, along with a number of other factors which have been hitherto largely underplayed or outright ignored as contributing to this under-representation.     

“Us” and “Them”: Ulster Loyalist Perspectives on the IRA and Irish Republicanism

This article draws on data from one-to-one interviews with members and former members of the Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence Association, Red Hand Commando, Ulster Political Research Group, and the Progressive Unionist Party to explore the dynamic and fluid perceptions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin among Ulster loyalists. The article will explore how attitudes and perceptions are influenced by the shifting political landscape in Northern Ireland as Ulster loyalists come to terms with the new realities created by the peace process, security normalization, decommissioning, and the rise in the threat of dissident republican violence. The article will also demonstrate that these perceptions are not purely antagonistic and based on the creation of negative, stereotypical “enemy images” fuelled by decades of conflict, but pragmatic, bound to societal and local events, and influenced by intragroup attitudes and divisions, in addition to the expected conflictual ingroup vs. outgroup relationships. Finally, the article will explore how loyalists employ republicanism and the transformation of the Provisional IRA in particular, as a mirror or benchmark to reflect on their own progress since 1994.     

Victimisation and Attitudes Towards Former Political Prisoners in Northern Ireland

The release of ex-combatants and the mechanisms for their re-integration within society has become an increasingly controversial issue in peace settlements. Yet to date, the view of victims concerning such arrangements in post-conflict societies remains unexplored. Mindful of this omission and using Northern Ireland as a case study, this article investigates the relationship between victimisation and attitudes towards the treatment of former political prisoners. Based on the 2011 Northern Ireland Social and Political Attitudes Survey, the results suggest that individual victims—those who directly and/or indirectly experienced violent incidents—are notably less supportive of a punitive approach towards the treatment of former political prisoners than non-victims. Moreover, this is particularly the case when victims from within the Catholic community are considered. The Northern Ireland evidence suggests that victims can act as a positive and inclusive force in terms of the rehabilitation and re-integration of former combatants in societies emerging from conflict.     

Economics of peace making: the case of The International Fund for Ireland

The civil unrest in Northern Ireland, which began in 1969/1970, formally came to an end on May the 8th 2007, when devolved government began in earnest in Northern Ireland, with Unionist (Protestant) and Republican and Nationalist (Catholic) political parties joining together in government. One of the reasons for this historical peace is related to the work of The International Fund for Ireland. This article will discuss the mechanisms this Fund used to transform structures of conflict, and to create economic foundations for peace in Northern Ireland. The author was Director (1989–1993) and Chairman (1993–2005) of the International Fund for Ireland.     

International Influences on Nonviolent and Violent Contention

ABSTRACT

How do international actors influence dissidents’ decisions whether to challenge their states using violent means, nonviolence, both or neither? We argue that the presence of important actors affects dissident decisions to engage in violent or nonviolent contention by affecting whether dissidents expect that governments will repress or concede to dissident demands in response to this contention. We examine the effect of two prominent types of actors – powerful states with close ties to the government and Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations (HSIGOs) on dissident behavior in all national-level elections in Africa from 2000–2012. Using integrated data drawn from four leading conflict events datasets, we find that dissidents are less likely to engage in violent contention when their government receives higher levels of military aid from the United States and in former French colonies, and more likely to engage in both violent and nonviolent contention when their state is a member of a greater number of HSIGOs.