Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien

The last quarter of the 20^th century saw the worldwide advance of democracy. However, almost three decades after the beginning of the third wave of democratization, the empirical evidence increasingly suggests that this wave could become less a triumph of political liberalism and much more a success story for a “defective” form of democracy. The mainstream of theoretical and empirical ‘consolidology’ speaks of democracies and autocracies. This crude dichotomy does not allow for more differentiated judgments and conceptualizations of the structural and functional elements of this regime-type that has developed in the grey area between consolidated, liberal democracy and open autocracy. Thus far, a theoretical concept enabling the new regime-type to be systematically differentiated from democracies based on the rule of law, the reasons for its emergence to be clearly set out, and the specific dynamics of its development to be explained, has thus far been lacking. To overcome this shortcomings this article presents a multidimensional concept of democracy that allows, to distinguish between liberal democracies based on the rule of law and defective, or illiberal, democracies. From developing a three-dimensional typology for classifying three subtypes of defective democracies (exclusive democracy, tutelary democracy, illiberal democracy), the paper is focused on the illiberal democracy, more specifically on the questions what are the defining characteristics of illiberal democracies, and what are the reasons for their emergence. We will examine the specific interdependence of formal institutions and informal institutional arrangements, which we consider to be one of the central features of illiberal democracies and, finally, we will outline possible scenarios for the future development of illiberal democracies.     

‘Illiberal Democracy’ after Post-Democracy: Revisiting the Case of Hungary

In taking stock of the ruling Fidesz party's project of ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary, this article first develops considerations based on Claude Lefort's democratic theory for critiquing ‘illiberal democracy’ and post-democracy alike, situating the former in an early 2010s post-democratic moment characterised by the emergence of a neoliberal crisis management regime in the Eurozone. ‘Illiberal democracy’ and ‘market-conforming democracy’ are both problematic from this standpoint insofar as they subordinate the key Lefortian dimension of democratic contestation to either the primacy of the markets or a reified conception of the ‘national interest’ as represented by a single party. The analysis then traces the development of ‘illiberal democracy’ and its construction of key signifiers such as the ‘national interest’ in programmatic speeches made by Viktor Orbán, from its beginnings in the post-democratic moment to subsequent crisis conjunctures in which it has redefined itself against ever newer threats.     

The Geography of Repression and Opposition to Autocracy

State repression is a prominent feature of nondemocracies, but its effectiveness in quieting dissent and fostering regime survival remains unclear. We exploit the location of military bases before the coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power in Chile in 1973, which is uncorrelated to precoup electoral outcomes, and show that counties near these bases experienced more killings and forced disappearances at the hands of the government during the dictatorship. Our main result is that residents of counties close to military bases both registered to vote and voted “No” to Pinochet's continuation in power at higher rates in the crucial 1988 plebiscite that bolstered the democratic transition. Potential mechanisms include informational frictions on the intensity of repression in counties far from bases and shifts in preferences caused by increased proximity to the events. Election outcomes after democratization show no lasting change in political preferences.     

Democracy as an equilibrium

Observation shows that while democracy is fragile in poor countries, it is impregnable in developed ones. To explain this pattern, I develop a model in which political parties propose redistributions of incomes, observe the result of an election, and decide whether to comply with the outcome or to launch a struggle for dictatorship. Democracy prevails in developed societies because too much is at stake in turning against it. More income can be redistributed in developed than in poor countries without threatening democracy. Limits on redistribution arise endogenously, so that constitutions are not necessary for democracy to endure. A democratic culture characterizes the equilibrium.     

Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi‐Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?

Previous studies report that semi‐democratic regimes are less durable than both democracies and autocracies. Still, mixing democratic and autocratic characteristics need not destabilize regimes, as three highly plausible alternative explanations of this correlation remain unaccounted for: (a) semi‐democracies emerge under conditions of political instability and social turmoil; (b) other regime characteristics explain duration; and (c) extant democracy measures do not register all regime changes. We elaborate on and test for these explanations, but find strikingly robust evidence that semi‐democracies are inherently less durable than both democracies and autocracies. “Semi‐democracies are particularly unstable political regimes” should thus be considered a rare stylized fact of comparative politics. The analysis yields several other interesting results. For instance, autocracies and semi‐democracies are equally likely to experience “liberalizing” regime changes more specifically, and once accounting for differences in degree of democracy, there is no robust evidence of differences in duration between military and single‐party regimes.     

Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy

This article explains why dissatisfaction with the performance of individual politicians in new democracies often turns into disillusionment with democracy as a political system. The demands on elections as an instrument of political accountability are much greater in new than established democracies: politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics of undesirable candidates who view this period as their “one‐time opportunity to get rich.” After a repeatedly disappointing government performance, voters may rationally conclude that “all politicians are crooks” and stop discriminating among them, to which all politicians rationally respond by “acting like crooks,” even if most may be willing to perform well in office if given appropriate incentives. Such an expectation‐driven failure of accountability, which I call the “trap of pessimistic expectations,” may precipitate the breakdown of democracy. Once politicians establish reputations for good performance, however, these act as barriers to the entry into politics of low‐quality politicians. The resulting improvement in government performance reinforces voters’ belief that democracy can deliver accountability, a process that I associate with democratic consolidation. These arguments provide theoretical microfoundations for several prominent empirical associations between the economic performance of new democracies, public attitudes toward democracy, and democratic stability.     

Demokratie als öffentliches Gut?

Political Science neglect classical insights on constitutional and economic conditions of the so called “tax state” as a fiscal institutional architecture sui generis. While studies in Political Economy focus on distribution quality of the welfare state or compare budgets from local to international level fiscal research should also consider the capitalist structure of tax paradigm again. Only after such a regeneration the discipline could better reflect old and new democratic challenges of fiscal problems. Recalling former theories of interdependencies between fiscal, constitutional and ideological orders, this article suggests to make sense of conceptualizing democratic regime itself as prime public good. Because if it is fiscal sovereignty that is foremost to produce with democracy’s budget it should be easier to analyze tax state driven regressive effects of democratic integrity.     

Regulatory capabilities: A normative framework for assessing the distributional effects of regulation

This paper develops the normative concept of “regulatory capabilities.” It asserts that nobody – individuals, groups, or entities – should be subjected to a regulatory regime without some freedom to determine its nature. Self‐determination in this context means the ability to accept or reject a regulatory regime imposed by others or to develop viable alternative approaches. We use the term “regulatory capabilities” to capture the importance of enabling conditions for regulatory self‐determination. This is particularly important in the transnational context where private, hybrid public–private, and public actors compete for influence, shape domestic regulation, and, in doing so, limit the scope for democratic self‐governance. In short, this paper seeks to contribute to the general debate on the normative foundations of and the requisite conditions for transnational regulation and governance.     

The Speed of Global Flows and the Pace of Democratic Politics

The claim I want to make in this article is, in short, first, that democratic theory for the most part has seriously neglected the temporal preconditions of liberal democracy and, second, that it therefore fails to adequately grasp some fundamental aspects of the crisis of democratic self-determination in the contemporary global age. In its first part, the article seeks to demonstrate that the history of modernity is an ongoing process of social acceleration and that most of the phenomena we currently grasp under the concept of “globalization” can in fact best be understood as instances or consequences of the latest wave of social acceleration. In the second and main part of this article, the consequences of this acceleratory character of modernity for the plausibility, legitimacy and possibility of political democracy are systematically explored. The main argument is that the speed-up of society at first enabled and supported democratization, but beyond a certain critical threshold, the reverse effect occurs: the speed of social change and the dynamics of socioeconomic development threaten to undermine the proper functioning of democracy. Thus, it is my claim that democracy only works properly within a certain time- or “speed-frame” of social change. From this, I conclude that what is called for in the Age of Globalization is a new critical theory of acceleration, the contours of which I briefly sketch out in the third and last part of this essay.     

Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions

The original studies of "competitive authoritarianism" and "hegemonic authoritarianism" inspected the occurrence of hybrid regimes during the 1990s but stopped short of testing their propensity for democratic change. This article assesses the causal effects of hybrid regimes, and the post–cold war period itself, on regime breakdown and democratization. Using a dataset of 158 regimes from 1975 to 2004, and a discrete measure for transitions to electoral democracy, I find that competitive authoritarian regimes are not especially prone to losing power but are significantly more likely to be followed by electoral democracy: vigorous electoral contestation does not independently subvert authoritarianism, yet it bodes well for democratic prospects once incumbents are overthrown.     

Why join the party in a one-party system?: Popularity versus political exchange

The paper investigates empirically the determinants of political stability in one-party states, taking as an example socialist Yugoslavia. We assume that the number of the Party members is an indicator of the stability of the regime and perform a time series analysis for the six Yugoslav republics in the 1953–1988 period. We find that rents distributed to the population were far more important than the popularity of economic policies and perhaps even more important than repression. These findings provide strong empirical support for economic models of dictatorship based on the notion of political exchange.     

Political cartoons as carnivalesque: a multimodal discourse analysis of Argentina’s Humor Registrado magazine

Political cartoons, although generally neglected by academic criticism, are often one of the only forms of socio-political critique permitted during authoritarian rule (Barajas, Rafael. 2000. “The Transformative Power of art: Mexico’s Combat Cartoonists.” NACLA Report on the Americas, 3: 6–41). This paper explores the reasons behind this, reading the genre as a form of Bakhtin’s carnivalesque, a participatory space of oppositional discourse outside the official version with which it has an “ambivalent” relationship (Bakhtin, Mikhael. 1984. Rabelais and His World (Trans Iswolsky H). Bloomington: Indiana University Press) and can be allowed to circulate as a “safety valve” (Holquist, Michael. 1984. “Prologue.” In Rabelais and his World, edited by M. Bakhtin, xiii–xxiii. Bloomington: Indiana University Press) of controlled protest. Drawing on tools of Multimodal Discourse Analysis, Social Semiotics (Kress, Gunther, and Theo Van Leeuwen. 1996. Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design. New York: Routledge) and Semiology (Barthes, Roland. 1968. Elements of Semiology. New York: Hill and Wang) for methodological purposes, this study investigates this hypothesis through the political cartoons of the covers of satirical fortnightly publication Humor Registrado during the final year of Argentina’s last dictatorship, 1982–1983. The magazine’s role in challenging the dictatorship is explored through an analysis of its representations of key social actors and events during Argentina’s difficult period of transition from dictatorship to democracy following defeat in the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War.     

„Bunte Revolutionen“ – Durchbruch zur Demokratie oder Modus der autoritären Systemreproduktion?

The bulk of the debate on “colour revolutions” interprets them as instances of democratic breakthrough promoting the democratization of postcommunist “laggards”. It contributes to democratization studies delivering neoinstitutionalist interpretations of electoral revolutions, models of the interplay between international and domestic factors, and implications for democracy assistance. There is, however, an alternative interpretation of the “colour revolutions” as instances of authoritarian regime instability and reproduction. It provides insights into the dynamics of post-Soviet (semi-)authoritarian regimes which are related to the ongoing debate on comparative authoritarianism. The different perspectives on “colour revolutions” also offer various prospects for postcommunist area studies.     

On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes

Numerous empirical studies have investigated the direction of causality between democracy and economic growth (as well as the level of income per capita), but this empirical work has been paralleled by relatively few theoretical models that endogenize the institutional structure of the regime. Moreover, the different types of autocratic regimes have received relatively little attention. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes facing a revolt or an insurgency. In this model, there are three players: the regime, the rebels, and the masses. There are three stages in the game. In the first stage, the regime determines the level of infrastructure and the tax rate. In the second stage, the masses allocate their time between production and helping the rebels. In the third stage, the regime and the rebels simultaneously choose their fighting effort levels in a contest, in which the probability of survival of the regime is determined. It is found that autocratic regimes facing a revolt endogenously sort themselves into “tinpot” regimes that maximize their consumption at the cost of their survival, and (weak and strong) “totalitarian” regimes that maximize their probability of survival at the expense of their consumption. Empirical implications of the model are derived, and the relevance of the model to public policy is discussed.     

Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion

Why has the decision to invite foreign election observers become an international norm? More generally, how do international norms develop in the absence of incentives for cooperation or activism by norm entrepreneurs? Motivated by the case of election observation, I argue that international norms can be generated through a diffusely motivated signaling process. Responding to increased benefits associated with being democratic, international election observation was initiated by democratizing governments as a signal of a government's commitment to democracy. Increased democracy‐contingent benefits gave other “true‐democrats” the incentive to invite observers, resulting in a widespread belief that all true‐democrats invite election monitors. Consequently, not inviting observers became an unambiguous signal that a government was not democratizing, giving even pseudo‐democrats reason to invite observers and risk a negative report. I evaluate this theory with an original global dataset on elections and election observation, 1960–2006.     

Transparency and mistrust: Who or what should be made transparent?

It is increasingly recognized in public administration that the relationship between trust and transparency is not straightforward. Recently, right‐wing populists have risen to power, rejecting transparency requirements based on documents while claiming that they “hide nothing.” Clearly, existing scholarly conceptualizations are insufficient for understanding how transparency operates as a value in real‐world political contestation. An analysis of state‐ and national‐level politics in Nigeria reveals that, while always retaining a core informational component, there are multiple competing conceptions of transparency. Popular demands for transparency express a belief that not only should data be made transparent, but also the social networks in which politicians are embedded. “Transparency in people” can clash with more traditional, technocratic transparency practices centered on data. By rethinking who or what should be made transparent—data, things, or people—this article offers fresh theoretical insights on the complex politics of transparency and trust.     

The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract

Is a genuine social contract mythical? I argue that pirates created genuine social contracts that established a system of constitutional democracy based on the same decision-making calculus and with the same effects that Buchanan and Tullock’s contractarian theory of government describes in The Calculus of Consent. Pirates’ constitutional democracy is the “holy grail” of social contract theory. It demonstrates that the contractarian basis of constitutional democracy is more than a mere analytic device or hypothetical explanation of how such a government could emerge. In pirates’ case, Buchanan and Tullock’s social contract theory describes how constitutional democracy actually did emerge.     

Motivation of politicians and long-term policies

We analyze the motivation of politicians in democracies when long-term policies are socially desirable. Politicians receive utility from holding office and from the success of their projects. We refer to the two extreme types of politicians as “populists” and “policy success-seekers”. One result is that inefficiencies in the political process are smaller when a politician is of the populist type. When politicians offer incentive contracts, the problem of inefficient decision-making may be solved. The amount of money necessary to induce the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal project decreases with the degree of populism he displays.     

General interest and redistribution with self-interested voters: Social contract revisited

I provide a rational solution to the lasting paradox that citizens be more concerned with “general interest” than most economic agents. I show who that, in the face of fundamental political uncertainty, the social contract, as conceptualized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau two centuries ago, provides to self-interested voters an effective mechanism of self-insurance that limits amount of involuntary transfers. My positive theory of voter behavior and general interest has but a formal resemblance with the normative theory of welfare judgments and social justice. Even when the efficiency aspects of redistribution are not considered, there is no way in which the final distribution of incomes could be equal if the initial distribution of incomes were unequal! The role of political parties in this model is to manipulate the distribution of political chances in order to maximize their probability of winning elections. I show for instance that “social instability” and progressive redistribution characterize the equilibrium outcome of a two-class democracy in which the lower class forms a majority.     

From partisan to pluralist ideology: the changing practices of democracy through Spain’s 20th-century constitutional moments

This article explores the practices of democracy in Spain through the lens of its 20th-century constitutional moments, namely, those around the 1931 and the 1978 constitutions, with the aim of elucidating its changing ideological significance. Whereas in 1931, supporting democracy had a strongly partisan meaning, as every endorsement of the democratic ideal entailed a conflicting understanding of the Republic’s democratic character, in 1978 it gave rise to an integrative form of pluralism. Even if the former has left a deep imprint on Spanish politics, anticipating a kind of seemingly irreconcilable opposition between left and right, the latter has proved instrumental in the consolidation of the new democratic regime. After the institutional distortion of democracy during the four-decade dictatorship’s ‘organic democracy’, since 1977 the ideal of democracy was thoroughly recast into a pluralist ideology. Unlike views describing it as a consensual regime, the article argues that the politics of consensus tested since the 1977 constitutional debates paved the way for the accommodation of democratic pluralism; furthermore, the culture of pacts it contributed to set up has continued to inspire a new form of adversarial, parliamentary politics well beyond the transition years.