Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion

This article quantifies the impact of civil wars on economic growth at home and in nearby countries. Three alternative measures of nearness—contiguity, length of contiguous borders, and distance of closest approach—are used to capture the spatial dispersion of civil war consequences. We present short-run panel estimates (at five-year intervals) and long-run (1961–95) panel estimates for the world. Generally, the distance measures, novel to this study, and not contiguity provides the most accurate measure of the diffusion of the negative economic consequences of civil wars on other countries. Unlike earlier studies, we also investigate the temporal influence of civil wars on growth at home and in nearby countries. Both the duration and the timing of civil wars have an economic impact.     

Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict

Wars within states have become much more common than wars between them. A dominant approach to understanding civil war assumes that opposition movements are unitary, when empirically, most of them are not. I develop a theory for how internal divisions within opposition movements affect their ability to bargain with the state and avoid conflict. I argue that more divided movements generate greater commitment and information problems, thus making civil war more likely. I test this expectation using new annual data on the internal structure of opposition movements seeking self‐determination. I find that more divided movements are much more likely to experience civil war onset and incidence. This analysis suggests that the assumption that these movements are unitary has severely limited our understanding of when these disputes degenerate into civil wars.     

Human Rights Violations,Weak States,and Civil War

This study examines the role of human rights violations as a harbinger of civil wars to come, as well as the links between repression, state weakness, and conflict. Human rights violations are both part of the escalating process that may end in civil war and can contribute to an escalation of conflict to civil war, particularly in weak states. The role of government repression and state weakness in leading to civil war is tested empirically. The results show that both closely correlate with civil war onset, especially if they are observed in combination. A two-stage model shows that, while low-level conflict leads to human rights violations, they increase the risk of an escalation to civil war in turn. Human rights violations are identified as an important aspect of understanding civil war onset as the result of an escalation over time and a clear early warning sign of wars to come.     

Effective Foreign Aid Following Civil War: The Nonstrategic‐Desperation Hypothesis

When does aid foster development after civil war? A testable model is needed to account for the uneven outcomes in postconflict development. This article proposes and empirically tests the novel nonstrategic‐desperation hypothesis, an explanation based on the varied incentives that fragile postconflict governments face when confronted with donor development goals. Paradoxically, incentives to meet development goals only exist when donors have little strategic interest in the recipients and when recipients lack income from resource rents and are therefore desperate for income. Ten‐year data on infant mortality changes following civil wars ending 1970–96 and a variety of robustness checks support the hypothesis. By focusing on how income sources constrain the choices of aid recipients, and how these constraints can provide incentives to meet donor development goals, the nonstrategic‐desperation hypothesis explains how the good use of aid can take place following civil war, when institutions are weak.     

Constitutional courts as veto players: Lessons from the United States,France and Germany

The number of constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitutional review rights has strongly increased with the third wave of democratisation across the world as an important element of the new constitutionalism. These courts play an important role in day‐to‐day politics as they can nullify acts of parliament and thus prevent or reverse a change in the status quo. In macro‐concepts of comparative politics, their role is unclear. Either they are integrated as counter‐majoritarian institutional features of a political system or they are entirely ignored: some authors do not discuss their potential impact at all, while others dismiss them because they believe their preferences as veto players are entirely absorbed by other actors in the political system. However, we know little about the conditions and variables that determine them as being counter‐majoritarian or veto players. This article employs the concept of Tsebelis’ veto player theory to analyse the question. It focuses on the spatial configuration of veto players in the legislative process and then adds the court as an additional player to find out if it is absorbed in the pareto‐efficient set of the existing players or not. A court which is absorbed by other veto players should not in theory veto new legislation. It is argued in this article that courts are conditional veto players. Their veto is dependent on three variables: the ideological composition of the court; the pattern of government control; and the legislative procedures. To empirically support the analysis, data from the United States, France and Germany from 1974 to 2009 is used. This case selection increases variance with regard to system types and court types. The main finding is that courts are not always absorbed as veto players: during the period of analysis, absorption varies between 11 and 71 per cent in the three systems. Furthermore, the pattern of absorption is specific in each country due to government control, court majority and legislative procedure. Therefore, it can be concluded that they are conditional veto players. The findings have at least two implications. First, constitutional courts and supreme courts with judicial review rights should be systematically included in veto player analysis of political systems and not left aside. Any concept ignoring such courts may lead to invalid results, and any concept that counts such courts merely as an institutional feature may lead to distorted results that over‐ or under‐estimate their impact. Second, the findings also have implications for the study of judicial politics. The main bulk of literature in this area is concerned with auto‐limitation, the so‐called ‘self‐restraint’ of the government to avoid defeat at the court. This auto‐limitation, however, should only occur if a court is not absorbed. However, vetoes observed when the court is absorbed might be explained by strategic behaviour among judges engaging in selective defection.     

Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions

Abstract

The normative and practical success of the 1990s campaign on the right and responsibility to intervene to stop civil wars should be acknowledged so that policy and research can move on to the more pressing question of how we intervene and improve on currently inadequate results. This essay confronts a standard explanation, the failure to address the root causes of a conflict. It argues from academic research on three aspects – the knowledge on causes shaping current policies, the interests of those who matter in intervention, and the new research on civil war – that a focus on root causes would not improve outcomes and could even be counterproductive.     

War,the Presidency,and Legislative Voting Behavior

An extraordinary body of scholarship suggests that war, perhaps more than any other contributor, is responsible for the emergence of a distinctly modern presidency. Central to this argument is a belief that members of Congress predictably and reliably line up behind the president during times of war. Few scholars, however, have actually subjected this argument to quantitative investigation. This article does so. Estimating ideal points for members of Congress at the start and end of the most significant wars in the past century, we find consistent—albeit not uniform—evidence of a wartime effect. The outbreaks of both world wars and the post‐9/11 era—though not the Korean or Vietnam wars—coincided with discernible changes in member voting behavior that better reflected the ideological leanings of the presidents then in office. In the aftermath of all these wars, meanwhile, members shifted away from the sitting president’s ideological orientation. These findings are not confined to any single subset of policies, are robust to a wide variety of modeling specifications, and run contrary to scholarship that emphasizes ideological consistency in members’ voting behavior.     

Von „alten“ und „neuen“ Kriegen — Zum Gestaltwandel kriegerischer Gewalt

There is a growing debate in the field of conflict and peace research as to whether the ways wars are fought have changed since the end of the cold war. Whereas some claim to identify the emergence of a new type of war — the so-called new wars — others deny a fundamental transformation of warfare. This article intervenes in this debate by subjecting the thesis of the new wars to a first plausibility test. An analysis of three case studies on the wars in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola suggests that there has indeed been a transformation of warfare since the end of the cold war. In contrast to the warfare of the 1980s, in the 1990s one can observe a privatisation of the conflict parties, a criminalisiation of their war economies, an economisation of their motives and a brutalisation of their strategies.     

Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes

This article examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing that incentives to avoid punishment influence their strategic decision making during war.  Leaders in civil war face punishment from two sources: internal audiences and opponents. I hypothesize that leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment from both sources following unfavorable war performance, and thus, have incentives to continue the fight in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding the negative consequences of defeat. These incentives, in turn, make leaders who bear responsibility more likely to fight to an extreme outcome and less likely to make concessions to end the war.  These propositions are tested on an original data set identifying all rebel and state leaders in all civil conflict dyads ongoing between 1980 and 2011.  Results support the hypothesized relationships between leader responsibility and war outcomes.     

The contingent morality of war: establishing a diachronic model of jus ad bellum

According to most accounts of just war theory, jus ad bellum is concerned with the morality of initiating war. This gives jus ad bellum a temporal dimension, making it a set of principles that are applied to judge belligerents’ actions at the outset of a war, but that cannot be revisited after a war begins. I challenge this synchronic conception of jus ad bellum by arguing that the considerations the principles of jus ad bellum are meant to judge can, and often do, change substantially over the course of wars. It is inappropriate to determine the ad bellum justice of a war solely based on how the principles of jus ad bellum are satisfied at a war’s outset. Because of the mercurial nature of war, jus ad bellum principles should be applied diachronically, as moral norms that can be used to guide or to judge belligerents even after a war has been initiated.     

In Search of Successful Reform: The Politics of Opposition and Consensus in OECD Parliamentary Democracies

Why are some governments able to undertake controversial policy reforms and others are not? Conventional wisdom argues that single-party majority governments are best able to implement reforms because there are fewer veto actors within the government that can block the reforms. However, these accounts fail to consider the veto power of societal actors and particularly of trade unions, which can stall reform even in the presence of a unified executive. This paper argues that controversial reforms require broad societal and, consequently, political consensus, which are easier to achieve under minority governments or governments of broad coalitions. Evidence from 22 OECD parliamentary democracies over 35 years shows that minority and large coalition governments have been more successful in reducing social security contributions and pensions than narrower majority governments. This is especially true in countries where trade unions are militant and often resort to industrial action.     

Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government

Does the effective number of veto players in a political system explain the rate of government growth? Panel data analyses are conducted in order to test several measures of veto players against each other, and these results are compared with similar analyses of government fractionalization. The analyses indicate that veto players and especially government fractionalization exert a constraining effect on changes in the size of government, but also that the effect is not consistent over time: neither veto players in general nor fractionalization of government in particular exerted any constraining effect during the decades of rapid government growth due to welfare state creation and expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. The strength of government fractionalization vis-a-vis the veto player measures in explaining changes in the size of government suggest that the constellation of partisan veto players within coalition governments matters, while the effect of institutional veto players remains uncertain.     

Information,Agreement Design,and the Durability of Civil War Settlements

Civil war is usually examined from the perspective of commitment problems. This approach provides considerable insight regarding which civil war agreement provisions reduce the chance of renewed fighting. Yet, additional insight can be gained by examining information asymmetries as a potential cause of civil war recurrence. We argue that significant uncertainty regarding military capabilities may persist after fighting ends and that this uncertainty may lead to the breakdown of peace. However, carefully designed peace agreements can guard against renewed civil war by calling for international monitoring, making the belligerents submit military information to third parties, and providing for verification of this information. Our empirical analysis of 51 civil war settlements between 1945 and 2005 shows that these provisions significantly reduce the risk of new civil war. Encouraging the adoption of these provisions may be a useful policy in the international community's effort to establish peace in civil‐war‐torn societies.     

Sexual Violence,Competitive State Building,and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

ABSTRACT

This article examines the practices of rape, sexual enslavement, and forced marriage used by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Most research see wartime sexual violence as solutions to battlefields challenges. Studies of civil war and competitive state building during civil wars have largely overlooked the implications of such violence for rebel governance. This article explores how efforts to regulate sexuality figure within processes of violent state formation. ISIS’s practices of sexual violence mirror previous efforts by the Iraqi and Syrian state to substantiate ethno-sectarian domination through violence. But ISIS creates new gendered and ethno-sectarian hierarchies. Repertoires of sexual and gender-based violence can help to sustain and create structures of state control and are thus integral to competitive state building.     

Civil society and post-communist democratization: Facing a double challenge in post-Milošević Serbia

Abstract

Civil society literature attributes the weakness of post-communist civil society to the communist heritage. It is structurally weak, the argument goes, because post-communist citizens are averse to voluntary organizations and because of ethnic nationalism. This article goes beyond the heritage argument and contends that post-communist civil society is weakened by democratization itself. Post-communist democratizing states are fragmented structurally and ideologically, and lack a consensus on the liberal state as a provider of public goods and an inclusive citizenship. Simultaneously, the non-state sector in post-communism is expanding in both liberal and illiberal directions. While the liberal segments of the state respond to a liberal civil society, its illiberal segments reinforce an illiberal civil society. Consequently, ‘good’ civil society is forced to confront ideologically both the illiberal state and illiberal non-state groups, which limits its potential contribution to promoting good governance. The argument is illustrated by a study of civil society's transformation in post-Milo?evi? Serbia and the struggle by liberal civil society groups for acceptance of responsibility for Serbian war crimes committed in the wars of Yugoslavia's disintegration in the 1990s.     

Adam Smith or Machiavelli? Political incentives for contracting out local public services

Why do some local governments deliver public services directly while others rely on providers from the private sector? Previous literature on local contracting out and on the privatization of state-owned enterprises have offered two competing interpretations on why center-right governments rely more on private providers. Some maintain that center-right politicians contract out more because, like Adam Smith, they believe in market competition. Others claim that center-right politicians use privatization in a Machiavellian fashion; it is used as a strategy to retain power, by ??purchasing?? the electoral support of certain constituencies. Using a unique dataset, which includes the political attitudes of over 8,000 Swedish local politicians from 290 municipalities for a period of 10 years, this paper tests these ideological predictions together with additional political economy factors which have been overlooked in previous studies, such as the number of veto players. Results first indicate support for the Machiavellian interpretation, as contracting out increases with electoral competition. Second, irrespective of ideological concerns, municipalities with more veto players in the coalition government contract out fewer services.     

Social capital,institutional structures,and democratic performance: A comparative study of German local governments

Abstract. The argument presented is that political culture and institutional structures independently shape government performance. This is consistent with Putnam et al.'s (1983) initial argument that 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' factors are independently at work in shaping institutional performance. It is hypothesized that: (I) social capital within a community positively contributes to government performance, and (2) governmental institutional forms that minimize the number of veto players in the decision making process generate performance superior to those where the number of veto players is large. An analysis of cross–sectional data (mainly drawn from surveys of citizens and elites) on 30 small– to medium–size municipalities in East and West Germany from the year 1995 is undertaken to evaluate these hypotheses. The results from this analysis lead to the following conclusions. Higher social capital within the elite political culture of a community leads to greater citizen satisfaction with local government performance. Local government structures where power is centralized (and thus the number of veto players minimized) generate greater citizen satisfaction with government performance than do those where the distribution of power is more diffuse.     

Economic Aid and Peace Implementation: The African Experience

Abstract

This paper examines the potential importance of externally-facilitated peace dividends and donor coordination in sustaining peace after the signing of an accord. We extend our previous research on US performance after civil wars to learn if adversary assumptions on peace dividends have additional positive impact when a wider sample of major Western European donors is included. Was the lack of US follow-through compensated for in whole or in part by the extension of development assistance allocations from European allies? We find that cases in which donors provide significant and sustained post-conflict aid are somewhat less likely to return to civil war than those who do not receive comparable assistance. Moreover, we find in such cases that donor coordination reinforced behaviour that encouraged the implementation process, providing an extra incentive for maintaining the peace agreement over the five-year threshold and beyond.     

Dynamics of Policymaking: Stepping Back to Leap Forward,Stepping Forward to Keep Back

We study dynamic policymaking when today's policy agreement becomes tomorrow's status quo, agents account for the consequences of today's policies for future policy outcomes, and there is uncertainty about who will hold future political power to propose and veto future policy changes. Today's agenda setter holds back from fully exploiting present opportunities to move policy toward her ideal point whenever future proposer and veto players are likely to be aligned either in favor of reform or against it. Otherwise, agenda setters advance their short‐run interests. Optimal proposals can vary discontinuously and nonmonotonically with political fundamentals.     

Does Cohabitation Matter? French European Policy-Making in the Context of Divided Government

This article analyses French European policy-making in the context of divided government, arguing that in the area of European policy-making cohabitation increases the number of veto players, as compared with unified government. The increase of veto players, in turn, reduces France's acceptance-sets at the European table and thereby introduces a status quo bias. In order to test this theory, use is made of a comparative case study design. Process-tracing and counterfactual analyses reveal that veto player theory can, indeed, be applied to the interactions of a split-executive government.