Veto games: Spatial committees under unanimity rule

There exists a large literature on two-person bargaining games and distribution games (or divide-the-dollar games) under simple majority rule, where in equilibrium a minimal winning coalition takes full advantage over everyone else. Here we extend the study to an n-person veto game where players take turns proposing policies in an n-dimensional policy space and everybody has a veto over changes in the status quo. Briefly, we find a Nash equilibrium where the initial proposer offers a policy in the intersection of the Pareto optimal set and the Pareto superior set that gives everyone their continuation values, and punishments are never implemented. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under two different agendas – sequential recognition and random recognition – we find that there are advantages generated by the order of proposal under the sequential recognition rule. We also provide some conditions under which the players will prefer to rotate proposals rather than allow any specific policy to prevail indefinitely.     

An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule

Scholars traditionally claim that unanimity rule is more capable of producing Pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule. Dougherty and Edward (Public Choice 151(3):655–678, 2012) make the opposite claim assuming proposals are either random, sincere, or strategic. We test these competing hypotheses in a two-dimensional framework using laboratory experiments. Our primary results suggest: (1) majority rule enters the Pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule, (2) majority rule leaves the Pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule, and (3) majority rule is more likely to select a Pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule at the end of the game.     

The political economy of swarming in honeybees: Voting-with-the-wings,decision-making costs,and the unanimity rule

The political economy of bee swarming offers a fascinating study of collective action in biological systems. Various aspects of the organization of swarming have been explained in this paper as devices bees have evolved to economize on information and decision-making costs associated with the economics and politics of establishing a new nest site.     

The time inconsistency of long constitutions: Evidence from the world

This article analyses the mechanisms establishing time consistency of constitutions. It explains why shorter and more locked constitutions are more likely to be time consistent (change less) and that long constitutions are more time inconsistent (change more, despite locking). Empirical evidence from all of the democratic countries in the world indicates that the length and locking of constitutions are not independent criteria, and that their combination leads to less time consistency. To address this inter‐relationship, a measure of time inconsistency (a combination of locking and amendment rate) is developed and it is demonstrated that it is connected with the length of constitutions. The article shows how time inconsistency is incompatible with theories of ‘constitutional amendment culture’ not only at the theoretical level, but also empirically. Finally, the article proves that the empirical finding that the length of constitutions is related to lower per capita income and higher corruption are not only in agreement with time inconsistency arguments, but this also extends beyond OECD countries to all democracies.     

Causal inference and American political development: the case of the gag rule

Public Choice - We extend previous work on the role of politically motivated donors who contribute to candidates in an election with single dimension policy preferences. In a two-stage game wherein...     

Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power

An enduring criticism of public choice theory is that it does not adequately address the question of power in contemporary capitalist societies. In particular it is argued that the exchange paradigm and the principle of unanimity lead to a conservative defence of the unequal and unjust status quo of such societies. These criticisms are often presented as unanswered and unanswerable. Indeed, public choice scholars have tended to pursue their own research agendas rather than engage such criticisms. This article seeks to make good this lacuna by providing a defence of the public choice account of power. It is shown that within the public choice approach the exchange paradigm and the unanimity principle serve as idealized models against which to judge real world institutional arrangements. As such, these models serve as a basis for critique of contemporary capitalist societies in which all individuals may be subject to predation as a matter of routine. It is shown that the public choice account of power addresses the legitimization and limitation of power, whereas the critics of public choice in effect propose to allocate power to those deemed deserving. Hence, the public choice approach provides a basis for a genuinely consensual politics and exposes the fact that alternative conceptions of politics are fundamentally non-consensual. On this basis it is concluded that the public choice account of power in contemporary capitalist societies is superior to that offered by its critics.     

Bureaucratic tradition, semi-presidential rule and parliamentary government: the case of Finland

Abstract. Primarily on account of the 'semi-presidential' trait of the regime Finland is, along with France, often regarded as a deviant case among Western European states. The presidency certainly restrains the leadership role of the prime minister and curtails the governmental agenda on foreign policy. But in its everyday political process Finland still reveals customary features of European multiparty parliamentarism. With special emphasis on the bureaucratic tradition of the central administration, the article examines the structure of the State Council and outlines four styles of decision-making.     

The importance of uncertainty in a two-stage theory of constitutions

This paper analyzes the consequences of different assumptions regardingthe kind of uncertainty that exists at the constitutional stage of a two-stage political process. Individuals at the constitutional stagedecide the actions that are to be allowed, compelled or banned in thesubsequent stage. The analysis allows us to specify conditions under whichcertain bans and obligations might be included in a constitution, whileothers are decided by legislative action, to define the ``optimal votingrule'', and the conditions under which the majority rule is this optimalrule. The paper provides a unified framework for analyzing the choice ofinstitutions in a two-stage constitutional political system.     

The fairness of discounting: A majority rule approach

A model of majority rule is developed in which each of a finite number of generations votes on a redistribution of income between itself and the other generations. In voting, each generation expresses tastes for its own income and for the distribution of income across generations. The model is then used to derive the conditions under which discounting is justified — namely those conditions for which the majority rule exhibits a positive marginal rate of time preference. It is demonstrated that when each generation is wealthier than those preceding it, the parameters representing the taste for income equality must be relatively high for the majority rule to exhibit a positive marginal rate of time preference.