Bargaining and voting

Government by majority rule voting is a mixture of voting and bargaining. Bargaining among people with moderately different objectives is indispensable for the passage of laws and the formation of public policy. Little of the nation’s business could be transacted without an ability on the part of the legislators and members of political parties to strike bargains, but that same ability to strike bargains makes possible the exploitation of minorities by majorities which, beyond some limit, destroys democratic government. Rules and customs are designed to foster bargaining in the one context and to thwart bargaining in the other.     

Bargaining and Learning While Fighting

Much of the existing formal work on war models the decision to go to war as a game-ending, costly lottery. This article relaxes this assumption by treating war as a costly process during which the states run the risk of military collapse. The model also allows for uncertainty over either the cost of fighting or the distribution of power. The analysis makes four contributions to the growing costly-process literature: (i) the present model provides a more general treatment of the learning process that occurs when states are uncertain about the distribution of power, (ii) it explicitly compares the bargaining and learning processes for the two different sources of uncertainty, (iii) it suggests a way to empirically distinguish wars arising from these two sources, and (iv) it shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be quite sensitive to the underlying bargaining environment through which information is conveyed .     

Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining

Chief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well‐developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policymaking. To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength, as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election, are important determinants of the use and effectiveness of dissolution threats in policymaking. Analyzing an original time‐series data set from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, we find evidence in line with key empirical implications of the model.     

Regional Policy: Implementation through Bargaining

This article analyzes the implementation of two regional development programs. The purpose is to show how the programs approved by the Riksdag were translated into practice and to explain why the funds were distributed as they were. We seem to have found substantation for the hypothesis that the borderlines between politics and markets are blurred in this implementation process. Bargaining was an important element in the process. Decisions were shaped in interaction between authorities and companies and, at the central level, in the actual process of bargaining. The most important finding is that the main conflict in this bargaining economy was not between the decision-makers and the company. Rather, it was between the central and regional levels.¹     

Fairness and Rejection in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game

The ultimatum game is a standard instrument for laboratory experimentalists.It has been replicated in a large number of environments andpoints to special considerations for fairness. Although it hasbeen popular in the experimental community, researchers havenot harnessed all the statistical power they should to evaluatethe dynamics at work in this type of a bargaining game. Thisresearch uses two planned treatments, the first involving asignaling condition concerning a subject's "type," and the seconda price effect built into the structure of the game. We findthat there are no significant main effects as a result of thesignaling condition of a subject's type, but that there arestrong effects as a result of the different payoff parameters.Using a variety of multivariate models we find important, nonobviousinteractions with the gender of the subjects. The lesson thatwe take away from this research is that experimentalists canlearn more from data collected in the tightly controlled laboratoryenvironment by using statistical techniques that complementtheir research designs.     

Collective Bargaining and The Performance of the Public Schools

Students of American politics rarely study public sector unions and their impacts on government. The literature sees bureaucratic power as rooted in expertise, but largely ignores the fact that bureaucrats often join unions to promote their own interests, and that the power of their unions may affect government and its performance. This article focuses on the public schools, which are among the most numerous government agencies in the country, and investigates whether collective bargaining by teachers—the key bureaucrats—affects the schools' capacity to educate children. Using California data, analysis shows that, in large school districts, restrictive labor contracts have a very negative impact on academic achievement, particularly for minority students. The evidence suggests, then, that public sector unions do indeed have important consequences for American public education. Whether they are consequential in other areas of government remains to be seen, but it is an avenue well worth pursuing.     

Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan

How do the dynamics of portfolio allocation work within parties? While much of the existing literature focuses on portfolio allocation among parties in coalition governments, bargaining over cabinet portfolios also takes place within parties because many parties have internal divisions or factions that influence these decisions. By analyzing data on portfolio allocation in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan from 1960 through 2007, this study demonstrates that, contrary to the proportionality proposition (Gamson's Law), substantial variance exists in allocation outcomes over time because party leaders allocate cabinet portfolios among factions as a means of preventing defections and challenges from their party's members. The resulting portfolio allocation reflects the bargaining dynamics within the party: I find that party leaders surrender more portfolios as they become more vulnerable to challenges posed by internal rivals.     

The European Convention: Bargaining in the Shadow of Rhetoric

The European Convention on the Future of Europe was initially presented as a turning point in the history of European integration. This article argues that, although its composition was broader, its process more transparent and its rules more flexible than classic intergovernmental conferences, the Convention was not Europe's Philadelphia. Since it took place under the shadow of the IGC and under a leadership especially sensitive to the positions of big member states, the Convention reproduced, by extension, the logic of intergovernmental bargains. Nevertheless, some of the Convention's outcome – the most formal aspects of its draft treaty with less predictable distributional consequences – can be explained by the ‘social norm’ of constitutional deliberation conveyed by its president and supported by a majority of its members.     

The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies

When and why will states adopt more (or less) cooperative bargaining strategies? Standard answers to this question focus on the role of state power. Other scholars highlight socialization effects. I argue that in most international negotiations, the institutional bargaining structure will mitigate the effects of power and socialization, and drive state bargaining behavior. Factors highlighted by formal models of international bargaining should therefore best explain the variation in the strategies states adopt. I introduce empirical measures of these abstract concepts, and test their effects against those of power and socialization using an original dataset of state bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU). The results show that structural factors best explain variation in the EU states’ bargaining strategies. I conclude by highlighting the conditions under which these effects should explain state bargaining behavior in other international negotiations, and discuss the implications of this argument for the study of international bargaining.     

Between Deadlock and Decentralization: Bargaining Dynamics in Federal States

A classic way to meet regionally diverse interests is to grant partial autonomy to sub-national entities, either by assigning them the right to decide upon policies (federalism), to implement policies (decentralization), or both. This article argues and formally elaborates that central governments may intentionally choose to increase decentralization in an effort to facilitate agreements that otherwise would be deadlocked. In this regard, a central government's decision to promote decentralization depends on its own relative valuation of policy change and congruence. We illustrate the empirical validity of our argument with a case study pertaining to the Swiss New Regional Policy.     

Bargaining Constitutional Design in Italy: Judicial Review as Political Insurance

Why would politicians, who expect to hold political power in the future, choose to create a constitutional court with the power of judicial review that can veto politicians' policies? Some theories suggest that international forces may be causal, as institutions or ideas are diffused geographically or within legal systems. Others focus on domestic politics as driving the decision to institute judicial review. Among these are the commitment, hegemonic preservation, party alternation and insurance theories. This article looks at the decision to establish a constitutional court in the Republic of Italy, the first post-World War II court in Europe that was not in a federal system. It argues that the insurance model drove the decision of the Italian Christian Democrats to support creation of a constitutional court at the point of constitutional design, but later to delay implementation once in power. Conversely, the Italian Communist–Socialist bloc opposed establishment of the court at the Constituent Assembly that wrote the post-war constitution on the ideological ground that it was contrary to popular sovereignty. However, once the leftist bloc found itself in the role of the opposition, it became a champion of the Constitutional Court and judicial review. The insurance theory is shown to explain the behaviour of the Christian Democrats in both design and implementation phases and the actions of the Communist–Socialist bloc during implementation.     

Bargaining in legislatures over private and public goods with endogenous recognition

Public Choice - This paper studies a sequential model of multilateral bargaining under majority rule in which legislators make decisions in both private and public good dimensions via an endogenous...     

Productivity: The Missing Link in Enterprise Bargaining for the NSW Police

The promised productivity gains of enterprise bargaining have yet to be realised by the NSW Police Service and its staff. This failure can be traced to a lack of understanding of workplace reform and productivity. Karpin (1995:3) forecast that improvement in management skills in Australia was required for growth. Enterprise bargaining demands increased productivity. Productivity demands performance management, which involves increased accountability with the establishment of practical performance indicators. As such, productivity and performance management are interrelated and require clear objectives (Directions in Government 1992a:26).