Talk is not cheap: Policy agendas,information processing,and the unusually proportional nature of European Central Bank communications policy responses

This article unveils the policy agenda of the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council as found in the speeches that Governing Council Members gave between 1999 and 2018. Using a dynamic topic‐modeling approached based on non‐negative matrix factorization, we demonstrate how the issues discussed by ECB Governing Council members have evolved over time, and how the general punctuation hypothesis (Jones, B. D. & Baumgartner, F. R. (2005). The politics of attention: How government prioritizes problems. University of Chicago Press) sheds light on what drives this process. We find that unlike policy outputs from many other policymaking systems, ECB communications evolve in a proportional manner. We attribute this finding to the information‐processing capacities of the bank. Our findings speak to the literatures on central bank communications, the evolution of policy agendas, and the application of topic models to speech texts.     

System Analysis of the Banking Systems of the USA and the EU

The article compares the banking systems of the USA and the EU employing the system analysis. The functions of the Executive Board and the Board of Directors are considered, there is also a comparison of the bank authorities, responsible for the decision-making： the features and interrelation of the parts of the system and their alternative within another bank system. The special attention is paid to the efficiency of the system construction on the basis of bank authorities and the degree of the power decentralisation. The article considers in details the efficiency of bank systems exposure to the countries＇ monetary policy. In particular, the tools of the monetary policy implementation are considered. The article also presents comparison of the methods of influencing the monetary policy, the frequency of their employment, the degree of their impact, and the way of implementation. In the process of analysing the banking systems of the USA and the EU, there is the conclusion on the high efficiency of the system with higher level of decentralisation since this system is accomplished formation.     

How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?

We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank that balances two opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the “one country, one vote principle”. There are indications that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme.     

The Distribution of A Priori Voting Power in the EC Council of Ministers and the European Parliament

One of the most important decision making bodies in the EC is the Council of Ministers. In that voting body the member states have different voting weights roughly in proportion to the size of their populations. This article focuses on the voting power of current and prospective member states (Finland, Norway and Sweden) utililizing the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power. As the decision rules play a crucial role in the computation of these indices, the a priori voting power distribution is considered under various decision rules ranging from simple majority to near unanimity. We also discuss the a priori voting power distribution of various political groupings in the current European Parliament and in the hypothetical parliament which would have Finland, Norway and Sweden as new members. Although thus far the real power base in the EC is the Commission, the analysis of voting power distributions in the Council of Ministers and in the parliament sheds some light upon the relative influence that various actors might have in EC decision-making processes.     

Taxing capital gains

From 1969 to 1971 he was a member and from 1972 to 1974 the Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers. His major publications include The Fiscal Revolution in America, Presidential Economics,and Governing the $5 Trillion Economy.He is a member of the board of contributors of the Wall Street Journal, where his writings appear frequently.     

Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union

This paper examines thesystem of Qualified Majority Voting, usedby the Council of the European Union, fromthe perspective of enlargement of theUnion. It uses an approach based on powerindices due to Penrose (1946), Banzhaf (1965) and Coleman(1971) to make two analyses: (1) the question ofthe voting power of member countries fromthe point of view of fairness, and (2) thequestion of how the threshold number ofvotes required for QMV should bedetermined. It studies two scenarios forchange from 2005 onwards envisaged by theNice Treaty: (1) no enlargement, the EUcomprising 15 member countries, and (2)full enlargement to 27 members by theaccession of all the present twelvecandidates. The proposal is made that fairweights be determined algorithmically as atechnical or routine matter as themembership changes. The analysis of how thethreshold affects power shows thetrade-offs that countries face betweentheir blocking power and the power of theCouncil to act. The main findings are: (1)that the weights laid down in the NiceTreaty are close to being fair, the onlysignificant discrepancies being theunder-representation of Germany andRomania, and the over-representation ofSpain and Poland; (2) the thresholdrequired for a decision is set too high forthe Council to be an effective decisionmaking body.     

The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review

This paper reviews research on central banking and monetary policy, with special emphasis on the position of the future European Central Bank. Nowadays, it is often thought that an independent central bank with an explicit mandate to aim for price stability constitutes an important institutional device to assure price stability. Indeed, the ECB will be one of the most independent central banks as follows from the codings of various indicators measuring legal independence. Still, it does not follow straightforwardly from the literature that the Statute of the ECB is optimal. It is also argued that the accountability of the ECB is poorly arranged for in comparison with that of several national central banks. Finally, the discussion about the monetary strategy of the ECB is reviewed.     

The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations

The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than that of the Council. This prediction is confirmed for a dataset covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002.     

The charismatic leadership of the ECB presidency: A language-based analysis

There is little doubt that the European Central Bank (ECB), and in particular its presidency, has taken the lead in tackling the euro crisis. But can this leadership be also characterised as charismatic? This article answers the question by focusing on language – a key component as well as a reliable indicator of charisma. By means of a software-assisted content analysis of the entire corpus of ECB presidential speeches, it is found that the crisis has indeed led to the emergence of the Bank's presidency as a charismatic euro leader. This in turn confirms the recent politicisation of the ECB, but at the same time might be seen as mitigating the problems related to the Bank's democratic deficit, to the extent that charisma can be seen, from a Weberian standpoint, as an alternative source of political legitimacy.     

Institutional influences on business power: how ‘privileged’ is the Business Council of Australia?

• This paper explores the institutional and political dynamics of the Business Council of Australia (BCA), a unique form of big business association which relies on the active involvement of its one hundred or so CEO members. The paper argues that associations such as the BCA confront a range of serious institutional problems in their attempts to wield political power, or more modestly perhaps, policy influence. First, they confront a disconnect between ‘structural’ and ‘instrumentalist’ articulations of business power. The key source of business power resides in business control over the economy and the investment process, a form of power wielded at the company level not at the level of business associations. When engaged in instrumentalist or overt forms of political activism, the BCA also confronts serious collective action problems. It is also argued that the influence of the BCA seems to have declined over time and that this can partly be traced back to declining CEO commitment rooted in changing institutional and structural dynamics in the corporate world.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Citizenship and Democracy: A Journey to Europe's Past

The relationship between citizenship and democracy is poorly understood, and the two notions are often used synonymously. Governing is obviously the central issue, but whereas citizenship seems to require self-limitation by calling on civic virtues, democracy is actually enlarging citizens' power. The Polish and Dutch Republics from the seventeenth and eighteenth century present an interesting mirror image of how citizenship and democracy relate to each other in political practice.     

Trustee strategies,politicization and de-delegation: The case of the European Central Bank

This article shows how the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced the risk of politicization and de facto de-delegation despite experiencing contestation. During the euro area crisis and the coronavirus emergency the ECB's monetary policy measures have been widely praised for their effectiveness. Even though the ECB is an independent trustee that cannot be easily sanctioned, it needs to engage with its principals to receive their political backing for common projects and in order to reaffirm its own centrality in governance. This article identifies different trustee strategies to reduce politicization and thereby to decrease the risk of de facto de-delegation: (i) dualism, (ii) voluntary self-restraint, and (iii) changing the yard stick. It concludes by showing that the ECB has expanded its monetary policy toolbox without triggering neither formal nor de facto de-delegation.     

I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends: Leveraging Campaign Resources to Maximize Congressional Power

Central to the study of Congress is the study of relationships among members. Electoral collaboration is a function of a member's position in the broader congressional power network. It allows members to leverage their campaign resources to achieve the four classic goals of members of Congress: reelection, making good public policy, obtaining power within the institution, and having one's party in the majority. Using nearly 3.2 million FEC records from 2010 to 2016, we explore the dynamics that influence electoral collaboration. We find members are most likely to collaborate electorally with other members from the same state, party, and committee, and the most electorally vulnerable. Further, party leaders share most frequently with the rank and file. These findings build upon our expanding understanding of congressional collaboration, the networks members of Congress form, and the congressional power structure members operate within.     

Power and changing modes of governance in the euro crisis

Which European Union actors are most powerful in the governance of the euro crisis? The euro crisis has reignited the classic debate between intergovernmentalists, who tend to stress the coercive power of dominant member states in the European Council, and supranationalists, who maintain that through the use of institutional power, the Commission, and the European Central Bank turned out the “winners” of the crisis. This article argues that euro crisis governance is best understood not just in terms of one form of power but instead as evolving through different constellations of coercive, institutional, and ideational power that favored different EU actors over the course of the crisis, from the initial fast‐burning phase (2010–2012), where the coercive and ideational power of Northern European member states in the European Council was strongest, to the slow‐burning phase (2012–2016), when greater influence was afforded supranational actors through the use of ideational and institutional power.     

Reality and historicity: economy and dialectics in Marxism ∗

On 1 July 1997, the Basil Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) will be enacted in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Articles 107 and 108 of the Basic Law, the so-called balanced budget and low tax policy articles, are the two most controversial articles of the Chapter on Economy. The manifest purpose of these two articles is to constrain the spending and taxing power of the HKSAR in order to prohibit elected members of the Legislative Council from turning Hong Kong into a welfare state, and they have been justified by some ostensibly using Buchanan's concept of fiscal constitution. This paper examines the justification and effects of incorporating elements of fiscal constitution in the Basic Law, focusing particularly on the income redistribution effect. The paper concludes that policy articles grounded on the philosophy of fiscal constitution should not have been included.     

The European Council and The Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation

The European Council and the Council of the European Union playkey roles in the European Union. The European Council is largelyconcerned with system-steering, while the Council of the EUundertakes sectoral policymaking. What is common to these rolesis the balancing act carried out by both institutions. Bothhave to mediate the centripetal dynamics of integration, termedcooperative confederalism here, and the centrifugal dynamicswhich are found in the strongly entrenched territorial natureof power, centered on the member states. Using new institutionalistanalysis, the article illuminates different facets of the twoinstitutions1 functioning in mediating the two dynamics.     

National interest versus the common good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting

The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or Governments of the European Union (EU) Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.     

Politics and Administration in Council-Manager Government: Differences between Newly Elected and Senior Council Members

This study examines the different attitudes of newly elected officials and senior incumbents on variables that are considered to be the building blocks of the relationship between local elected officials and professional civil service staff: council respect for the city's professional staff; a clear understanding of the roles of council and the staff; and the governing body's commitment towards working as a group and toward consensus. Governing body members who have served for eight or more years show greater respect for staff, have greater role understanding, and value teamwork among their colleagues more than their newly elected counterparts. While there are differences, the attitudes of long-term officials appear to change little while in office. They enter office with the building blocks of their own success. These findings are based on a cross-sectional and modest longitudinal survey research design, supplemented by in-depth interviews.     

A priori power measures and the institutions of the European Union

Abstract. The a priori voting powers of member countries in the council of ministers of the European Union have been discussed in the literature mainly from the view–point of Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices. This paper discusses — in the light of these and other more recent (Colomer's, Holler's as well as Deegan and Packel's) power indices — the interaction of the council ministers and the European Parliament (EP) under the assumption that the consent of both bodies is needed to carry a motion or piece of union–wide legislation. Moreover, the double–majority principle is discussed from the view–point of voting power distribution. Finally we consider the voting power distribution in a three–chamber system consisting of Commission, Council and EP.     

Bicameralism in the European Union: parliamentary scrutiny as a tool for reinforcing party unity

During recent years, the European Union has increasingly been portrayed as a bicameral political system in which political parties build bridges across the European Parliament (EP) and the Council. From this perspective, national parties’ representation in the Council should affect their members’ voting behaviour in the EP. Survey evidence reveals that most members of the EP (MEPs) frequently receive voting instructions from ‘their’ ministers. Accordingly, these MEPs should have a higher likelihood of defecting from their European Political Group. The observed voting instructions imply that the voting preferences of MEPs and their ministers differ. This article argues that parliamentary scrutiny may be one way effectively to coordinate on a common position at an early stage and, consequently, reinforce party unity at the voting stage. However, effective scrutiny depends on national parliaments being strong enough. On the empirical side, this article studies the voting behaviour of MEPs from eight member states during the Sixth EP. We include four national parliaments which the literature conceives of as being strong (DK, DE, SF, SK) and four parliaments conceived of as being weak (FR, IE, IT, UK). Overall, the results support the theoretical argument, thereby demonstrating how domestic-level scrutiny affects EU-level voting behaviour.