The calculus of consent after thirty years

It is shown that the basic normative argument of thecalculus is moored to a collectivistic unanimity norm. As most scholars working in the field of public choice, including the authors of the seminalcalculus, would otherwise reject collectivistic normative premises, a re-interpretation of the status of the unanimity principle of thecalculus seems unavoidable. The paper argues that this can be done if the basic formation of a society is not characterized as starting from a given set of individuals but rather in terms of the formation of clubs. This amounts to the same thing as substituting universalistic ethical premises by particularistic ones which are more in line with standard economic methodology.     

Towards a contextual theory of innovation

A contextual theoretical strategy should be pursued to overcome past deficiencies in the study of organizational innovation. The strategy is likely to lead to greater success in efforts to promote innovation. The heart of this strategy is to define the types of innovation processes at work and the contexts in which they operate. There are at least three innovation processes at work which operate in contexts defined by organizational and environmental characteristics and by the type of innovation under consideration.     

Towards a critique of the theory of state monopoly capitalism

Marx and Engels's writings on Ireland are usually associated with their positive support for Irish nationalism. This article seeks to examine the extent and depth of their knowledge of Ireland, politically and economically, by focusing attention on Marx's analysis of post-famine agricultural readjustment. Comparing the latter's comments in Capitaland elsewhere with actual developments, it is suggested that Marx and Engels's understanding was less than accurate. The source of their misinterpretation lies principally with their inadequate analysis of tenants, agrarian capitalism, and land fever.     

Towards a stages theory approach to privatization

In analysing the path of optimal sequencing of privatizations by public administrations, it is too simplistic to characterize the process as one in which in the early phase small state-owned enterprises are disposed of and, in the later stage, the larger enterprises. Such a dichotomy fails to capture fully the market failure elements, technological dimensions, sociological imperatives and political constraints that help to determine the choice and timing of enterprises to be privatized. Rather, the privatization experience of the developing and developed countries, including the former centrally planned economies, can be eclectically analysed as traditional, transitional and transformation stages in an almost inexorable movement towards a pure capitalist economy. In the traditional stage, countries have tended to privatize those enterprises for which the private sector has an obvious comparative advantage. In the transitional stage, the privatization programme includes certain important enterprises, which, despite a considerable amount of government subsidy or tariff protection, have performed ‘inefficiently’. In the stage of transformation from a still basically mixed economy to a near pure capitalist economy, there is privatization of the strategic enterprises. Although the stages approach varies between countries, the above-mentioned sequencing allows for more effective cumulative internalization of the learning experience.     

Towards a positive theory of political rhetoric: Why do politicians lie?

This paper presents a model in which politicians can increase the probability of election by making exaggerated claims about the benefits of their own platform — referred to as positive campaigning — and by exaggerating the undesirable characteristics of their rival — i.e., negative campaigning. Such lies may be detected at some point in the future and thus result in a costly loss in reputation. Thus the politician must tradeoff immediate benefits against potential future costs. Of course this problem is similar to any commercial endeavor — a car maker, for example, is tempted to claim that his car is better and the competition's is worse than it is. But it is shown that the lack of transferable property rights to political office makes lying more likely in political markets. It is also shown that there is a natural tendency for politicians to engage in more negative campaigning.     

On the economic theory of interest groups: Towards a group frame of reference in political economics

This paper evaluates the development of the economic theory of interest groups. Although there is important progress, many substantial lacunae in our knowledge exist. I argue that part of the problem is the way Public Choice theory developed. Methodological individualism has led to an overindividualized ('a- social') view of human behavior. Furthermore, the importance of imperfect information has been underexposed. Acknowledging the essentially social character of human behavior and the lack of information leads to the conclusion that a more prominent place should be given to the role of social groups. A shift towards a “group frame of reference” is advocated.     

Minority rights and the dialectics of the nation: Otto Bauer’s theory of the nation and its contributions to multicultural theory and globalization

Conclusion This article analyzed Otto’s Bauer idea of the nation and assessed its meaning and significance qua liberal nationalism and the expansion of national minority rights in Europe. It argued that Bauer's formulation of the same rights for all minorities exposed certain limitations of multicultural theory, namely the failure of liberal multicultural theorists to adequately address the consequences of special minority rights and the potentially transformative role of labor in liberal societies that necessarily seek to be inclusive. Further, Bauer's idea of cultural autonomy raised important and relevant implications for advancing national minority rights in Europe. In particular, his initiative exposed possible ways to promote the social of cultural rights of EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. Given this and the EU's commitment to labor rights, it is curious that Bauer’s theory has not received the attention it deserves. Indeed, even if Bauer's ideas prove somewhat non-conventional by liberal standards, it is still important that we see his ideas as serving some elemental purpose in linking the advancement of national values and sentiment with the EU goal of integration.     

Lockean Self-Ownership: Towards a Demolition

Self-ownership is the moral principle that one ought to be left free to do whatever one chooses so long as non-consenting other persons are not thereby harmed, in specified ways. The principle is foundational for one tradition of political liberalism running from Locke to Nozick. This paper aims first to clarify this principle, in part by contrasting it with a kindred principle of 'self-benefit', and secondly to develop its implications for justified private property ownership. These implications are more meagre than is usually supposed. The principle is indeterminate in ways that undermine its claim to adequacy. Finally, further reasons for rejecting the self- ownership principle are suggested.     

With consent of the governed: SEC's formative years

The Securities and Exchange Commission, established in 1934, has achieved a uniquely high reputation for effective regulation. The SEC succeeded in large measure because of the initial strategy developed by its founders. Led by Joseph P. Kennedy, James M. Landis, and William O. Douglas, the SEC sought to restore public confidence in the capital markets and induce regulated interests to help enforce public policy. These interests included the accounting profession, the organized securities exchanges, and the brokers and dealers operating in the over-the-counter market. In each case, the SEC encouraged the strengthening of regulatory structures within the private sector, using its power and influence to promote what later came to be called the “public use of private interest”.     

Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power

An enduring criticism of public choice theory is that it does not adequately address the question of power in contemporary capitalist societies. In particular it is argued that the exchange paradigm and the principle of unanimity lead to a conservative defence of the unequal and unjust status quo of such societies. These criticisms are often presented as unanswered and unanswerable. Indeed, public choice scholars have tended to pursue their own research agendas rather than engage such criticisms. This article seeks to make good this lacuna by providing a defence of the public choice account of power. It is shown that within the public choice approach the exchange paradigm and the unanimity principle serve as idealized models against which to judge real world institutional arrangements. As such, these models serve as a basis for critique of contemporary capitalist societies in which all individuals may be subject to predation as a matter of routine. It is shown that the public choice account of power addresses the legitimization and limitation of power, whereas the critics of public choice in effect propose to allocate power to those deemed deserving. Hence, the public choice approach provides a basis for a genuinely consensual politics and exposes the fact that alternative conceptions of politics are fundamentally non-consensual. On this basis it is concluded that the public choice account of power in contemporary capitalist societies is superior to that offered by its critics.     

Political Parties: Towards a New Theoretical Synthesis

Three conceptions of the political party can be distinguished. They are Seller's socio-cultural cleavage approach; Lawson's notion of the linkage party, based upon participatory, policy-responsive, clientele reward and government directive linkages; and Offerlé's conception of parties as political enterprises concentrating upon partisan supply to the political market. After suggesting that, whatever their partial merits, none of these approaches provides the basis for a comprehensive theory of political parties, a dual party approach is prepared. Every party exists in and for itself as well as interacting with a constraining environment. A dialectical model, based upon relations between internal decision-making and external competition within the context of the rules of the game, offers the best prospect of further advance in the study of political parties.     

The Measurement of Democracy: Towards a New Paradigm

Mainstream political science on democracy has been criticised for ‘regime bias’. This has led political scientists to draw on a narrow range of democratic theory that considers democratic potential only at the cost of ignoring democratic purpose, to ignore other units of observation than the regime, notably the individual citizen, and to overlook advances in measurement theory. A robust normative account of democratic quality, it is argued, should rest on three foundations. First, measurement should start with observations of the regime. No account of democratic quality should be considered valid without an account of the degree of democracy in the regime. This analysis should be grounded in standard democratic theory. Secondly, the measurement effort should follow through to observations of how the potential in the regime is manifested in the lives of citizens. No account of democratic quality should be considered valid without an account of how well the system delivers for citizens. This analysis should be grounded in a theory of the purpose of democracy. Thirdly, pronouncements on democratic quality should finally be made only from some combination or index of information from both systems analysis and individual analysis. That combined analysis should be grounded in measurement theory, specifically the law of methodological individualism and the principle of double book-keeping.