On the formation of alliances in conflict and contests

This paper examines the problem of the formation of alliances in conflict and, more generally, in contests with three players. Each player possesses an exogenous strategic endowment (e.g., arms, efforts, rent-seeking activity). The outcome of contests, including those between any alliances of players, is governed by a Contest Success Function (CSF). In the three-person/one-cake problem an alliance between two players against the third one will form if and only if the CSF has an increasing returns characteristic. When an alliance forms, there is a tendency to be formed by the weaker players against the strongest player. Similar tendencies exist in other three-person problems that I examine.     

Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes

Scholars have long debated the effects of military alliances on the likelihood of war, and no clear support has emerged for the argument that alliances improve the prospects for peace through effective deterrence nor that they kindle the flames of war. In this study, I argue that alliance commitments affect the probability that a potential challenger will initiate a militarized interstate dispute because alliances provide information about the likelihood that others will intervene in a potential conflict. Yet, different agreements provide different information. Alliance commitments that would require allies to intervene on behalf of potential target states reduce the probability that a militarized dispute will emerge, but alliance commitments promising offensive support to a potential challenger and alliances that promise nonintervention by outside powers increase the likelihood that a challenger will initiate a crisis. As diplomats have long understood, the specific content of international agreements helps to determine their effects.     

Burden sharing in the NATO alliance: An empirical test of alternative views

This paper undertakes an empirical test of two opposing views of interdependencies among members of military alliances. The first view, associated with Olson and Zeckhauser, argues that the public good aspect of defense induces free riding behavior by smaller alliance members, which imposes a disproportionate burden of supporting the alliance on the larger members. A second view argues that NATO defense activities produce a mix of outputs, some of which are not purely public, and some of which may be complementary across nations. Furthermore, the nature of the weapons systems and their relative use by alliance members may induce substantial cooperation by allies. The test proposed here analyzes the relationship between defense spending shares of NATO members and their population and relative wealth shares. A simple model is specified and tested using pooled time series cross sectional data. The empirical results indicate more support for the cooperative view of ally relationships than the Olson-Zeckhauser non-cooperative model.     

Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information

We consider a rent-seeking contest in which one player has private information about his own valuation of the prize. This valuation may be either high or low. All other players have a known and identical valuation of the prize. We present necessary and sufficient conditions under which the privately informed player exerts a positive or zero equilibrium effort.     

Learning the Ropes: Communities of Practice and Social Networks in the Public Sector

ABSTRACT

How do public agencies integrate new employees and shape their learning process? How do newcomers’ connections, formed with experienced professionals, help them “learn the ropes”? Public managers may find themselves asking such questions as they employ tactics to transition newcomers into productive organizational members who fit in well. At the same time that managers work to shape newcomer learning, newcomers proactively develop their own ties within the organization for information and support. This study examines organizational socialization tactics in a state agency using longitudinal qualitative and social network data. We investigate the dynamics of organizationally instituted communities of practice and individual level egocentric networks in the context of newcomer adaptation. Our analysis reveals that while both are venues for newcomer learning and information acquisition there exists a distinction in real-time learning and practice between these two knowledge sources. Our article develops implications for both public management theory and practice.     

Asymmetric Two-Stage Group Rent-Seeking: Comparison of Two Contest Structures

Two variations of a two-stage rent-seeking contest areconsidered. In the first stage of the Between-Groupmodel, groups compete through the expenditure of resources bytheir members. Based on group expenditures, one winning groupis probabilistically determined. On the second stage, membersof the winning group compete with one another for an exogenousprize. In the Semi-Finals model a player is chosen fromeach group and then these players compete for the prize.Groups differ in size or in their valuation of the prize.Subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions are constructed forthese two contest structures.     

Veto Players and Civil War Duration

Civil wars show a remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within days; others continue for decades. What explains the extreme intractability of some wars while others are resolved quickly? This article argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult. This veto player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new dataset containing monthly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II. The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players and the duration of civil war.     

Campaigning and split-ticket voting in new electoral systems: the first MMP elections in New Zealand, Scotland and Wales

New electoral systems create learning problems for parties and electors: the parties have to learn how to focus their campaigns and the electors how best to use their votes. This was the case in three countries in the late 1990s where MMP was used for the first time rather than first-past-the-post: New Zealand in 1996 and Scotland and Wales in 1999. MMP involves each elector voting twice — for a candidate in a single-member constituency contest and for a party in a regional/national list contest. Survey and (in New Zealand) official data show that substantial proportions of the three electorates voted a split ticket — the candidate they supported was from a different party to that they voted for in the list contest. (Approximately one-in-five did this in Scotland and Wales and two-in-five in New Zealand.) We argue that split-ticket voting will be influenced by the amount of information received by electors regarding the candidates for the constituency seats. Using the amount of campaign expenditure by each candidate as a measure of the volume of information provided, we find strong supporting evidence for this responsive voter model in each of the three countries.     

Endogenous timing of contest with asymmetric information

Simultaneous moves have been conventionally assumed in modeling rent-seeking competition. However, in reality many forms of contests involve contestants sequentially choosing their effort entries. This study allows agents to choose the timing of their moves before the contest takes place. In contrast to the previous literature, we introduce information asymmetries across agents. We find that in all sequential-move equilibria, the uninformed agent moves first. More generally we show that the order of agents’ moves in a sequential contest is a regularity stemming from information asymmetries. Furthermore, under plausible assumptions, sequential moves Pareto dominate simultaneous moves (from the view point of the players) and also result in lower rent-seeking expenditures. Our result explains the timing pattern in National Presidential Conventions observed from 1948 through 2004. Our result also applies to many other formal or informal institutions, which give rise to sequential contests.     

Winner-pay contests

We analyze winner-pay contests in which players select bids, the winner is determined probabilistically through a contest success function, and only the winner must pay her bid. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is unique under weak assumptions on the contest success function. We determine the Nash equilibrium for several examples. We also consider how equilibrium bids are influenced by private information about the value of winning the contest.     

Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring

In a standard rent-seeking contest, players optimally employ resources in an attempt to obtain the rent. Typically, it is assumed that these resources may be hired at any desired level at some exogenous per-unit cost. In practice, these resources often consist of scarce, talented individuals. We model a rent-seeking contest with scarce talent and find that talent scarcity leads to preemptive hiring by the player receiving the larger rent. This player hires all available talent and wins the contest with probability 1. This is true even when the difference in rents is small.     

Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players

I explore asymmetric equilibria in a Tullock contest of heterogeneous players in the case when the players’ heterogeneity is weak, and the effort optimization problem can be analyzed in the linear approximation. With increasing discriminatory power of the contest, players sequentially drop out. The corresponding threshold values of the discriminatory power are related to those identified earlier for a Tullock contest of identical players. Weak heterogeneity, however, is sufficient to make the players’ behavior strongly asymmetric and qualitatively alter the structure of the equilibria as compared to the homogeneous case.     

Electoral alliances: Party identities and coalition games

Abstract The emergence of electoral alliances competing for plurality seats has been one of the main consequences stemming form the introduction of the new electoral laws for the Senate and the Chamber of deputies in Italy. This paper analyzes the politics of electoral alliances at the general elections of April 1996, focusing on two factors: the making of electoral alliances and their internal arrangements for coalition management. From both points of view, the elections have shown some important new developments, including a simplification in the number of coalitions. But although the centre–left alliance was able to broaden its range, the centre–right lost the Lega Nord and suffered the split of Movimento sociale–Fiamma tricolore on its right. Moreover, the centre–right alliance also suffered from a lack of cohesion, wasting its previous coalitional capability. As in the 1994 elections the politics of electoral alliances proved to be a key factor in the electoral competition.     

Electoral alliances: Party identities and coalition games

The emergence of electoral alliances competing for plurality seats has been one of the main consequences stemming form the introduction of the new electoral laws for the Senate and the Chamber of deputies in Italy. This paper analyzes the politics of electoral alliances at the general elections of April 1996, focusing on two factors: the making of electoral alliances and their internal arrangements for coalition management. From both points of view, the elections have shown some important new developments, including a simplification in the number of coalitions. But although the centre–left alliance was able to broaden its range, the centre–right lost the Lega Nord and suffered the split of Movimento sociale–Fiamma tricolore on its right. Moreover, the centre–right alliance also suffered from a lack of cohesion, wasting its previous coalitional capability. As in the 1994 elections the politics of electoral alliances proved to be a key factor in the electoral competition.     

Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments

One feature associated with democratic governance is frequent leadership turnover. While the ease of replacing leaders improves accountability, it may impede the ability of democracies to make credible long-term international commitments. Using newly collected data that identify cases in which leaders who derive their support from different domestic interests come to power, we evaluate the effects of changes in domestic political leadership on one important aspect of foreign policy—decisions to maintain military alliances. An analysis covering bilateral alliances between 1919 and 2001 reveals that changes in societal supporting coalitions in nondemocratic states are associated with decisions to abrogate alliances prior to their scheduled end dates, but changes in societal supporting coalitions in democracies have no effect on the probability of premature alliance termination. We conclude that international cooperation is sensitive to changes in core supporting coalitions, but that this effect is moderated by democratic political institutions.     

Britain Betwixt and Between: Uk SIGINT Alliance Strategy's Transatlantic and European Connections

Intelligence alliances are among the most intimate and enduring international security relationships. International partnerships have proven to be especially relevant to signals intelligence (SIGINT), where collaboration among allies has been crucial for extending the range and scope of geographic coverage. One of the earliest and most enduring SIGINT alliances dates back to the Second World War, when Great Britain and the United States collaborated in intercepting German and Japanese electronic communications and shared the intelligence product. This Anglo-American wartime partnership subsequently evolved and expanded during the post-war and Cold War eras, and continues up to the present as the core of a wider plurilateral SIGINT alliance involving Australia, Canada and New Zealand as well. Britain's accession to the European Communities, now the European Union (EU), did not, at first, detract from its transatlantic intelligence connection. By the late 1990s, however, European partners had begun to challenge Britain's alliance strategy for SIGINT, in particular, out of heightened concern for their own communications security and in response to the increasing salience of economic intelligence in contemporary international affairs. British statecraft now found itself confronted by mounting pressure from EU partners to reorient the UK intelligence away from its long-standing transatlantic SIGINT connection, so as to undermine American reach and also promote a potentially competing European capability to achieve global coverage in signals intelligence collection. While the 2003 war against Iraq certainly consolidated the trans-Atlantic alliance between the UK and USA, while alienating the Americans from the so-called 'Old Europe' led by France and Germany, the longer term spin-offs from that conflict seem likely to exacerbate those pressures on British intelligence strategy.     

Sent Seeking With Private Values

We study a rent-seeking contest in which the players'valuations of the prize are private information. We determinea Bayesian equilibrium and give conditions under which theequilibrium exists. Although players are ex ante symmetric,increased possibilities for ex post lopsidedness lead toless aggressive bidding. (Lopsidedness increases as players'values become less positively correlated or as the variationin possible values increases.) We also compare theprivate-information contest to a related public-informationcontest in which the realizations of values are commonknowledge. The contests are equally efficient and players areindifferent between the two, but risk-averse sellers of theprize are not.     

Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand‐Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence

How can states signal their alliance commitments? Although scholars have developed sophisticated theoretical models of costly signaling in international relations, we know little about which specific policies leaders can implement to signal their commitments. This article addresses this question with respect to the extended deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. Can nuclear states deter attacks against their friends by simply announcing their defense commitments? Or must they deploy nuclear weapons on a protégé's territory before an alliance is seen as credible? Using a new dataset on foreign nuclear deployments from 1950 to 2000, our analysis reveals two main findings. First, formal alliances with nuclear states appear to carry significant deterrence benefits. Second, however, stationing nuclear weapons on a protégé's territory does not bolster these effects. The analysis yields new insights about the dynamics of “hand‐tying” and “sunk cost” signals in international politics.     

Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player

We consider an extension of Tullock's (1980) N-player contest under which prize valuations may vary across players. We show that the pure-strategy equilibrium of this contest is unique. We also establish the following results: rent dissipation increases, individual winning probabilities decrease, and individual spending either increases or decreases with the addition of a player.     

Congressional dysfunction: An information processing perspective

The public's approval of Congress is at an all time low. The parties seem to have taken the legislative process hostage for their own electoral gain. Whereas traditional arguments about congressional dysfunction focus on polarized voting coalitions or outputs – particularly legislation – in this article we highlight congressional information processing and how it has changed in this highly partisan era. By coding congressional hearings according to the kind of information on which they focus, we find that members of Congress are receiving one‐sided information to a greater degree and are spending less time learning about potential solutions. We use these results to make numerous recommendations for improving how Congress gathers its information.