Potentials and limitations of executive leadership: the Austrian cabinet since 1945

Abstract. This article analyzes the Austrian cabinet along the representation-efficiency and the leadership-collective decision-making dimensions. After outlining the respective traditions of the Austrian cabinet some information about the personal styles of Austrian chancellors and their respective ability for leadership is provided. Some aspects of pre-ministerial careers are analyzed in terms of the representation-efficiency dimension, while a discussion of cabinet life tries to detect indicators for the systematic analysis of the leadership-collective decision-making dimension. The final section links the two dimensions: in the Austrian case high leadership efficiency on the one hand and collective decision-making representation on the other appear to be positively correlated.     

From polls to votes to seats: Forecasting the 2010 British general election

This paper outlines and discusses techniques for three stages in forecasting parliamentary seats from British opinion polls: adjusting and aggregating published vote-intention figures from across different polls; forecasting how public opinion might change before election day; and predicting the seat totals from the forecasted election-day vote shares. Specifically, we consider a state-space model for opinion polls which correct for house effects and other sources of survey error, the estimation of the historical relationship between polls and the election-day share of the vote, and a probabilistic approach to predicting the winner in each constituency.     

Opinion formation in foreign policy: the Swiss experience

Applying John Zaller's model of opinion formation to survey data covering 15 years (1981–95) of direct democracy in Switzerland, this paper provides a contribution to the debate about opinion formation in foreign policy. On the one hand, the Swiss experience contradicts the widespread view that citizens are poorly informed about and little interested in foreign affairs. On the other hand, direct democracy often translates into governmental defeats in this field. We address these mixed results and show that opinion formation in foreign policy is not a special case, and differs from that in domestic policy only with respect to the circumstances under which it occurs. In particular, we highlight the unusual type and level of conflict within the elite on foreign policy issues, which translates into distinct patterns of attitudes among the public.     

The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments: A sequential approach

Multiparty government in parliamentary democracies entails bargaining over the payoffs of government participation, in particular the allocation of cabinet positions. While most of the literature deals with the numerical distribution of cabinet seats among government parties, this article explores the distribution of individual portfolios. It argues that coalition negotiations are sequential choice processes that begin with the allocation of those portfolios most important to the bargaining parties. This induces conditionality in the bargaining process as choices of individual cabinet positions are not independent of each other. Linking this sequential logic with party preferences for individual cabinet positions, the authors of the article study the allocation of individual portfolios for 146 coalition governments in Western and Central Eastern Europe. The results suggest that a sequential logic in the bargaining process results in better predictions than assuming mutual independence in the distribution of individual portfolios.     

Clearer Cues,More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization

Scholars typically argue that elite polarization has only negative consequences for American politics. I challenge this view by demonstrating that elite polarization, by clarifying where the parties stand on the issues of the day, causes ordinary voters to adopt more consistent attitudes. Scholars have made such claims in the past, but because only observational data has been available, demonstrating a cause-and-effect relationship has proven to be difficult. I use original experiments to verify that there is a small but significant causal link between elite polarization and voter consistency. These findings have important normative implications for our understanding of the consequences of elite polarization, the role of political parties in a modern democracy, and the standards scholars use to assess citizen competence and participation.     

Institutional shrinkage: The deviant case of Swiss banking secrecy

Using the Mahoney–Thelen causal model one would expect “layering” to be the dominant kind of institutional change affecting Swiss banking secrecy. Our research into governance in Swiss banking shows that it does not fit this theoretical model. Applying deviant case analysis we have refined our understanding of institutional change. We argue that the removal of rules and the momentum of pressure should be acknowledged when explaining variations of institutional change and we suggest that the processes of shrinkage should not be ignored.     

The Covenantal Basis for the Development of Swiss Political Federalism: 1291-1848

This study argues that the modern political philosophy of federalismis directly linked to the Swiss Reformed idea of religious covenant,which was first formulated in the 1520s and 1530s by HeinrichBullinger in Zürich. Bullinger's concept of religious covenanthad roots both in the Old Testament and in the early federalideal and reality that had come out of the Swiss Middle Ages;it therefore had important social and political implicationsas well as theological meaning. During the sixteenth and earlyseventeenth centuries, this theological idea of federalism fedinto and helped to create the modern political concept of federalism,especially in the thought of Philippe Duplessis-Mornay and JohannesAlthusius. Political federalism became a reality in the Constitutionof the United States in the late eighteenth century. The Swissfederal Constitution of 1848 was instructed by the mature conceptof political federalism, by the Constitution of the United States,and by the long tradition of Swiss federalism. All of theseinfluences had some basis in the uniquely Swiss idea of religiouscovenant.     

期刊编目信息应与馆藏地信息一致

虽然CNMARC对于馆藏记录项并未做出明确规定,各图书馆可以根据自己的实际情况对其进行定义,但是从便于读者使用期刊的角度出发,在对期刊编目或者在维护期刊数据的过程中,690$a子字段应该和期刊的馆藏信息保持一致,这样才可以更加方便地让读者使用馆藏期刊。     

Integrating biodiversity: a longitudinal and cross-sectoral analysis of Swiss politics

Policy Sciences - The effective conservation and promotion of biodiversity requires its integration into a wide range of sectoral policies. For this to happen, the issue must receive attention...     

Overestimating the Shift from Government to Governance: Evidence from Swiss Metropolitan Areas

There is an oft‐stated claim in political science research that public sector reforms in Western democracies are consistent with a shift from government to governance. This article challenges that claim. Based on a comparative analysis of governance reforms in Swiss metropolitan areas, the article reveals that what seems to be a shift to governance may turn out to be a path to government, however, including a change either from the local to the metropolitan level or from general‐purpose authorities to task‐specific jurisdictions. Further, the article analyzes the political dynamics behind governance reforms. It shows that exogenous pressures put existing governance schemes under strain. Its impact, however, is mediated by the initial institutional setting and the narratives responding to case‐specific political dilemmas.     

Consistent Estimates of the Impact of Special Interest Groups on Economic Growth

Empirical studies designed to testOlson's (1982) theory of institutional sclerosis aretypically forced to rely upon proxies to measure theability of special interest groups to engage inredistributive activities, which in turn areexpected to hinder economic growth. This note showsthat reliance on proxies biases the estimates towardzero. Here, instrumental variable routines areutilized which increase the estimated impact ofspecial interests on the economy.     

Europeanisation of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy

Although studies of the influence of Europeanisation on domestic politics and institutions are numerous, a consistent and systematic analytical framework is still lacking. This article tries to overcome this weakness and presents a comprehensive framework that examines the conditions under which Europeanisation is likely to lead to national adaptation. We identify three main independent variables, including domestic power configurations, mediating domestic institutions, and actors' strategies. This model is applied to the agreement on the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the European Union. Our results suggest that it is not the number of veto points as such that matters most, but the strength of the actors that activate them or threaten to do so, and the counter-strategies available to actors favouring change.     

Decentralization and Fiscal Discipline in Sub-national Governments: Evidence from the Swiss Federal System

This article analyses the relationship between decentralizationand the extent of fiscal discipline in the Swiss cantons between1984 and 2000. From a theoretical point of view, decentralizationand federalism can be associated with both an expansive anda dampening effect on government debt. On the one hand, decentralizedstructures have been argued to lead to a reduction of debt dueto inherent competition between the member states and the multitudeof veto positions which restrict public intervention. On theother hand, decentralization has been claimed to contributeto an increase of public debt as it involves expensive functionaland organizational duplications as well as cost-intensive, oftendebt-financed, compromise solutions between a large number ofactors that operate in an uncoordinated and contradictory way.Our empirical results show that in periods of prosperous economicdevelopment, the architecture of state structure has no impacton debt. However, the degree of decentralization influencesdebt in economically poor times: In phases of economic recession,administratively decentralized cantons implement a more economicalbudgetary policy than centralized Swiss member states.     

Interests and information in referendum voting: An analysis of Swiss voters

Abstract. Referendums impose considerable informational demands on voters. Recent theoretical and empirical research has emphasized the different shortcuts and heuristics they may employ in deciding how to vote. Relying on a substantial series of votes at the national level in Switzerland, we provide empirical tests on how Swiss voters cope with the informational demands in referendum voting. We combine simple heuristics, like partisan cues and endorsements, with indicators of instrumental interests to explain citizens' choices in a series of votes.     

The Federal Formula and the Collapse of the USSR

A plan for the most ambitious political reform in Soviet historywas approved by the USSR's parliament in late 1988. As the reformunfolded, a key component came to be what Mikhail S. Gorbachevcalled "a renewed federal structure. "Reform proponents arguedthat only a renewed federalism could provide for the continuedintegrity of the Soviet state while assuring greater responsivenessto local demands. However, the attempt to breathe life intothe USSR's pseudo-federal structure unleashed long-suppressednationalist, territorial, and localist sentiments. Beginningin 1990, "refederalization" passed from mainly rhetorical discussionto a plan for a more loosely organized federation under theauspices of a Union Treaty. Following the attempted coup d'étatby Kremlin hard-liners in August 1991, pressures for decentralizationled, in the closing weeks of 1991, to the complete abandonmentof the "Great Soviet experiment." With the demise of the USSR,the plan for federal redesign was superseded by the rapid emergenceof independent states.     

Government allocation of property rights: Who gets what?

It is widely believed that regulatory programs that confer property rights in the United States represent a device for transferring income from those with less political power to those with more. An analysis of twelve regulatory programs that confer such rights shows that programs do define and allocate property rights according to clearly visible rules; but the rules work to support the economic status quo. To satisfy this paramount political objective, policymakers may sacrifice efficiency. But there is no evidence that they intend these programs to shift wealth from a weaker to a stronger group.