Legislative Control of Powers Delegated to the Executive: The Case of the EU

How can legislators derive the benefits of delegation without unduly empowering the executive? This article investigates how this dilemma is met in the European Union (EU) political system where executive power is delegated to the Commission. The argument is that the European member states have found a unique solution. They install committees of member state representatives to monitor the EU Commission, the so‐called comitology committees. However, the extent to which comitology committees are installed and their exact competence vary considerably across policy areas. This article uses a delegation perspective to understand this variation. An analysis of comitology provisions in 686 directives and regulations shows that institutional conflict and issue complexity, well‐known factors from the delegation literature, are important predictors of comitology control of the Commission. The findings support one of the two prevailing images of comitology—comitology as a control mechanism, not deliberative democracy.     

Book Reviews

Four years after its formal establishment, the European External Action Service (EEAS) remains in a state of complex and overlapping areas of competence. There are interlocking layers of political and administrative governance, where the service has to interact with, and answer to, different national and intergovernmental political masters as well as supranational actors, notably the European Commission and the European Parliament. The formal political decision-making power with regard to the EU’s common foreign and security policy lies with the Council, whilst substantial competences, notably in the field of the European Neighbourhood (ENP) and trade policies, as well as development and cooperation, remain under the control of the European Commission. The EEAS’s autonomy and institutional orientation are both much debated and empirically unexplored. Based on quantitative and qualitative data, this article undertakes a behavioural analysis of EEAS decision-making. Empirical findings suggest that there are competing institutional logics at work among different groups of staff which affect their respective administrative decisional behaviour. Supranational recruits tend to be more community-minded, whereas officials with an intergovernmental background have a propensity to be more member state oriented.     

The Political Foundations of the Eurocracy

This article explores the politics behind the design of EU regulatory institutions. The EU has established an extensive ‘Eurocracy’ outside of the Commission hierarchy, including over 30 European agencies and a number of networks of national regulatory authorities (NRAs). The article examines the politics of institutional choice in the EU, explaining why EU policy-makers create agencies in some policy areas, while opting for looser regulatory networks in others. It shows that the design of EU regulatory institutions – ‘the Eurocracy’ – is driven not by functional imperatives but by political considerations related to distributional conflict and the influence of supranational actors.     

The first supranational policy in the European Union: Competition policy

Abstract. Competition policy has become a salient issue in the last decade. The purpose of this article is to widen discussion amongst political scientists of an issue that has been dominated by the disciplines of economics and law. The concept of a competition policy is the foundation stone of the entire European Union. It lies at the very heart of efforts to establish a common market and within the EU competition policy arena the decision making powers have laid firmly with the supranational institutions. This article provides an overview of the issue; it traces the constitutive foundations of policy and discusses the functions of the core EU competition policy actors. It is primarily concerned with the European Commission, in particular, DGIV. The paper accounts for DGIV's metamorphosis in the 1980s and the myriad of problems now confronting its procedures and efficiency in the 1990s. Whether these defects can be resolved will ultimately determine the fate of DGIV. Arguments for institutional reform are raging through the European institutions and DGIV provides no exception. The paper concludes with a discussion on the plausibility of the creation of an independent European Competition Office, modelled on the role of the German Federal Cartel Office.     

Schattschneider in Brussels: How Policy Conflict Reshaped the Biotechnology Agenda in the European Union

This article asks why the European Commission lost control over the policy process in one of the most contested areas of policy-making in the European Union in recent years. The article finds that after years of vigorous political controversy over the framing of the issues at stake, the EU finally shifted into a Schattschneiderian mode of politics. The policy conflict expanded dramatically and a previously unrelated set of actors and interests united along new lines of policy debate. The analysis underscores how the political mode of EU decision-making can shift during the process of policy-making. In particular, it stresses how policy conflicts affect the mobilisation and demobilisation of political contestants and the realignment of political actors in the European Union.     

Channelling Protest in Illiberal Regimes: The Cuban Case since the Fall of the Berlin Wall

Abstract

As part of the strategy for better governance, the European Commission has taken steps towards improved consultation and dialogue on European Union (EU) policy with interested parties. Opening up the policy process and getting interest groups involved are considered important for the democratic legitimacy of EU policy making. This article examines the public Internet consultation on the Commission proposal for a new European chemicals policy, the so-called REACH system. Being one of the most consulted issues in EU history, the chemicals policy review is considered as a critical test for the participatory mechanisms provided by the European Communities. By analysing more than 6000 contributions to the consultation, it is demonstrated that it invited broad participation, although industry was considerably better represented than NGOs and other civil society associations. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of participants were national actors from the largest member states rather than transnational actors. It is concluded that online consultations can invite broad participation in EU policy shaping but it is unlikely to bring about equal participation from different group of actors. Therefore it raises concern when measured against standards of democratic governance.     

The EU Fundamental Rights Policy as a Source of Euroscepticism

This article analyzes how the development of the European Union (EU) fundamental rights policy feeds Euroscepticism—and notably political Euroscepticism—within segments of national political elites in EU Member States. More specifically, it argues that this relatively new policy also gives rise to a new form of political Euroscepticism, which has been defined as “value-based Euroscepticism,” e.g., the perception that the EU via its fundamental rights policy, unduly interferes in matters where value systems and core domestic preferences on ethical issues are at stake. This happens in a context where the EU is resented, by some segments of political elites, for allegedly empowering diverse groups (such as ethnic minorities, immigrants' associations, judges, and so on) at the expense of popular sovereignty. This resentment is exacerbated by the fact that national governments are increasingly submitted to the critical assessment of EU-level actors (e.g., the European Parliament or the European Commission) in terms of democratic credentials.     

Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Re–creating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

The article studies the impact of the European Union (EU) on the reforms of regional administration in Central and East European (CEE) accession countries. It analyzes the motives, process and outcomes of regional– or mesolevel administrative reforms in five countries—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia—considering whether the EU has shaped these reforms to a higher degree than in relation to its incumbent member states. The article finds that the EU Commission's interest in regional self–governments with a substantial fiscal and legal autonomy has provided an additional rationale and an incentive to re–create regional self–governments. Advocates of regional self–government and an institutionalization of regions in the accession countries have referred to European trends and (perceived) EU expectations of regionalization. Thus, the Commission and the preaccession framework have become catalysts for a process in which most CEE regions have already enhanced and will further increase their political salience. However, the trajectories and outcomes of regional–level reforms can be better explained by a combination of domestic institutional legacies, policy approaches of reformers and their adversaries, and the influence of ethnic/historical regionalism.     

Are Europeans ready for a more democratic European Union? New evidence on preference heterogeneity,polarisation and crosscuttingness

Some scholars and policy makers argue in favour of increasing democratic contestation for leadership and policy at the European level, for instance by having European‐wide parties campaign for competing candidates for President of the European Commission ahead of European Parliament elections. But do such changes put the survival of the European Union at risk? According to the consociational interpretation of the EU, the near absence of competitive and majoritarian elements has been a necessary condition for the stability of the EU political system given its highly diverse population. This article contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it develops a more precise understanding of ‘problematic’ diversity by examining how three variables – the heterogeneity, polarisation and crosscuttingness of citizen preferences over public polices – affect the risk of democratic contestation generating persistent and systematically dissatisfied minorities. Second, it uses opinion surveys to determine whether the degree of diversity of the European population is problematically high compared to that of established democratic states. It is found that the population of the EU is slightly more heterogeneous and polarised than the population of the average Member State, although policy preferences in several Member States are more heterogeneous and polarised than the EU as a whole. Strikingly, however, policy preference cleavages are more crosscutting in the EU than in nearly all Member States, reducing the risk of persistent minorities. Moreover, policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarised, and nearly as crosscutting, in the EU as a whole as in the United States. For observers worried about how high polarisation and low crosscuttingness in policy preferences may combine to threaten democratic stability, these findings should be reassuring.     

Religion and Fundamental Rights in European Politics: Convergences and Divisions at the European Parliament

European legislators must increasingly deal with issues related to fundamental rights. Religion is a frequent topic obliging them to do so. It is not directly part of the EU’s competences but is a source of values underlying policy choices and a tricky political object. Relying on the findings of a survey about what Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) believe and what they do with these beliefs, the article analyzes potential tensions created by religion in the implementation of human rights by the EU. A first part shows how and to what extent European law meets religion, and how it leaves ample room for flexibility but also for divergent interpretations. A second part states that MEPs agree largely on the principle of separation between politics and religion, but may be divided when it comes to drawing boundaries between the two domains. The conclusion points out the limits of the rule of law to prevent conflicts and suggests that human rights may inspire support as well as cause resistance to Europeanization.     

Procedural Change and the Sources of Ex Ante Constraints in EU Legislation

With 27 member states using a variety of administrative practices and institutions to implement European Union (EU) policy, the EU has been widely used as a natural laboratory for analyzing administrative politics and institutions. This research has largely focused on the institutional relationships as they are at the time of the analysis. However, the EU has used several legislative procedures. Furthermore, there has been little attention given to the administrative and delegatory consequences of changes in the EU's legislative procedures. This article examines how legislative institutions' preferences for limits to the implementing discretion of the Commission and the member states have changed with the shift from the cooperation procedure to the codecision procedure. I find that the European Parliament (EP) responded to the codecision procedure by increasing the share of its amendments that expand the implementing discretion of member states. Furthermore, the Council significantly changed its attitude toward EP amendments restricting Commission discretion.     

The Politics of 'Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies

The establishment of agencies at the European level is one of the most notable recent developments in EU regulatory policy. This article examines how politics has shaped the design of EU regulatory agencies. Building on the American politics literature on delegation, the article explains how principal-agent concerns and political compromise have influenced agency design in the EU context; shows how conflicts between the EU's primary legislative actors - the Council and the Parliament - and its primary executive actor - the Commission - have influenced the design of new bureaucratic agencies; and discusses how the growing power of the European Parliament as a political principal has changed the politics of agency design.     

Codes of conduct and practical recommendations as tools for self-regulation and soft regulation in EU public affairs

During the 2000s–2010s, EU Commission and Parliament and European interest groups advanced a specific model of regulation. It combines, on one side, lobbyists self-regulation—the codes of conduct for EU lobbying professionals' associations, such as SEAP and EPACA—with institutional nonbinding or “soft” regulation on the other side—the EU Transparency Register framework for registered interest groups, its code of conduct, the related system of checks, alerts, and complaints about interest groups misconduct put forward by the EU Joint Transparency Register Secretariat, the list of Dos and Don'ts by the EU Ombudsman. This paper examines the peculiar lobbying self-regulation and soft regulation tools and practices, as implemented within the EU model: SEAP and EPACA codes of conduct, EU Transparency Register, EU Interest Groups Code of Conduct, Commissioners and MPs codes of conduct, the procedures of the EU Joint Transparency Register Secretariat, and the Ombudsman list of Dos and Don'ts, underlining their growing impact on interest groups registration to the EU Transparency Register. This EU innovative regulatory model-based on a peculiar mix of self-regulation and institutional, incentive-based, soft regulation-stands as a concrete alternative to the traditional North American top-down binding regulatory pattern. The EU model is based on a participatory, cooperative, and pragmatic dialogue between European policy makers and interest groups. Clarifying the concept, the nature, and the functions of this model, while underlining its peculiarity is the purpose of this paper.     

National interest versus the common good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting

The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or Governments of the European Union (EU) Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.     

All Tögethé® now: the recontextualization of branding and the stylization of diversity in EU public communication

This article examines the EU Birthday Logo Competition, which was launched jointly by the major European Union (EU) institutions to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome in 2007. As the first public communication initiative by the European Commission's newly restructured Directorate General for Communication, the logo competition is a particularly rich micro-textual “site” for a critical investigation of the recontextualization of corporate communication discourses and practices into institutional approaches to the communication of EU identity. Through an analysis of policy documents, on-site observations, textual artifacts, and in-depth interviews with policy-makers and design professionals I argue that the tensions and challenges that characterized the EU Birthday Logo Competition and related EU communication policy as a site of recontextualization may have led to the communication of a much more stylized, rather than complex and nuanced, version of European identity. In particular, I argue that the dialectic between the “professional/corporate” and “institutional/political” cultures that interacted in the selection, production and implementation of the anniversary logo may have contributed to obscuring key principles of corporate branding at work in the design, and may have in fact worked to produce a highly generic, decontextualized and ultimately also bland, although certainly problematic, “vision” of EU diversity.     

Narrative dynamics in European Commission AI policy—Sensemaking,agency construction,and anchoring

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is arguably one of the most powerful and disruptive technologies of our times which may pose challenges as well as opportunities to contemporary political organizations. Studying AI from a lens of perceived uncertainty, this article studies the policy response of the European Commission toward this fast-paced emerging technology. By empirically focusing on the Commission's policy process from start to end, from initial communication to concrete proposal, the article shows how different types of narratives are used to construct the new policy area of AI policy. A novel theoretical framework is constructed building on a combination of narrative organizational studies and narrative policy studies, displaying how narratives play a key role in organizational sensemaking, agency construction and anchoring. The paper finds that the Commission broadly makes sense of AI technologies with a future-oriented discourse, establishes agency to existing and new forms of political organizing and anchors the policy response within the overarching frame of the EU single market policy. The main contribution of the paper is that it shows how political organizations settles uncertainty through narratives and sketches a way forward through establishing policy goals and anchoring them within pre-existing lines of political mobilization.     

Constructive Ambiguity: Comparing the EU’s Energy and Defence Policies

This article explores the paradox of constructive ambiguity. Based on a focused, longitudinal comparison of the European Union’s energy and defence policies, it analyses the role played by strategies of ambiguity in European integration. Ambiguity is found to be an attractive strategy for political entrepreneurs when member state preferences are heterogeneous and the EU’s legal basis is weak. It is likely to be effective, however, only if it is embedded in an institutional opportunity structure – that is, a formal-legal context – that entrepreneurs can fold into their strategic repertoire of ideas. While ambiguity can be strategic in circumstances where clarity would create strong opposition, it is not sufficient to entrench a European policy if it does not rest on an institutional basis. This suggests that European political entrepreneurs should be wary of relying on coalition building by ambiguity only.     

The birth,life, and death of policy instruments: 35 years of EU gender equality policy programmes

Policy instruments research is an essential part of studying European Union governance. A growing interest in processes of (de-)legalisation and patterns of instrument choice requires a more process- and context-oriented analysis of the EU’s instrument selection. Using a political sociology approach, the article analyses patterns of instrument choice in soft law policy programmes, by examining the life cycle of EU gender equality policy programmes from 1982 to the present day. Gender equality policy programmes offer an in-depth understanding of how the Commission upgrades and downgrades policy instruments. The analysis indicates that patterns of policy instrument choice are not necessarily inflexible once a policy instrument is selected. Instead, patterns vary while the instrument is (de-)legalised. Investigating gender equality policy programmes provides explanations for the shifts in the use of legislative instruments and their limitations.     

The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative Study of France and the Netherlands

Studies of the impact of European integration on the national administrations of the member states of the European Union (EU) have pointed towards an uneven process of "Europeanization." While there has unquestionably been a growing range and frequency of contacts between national administrations and the EU system, there is little evidence of an expected convergence towards a common institutional model. This uneven Europeanization is presently explained with reference to a neo-institutionalist framework, drawing primarily on the work of March and Olsen. It is argued that the politico-administrative systems of the member states differentially adapt to the pressures of European integration in a manner which reflects the preexisting balance of domestic institutionnal structures, as well as th broader matrices of values which define the nature of appropriate political forms in the case of each national polity. Distinctive national patterns of institutional adjustment, rather than appearing anomalous, emerge as corresponding to a basic logic of differentiation indissociable from the integration process itself. The general argument is illustrated by an extended comparative study of France and the Netherlands, examining both the making and the implementation of European policy in the two countries.     

Resistant to Change? The European Commission and Expert Group Reform

This article examines how the European Commission has responded to external criticism and demands for the democratisation and reform of the way it uses expert groups in EU policy making. The article analyses the nature and character of the Commission’s dialogue with its critics and the degree and extent to which it was prepared to adapt its existing internal processes and procedures to the reform agenda. Recent theories inform us that organisations respond in different ways to external criticism and demands for reform, including full adaptation, evasion, institutional decoupling and reinterpretation. The main findings suggest that the Commission was not completely resistant to changing its approach to the use of expertise. The Commission reinterpreted its critics’ demands by introducing reforms that defused this external pressure, while protecting the effectiveness of its existing internal ideology and processes. These findings serve to enhance the Commission’s image as an increasingly normalised bureaucracy and reinforce the importance of knowledge and expertise as a key source of Commission legitimacy.