The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own

For regionalist populists like the Lega Nord, participation in coalition at national level requires striking a delicate balance between being a party of government and a movement of opposition. The key to this is choosing the right ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ within government. In contrast to its previous time in power in 1994, in the second Berlusconi government (2001–05) the Lega cast itself as the Forza Italia leader's most faithful ally, while being seen to be in almost constant conflict with its fellow junior coalition partners: Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the UDC. Indeed, as AN repositions itself within a respectable governmental ‘European’ Right, so the Lega appears ever more in a league of its own within the Italian centre-right. Based on exclusive recent interviews, this article examines the Lega's relationship to its heartland and its positions on issues such as immigration, Europe, globalisation and constitutional reform. We argue that the party has transformed itself into an ‘institutionalised’ populist movement that has successfully walked the tightrope of being seen to have ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of government.     

Sailing with Northern Winds: Party Politics and Federal Reforms in Italy

Territorial reforms have been on the political agenda in Italy for the last two decades, becoming a stable issue of party competition. The breakthrough of Lega Nord (LN) in the party system has represented the main driver for federal reforms. The article argues that the bipolar and majoritarian institutional environment of the Second Republic has compelled the main state-wide parties to adopt an electoral logic that led them to accommodate the LN’s claims. However, the ideological orientations and the territorial interests of centre-left coalition proved more compatible with this accommodative strategy than those of the centre-right coalition. The majoritarian and adversarial style of government–opposition relations has made compromise on territorial reforms difficult, contributing to their rising salience in party competition.     

Electoral promises and minority governments: An empirical study

Abstract.  This article studies the relationship between electoral policy proposals and subsequent government actions in the case of minority governments. Content analysis of electoral pledges of Spanish parties is utilised to study the gains that a relatively small party obtains when it helps to sustain the governing party in office without entering a coalition government. According to the authors' results, cooperating in parliament to maintain the minority government in office can be a rational choice for a party because it allows it to obtain significant gains in terms of programme fulfillment.     

Reconciling 'Voice' and 'Exit': Swiss and Italian Populists in Power

This article focuses on the strategic communication of four populist parties which have served in national and/or sub-national governments during the last two decades: the Lega Nord (LN) and Forza Italia (FI) in Italy, as well as the Lega dei Ticinesi (LDT) and the Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union Démocratique du Centre (SVP/UDC) in Switzerland. The analysis identifies two strategies which have been adopted by these parties (i.e. the 'opposition within government' and 'role playing'), as they try to maintain their identity and balance their recourse to 'spectacular politics' with the responsibilities of office. Unlike others, this study provides little support for the idea that government participation must bring with it the 'moderation' of populists, at least as far as their strategic communication is concerned.     

Government Formation in the Nordic Countries: The Electoral Connection

Government formation is guided by several principles, such as majority, plurality and electoral principles. According to the electoral principle, parties that increase their share of seats in the elections should form the government, parties that lose seats joining the opposition. We analyse the fulfilment of this principle in the five Nordic countries. In Denmark, Finland and Iceland the majority of governments contained parties that both won and lost in elections, whereas in Sweden nearly half of the governments included only parties that lost seats. Only in Iceland and Denmark does election success translate to an increased probability of a government place in an increasing way. In Norway and particularly in Sweden big losers have better chances of being in government than big winners. Party system attributes are not related to the fulfilment of the electoral principle. To shift our analysis to individual parties, prime ministers come more likely from parties that are big winners. Winning does not explain the probability of becoming a coalition partner. If a party wants to be in government it is more important to avoid losing seats than to be an actual winner. Coalition partners are more likely to be mid–sized parties, a finding probably explained by the desire of the formateur party to maximise its policy influence in the government.     

How voters' perceptions of junior coalition partners depend on the prime minister's position

Recent studies document that voters infer parties' left‐right policy agreement based on governing coalition arrangements. This article extends this research to present theoretical and empirical evidence that European citizens update their perceptions of junior coalition partners' left‐right policies to reflect the policies of the prime minister's party, but that citizens do not reciprocally project junior coalition partners' policies onto the prime minister's party. These findings illuminate the simple rules that citizens employ to infer parties' policy positions, broaden understanding of how citizens perceive coalition governance and imply that ‘niche’ parties, whose electoral appeal depends upon maintaining a distinctive policy profile, assume electoral risks when they enter government.     

Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies

In electoral autocracies, opposition coalition formation offers the best hope of getting to democracy. Yet forming electoral coalitions also entails convincing opposition voters to ignore compromises and engage in the cross‐party voting necessary for opposition victory. To what extent are voters committed to defeating the autocratic incumbent even if it would result in dislikable outcomes? A survey experiment in Malaysia finds that opposition voters overwhelmingly express pretreatment support for the opposition coalition. But when exposed to a treatment vignette about which member party might lead the next government, many voters retract their support. Specifically, voters’ support for the coalition declines when their least preferred member is expected to control the government and when they can vote for a closer ideological alternative outside of the coalition. Although voters are committed to opposition unity and democratic transition, that commitment is sensitive to the anticipated consequences of an opposition victory.     

Ideological congruence over government mandates under majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems

The existing literature on ideological congruence has typically looked at congruence immediately after elections when governments are formed. This article goes beyond that comparative static approach by examining changes in citizen-government ideological congruence between two fixed points in time, namely at the beginning and end of government mandates. Building on a veto player approach and dynamics of party competition under majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, the results indicate, first, that government positions are more stable in between elections, as the number of parties and their ideological distance increase in cabinet. Second, it appears that single-party and homogeneous coalition governments decrease ideological congruence between elections under low levels of polarisation, while they increase congruence under very high levels of polarisation. Third, it was found that governments under majoritarian systems slightly decrease congruence between elections while congruence stays stable on average under PR systems. The different levels of party system polarisation across majoritarian and PR electoral systems mostly explain this difference.     

The Progressive Dilemma Revisited

In his book of the same title, David Marquand identified the progressive dilemma faced by many intellectuals since the beginning of the twentieth century as a question of whether it was better to work through a political party or through civil society to achieve reform. This dilemma was sharpened by the emergence of the Labour party as the main challenger to the Conservatives, because the party was so closely identified with the defence of a particular interest. This hindered the creation of the kind of broad electoral coalition that could win general elections. Throughout most of its history, Labour has failed to realise its promise and sustain reforming governments. In this article, the history of the Labour party over the past hundred years is outlined, in particular the three cycles 1931–51, 1951–79 and 1979–2010 and the divisions and recriminations that have followed each period in government. The current predicament of the party is then briefly assessed.     

Coalition politics and accountability

The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) can not be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy.     

Coalition government and satisfaction with democracy: An analysis of New Zealand's reaction to proportional representation

Following approval of a referendum in 1993, New Zealand replaced its first–past–the–post electoral system with proportional representation (PR). Although support for PR was initially high, less than a third expressed support for the new system a year and a half after its implementation. We examine two explanations for this decline. One theory assumes that dissatisfaction with the new system is the result of a growing alienation with politics, exacerbated by an unpopular coalition government that voters neither expected nor desired. Another theory assumes that evaluations of the new system are mediated by a preference for coalition or single party government. Our results indicate that a preference for single party government, guided primarily by partisan self–interest, has the largest impact. Nevertheless, negative evaluations of the performance of the coalition government helped contribute to a loss in support for PR suggesting that government performance can affect citizen's evaluation of political institutions, particularly when systems undergo radical change.     

Coalition government and satisfaction with democracy: An analysis of New Zealand's reaction to proportional representation

Abstract. Following approval of a referendum in 1993, New Zealand replaced its first–past–the–post electoral system with proportional representation (PR). Although support for PR was initially high, less than a third expressed support for the new system a year and a half after its implementation. We examine two explanations for this decline. One theory assumes that dissatisfaction with the new system is the result of a growing alienation with politics, exacerbated by an unpopular coalition government that voters neither expected nor desired. Another theory assumes that evaluations of the new system are mediated by a preference for coalition or single party government. Our results indicate that a preference for single party government, guided primarily by partisan self–interest, has the largest impact. Nevertheless, negative evaluations of the performance of the coalition government helped contribute to a loss in support for PR suggesting that government performance can affect citizen's evaluation of political institutions, particularly when systems undergo radical change.     

Party system nationalization,presidential coalitions,and government spending

This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between geographical patterns of political parties' electoral performance and the composition of central government expenditures. When party system nationalization is high, the composition of spending will focus more on non-targetable expenditures, while targetable expenditures increase as the party system distribution of votes across different districts becomes less homogenous. However, the effect of party nationalization on spending type is conditioned by the size of the presidential coalition; targeted transfers will increase if the coalition size decreases, even if party nationalization is high. I find support for these hypotheses with an empirical analysis of district-level electoral and government expenditure data for several countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2006.     

Mainstreaming populist discourse: the race-conscious legacy of neo-populist parties in Australia and Italy

Curran examines the political legacy of far-right neo-populist parties in Australia and Italy. She argues that assessments of their ‘success’ need to extend beyond the electoral decline or organizational implosion of the parties themselves. An important measure of their impact is the influence they have exerted on mainstream political discourse and styles of communication. That they have been successful in having such an impact is well illustrated in the politically expedient adoption of race-conscious, anti-immigration and anti-asylum policies in Australia and Italy. Curran examines the influence of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party and Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord (Northern League) on the mainstreaming of populist discourse in these two countries. She focuses on some of the populist themes and styles embraced by the Australian political leader John Howard and his Italian counterpart Silvio Berlusconi, and she concludes that, regardless of their political fragility or outright demise, these far-right neo-populist parties have been successful in injecting populist themes and prejudices into the mainstream political discourse in their respective countries.     

How Unusual is the United Kingdom Coalition (and What are the Chances of It Happening Again)?

This article draws upon insights from theoretical and empirical studies of coalition behaviour in multiparty politics to examine the formation of the United Kingdom coalition following the general election of 6 May 2010. It argues that the formation of the Conservative‐Liberal Democrat coalition is not unusual in historical terms or in the context of contemporary European politics; and that although it is a break from the more recent pattern of postwar British politics it nevertheless does conform to expectations in the light of the coalition literature. The article also provides a comparative analysis of the impact of Britain's ‘First‐Past‐The‐Post’ (FPTP) electoral system on party competition and an examination of the performance of the Alternative Vote (AV) system and argues that if the United Kingdom retains FPTP then a return to single‐party government in 2015 is highly likely; and it is not inevitable that the introduction of AV would significantly advantage the Liberal Democrats.     

Electoral alliances: Party identities and coalition games

The emergence of electoral alliances competing for plurality seats has been one of the main consequences stemming form the introduction of the new electoral laws for the Senate and the Chamber of deputies in Italy. This paper analyzes the politics of electoral alliances at the general elections of April 1996, focusing on two factors: the making of electoral alliances and their internal arrangements for coalition management. From both points of view, the elections have shown some important new developments, including a simplification in the number of coalitions. But although the centre–left alliance was able to broaden its range, the centre–right lost the Lega Nord and suffered the split of Movimento sociale–Fiamma tricolore on its right. Moreover, the centre–right alliance also suffered from a lack of cohesion, wasting its previous coalitional capability. As in the 1994 elections the politics of electoral alliances proved to be a key factor in the electoral competition.     

Electoral alliances: Party identities and coalition games

Abstract The emergence of electoral alliances competing for plurality seats has been one of the main consequences stemming form the introduction of the new electoral laws for the Senate and the Chamber of deputies in Italy. This paper analyzes the politics of electoral alliances at the general elections of April 1996, focusing on two factors: the making of electoral alliances and their internal arrangements for coalition management. From both points of view, the elections have shown some important new developments, including a simplification in the number of coalitions. But although the centre–left alliance was able to broaden its range, the centre–right lost the Lega Nord and suffered the split of Movimento sociale–Fiamma tricolore on its right. Moreover, the centre–right alliance also suffered from a lack of cohesion, wasting its previous coalitional capability. As in the 1994 elections the politics of electoral alliances proved to be a key factor in the electoral competition.     

The emerging political economy of austerity in Britain

This paper uses data from the British Election Study's Continuous Monitoring Surveys to investigate reactions of the British public to the economic crisis and the austerity policies the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government has adopted to deal with it. Multivariate models informed by competing valence and positional theories of electoral choice are employed to study the impact of these reactions on support for the Conservative Party and Prime Minister David Cameron and evaluations of the Conservatives' ability to handle important issues. Analyses indicate that there is widespread and growing pessimism about the prospects of resolving the economic crisis in the near future. Since the crisis began in 2008, the dynamics of these bearish attitudes have been closely linked to rising unemployment rates. Differing positions regarding the Coalition's austerity policies exert sizable effects on party support, but these attitudes have not negated the force of valence politics considerations such as party leader images, partisan attachments and global assessments of party performance.     

Doomed to Defeat? Electoral Support and the Conservative Party

This article recaps the main trends in public opinion and electoral support for the Conservative party since the last general election in June 2001 by examining the overall polling data relating to party popularity. The article also considers by-elections, local elections and leadership change, as well as the most recent elections in 2004. The various challenges the party faces as it attempts to position itself as a credible alternative government to the Labour party under Tony Blair are considered.
Given the clear biases of the electoral system used for the House of Commons, which are certain to benefit Labour substantially even if the Conservatives get close to them in terms of overall vote share, or indeed even overtake them, it still seems unlikely that such success will be sufficient to achieve much more than to reduce Tony Blair's House of Commons majority in 2005.     

Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success

West European right-wing extremist parties have received a great deal of attention over the past two decades due to their electoral success. What has received less coverage, however, is the fact that these parties have not enjoyed a consistent level of electoral support across Western Europe during this period. This article puts forward an explanation of the variation in the right-wing extremist party vote across Western Europe that incorporates a wider range of factors than have been considered previously. It begins by examining the impact of socio-demographic variables on the right-wing extremist party vote. Then, it turns its attention to a whole host of structural factors that may potentially affect the extreme right party vote, including institutional, party-system and conjunctural variables. The article concludes with an assessment of which variables have the most power in explaining the uneven electoral success of right-wing extremist parties across Western Europe. The findings go some way towards challenging the conventional wisdom as to how the advance of the parties of the extreme right may be halted.