Trade unions,nonneutrality and stagflation

The claim that in policy games nonneutrality and a stagflation bias emerge in equilibrium if the unions care about inflation, per se, is discussed. This assumption is shown to be not necessary to obtain a stagflation bias; the same applies to nonneutrality if a government acts in the economy. The question of whether unions should be envisaged as “institutions” (i.e., interested in variables unrelated to wages and employment) is also addressed. Two model-based alternatives providing “microeconomic” foundations versus “macroeconomic” foundations to unions' behaviour are presented. The conclusion is that the modelling of unions remains an unsettled problem.     

Fiscal restraint and the political economy of EMU

While the principle of delegation has become well established on the national level for monetary policy, fiscal policies remain in the hands of policy makers depending on rent-seeking interest groups. We argue that the Maastricht Treaty provides a unique international commitment that enables governments to follow restrictive fiscal policies by attributing their negative side-effects to Europe, and to implement austerity measures despite rising unemployment or a decline in growth. Hence, the popularity of the European idea is instrumented to enforce fiscal discipline. The paper outlines the political economy framework and presents new econometric evidence.     

Public affairs,issues management,and political strategy: opportunities,opportunities, and more opportunities

This paper begins where Professor Windsor left off and enumerates some other areas in which academic research could be profitably pursued for both intellectual and practical gain. The tone of Professor Windsor's paper is pessimistic, and lays out in detail some of the obstacles to research; but these are not insurmountable. Some key areas that can be explored to the benefit of researchers and practitioners are in self‐regulation, the initiative process, term limits (a relatively recent phenomenon and not particularly well known outside of the USA), and in alliance building, constituency statutes, and links to stakeholder theory and action. Each of these additional areas is addressed in this presentation. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Economic policy advice and political preferences

This essay argues that public choice offers an appropriate approach for thinking about economic policy advice. First I discuss the nature of the policy advice that is proffered by economists. Then I specifically suggest that one of the most common modeling features in the public choice literature (viz., the assumption that individuals have political preferences) may be useful in helping us understand the nature of this advice. Finally, I also carry out a tentative exploration of the implications of accepting the perspective that is provided when the suggested modeling feature is used in this context.     

Causal inference and American political development: common challenges and opportunities

Public Choice - The causal inference (CI) movement has forced political scientists to think far more seriously about what can be learned from a particular research design and to be more attentive...     

Anchoring political preferences: The structural bases of stable electoral decisions and political attitudes in Britain

Abstract. The paper applies a structural perspective to the analysis of political preferences. Examining two British surveys, the 1987 cross–section of the electorate and a panel survey that covers the 1983 and 1987 elections, the research explores the bases of persistent voting for the same party, location on left–right scales, and the probability of holding the same policy views on a host of different issues over time. A set of structural variables rests at the heart of the paper's theory: discussion networks, patterns of interactions with members of political parties, social class networks, and location in the social structure. Several hypotheses guide the analysis: The effects of the structural variables on the probability of casting a ballot for the same political party in any one election and in adjacent elections will remain, even after controlling for party identification; political party socialization; location on left–right scales; positions taken on any and all political issues; age, and past levels of electoral stability. The effects of structural variables on left–right position will remain, even after controlling for locations on alternative left–right scales. Finally, reinforcing attitudinal context provides the only consistent determinant of stable policy positions, after controlling for a host of alternative explanations including level of education; age; interest in politics, and a general propensity to offer stable answers to political questions.     

Committee structure and political preferences: The case of Norwegian local government

Abstract.  In Norway, as in the other Nordic countries, sector-based policy making in local government is considered a problem as it is alleged to take place at the expense of a more integrated approach. Inspired by American rational choice theories on committee power, this article first sets out to establish whether the distributive rationale of the present committee system actually does promote sector-orientation among local politicians. This approach is challenged by alternative theories on committee power, focusing on the informational rationale in specialisation and the relevance of partisanship . The findings suggest that all the three theories explain in part committee member' preferences, but partisanship is most important for explaining both spending preferences and preferences on organisational forms. The article goes on to explore whether recent local council reforms, intended to replace the sector-oriented system with strong committees by a new de-specialised system with weaker committees, are likely to curb the effect of sector on committee members' preferences. The conclusion here is not easy to draw, but it is clear that sector-orientation is not encouraged by the reforms; in fact, the opposite seems to be the case. What local councils may have overlooked, however, is the influence of the informational rationale on committees and their members. The analyses are based on data obtained from a random sample of 119 of Norway's 435 municipalities.     

Protest participation and economic crisis: The conditioning role of political opportunities

The economic crisis that started in 2008 has negatively affected European nations to different degrees. The sudden rise in demonstrations particularly in those countries most hard hit by the crisis suggests that grievance theories, dismissed in favour of resource‐based models since the 1970s, might have a role to play in explaining protest behaviour. While most previous studies have tested these theories at the individual or contextual levels, it is likely that mechanisms at both levels are interrelated. To fill this lacuna, this article examines the ways in which individual‐level grievances interact with macro‐level factors to impact on protest behaviour. In particular, it examines whether the impact of individual subjective feelings of deprivation is conditional on contextual macroeconomic and policy factors. It is found that while individual‐level relative deprivation has a direct effect on the propensity to have protested in the last year, this effect is greater under certain macroeconomic and political conditions. Both significant results for the cross‐level interactions are interpreted in terms of their role for opening up political opportunities for protest among those who feel they have been most deprived in the current crisis. These findings suggest that the interaction of the contextual and individual levels should continue to be explored in future studies in order to further clarify the mechanisms underlying protest behaviour.     

Labour market risks and political preferences: The case of temporary employment

The political economy literature has gathered compelling evidence that labour market risks shape political preferences. Accordingly, insecurity fuels support for redistribution and left parties. This article analyses this argument for temporary workers, a so far neglected risk category which has increased dramatically in the past two decades. Temporary workers also have been in the focus of recent insider‐outsider debates. Some authors in this line of research have argued that temporary work leads to political disenchantment – for example, non‐instrumental responses such as vote abstention or protest voting. This contradicts risk‐based explanations of political preferences. The article discusses both theoretical perspectives and derives conflicting hypotheses for the empirical analysis of temporary workers' policy and party preferences. The review reveals considerable ambiguity regarding the questions which parties temporary workers can be expected to support and what the underlying motives for party choice are. Synthesising arguments from both perspectives, the article proposes an alternative argument according to which temporary workers are expected to support the ‘new’ left – that is, green and other left‐libertarian parties. It is argued that this party family combines redistributive policies with outsider‐friendly policy design. Using individual‐level data from the European Social Survey for 15 European countries, the article supports this argument by showing that temporary, compared to permanent, workers exhibit higher demand for redistribution and stronger support for the new left. Neither the risk‐based nor the insider‐outsider explanations receive full support. In particular, no signs of political disenchantment of temporary workers can be found. Thus, the findings challenge central claims of the insider‐outsider literature.     

Anyone for higher speed limits? – Self-interested and adaptive political preferences

Swedish survey-evidence indicates that variables reflecting self-interest are important in explaining people’s preferred speed limits, and that political preferences adapt to technological development. Drivers who believe they drive better than the average driver as well as drivers of cars that are newer (and hence safer), bigger, and with better highspeed characteristics, prefer higher speed limits. In contrast, elderly people prefer lower speed limits. Furthermore, people report that they themselves vote more sociotropically than they believe others vote on average, indicating that we may vote less sociotropically than we believe ourselves. One possible reason for such self-serving biases is that people desire to see themselves as socially responsible.     

Governments,trade unions and the macroeconomy: An expository analysis of the political business cycle

We have briefly reviewed the state of the art of research on the political business cycle in the context of a simple textbook model of the macroeconomy. It has been demonstrated that the government-generated political business cycle vanishes as expectations turn rational. Even then, however, non-inflationary policies apparently are time inconsistent. Hence, democracies seem to be stuck with some sort of inflationary bias.Countries with fairly centralized wage bargaining and strong labor unions have to deal with a second political source of instability in the macroeconomy: if the labor union's program contains political items such as equal educational opportunities for working class children, extended co-determination, a more equal distribution of wealth, and the like, they will prefer to see those parties in power who show the best prospects of implementing those items. So the trade union's wage bargaining strategies take into account how bargaining results influence the state of the economy and, hence, the reelection prospects of the ruling government — and they will do so in different ways, depending on whether the union prefers the government to the opposition party or vice versa.     

Trade unions and social capital in transitional communist states: The case of China

In the study of social capital in Asia, it has been common to see kinship networks as the formation of social capital relations that create trust within society or within Asian states. This paper explores social capital surrounding industrial conflicts to see how unions relate to social capital formation in the context of recent reforms in state socialist China. This paper will argue that in the face of spontaneous outbursts of rapid social capital formation, as in industrial conflicts, the role of institutional agents is important for sustaining social capital. In China, the traditional model of the states bureaucratic trade unions has proved poorly adapted to coping with rapid social capital formation, either as organizer or suppressant. In the case of new workplaces, however, without the history of cynicism and state corporatism, the official unions that seek to represent members and sustain social capital are able to do so quite effectively. To build social capital, it is not necessary to destroy existing trade unions in China but to reorient their focus from bureaucratic centralist to representative organizations.     

Intergovernmental councils in Spain: Challenges and opportunities in a changing political context

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the most important characteristics and of the Spanish Intergovernmental Councils (IGCs) and theorizes about the effect of the increasing fragmentation of the party system on the nature and dynamics of multilateral bargaining in IGCs. The essential argument is that party system fragmentation may have an impact on IGCs through its effect on the formation of minority and coalition governments. These types of governments may put an end to the two-bloc confrontation, bring to the system higher levels of party congruence between levels of government and lower the costs of compromise, three factors that may help to grease the bargaining process and, in turn, enhance the achievement of intergovernmental cooperation agreements. The positive effect will be conditional on several factors, namely the ideological coherence of inter-party alliances, the predominant type of government in the system (coalition or single-party minority) and the duration of governments.     

Distribution of income in advanced capitalist states: political parties, labour unions, and the international economy

Abstract. Hypotheses about determinants of income inequality in advanced capitalist societies are tested with data from the World Bank for 1975–80 across virtually the complete population. The results support most of the propositions of a model that takes into account differences in partisan control of government, the organization strength of labour, and the openness of the economy to international market forces. Hypotheses derived from global models of income distribution are not supported. The major findings are (1) that labour organization has no direct effect on income inequality; (2) that strong socialist parties have a negative effect on the size of the gap between the rich and the poor but no effect on the gap between the rich and the middle class; (3) that the governmental strength of conservative parties is unrelated to the size of the gap between the rich and the poor but has a very strong positive effect on the gap between the rich and the middle class; and (4) that, regardless of partisan control of government, relatively small trade dependent economies are more egalitarian than relatively large economies which are less dependent on international trade.     

Instrumental political support: bringing policy preferences back into explanations of EU support

There is a joint development towards Europeanisation of public policies and an increasing visibility and politicisation of European issues in EU member states. In this context, the degree of fit between individuals’ policy preferences and European norms could be expected to influence support for the EU: this support might increase when Europeanisation makes the desired policies more likely, and decrease when it hinders these policies. Multilevel analyses of the 2014 wave of the European Election Study confirms the existence of such instrumental support for the EU. The findings demonstrate that this support is shaped by policy preferences on state intervention, immigration, moral issues and environmental protection. The results also show that the impact of these policy preferences is modulated by the level of integration of the designated policy, by the weight of the policy issue in the country and, in some cases, by the level of individual political knowledge.     

The origins of redistributive policy preferences: political socialisation with and without a welfare state

Research on the impact of the macroeconomy on individual-level preferences for redistribution has produced varying results. This paper presents a new theory on the presence of an expansive welfare state during one’s formative years as a source of heterogeneity in the effect that macroeconomic conditions have on individuals’ preferences for redistributive policy. This theory is tested using cohort analysis via the British Social Attitudes surveys (1983–2010), with generations coming of age between the end of World War I and today. Findings confirm that cohorts that were socialised before and after the introduction of the welfare state react differently to economic crises: the former become less supportive of redistribution, while the latter become more supportive. The research sheds light on the long-term shifts of support for the welfare state due to generational replacement.     

Public affairs,issues management,and political strategy: opportunities,obstacles, and caveats

This paper evaluates research in corporate public affairs, social issues management and political strategy, and theoretical integration of the three areas and also cross‐disciplinary and cross‐institutional collaboration, especially with business or government officials. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Issue politicization and social class: How the electoral supply activates class divides in political preferences

Against premature claims about the declining political relevance of social class in post-industrial democracies, recent research indicates that class continues to be a relevant determinant of political preferences. In post-industrial societies ‘old’ class divides on economic issues coexist with ‘new’ class alignments on cultural topics. While there is cumulated evidence of social classes’ distinct placement on these issues, this paper argues that the strength of class divides depends on the extent to which these issues are politicized by political parties. Studying preferences on economic and cultural issues (attitudes towards redistribution, immigration, gay rights and European integration), this study shows that class divides in preferences are context dependent. The multilevel analyses drawing on data from the European Social Survey and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey for 27 European democracies demonstrate that classes’ differences in preferences are accentuated on issues strongly contested and emphasized by parties, and mitigated on issues where party conflict is weaker. Adding to recent literature on parties and class conflict, this study identifies another stage at which parties can affect the strength of class voting. The varying strength of class divides across contexts also has implications for parties’ ability to garner support beyond a single class. This becomes increasingly unlikely in contexts of high issue politicization.