Coalition formation and polarisation

Party ideology plays an important role in determining which government coalitions form. Research on coalition formation tends to focus on the ideological distance between coalition parties. However, the distribution of preferences within the coalition, and the legislature, also has implications for which government coalition forms – that is, a party's willingness to join a coalition depends not only on its prospective coalition partners, but also on the alternative coalitions it could form. Several hypotheses about the effects of legislative polarisation are offered and tested using data on coalition formation in 17 parliamentary democracies in the postwar period. This article also demonstrates how the traditional measure of ideological divisions within coalitions fails to capture certain aspects of ideological heterogeneity within the cabinet (and the opposition) and how Esteban and Ray's polarisation index helps in addressing these deficiencies.     

Coalition politics and accountability

The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) can not be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy.     

Budget Deficits and Coalition Governments

This paper shows that compromise between different ideologicalmotivations within multiparty governments may result in a biastoward running budget deficits even if all parties in thecoalition prefer balanced budgets. The deficit bias increases withthe degree of ``polarization'' of the ideological motivations andgenerally decreases with the degree of concentration of powerwithin the government. Although the analysis is conducted assuminga proportional representation electoral system, the results willalso apply to majoritarian systems if the winning party comprisesideologically different constituencies. The relationship betweenbudget deficits and multiparty governments is investigated usingdata from a sample of eight European Union countries for the period1971–1990. Analysis on pooled data is partly in line with the theory.Time series within country analysis is less favorable: we findclear support to the theory only in the case of Italy.     

Coalition government and electoral accountability

Single-party governments are commonly thought to be more clearly responsible for government policy than coalition governments. One particular problem for voters evaluating coalition governments is how to assess whether all parties within a coalition should be held equally responsible for past performance. As a result, it is generally argued that voters are less likely to hold coalition governments to account for past performance. This article uses data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project to assess whether and how the composition of coalition governments affects the way in which people use their votes to hold governments to account, and which parties within coalitions are more likely to be held to account for the government’s past performance.     

Coalition from the Inside Out: Women of Color Feminism and Politico-Ethical Coalition Politics

This article turns to 1980s US women of color feminism to develop a notion of politico-ethical coalition politics as an alternative to contemporary articulations of activist coalition politics that obscure the high-stakes politics of coalescing across hostile race, class, gender, sex, and sexuality divides. Rethinking political joining outside of notions of ontological spectacle and ethical community, women of color feminists such as Bernice Reagon, Audre Lorde, and Gloria Anzaldúa encourage a uniquely political conception of coalition that resists appeals to political indeterminacy while still anticipating the power struggles and danger inherent to working in coalition. This understanding of coalition, I argue, is best thought of as politico-ethical insofar as the political commitment to undermining interlocking oppressive forces grounding such efforts is overtly self-reflexive, thereby encouraging an ethical sensibility characterized by love, existential transformation, and a reconceptualization of identity and consciousness in coalitional terms.     

Coalition Government and Committee Power

Recent research suggests that committees in parliamentary democracies may, at least partly, be endogenous to the prevalence of coalition government. In this article, I examine the conditions under which parliamentary majorities reform legislative rules to expand or reduce committee power. I expect that, ceteris paribus, the greater the conflict inside the governing coalition, the higher the probability that parties in government will adopt reforms expanding committee power and the lower the chance that they will implement changes reducing such power. These expectations are tested using original new data on the reforms of committee agenda powers undertaken in eight European states within 20 years from democratic transition. I find some evidence to support the endogeneity of committee power to the ideological heterogeneity of parliamentary government.     

Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation

This article investigates how interest group competition, a state of conflicting policy preferences stemming from how organizational memberships are defined, can resolve into conflict or cooperation. The strategic choices of competing lobbyists are modeled as the results of a trade-off between the need to represent members and please legislators, and the additional advocacy resources they hope to gain by agreeing to form coalitions with their competitors rather than fight them in resource-draining conflicts. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested with data from interviews with lobbyists on six issues taken up by the U.S. Congress from 1999 to 2002. The results suggest that while group members do have some limited power to constrain the policy positions taken on issues by their lobbyists, it is primarily the pressures from legislators and competitor groups that push lobbyists into collectively supporting coalition positions different from those desired by their members.     

Coalition incentives and party bias in Chile

This article revisits the debate over Chile's binomial electoral rules and its consequences and examines how the new electoral system conceived by a democratic congress altered political competition. It utilizes a seat-vote model of multiparty competition to analyze party bias under the binomial rule. This approach differs substantively from prior studies of the Chilean case that focused primarily on the disproportionality of aggregate results. In contrast to earlier analyses, the findings reveal that the allocation of the seats under the binominal resulted in significant party bias benefiting the main parties of the right. This bias, however, was eliminated after the electoral reform. The new rule continues to provide majoritarian benefits to parties receiving larger shares of votes, but this effect is less pronounced than before. It is now easier for small parties to gain seats, which has increased party fragmentation. However, we show that coalition incentives, which were heralded as one of the main advantages of the binomial rule, are also significant under the new rule in use since 2017.     

我国草根NGO联盟组织间的资源共享模式探讨——基于华夏公益联盟案例分析

我国草根NGO联盟兴起于20世纪90年代环保领域,经历专业化联盟、非常态下的异质性联盟以及常规化联盟阶段,草根NGO结盟是草根NGO获取可持续性资源的一种策略选择,它可以实现公益资源的有效整合与共享。本文基于华夏公益联盟实践中的几个跨区域性公益项目,尝试探索草根NGO联盟存在的几种资源共享模式,研究发现草根NGO联盟存在支持型资源共享模式、互补型资源共享模式、联动型(或增殖型)资源共享模式等三种资源共享模式,其中,联动型(或增殖型)资源共享模式还包括公益产业链型、资源辐射型、关键性资源驱动型等三种类型。理清草根NGO联盟的资源共享模式,有利于指导实践。     

Supply Chain Linkages and the Extended Carbon Coalition

Which firms oppose action to fight climate change? Networks of input sourcing and sales to downstream customers ought to propagate and reinforce opposition to decarbonization beyond direct emitters of CO₂. To test this claim, we build the largest data set of public political activity for and against climate action in the United States, revealing that the majority of corporate opposition to climate action comes from outside the highest‐emitting industries. We construct new measures of the carbon intensity of firms and show that policy exposure via carbon‐intensive inputs and sales to downstream emitters explains this large volume of opposition from non‐emitting industries. Sixty‐six percent of U.S. lobbying on climate policy has been conducted by an extended coalition of firms, associations, and other groups that have publicly opposed reducing carbon emissions. Public opposition to climate action by carbon‐connected industries is therefore broad‐based, highly organized, and matched with extensive lobbying.     

Coalition Termination in Norway: Models and Cases

This article focuses on coalition termination in Norway and explores the questions: Which issues are severe enough to bring down a coalition government? To what extent are coalition crises caused by a complex bargaining environment? On the basis of a unified model for government solution, three cases are examined: the termination of Borten II in 1971, Willoch III in 1986, and Syse in 1990. The analysis demonstrates that the complexity of the bargaining environment is conditioned by the dimensionality of the party system. The stability of coalitions is restricted by the cleavage structure and the ideological diversity of the system, as parties are polarized along several conflict dimensions. Terminal issues are fundamentally related to the parties' position in the policy space. In order to preserve party identity and unity, political parties change from a cooperative to a competitive strategy when issues belonging to the “heartland” of the parties concerned become salient.     

对"自由人联合体"的再认识

马克思、恩格斯在《共产主义原理》、《共产党宣言》中，把社会主义和共产主义看作是资产阶级社会的直接对立物和代替物，并把未来的社会主义或共产主义社会称之为一个“联合体”。这个“联合体”被看作是联合起来的个人的集合，是首先实现了每个人的自由发展，并在此条件下能够使一切人的自由发展成为现实的自由人联合体。　　　　马克思、恩格斯所阐述的这样一个代替存在着阶级和阶级对立的资产阶级旧社会的自由人联合体，是建立在如下一些理论和认识的基础之上的：　　　　(1)过去的一切阶级在争得统治之后，总是使整个社会服从于它们发…     

Consensual Coalitions? Coalition Formation in Norwegian Municipalities

While widely applied to political coalitions in national assemblies and cabinets, theories of coalition formation have seldom been tested at the local level of government. This article presents a model of coalition formation in connection with mayoral elections in Norwegian local councils and tests it on the basis of the first systematic collection of data on the election of mayors from a large number of municipalities. It finds small significant effects on the probability that oversized coalitions will be formed. Contrary to "common" knowledge, the size of a municipality has a positive influence on the conflictual climate, and thus on the size of the coalitions formed, which implies that the probability that an oversized coalition will form is higher in a large than in a small municipality. It also finds that the possibility that an oversized coalition will form increases if one party controls a majority of the councilors on its own, and if the majority is non-socialistically controlled. The assumption of a strong norm for reaching consensus-based decisions, reinforced by the design of the local political institutions, is supported.     

Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny

Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic principal‐agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policymaking powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they favor rather than sticking to the “coalition deal”? We argue that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of “hostile” ministerial proposals to overcome the potential problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain. Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition conflicts.     

Making words count: Coalition agreements and cabinet management

The cabinet is a central actor in policy making in parliamentary systems. Yet, relatively little is known about how coalition cabinets operate. The delegation of decision‐making authority to ministers invites policy drift, which threatens the cohesiveness of the cabinet's policy programme. Cabinets employ a variety of methods to contain policy drift. The writing of coalition agreements is among the major tools, but there are others, including limiting ministerial autonomy and the use of junior ministers to shadow ministers. The present study demonstrates that coalition agreements are written to contain policy drift and that it is directly related to the degree of hierarchy in the cabinet. It studies the factors that affect the likelihood of a coalition agreement being written and how extensive they are, if written. Among these are the ideological diversity found in the cabinet, the use of alternative methods for controlling ministers and the complexity of the bargaining situation.     

The Coalition and the Politics of the English Question

For much of the 2010–15 Parliament the English Question was not a conspicuous feature of political debate in the UK. However, the issue of English votes for English laws (EvfEl) was thrust to centre stage by Prime Minister David Cameron in the aftermath of the Scottish independence referendum, when he announced that fulfilment of the promise of further devolution to Scotland must be accompanied by an answer to the West Lothian Question at Westminster. This article analyses these events and explores their possible consequences. It argues that a reform of parliamentary procedures along the lines outlined in the report of the McKay Commission looks increasingly likely, but that this will not mark a resolution of the broader English Question, and the future of the Union remains in doubt.     

Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory

For decades theorizing about party competition in two-party and multiparty democracies has proceeded along separate tracks. The former has assumed an idealized world in which one party wins full control of a system's governing institutions in a first-past-the-post election, while the latter posits a world in which elections conducted under a system of proportional representation split control of the parliament among the parties. The contemporary American experience with divided government suggests that the two lines of theorizing greatly exaggerate the differences between two-party and multi-party systems. Where a two-party system has a separation of powers based on independent elections, coalition governments involving shared control of the separate institutions may result. Under such conditions rational voting may be just as demanding in two-party systems as in multi-party systems, and the policy outputs of two-party systems may be no more coherent than the outputs of multi-party systems, contrary to traditional arguments.