Primed by the Euro: The Impact of a Referendum Campaign on Public Opinion and Evaluations of Government and Political Leaders

The premise of political priming is that public evaluations of political leaders are made on the basis of issues that are on the top of citizens' minds. This study investigated the impact of a national referendum campaign about a European integration issue on the evaluation of the incumbent government, the prime minister, and the opposition leaders. Drawing on a content analysis of news media and a two-wave panel survey, the results showed that as the topic of the referendum (the introduction of the euro) became more visible in the media during the campaign the importance of the euro issue for formulating general evaluations of political leaders increased. The incumbent government that was seen to handle the referendum poorly was penalized by the referendum. Exposure to news media outlets that covered the referendum extensively and offered negative evaluations of political leaders boosted the decline in the overall performance rating of political leaders by politically less involved respondents. These results stress the necessity of considering the campaign and the specific content of the media to understand fluctuations in public opinion during a referendum campaign. The study concludes with a discussion of the implications of a referendum campaign for political leaders.     

History Trumps Government Unpopularity: The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum

This analysis explains why Poles voted overwhelmingly to join the EU and how the 50% turnout requirement was achieved fairly easily. It argues that most Poles appeared to accept the historical significance of the referendum and de-coupled the issue of EU membership from that of confidence in an extremely unpopular government. This occurred because most key political and social actors, including the opposition parties, called for a Yes vote, while, at the same time, a vigorous campaign by pro-EU civic organisations presented a ‘non-political’ face to the campaign. Although the No camp made tactical errors and had difficulties staying focused on its main arguments, lack of both access to the public media and a convincing or attractive alternative made it extremely difficult for them to mount an effective campaign. At the same time, the stability of the opinion polls in the years leading up to the referendum suggested that most Poles had already made their minds up about the issue well in advance. In spite of the low levels of trust in political parties, partisan cues appeared to be a better predictor of referendum voting behaviour than socio-economic and demographic factors.     

Support for Earmarked Public Spending on Culture: Evidence from a Referendum in Metropolitan Detroit

Using the precinct‐level voting results of a 2002 referendum in Metropolitan Detroit to increase property taxes, with the proceeds earmarked for cultural institutions, this paper inquires into the pattern of voting support for an increased public funding of culture. The estimation matches voting precincts to census tracts, and employs tract‐level economic and demographic data. Results are compared with public opinion survey data from the United States and a similar referendum in Switzerland.     

Security, Capacity and Post-Market Reforms: Public Management Change in 2003

Public sector change in 2003 was a product of external demands and internal pressures for improvement. The specific areas addressed are responses to security threats in the international environment; strengthening internal capacity, particularly through whole-of-government approaches; and fine-tuning the public management model in part through readjustments to the centre-agency relationship and greater emphasis on horizontal structures and processes.
This is the ninth year an administrative essay has been published in the journal since 1996. Earlier chronicles include: J. Stewart 55(1) 1996; S. Prasser 56(1) 1997; J. Homeshaw 57(3) 1998; J. Moon 58(2) 1999; J. Curtin 59(1) 2000; C. Broughton and J. Chalmers 60(1) 2001; N. Miragliotta 61(1) 2002; and J. Nettercote 62(1) 2003.
In this issue two chronicles are published — the first, by John Halligan and Jill Adams, focuses on external security and internal capacity building. The second assessment by Scott Prasser takes a different view of compliant management, poor decisions and reactive change.     

The 1994 EU Referendum in Norway: Continuity and Change

In the 1994 EU referendum a majority of Norwegian voters rejected membership in the European Union. The outcome contrasts with victories for membership in the corresponding referendums in Austria, Finland and Sweden. The article reports a preliminary investigation of factors relating to the support for "no". Analysis of aggregate data (representing 435 municipalities) and survey data demonstrates the importance of traditional cleavages as well as new cleavages for the vote. The no-vote was strongest in northern Norway, among supporters of the traditional "counter-cultures" and among those employed in the primary sector. Women were more likely to vote no as were public sector employees. The major parties took relatively clear stands on the issue, and we find that party identification shows a strong correlation with the vote in the referendum. With a turnout of 89 percent, the 1994 referendum represents an all-time high for elections in Norway. Compared with the previous referendum on the EC in 1972, we find that the increase in mobilization was particularly strong in the no-dominated periphery, but the shift in mobilization patterns was not decisive for the outcome of the referendum.     

Keeping them Honest: Public and Elite Perceptions of Ethical Conduct among Australian Legislators

Public confidence in politicians across all democratic countries has fallen to historic lows in recent years. In Australia, around one in three voters believe that legislators use their public office for financial gain, and only one in four believe that legislators have a high moral code. Governments in many countries have attempted to deal with this problem by establishing codes of ethical conduct for legislators. This paper examines what standards citizens expect from their politicians and, in turn, what standards politicians themselves regard as important. The data come from the 1996 Australian Election Study survey which asked voters and elected representatives what importance they attributed to the eight principles laid out in the federal parliament's own ethical guide. The results show that voters expect higher standards from legislators than do legislators themselves, particularly with regard to the proper use of public resources and rejecting favouritism. A range of hypotheses are tested to account for citizen and elite beliefs about legislators' ethical conduct. The results show that stronger democratic culture and political skills are important for the public, and lengthy exposure to political parties and democratic institutions for the elite.     

The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions

An established line of research demonstrates that vague judicial opinions are less likely to be implemented than clear opinions. Vague opinions thus present a puzzle. Why would judges craft opinions that risk noncompliance? We argue that the relationships between judges and other policy makers in separation‐of‐powers systems are central to understanding this puzzle. Opinion vagueness can reflect efforts to resolve core tradeoffs associated with judicial policymaking that bear some resemblance to standard accounts of political delegation. Vagueness offers judges the ability to manage their uncertainty over policy outcomes and to hide likely defiance from public view. At the same time, vagueness removes a central source of pressure for compliance that judges can place on other policy makers. Using a game‐theoretic model, we identify conditions under which judges use vagueness precisely as legislatures use statutory discretion. We also demonstrate conditions under which judges use vagueness in ways unanticipated by standard delegation accounts.     

Referendum Design: An Exercise in Applied Social Choice Theory

The formal status of the referendum institution in democratic system varies from consultative and optional to mandatory and binding. Despit the formal status, it can be argued that in all systems the legislators can hardly ignore the referendum results. The article presents two arguments: (1) The results of social choice theory suggest that the number of alternatives in referenda should to be restricted to two in order to a void severe problems of interpretation and agenda manipulation. (2) The consultative referendum system may lead to quite dramatic norm conflicts for both legislators and voters. Taken together, these two arguments imply that referenda are appropriate only in cases where there is natural way to dichotomize the issue at hand. Moreover, whenever a referendum is called, its result should be binding.     

Implementation from Above: The Ecology of Power in Sweden's Environmental Governance

This paper seeks to assess the tenability of Rhodes' view of the "new governance" as "governing without government," as well as the validity of Pierre and Peters' assertions that the state is still at the center of structures and processes of governance. The case used for analysis is Sweden's ecological modernization and the implementation of Local Investment Programs for Sustainable Development. This case provides a crucial test of the contradictory propositions of Rhodes and Pierre and Peters. Contrary to Rhodes' assertions, central government held the initiative in the process of implementing Sweden's ecological modernization. In line with the arrguments of Pierre and Peters central government created new structures and processes of governance to keep its initiative over constitutionally independent expert agencies and municipal governments—exactly those actors that, in Rhodes' view, could make central governmental steering well nigh impossible. As the paper illustrates, what government gains in direct control over the process, it may well lose in terms of the end results. The case of "new governance" analyzed here thus directs attention to the critical interplay between structure, process, and end results, and to government's role in governance.     

Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence

This paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors. Thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying. We show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying, when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross-price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high. The empirical evidence from the U.S.supports the theory. Greater collusionreduces the level of PAC contributions.     

The Politics of European Referendum Outcomes and Turnout: Two Models

This survey briefly examines the EU accession process for the countries included in this collection and considers the distinctive features of this set of referendums, particularly the comparatively high levels of Yes vote and low levels of turnout. It argues that, although they represent a distinctive sub-type of European referendum, they can be used as a basis to draw at least tentative comparative and theoretical conclusions. Consequently, it then posits causal models that both provide an analytical framework for this collection and, more broadly, attempt to explain the results and turnout in these and, potentially, other (European) referendums.     

Reclaiming Politics: Popular Democracy in Britain after the Scottish Referendum

Referendums are often criticised for being elite‐controlled and undeliberative. This article argues that the detailed, multiactor regulation of the Scottish referendum resulted in an elaborate legal regime which helped to overcome these potential pathologies, diluting executive control and facilitating an exercise in national public engagement. It addresses the troubled history of referendum use in the UK and contends that the Scottish process may well transform how referendums are now viewed. Indeed, one outcome of the Scottish process is likely to be a greater demand at UK level for the use of direct democracy in processes of significant constitutional change. It is by no means certain, however, that these demands for greater popular engagement in the process of constitutional change will be met, particularly when we consider the Smith Commission process, which marks a return to elite interparty bargaining.     

Inside Moves and Outside Views: An Australian Case Study of Elite and Public Perceptions of Political Corruption

The search for a definition of political corruption that adequately captures the nuances of governmental activity has been a long one. This article defends social or attitudinal definitions of corruption against some recent criticisms. It examines the value of Arnold Heidenheimer's widely cited distinctions among "black,""gray," and "white" corruption using empirical evidence from an interview study of over 100 Australian politicians and 500 voters. The results show that the broad dimensions of corruption — the official, the donor, the payoff, and the favor — identified by John Peters and Susan Welch affect the views of both politicians and voters alike.
Nonetheless, elites and the public come to judgments from different perspectives, and they judge some acts differently. Put another way, some corruption is gray. Politicians judge actions more subtly than do voters, who are more likely to see corruption in all acts. As Michael Johnston has suggested, the different experiences of political insiders and outsiders explain this disparity in their moral outlooks. Insiders are socialized to see at least some actions as functional and therefore not corrupt. Outsiders, unaware of the insiders' rules, tend to judge political action by moral absolutes. Thus the structure of liberal democratic government contributes to conflicting elite and public views of political right and wrong.     

Social Change and Moral Politics: the Irish Constitutional Referendum 1983

The dominance of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland has been challenged by rapid socioeconomic change. To counter emerging secularist trends, anti-abortion activists pressurized the political parties to agree to hold a referendum for a constitutional amendment to ban abortion. Opposition to the referendum, and party divisions, led to the active involvement by the Catholic Church and the hierarchy in the campaign. Although the amendment was passed, the intervention of the Church has not been beneficial to it as an institution. This is the first time since the establishment of the Irish state that a significant cleavage has emerged around a religious issue. The referendum reflected a change in Irish politics—new divisions had emerged, based on age, class, religion and place of residence. This change is now having an impact on the political parties.     

Europeanisation,Public Goals and Group Interests: Convergence Policy in Greece, 1990-2003

After prolonged stagnation in the 1980s and early 1990, Greece during the past decade or so has experienced a change from its post-war statist economic policy paradigm towards a liberal model. Focusing on political and political-economic aspects, this article gives an account of the reform of state interventionism in the 1990s. Different hypotheses are consistent with explaining distinct aspects of this policy change. The general interest and Europeanisation hypotheses are mainly borne out by macroeconomic stabilisation measures, but they cannot explain failure or delay in structural adjustment. The latter are better understood on the basis of public choice institutionalism and approaches emphasising uncertainty.     

Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis

Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms—uniform and discriminatory price sealed‐bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).© 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.