From Class Party to Catchall Party?: The Adaptation of the Finnish Agrarian-Center Party

This article seeks to apply Kirchheimer’s ‘catchall party thesis’ to the transformation of the Agrarian-Center Party in Finland. On at least two counts this might seem a hopeless endeavor. First, Kirchheimer excluded most parties in the smaller West European democracies like Finland from his analysis on the curious grounds that they either had effective majorities or regular access to power and, therefore, had no need of catchall strategies. Second, he expressly excluded certain parties, including significantly Agrarian parties, from his purview because they were too narrowly based to become catchall parties. Kirchheimer also asserts that in general only major parties could successfully achieve a ‘life-saving transformation.’ The Finnish Agrarian Party was certainly that. In the early 1960s, it was the largest single party, with a substantial classe gardée, and was also the pivotal party of governing coalitions. Accordingly, this article addresses three interrelated questions: a) Why did the Finnish Agrarians seek catchall status? b) What were the catchall strategies they pursued? c) Has an archetypal mass-class party, contrary to Kirchheimer’s submission, been able to extend the basis of its support to become a catchall party? It is argued that although the Center Party today exhibits the electoral attributes of the catchall party – and is the only Finnish party really to do so – it lacks the organizational characteristics of the genre as enumerated by Kirchheimer.     

Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the “system of 1955”

The Liberal Democratic Party continuously held an absolute majority in the Japanese Lower House, under the Gojyûgonen taisei (System of 1955), from its founding in 1955 until its break-up and temporary fall from power in 1993. Until 1989, it also had a majority in the Upper House. Unlike the Italian DC, the Japanese dominant party never formally entered into coalition with another party — except for a single minor occurrence¹. Despite this continuity at one level, 15 different prime ministers presided over 48 Japanese cabinets formed between 1955 and 1993, whose average duration was 9.4 months. The re-allotment of all cabinet portfolios and party posts took place every year with a metronomic regularity and these realignments were fully-fledged exercises in coalition-building even though only one party was involved. This cabinet instability has provided evidence for the view that the LDP surrendered both policy- and decision-making power to the bureaucracy. But, since the LDP clung to the practice of yearly cabinet reshuffles rather than remedying this by simply changing the party constitution, the consequent weakening of the executive power cannot have been seen as having imposed a heavy cost. And, since the LDP held onto power for such a long time, it is obvious that this cost was successfully managed. The purpose of this paper is to treat the one-party Gojyûgonen taisei system as an important case study for coalition theory, relaxing the assumption of the LDP as an unitary actor and considering the party as a political system in its own right.     

The activists decide: the preferences of party activists in the 2016 presidential nominations

ABSTRACT

One view of presidential nominations in the United States [Steger, Wayne P. 2007. “Who Wins Presidential Nominations and Why: An Updated Forecast of the Presidential Primary Vote.” Presidential Research Quarterly 60: 91–97; Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Silver, Nate. 2016. “The Republican Party May Be Failing.” FiveThirtyEight. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-republican-party-may-be-failing/] claims that the support of political elites is causally related to success in the nomination. The mechanisms for this relationship include party activists, who follow the cues party leaders send and provide necessary support to candidates in primaries and caucuses. This mechanism has not been explicitly tested. This paper explores the preferences of party activists in light of the unified elite preferences among Democrats and the lack of such unity among Republicans. Some activists in each party resist the signals from elites, but the resistance is far less widespread in the Democratic Party, where party leaders exhibited consensus support for the eventual nominee.     

Leadership change, legitimacy, and party transition in China

Using Max Weber’s theory of legitimacy and transition, this article suggests that the biggest challenge for China’s new leadership is to transform the Communist Party into an institutionalized ruling party. After analyzing the scenarios of democratization, legitimation, decay, or repression, resulting from the interactions between public contention and the ruling elite, this article argues that the CCP has accomplished the transition from a revolutionary to a reformist party but is now somewhere between claiming to “govern for the people” and “hanging on to power.” To become an institutionalized ruling party, the CCP needs to curtail official corruption and control its membership growth. There are, however, some serious political and personal limitations that China’s new leaders will have to overcome. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Yale University in 1988 and 1992 respectively. He has been a visiting scholar at Harvard University, research fellow at the Salzburg Seminar in Austria, and a visiting senior fellow at the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore. His research interests include Chinese political institutions and leadership changes, theories of international relations, Taiwan-Strait relations, and U.S.-China relations. He is the author ofParty vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma (Cambridge University Press, 1997). The author wishes to thank John Watt, Joshua Forrest and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on the draft version of this article.     

Party Identification and Core Political Values

Party identification and core political values are central elements in the political belief systems of ordinary citizens. Are these predispositions related to one another? Does party identification influence core political values or are partisan identities grounded in such values? This article draws upon theoretical works on partisan information processing and value‐based reasoning to derive competing hypotheses about whether partisanship shapes political values or political values shape partisanship. The hypotheses are tested by using structural equation modeling techniques to estimate dynamic models of attitude stability and constraint with data from the 1992–94–96 National Election Study panel survey. The analyses reveal that partisan identities are more stable than the principles of equal opportunity, limited government, traditional family values, and moral tolerance; party identification constrains equal opportunity, limited government, and moral tolerance; and these political values do not constrain party identification.     

The ‘Hows’, not the ‘Whys’ or the ‘Wherefores’: The Role of Intra‐party Competition in the 2011 Breakthrough of the True Finns

From minor party status, the True Finn Party (PS) claimed nearly one‐fifth of the vote and almost the same proportion of parliamentary seats at the April 2011 Finnish general election. It registered the largest gains made by any party in postwar Finnish history, thus writing – in the eyes of foreign journalists at least – yet another chapter in the surge of populist radical right parties across contemporary Europe. This article, however, is concerned more with how the substantial PS vote was mobilised than with how much was mobilised. The idea is not to identify the primary causes of the PS's national breakthrough, but to explore the internal dynamics of party's explosive growth and the process of translating a large prospective vote into ‘hard votes’ through the ballot boxes. The focus is on district‐level nomination strategies, the range of candidate types, the mechanics of vote optimisation and the distribution of the personal vote. With regard to the latter, the article seeks to measure and analyse the role of intra‐party competition in the anatomy of party transformation and to do so by the novel means of adapting the Laakso‐Taagepera index to measure the ‘effective number of co‐partisans’. Significantly, at the 2011 Eduskunta election the PS exhibited the highest level of intra‐party competition of any of the eight parliamentary parties.     

The 2019 Portuguese general elections

Abstract

The 2019 Portuguese general elections have led to the formation of another minority government of the Socialist Party. Right-wing parties suffered a resounding defeat. The election had two key consequences. First, after four years of contract parliamentarism with an extreme-left party, the Socialists returned to their historical position of pivotal party in the system. Socialist leader Costa refused to replicate alliances with parties to his left. Second, the 2019 election witnessed the emergence of three new parties, Chega, Iniciativa Liberal and Livre. The election of Chega marks a watershed moment in Portuguese democratic history, as for the first time an extreme-right populist party has gained representation in the country.     

How has Radical Right Support Transformed Established Political Conflicts? The Case of Austria

In many European party systems, the radical right has challenged established patterns of political competition. This article studies the consequences of this by using the case of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and data from Austria’s first national election study (AUTNES). It is found that the FPÖ has weakened Austria’s previously highly stable system of socio-structural and ideological divisions as expressed by the two mainstream parties, the People’s Party and the Social Democrats. In socio-structural terms, the FPÖ has undermined the Social Democrats’ support base. In ideological terms, FPÖ voters have distinct views on newer issues such as immigration, European integration and dissatisfaction with the political system, but its supporters’ views on Austria’s traditional conflicts surrounding the economy and social and religious values cannot explain the party’s success. These findings further our understanding of the transformation of political conflicts not just in Austria, but in Western Europe in general.     

Dominant Party Strategy and Democratization

How do incumbent parties strategize against challengers when a new partisan cleavage cuts across the incumbent's electoral coalition? This article argues that a two‐dimensional extension of Riker's anticoordination thesis conflicts with Downsian extensions. It shows that when voters coordinate on a single challenger based on their shared preference on a cross‐cutting cleavage, a vote‐maximizing incumbent party should move away from the challenger on the primary dimension of competition, even at the risk of abandoning the center. The article develops this hypothesis with reference to dominant parties in competitive authoritarian regimes where challenger parties constantly attempt “heresthetical” moves by mobilizing regime issues into the partisan debate, and it tests the predictions with an original sample survey of national leaders of Mexico's Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI). It also spells out the implications of the findings for dominant party survivability in democratic transitions and, more broadly, for incumbents' spatial strategies in the face of new partisan cleavages.     

Federal Political Fragmentation in Mexico's 2015 Elections

The 2015 congressional, gubernatorial and mayoral elections in Mexico display the continuation of political changes that started 15 years ago. The most notorious change in 2015 is the electoral success of non-mainstream parties, which have increased their vote share vis-à-vis the mainstream parties, the Party of National Action (PAN), the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), and the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD). These mainstream parties lost important vote shares, although the PRI has shown itself to be more resilient to electoral volatility than the other parties. The increase of volatility in Mexico favours the alternation of the parties in power; however, it also increases political fragmentation. This article argues that in a context of growing electoral volatility and political fragmentation, presidential authority is weakened, giving rise to the dispersion of power to other levels of government. Furthermore, the article suggests that party volatility presents important territorial variation in Mexico.     

Shooting the fox? UKIP’s populism in the post-Brexit era

Abstract

The UK Independence Party (UKIP) has moved from being a single-issue party par excellence to a broader party of protest, taking advantage of wider feelings of discontent and disconnection. However, the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the EU fundamentally challenged its development and operation, by removing a core part of the party’s rationale and identity, and radically shifting the overall political landscape. This paper considers the re-positioning through the referendum period, both rhetorically and organisationally. Drawing on party press releases and media coverage, the paper argues that UKIP has become caught in a set of multiple transformations, pushing it in the longer term towards a more conventionally populist position in a way that carries important resonances for other Eurosceptic parties across the continent.     

Simulation Analysis of the Effect of Party Identification on Finnish Parties' Optimal Positions

The Finnish National Election Study of 2003 revealed that most voters in Finland do not identify with parties and are self‐described as independents. In this article it is asserted that partisan attachments affect Finnish parties' optimal positions despite the large amount of independents. To show this, the article is divided in two parts. In the first part, voters' decisions are assumed to be deterministic. To show the effect of party identification under deterministic voting, two different types of simulations are conducted: the partisan type, where the partisans' voting behaviour depends on their distance from the party and on a degree of partisan attachment, and the apartisan type, where voting behaviour depends solely on policy issue distance. Results show that partisan attachments drive parties to adopt different ‘one‐off’ optimal positions than they would if party competition was solely based on policy issue distance. In the second part of the article, it is assumed that voters' decisions are probabilistic. Upon showing that party identification makes a voting model solely based on distance significantly more fit, the predicted probabilities of party choice are computed. Results indicate that the probability that a voter will vote for a party is higher when the party is located at its optimal position according to the partisan type of simulations rather than the apartisan one.     

Reconsidering Nordic Party Space1

The erosion of the social and economic bases underlying traditional party systems has led analysts to search for new cleavage structures undergirding the present party systems. Meanwhile, analysts have identified a range of issue dimensions that also bear on voters’ party preferences. This article studies the degree to which grid-group theory's four political biases of hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism can make inroads into the left–right dimension's stronghold in accounting for voters’ party preference. The analysis draws on a 1999 survey in the five Nordic countries (N= 4,832). The method combines voters’ party preferences with their scores on issue dimensions, or political dimensions. Analyses show that conventional party families, with one exception, are not identified along any of the five political orientations. Only the five conservative parties are exclusively identified as a party family on the left–right dimension. Party preference is more closely associated with the left–right dimension than the political biases. Sweden has the purest and simplest party cleavage, whereas Denmark has the most composite one. Across the Nordic countries, the green party family is most dissimilar, whereas the progress siblings are most alike. The left–right dimension accounts well for differences between parties within polities, whereas political biases, and egalitarianism in particular, account well for differences between parties of similar origin across polities.     

The Erosion of Party Politics in Britain

This article looks at the erosion of democratic practice enacted by "New" Labour in Britain under the leadership of Tony Blair. Building on the internal reforms of the 1980s, the process of Labour Party "modernization" has created an exclusive, top-down managerial style of leadership. This type of party leadership and management has far-reaching implications for British politics more generally, not least the role of political parties. The current crisis of the Conservatives and the destruction of representative democracy within the Labour Party pose serious questions regarding the medium-term future of parties as voluntary membership organizations. These changes are placed in the context of a possible longer-term transformation of British political structures in order to exchange the long-established administration of the Conservative Party for a new type of governmental machinery. The aim is not a new "traditional" party of government, but a partyless formation built around a dominant central presidential figure and his office—a change which necessitates abolishing the Labour Party and social democracy as they currently exist. It is argued that this anticipated remedy to a protracted crisis of the British state accords closely to the requirements of neoliberal economic management, while drawing upon developments in the wider global environment. However, if this is to succeed, Blair's "modernizing" tendency needs to be able to articulate a coherent ideology that strikes a popular chord. Thus far, Blair's managerial approach to politics may have scored a few points against the old party ideologies, but it has also undermined attempts to promote an alternative ideology—even one of a "partyless" nature.     

New Panthers,old Panthers and the politics of black nationalism in the United States

ABSTRACT

The New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense has been a cause du scandale since it was formed in the early 1990s. Indeed, the Anti-Defamation League has described it as ‘the largest organized anti-Semitic and racist black militant group in America’. It is somewhat surprising, then, that there has been very little detailed analysis of the party and its activities. Mulloy begins to fill this gap by outlining the origins and development of the party, and by closely examining the ongoing dispute between the New Black Panthers and surviving members of the original Black Panther Party—established by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale in Oakland, California in 1966—over the right to claim the name, the history and the legacy of the Panthers in the United States. Critically assessing the strategies and actions of the New Black Panthers, Mulloy argues that its high-profile, media-centred approach to political activism has largely been a failure with regard to its overall aim of reviving the Black Power movement in the United States.     

Performance of political parties in the 2016 parliamentary election in Slovakia: regional comparisons and district-level determinants

This paper explores the results of the 2016 parliamentary election in the Slovak Republic, with a special emphasis on the regional aspects of participating political parties’ election campaigns. It summarizes the election results for the country as a whole, as well as separately by region. An empirical analysis of party electoral performance at the district level suggests that the incumbent Smer party tended to do well in districts with higher rates of unemployment and a lower proportion of university-educated population. Similar patterns hold for the Slovak ethnic nationalist Slovak National Party and the far-right People’s Party Our Slovakia. By contrast, the two parties that presented themselves as being starkly opposed to the Smer government’s policies—Freedom and Solidarity and Ordinary People and Independent Personalities—exhibit greater support in districts with more university-educated voters and lower unemployment rates.     

Four worlds of morality politics: the impact of institutional venues and party cleavages

The most prominent theory accounting for variation of morality politics across Western Europe is the so-called Two Worlds framework. According to this approach, the presence or absence of a secular?religious cleavage in national party systems strongly affects the degree of conflict intensity and the framing of morality policy issues. This article shows that the explanatory power of the Two Worlds model could be enhanced significantly by introducing a second analytical dimension that captures the institutional venue (party politics vs. parliamentary politics), in which moral conflicts take place. This is useful because there are instances in which a religious cleavage is lacking, but moral conflicts are nonetheless highly intense and party-based (the traditionalist world), and there are cases in which the religious cleavage formally exists, but moral conflicts are nonetheless resolved in the parliamentary arena (the unsecular world).     

加强企业基层组织和党员队伍建设实践研究

高楼大厦只有根基稳固,才能经受住狂风暴雨和自然灾害的侵害。中国共产党能长期成为执政党,就是因为我们党始终把根扎在基层,不断加强对基层权力点的控制和管理。我们党在革命初期就把党支部建在连上,这不是一时的随意,是共产党第一代领导人的智慧所在,深知党指挥枪的重要性,才使共产党从小到大,由弱到强,并领导人民建立了新中国。     

Left behind: The social democratic party in Eastern Germany

Four long‐term structural complications have prevented the Social Democratic Party of Germany from establishing a large party membership in eastern Germany since unification: the injurious legacy of Nazi and communist rule, the contradictions that arose in the 1980s out of the SPD's Ostpolitik, the flawed birth and development of the eastern SPD, and continuing tensions between the eastern and western wings of the party. Since none of these structural problems is likely to change quickly, the SPD will remain impaired in the East for the foreseeable future. This in turn will make it extremely difficult for the SPD to win federal elections.     

Party Sub-Brands and American Party Factions

Scholars and pundits have long noted the dominance of the American two-party system, but we know relatively little about new, endogenous institutions that have emerged within the two major parties. I argue that ideological factions provide party sub-brands, which allow legislators to more precisely define their partisan type and capture faction-specific resources. To support this claim, I analyze new data on nine ideological factions in the House of Representatives (1995–2018). I find that (1) faction voting is distinct, suggesting a product ripe for party sub-branding, and (2) joining a faction changes the ideological composition of a candidate's donor base—conditional on the strength of the faction's institutions. Party sub-branding is effective only when factions possess organizational features that induce coordinated and disciplined position taking (e.g., whips, PACs, membership restrictions). These results suggest that, even within highly polarized parties, American political ideology is more than a dichotomous choice, and factions target niche markets of political donors as a means of blunting financial instruments of party power.