Party patronage in contemporary democracies: Results from an expert survey in 22 countries from five regions

This Research Note presents a new dataset of party patronage in 22 countries from five regions. The data was collected using the same methodology to compare patterns of patronage within countries, across countries and across world regions that are usually studied separately. The Note addresses three research questions that are at the centre of debates on party patronage, which is understood as the power of political parties to make appointments to the public and semi‐public sector: the scope of patronage, the underlying motivations and the criteria on the basis of which appointees are selected. The exploration of the dataset shows that party patronage is, to a different degree, widespread across all regions. The data further shows differences between policy areas, types of institutions such as government ministries, agencies and state‐owned enterprises, and higher, middle and lower ranks of the bureaucracy. It is demonstrated that the political control of policy making and implementation is the most common motivation for making political appointments. However, in countries with a large scope of patronage, appointments serve the purpose of both political control and rewarding supporters in exchange for votes and services. Finally, the data shows that parties prefer to select appointees who are characterised by political and personal loyalty as well as professional competence.     

Issue salience in regional party manifestos in Spain

Abstract.  This article analyses the dynamics of electoral competition in a multilevel setting. It is based on a content analysis of the party manifestos of the Spanish PP and PSOE in eight regional elections held between 2001 and 2003. It provides an innovative coding scheme for analysing regional party manifestos and on that basis seeks to account for inter-regional, intra-party and inter-party differences in regional campaigning. The authors have tried to explain the inter-regional variation of the issue profiles of state-wide parties in regional elections on the basis of a model with four independent variables: the asymmetric nature of the system, the electoral cycle, the regional party systems and the organisation of the state-wide parties. Three of their hypotheses are rejected, but the stronger variations in the regional issue profiles of the PSOE corroborate the assumption that parties with a more decentralised party organisation support regionally more diverse campaigning. The article concludes by offering an alternative explanation for this finding and by suggesting avenues for further research.     

Was erklärt politische Patronage in den Ländern Westeuropas? Defizite des politischen Wettbewerbs oder historisch-formative Phasen der Massendemokratisierung

Every major paradigm in the social sciences since the 1950s has offered its own explanation for the varying incidence of party patronage and political clientelism in modern democracies. Today the two main contenders are (RC-based) positive political economy and historical institutionalism. Positive political economy emphasizes the crucial importance of effective political competition as a control device against the ever present temptation for politicians to use ‘improper political practices’ like patronage or clientelism. Historical institutionalism highlights the importance of formative moments in the history of democratic mass mobilization and party formation. The article argues that both approaches suffer from considerable weaknesses. The article proposes a modified historical-institutionalist explanation, which emphasizes the importance of state formation rather than party formation and which explains varying degrees and different forms of political patronage in Europe with different paths of modern state-building.     

What do Parties Want? Policy versus Office

What parties want – policy, office or votes – affects how they represent their voters, make strategic decisions and respond to external changes in society. What parties strive to accomplish is crucially important for what they do. Moreover, our knowledge of what parties want affects what we expect them to do. For instance, coalition theory assumes that parties have homogeneous goals, and hence are equally likely to join coalitions given the same circumstances. However, this article investigates this basic assumption of party goal homogeneity and finds that party goals do indeed diverge. The article demonstrates that party goals are influenced by party-specific factors such as party size, policy position and intra-party politics. It therefore suggests, further, that intra-party politics should be included more systematically in future studies of party behaviour.     

Party performance explains disagreement between politicians and their parties

Are politicians more likely to disagree with their party after an electoral defeat or during a spell in opposition? If so, are they likely to advocate a more moderate or a more radical position than their party? In order to evaluate this, the article analyses the absolute distance between candidates for parliament and their parties on the left–right dimension. The sample used consists of 5614 politicians from 11 countries (Comparative Candidate Survey). Controlling for party system differences and individual characteristics, the results demonstrate that politicians take more moderate positions than their party after an electoral defeat. Also politicians of government parties are surprisingly more likely to disagree than politicians of opposition parties. These results overlap with predictions of party position shifts and inform the discussion on how intra-party dynamics bring about changes in party position. In addition, the article finds evidence of loss aversion, and differences in the responsiveness of elite and non-elite candidates.     

Intra-Party Democracy and Party Responsiveness

This study examines whether parties respond to their supporters or to the median voter position. Party leaders require the support of the ‘selectorate’, which is defined as the group that has influence in party leadership selection. Inclusive parties, which rely on rank-and-file membership to select their leaders, will respond to their members. Exclusive parties, which rely on office-seeking members for leadership selection, will respond to the median voter position. Thus, intra-party institutions that (dis)enfranchise party members are crucial for understanding whether a party responds to their supporters (or to the median voter position). Using data from 1975–2003 for six West European countries, this article reports findings that inclusive parties respond to the mean party supporter position. While there is evidence that exclusive parties respond to the median voter position in two-party systems, this finding does not extend to multiparty systems. This study has implications for the understanding of intra-party institutions and political representation.     

Locating parties, factions and ministers in a policy space: a contribution to understanding the party-policy link

Abstract. The article examines approaches to the study of the party-policy link and argues that two generally held assumptions - the unidimensionality of party political conflict and the party as unitary actor - should be treated as matters for empirical dedermination rather than a priori assumption. Having briefly reviewed interpretations of dimensionality in the Irish party system, the article puts forward an empirical approach to both issues based on multidimensional scaling of preference data from a sample of parliamentarians. The results of the application of such an approach in the Irish case indicate at least a two dimensional policy space and considerable intra-party factionalism. This evidence is then used to interpret the party-policy link in three areas: capital taxation, abortion and divorce, and Northern Ireland policy.     

Locating power in party leader selection

In this article, the aim is to enhance our understanding of who has power over leader selection in political parties. To this end, we apply an analytical framework in which the selection process is divided into three phases: gatekeeping, preparation and decision. The focus is on determining the extent to which each of these phases is influential for the outcome and thereby locating the distribution of intra-party power. Underpinning the analysis is the conviction that the comparison of leader selection is too limited if it relies solely on information about formal procedures, including the composition of the selectorate. We should also take the preselection phase of leader selection into account. Empirically, we examine a sample of recent selection processes in European parliamentary democracies. In contrast to previous research on intra-party politics, which has suggested an ascendancy of the party in public office, our results suggest an enduring strength of the party on the ground and the party in the central office.     

Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi‐presidential democracies compared

Control over government portfolios is the key to power over policy and patronage, and it is commonly understood to lie with parties in European democracies. However, since the democratic transitions of the 1990s, Europe has had nearly equal numbers of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, and there is evidence that the ability of parties to control government posts in these two regime types differs. As yet, political scientists have a limited understanding of the scale and causes of these differences. In this article a principal-agent theoretical explanation is proposed. Data are examined on 28 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies in Europe that shows that differences in party control over government portfolios cannot be understood without reference to the underlying principal-agent relationships between voters, elected politicians and governments that characterise Europe's semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes.     

Who talks about what? Issue strategies across the party hierarchy

We combine the recent literature on issue competition with work on intra-party heterogeneity to advance a novel theoretical argument. Starting from the premise that party leaders and non-leaders have different motivations and incentives, we conjecture that issue strategies should vary across the party hierarchy. We, therefore, expect systematic intra-party differences in the use of riding the wave and issue ownership strategies. We test this claim by linking public opinion data to manually coded information on over 3600 press releases issued by over 500 party actors across five election campaigns in Austria between 2006 and 2019. We account for self-selection into leadership roles by exploiting transitions into and out of leadership status over time. The results show that party leaders are more likely than non-leaders to respond to the public's issue priorities, but not more or less likely to pursue issue-ownership strategies.     

Towards a professional civil service in post‐transition Romania

To what degree and under what conditions can a young democracy build a competent, politically neutral public bureaucracy? A crucial component of the transition from communist party rule to democracy is the creation of a professional civil service. Success along this dimension of state‐building generates administrative capacity: non‐elected public officials ensure the implementation of reforms initiated by political leaders. In the communist party‐led regimes of Eastern Europe, forging this new administrative class from its highly politicised predecessor took place as new democracies sought to overcome historical legacies and integrate with the European Union. A case study of administrative reform in Romania during the post‐1989 period suggests the importance of external influences in forming a civil service more closely adhering to the Weberian ideal of an expert, rules‐based bureaucracy. Through analysis of survey data from a nationally representative sample of the Romanian civil servants, the public bureaucracy has professionalised insofar as educational and training credentials rather than political affiliation are significant predictors of salary levels. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Membership ballots and the value of intra-party democracy

On the face of it, membership ballots present a clear case in which intra-party democracy comes into collision with core principles of representative democracy: they weaken the autonomy of representatives, and undermine the authority of the voters. In this article, I investigate whether this is correct, and whether membership ballots are, therefore, democratically illegitimate, using the controversial 2013 Mitgliederentscheid in the German Social Democratic party as a critical case. I argue that there is nothing democratically suspect about membership ballots and mount a defence of intra-party democracy as intrinsically valuable, appealing to a principle of equal respect for persons as autonomous agents. It turns out that endorsing this principle has two possible implications: that the content of the ballot must be open to deliberation, and that these deliberations should be rendered open to non-members. I discuss these implications and offer some institutional design guidelines.     

Intra-Party Support for the Good Friday Agreement in the Ulster Unionist Party

Party organisations are often 'black boxes' overlooked by scholars in favour of party leaders, manifestos and elections. Yet intra-party dynamics are often crucial. This article uses the example of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) to illustrate this. Events in the 1998–2003 period highlight the importance of splits within the party's governing Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) over the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) which underpins the Northern Ireland peace process. This article pioneers the use of postcode-profiling technology and uses multi-level analysis of a UUC party list to show that delegates' party section provides the best predictor of their stance towards the Good Friday Agreement. Consequently, the article argues that delegate voting behaviour within the UUC is best explained by reference to highly embedded, meso-level institutions which perpetuate networks and condition individual preferences.     

The Internal Politics of Parties: The Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited

One of the few efforts to link systemic and organizational determinants of party strategies is provided by what John May dubbed the 'law of curvilinear disparity'. According to this law, voters, party activists and leaders have necessarily divergent political ideologies. These systematic differences are attributable to the activists' motivations and the constraints of party competition. This paper argues that the law is empirically valid only under distinctive behavioural, organizational and institutional conditions, which are not specified in its general formulation. Thus, the law is only a special case in a broader theory reconstructing the interaction between constituencies, intra-party politics and party competition. This alternative theory is partially tested with survey data from party activists in the Belgian ecology parties Agalev and Ecolo.     

Cracking the whip: the deliberative costs of strict party discipline

ABSTRACT

This article explores the deliberative costs incurred when political parties rely on strict discipline to attain unity. I begin with a brief discussion aimed at clarifying the notion of strict party discipline. The second section explores how such discipline affects the formation, expression and reception of dissenting views. In the third section, I go on to outline two approaches towards deliberation in Parliament: the epistemic approach and the political justification approach. I argue that the impact of strict party discipline on dissenting views entails costs on legislative deliberation conceptualised in either way. The fourth section highlights how intra-party deliberation could potentially mitigate the deliberative costs outlined in this article. Finally, I turn to the implications of my analysis for assessing party discipline, and then I take a closer look at the case of India’s anti-defection law, demonstrating why the deliberative costs outlined in this article are particularly severe there.     

The political and partisan determinants of patronage in Latin America 1960–1994: A comparative perspective

Abstract. Countries vary substantially in the level of political patronage exercised in their respective political systems. This article examines how hypotheses generated by the literature on economic, institutional-partisan and electoral factors account for variation in the level of political patronage in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Political patronage – operationalized as the proportion of spending on personnel to total spending, both at the central government and ministerial levels – is examined through a pooled cross-sectional time-series regression. Previous spending on personnel has the most consistent effect on political patronage, while the influence of political variables is more ambiguous. In contrast to conjectures that tie personalism and clientelism, it is shown that the presence of personalist parties in the legislature is negatively associated with patronage spending. Subsequently, the evolution of personnel expenditure in Argentina and Peru is traced, based on qualitative evidence and interview data.     

How European Integration Changes National Parties: Evidence from a 15-Country Study

This article examines the impact of European integration on the balance of power within national political parties. It does this by drawing on the results of a survey of key actors in up to 55 parties in the 15 pre-2004 enlargement member states. The analyses show that, when they are involved in EU-level decision-making, party elites are relatively powerful vis-à-vis their national parties and that in a number of instances their intra-party power has also increased over time. National parties have, to some extent, attempted to constrain their elites but appear to be fighting a losing battle. Although there are some minor differences by country and by party, the empowerment of party elites is a general phenomenon. This research provides an empirical dimension to the existing research on the Europeanisation of national political parties and presents an important substantiation of the widely discussed democratic deficit that exists within the EU system of governance.     

Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting

Almost all legislators are subordinate to party leadership within their assemblies. Institutional factors shape whether, and to what degree, legislators are also subject to pressure from other principals whose demands may conflict with those of party leaders. This article presents a set of hypotheses on the nature of competing pressures driven by formal political institutions and tests the hypotheses against a new dataset of legislative votes from across 19 different countries. Voting unity is lower where legislators are elected under rules that provide for intraparty competition than where party lists are closed, marginally lower in federal than unitary systems, and the effects on party unity of being in government differ in parliamentary versus presidential systems. In the former, governing parties are more unified than the opposition, win more, and suffer fewer losses due to disunity. In systems with elected presidents, governing parties experience no such boosts in floor unity, and their legislative losses are more apt to result from cross-voting.     

Bestimmungsgründe der Parteienvielfalt in den deutschen Bundesländern

Which factors are decisive for the extent of the legislative party fragmentation in the German Laender? While the institutional approach stresses the importance of the electoral design, the sociological theory considers the degree of heterogeneity within a society and the resulting cleavages the determining factors. In this article hypotheses are derived from both theories. The analysis of these hypotheses is based on aggregate data. It is shown that religious heterogeneity exerts the greatest influence on party fragmentation. Besides, factors of socio-economic modernisation matter while the only institutional variable of relevance is district magnitude.     

Why so few, and why so late? Green parties and the question of governmental participation

Abstract.  Green parties have been represented in the parliaments of European Union countries since 1981, but it was not until recently that a few have entered national governments. Using a data set comprised of 51 government formation opportunities (where the Greens were represented in parliament), the authors of this article show that the parties involved in these bargaining situations are more office-oriented than earlier studies had found. As Green parties are seen to be less office-seeking than other parties, this general tendency for office-seeking behaviour in government formation may partly account for the scarcity of Greens in government. Furthermore, a number of hypotheses derived from theories that account for the specific nature of Green parties in terms of their office-, policy- and vote-seeking orientations are tested. It is found that Greens participate in government when they have lost votes in at least one election, when the main party of the left identifies them as a clear electoral threat and when the policy distance between the Greens and either the formateur party or the main left party is small (the latter condition must be accompanied by a substantial proportion of seats for the Green party in parliament). As most of these simultaneous conditions only materialized recently, and in a few countries, it is argued that this analysis, which is the first comparative and multivariate test focused on this question, explains the scarcity and the delay of Green governmental participation.