Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining

Chief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well‐developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policymaking. To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength, as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election, are important determinants of the use and effectiveness of dissolution threats in policymaking. Analyzing an original time‐series data set from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, we find evidence in line with key empirical implications of the model.     

Models of Executive Politics: a Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi–presidential Regimes

The study of executives politics has been characterized by dichotomous country–specific debates about whether there is, for example, prime ministerial or cabinet government. Recent work has established new terms for these debates leading to more pluralistic conceptualizations of executive politics. Nevertheless, this work has not created the conditions for rigorous cross-national comparison. This article establishes a framework to compare executive branch power relations. It identifies six models of executive politics comprising a comprehensive set of ways in which power may be distributed amongst chief executives, cabinets, ministers and bureaucrats. On the basis of this framework it is argued that it is necessary to engage in empirical observation to determine which models of government occur and to identify the reasons why these models emerge.     

Executive Orders and Administrative Control

One of the key recommendations of the Winter Commission was the empowerment of governors over the executive branch. However, key institutions have not evolved in this direction; the long ballot still exists in most states, and the formal powers of governors have strengthened to their probable capacity. The authors suggest that a quasi‐formal power—the gubernatorial use of executive orders—may be a significant tool for empowering the governor in the state administrative realm. Analyzing all executive orders in 49 states for 2004 and 2005, they find variation in the aggregate use of and functions performed through these orders. Many executive orders do allow the government more direction and control of state bureaucracy. Finally, the authors suggest that the study of executive orders may be necessary to understand gubernatorial power in the executive arena and beyond.     

Europäisierung und innerstaatlicher Wandel. Zentralisierung und Entparlamentarisierung?

A number of studies suggest that European integration impacts upon the domestic institutions of the member states by changing the distribution of resources among domestic actors. This paper argues that resource dependency needs to be embedded in an institutionalist understanding of Europeanisation in order to explain when and how Europe affects the domestic institutions of the member states. First, domestic institutions determine the distribution of resources among the domestic actors in a given member-state. Second, the compatibility of European and domestic institutions determines the degree to which Europeanisation changes this distribution of resources and hence the degree of pressure for institutional adaptation. Third, the domestic institutional culture determines the dominant strategies of actors by which they respond to such a redistribution of resources facilitating or prohibiting institutional adaptation. This argument is empirically tested by comparing the impact of Europeanisation on the territorial institutions of the five most decentralized member states, with special reference to Germany and Spain as representatives of opposite institutional cultures. The study shows that the regions succeeded in balancing the territorial centralization caused by Europeanization. However, the compensation of regional losses of competencies through the intrastate participation of the regions in the formulation and representation of the national bargaining position in European affairs reinforces executive dominance in European decision-making contributing to the tendencies of deparlamentarization in the member states.     

The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Power Sharing

Why are some parties more likely than others to keep the promises they made during previous election campaigns? This study provides the first large‐scale comparative analysis of pledge fulfillment with common definitions. We study the fulfillment of over 20,000 pledges made in 57 election campaigns in 12 countries, and our findings challenge the common view of parties as promise breakers. Many parties that enter government executives are highly likely to fulfill their pledges, and significantly more so than parties that do not enter government executives. We explain variation in the fulfillment of governing parties’ pledges by the extent to which parties share power in government. Parties in single‐party executives, both with and without legislative majorities, have the highest fulfillment rates. Within coalition governments, the likelihood of pledge fulfillment is highest when the party receives the chief executive post and when another governing party made a similar pledge.     

Who's the chef? Economic voting under a dual executive

Abstract. Standard economic voting models assume a dominant locus of policy responsibility, a single chief executive whose powers are fixed by certain inviolate institutional rules. The president-centred US system serves as the paradigm here. However, economic voting may occur under a dual executive, whose powers change in response to the institutional rules themselves. France represents this second scenario. There are two executives, the President and the Prime Minister. Under conditions of cohabitation, with a partisan division of the power between the two offices, economic voting becomes more sophisticated. According to data from the 1993–1995 cohabitation, voters perceived that the Prime Minister, not the President, was responsible for the economy. Therefore, in the 1995 presidential contest, they directed their economic evaluations at the Gaullist party of the Prime Minister, not the Socialist party of the President.     

Legislative Control of Powers Delegated to the Executive: The Case of the EU

How can legislators derive the benefits of delegation without unduly empowering the executive? This article investigates how this dilemma is met in the European Union (EU) political system where executive power is delegated to the Commission. The argument is that the European member states have found a unique solution. They install committees of member state representatives to monitor the EU Commission, the so‐called comitology committees. However, the extent to which comitology committees are installed and their exact competence vary considerably across policy areas. This article uses a delegation perspective to understand this variation. An analysis of comitology provisions in 686 directives and regulations shows that institutional conflict and issue complexity, well‐known factors from the delegation literature, are important predictors of comitology control of the Commission. The findings support one of the two prevailing images of comitology—comitology as a control mechanism, not deliberative democracy.     

The Odyssey of Senior Public Service: What Memoirs Can Teach Us

This article examines the political, psychological, and moral challenges of senior public service in the executive office. The study uses memoirs published by members of the Clinton administration. The memoirs discuss the consistent background conditions of senior public service as the personality of the chief executive, the vagaries of election cycles, the tension between staff and agency executives, and the role of the media. Senior executives adopt a number of stances to address the tension between the realities of public service and the ideals they bring. The memoirs suggest several stances, such as politics as original sin, seduction, hard work and compromise, and game. The memoirs demonstrate the high cumulative cost that public service exacts on the health and personal lives of senior officials. Finally, the study reveals a number of consistent themes about how senior appointed public officials can navigate the dilemmas and challenges of senior public service at all levels of government.     

Power Resources of Parliamentary Executives: Policy Advice in the UK and Germany

This article compares the institutionalisation of policy advice inside offices which service chief executives in the UK and Germany. It focuses on the institutionalisation of ‘policy units’ during the early 1970s and late 1990s which reveals different patterns. Whereas British policy units are allowed to interfere in any departmental business and address a variety of issues, German policy units are narrowed to provide administrative support and avoid partisan issues. Applying a new institutionalist perspective and the veto approach, this article argues that institutionalisation processes as strategic interactions of organisational actors are affected by institutional features at the macro-level of parliamentary systems. These features include principles of cabinet decision-making and the electoral system with its effects on parliament and cabinet composition which both set veto positions in the executive and legislative decision arena. Next to these institutional features, the empirical evidence shows how organisational legacies account for the influential role of British policy units as power resource for the PM and the nearly irrelevance of German policy units as power resource for the Chancellor.     

Contestation and co-optation: why secrecy in EU external relations varies

Abstract

The question posed in this article is how to explain that the governance of secrecy in EU external relations varies. While the Common Foreign and Security Policy appears to retain its secretive character, the EU’s external trade policy has recently seen a shift towards more transparency. This article argues that to understand this variation, one has to take into account the institutional power of the European Parliament as well as the extent to which the rules and practices of secrecy are perceived as legitimate. The empowerment of the Parliament in trade means that it has had recent success in pushing back secrecy in this area. However, a general finding is that the majority of parliamentarians seem only rarely to question the executive’s governance of secrecy in external relations. The analysis shows that perceptions of legitimacy are crucial to account for different secrecy regimes – a finding that is likely to be relevant for the understanding of secrecy in foreign policy beyond the EU.     

Political careers in multi-level systems: Regional chief executives in Italy, 1970–2015

This article focuses on Italian regional chief executives and aims to investigate if and how the Italian regionalization process has affected regional chief executives’ career trajectories. Our analysis is based on an original dataset on political careers of regional heads of government in Italy from 1970 to 2015. After presenting our two research expectations, we find that the direct election of regional presidents and the decentralization process have gone hand in hand with the selection of more regional political outsiders and visible politicians as well as with a higher integration between institutional levels in terms of career paths     

Representing the compromise: How institutions serve government support coalitions in European Union policy making

This article presents an original model of policy making by multiparty coalitions at the international level. Specifically, it analyses how domestic institutions serve parties in enforcing policy compromises onto national ministers negotiating legislation in the European Union (EU). In contrast to existing research on coalition politics, the model accounts for the benefits of not only legislative but also executive institutions and incorporates opposition parties as pivotal actors under minority governments. Ministers propose policy positions at the EU level that represent domestic coalition compromises when cabinet participation, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight of EU affairs make it cheap for coalition partners to challenge the minister's position and when ideological divisiveness increases the incentive to do so. Statistical analyses of 1,694 policy positions taken by ministers from 22 member states in the Council of the EU provide strong empirical evidence for the model. The results support the claim of executive dominance in EU policy making but also highlight that, where institutions are strong, ministers represent domestic coalition compromises rather than their own positions.     

When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Process in Central and Eastern Europe

A number of recent studies examining the accession of states from Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union have provided a much more sophisticated understanding of when, why and how the EU shaped, directed and occasionally determined change in the region since 1989. Although acknowledging the EU was at times a motor of change, its power was limited to particular points in the accession process and varied significantly across policy areas. Even in cases such as Slovakia, often used to demonstrate the power of EU conditionality, the influence of the EU on domestic actors and policy change has been exaggerated. The EU's 'transformative power' is at its greatest when deciding to open accession negotiations, a finding which has implications for the EU's ability to enact change in Croatia and Turkey.     

National interest versus the common good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting

The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or Governments of the European Union (EU) Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.     

Institutions or Contingencies? A Cross‐Country Analysis of Management Tool Use by Public Sector Executives

Management tools are often argued to ameliorate public service performance. Indeed, evidence has emerged to support positive outcomes related to the use of management tools in a variety of public sector settings. Despite these positive outcomes, there is wide variation in the extent to which public organizations use management tools. Drawing on normative isomorphism and contingency theory, this article investigates the determinants of both organization‐oriented and client‐oriented management tool use by top public sector executives. The hypotheses are tested using data from a large‐N survey of 4,533 central government executives in 18 European countries. Country and sector fixed‐effects ordinary least squares regression models indicate that contingency theory matters more than normative isomorphism. Public executives working in organizations that are bigger and have goal clarity and executive status are more likely to use management tools. The only normative pressure that has a positive impact on management tool use is whether public sector executives have a top hierarchical position.     

Undermining,defusing or defending European integration? Assessing public communication of European executives in times of EU politicisation

How do mainstream political executives cue their politicised constituencies on European integration? Moving beyond static expectations that EU politicisation induces executives to either undermine, defuse or defend integration, this article theorises executives’ incentives under different configurations of public and partisan Euroscepticism in their home countries. Expectations are tested on the sentiment and complexity that executives attach to European integration in almost 9,000 public speeches delivered throughout the Euro Crisis. It is found that national leaders faced with sceptical public opinion and low levels of partisan Euroscepticism rhetorically undermine integration, whereas European Commissioners faced with similar conditions are prone to defend it. These responses intensify disproportionally with growing public Euroscepticism, but are moderated by Eurosceptic party strength in surprising ways. When such challenger parties come closer to absorbing the Eurosceptic potential in public opinion, executive communication turns more positive again but also involves less clear rhetorical signals. These findings move beyond existing uniform expectations on mainstream responses to Eurosceptic challenges and highlight the relevance of different domestic configurations of EU politicisation.     

Die Umsetzung von EU-Richtlinien im Zeichen der Parteipolitik: Eine akteurszentrierte Antwort auf die Misfit-These

Recent debates about the problem-solving capacity of supranational governance within the EU form the background of this paper, which explores the causal conditions for correct and timely transposition of EU directives. In this context, some scholars have pointed to the degree of fit or misfit between European demands and existing national structures and traditions as one of the major factors determining implementation performance. On the basis of empirical evidence from the transposition of six labor-law directives in four member states, the paper demonstrates the limited explanatory power of this approach. Instead, it stresses the importance of domestic party politics and discusses the implications of this finding for the governance capacity of the EU.     

Credible Commitment in Covert Affairs

A recurring challenge in politics is to convince actors to take cooperative actions against their self‐interest. This is especially challenging for executives conducting covert activities, as infractions are unobservable and institutional reforms often require the executive's consent. We develop a model based in the auditing literature to investigate when executives agree to reforms that credibly constrain their behaviors. If the revelation cost falls in a high range, the risk of whistleblowing convinces executives to restrain themselves. Executives cannot credibly commit to this when the costs are low, resulting in inefficient investigations from watchdog groups that tax executive resources. We show that executives are sometimes better off in the first case than the second, which results in executives endogenously reforming institutions to achieve this outcome. We illustrate the mechanism with a case study of Gerald Ford's executive reforms to the intelligence community in the 1970s.     

An alternative route of European integration: The community's railways policy

The process of European integration and policy‐making is sometimes rather puzzling. On the one hand, it is well documented that with respect to the implementation of European legislation member states tend to do less than they are supposed to do. On the other hand, it is striking that with respect to the implementation of the Council Directive 91/440 on the development of the Community's railways many member states went far beyond the minimum required by the European legislation. We argue that these differing evaluations of implementation success can be traced to different implementation approaches, which may be termed the ‘compliance approach’ and the ‘support‐building approach’. While the first is directed at prescribing domestic reforms from above’, the latter aims at triggering European integration within the existing political context at the national level. Here, successful implementation refers to the extent to which European legislation triggers domestic changes by stimulating and strengthening support for European reform ideas at the national level. In this respect, European legislation can influence the domestic arenas in basically three ways: by providing legitimisation for political leadership, concepts for the solution of national problems, and strategic constraints for domestic actors opposing domestic reforms.     

Defending the Realm: The Appointment of Female Defense Ministers Worldwide

Though the defense ministry has been a bastion of male power, a growing number of states have appointed women to this portfolio. What explains men's dominance over these positions? Which factors predict women's appointments? With comprehensive cross‐national data from the post–Cold War era, we develop and test three sets of hypotheses concerning women's access to the defense ministry. We show that women remain excluded when the portfolio's remit reinforces traditional beliefs about the masculinity of the position, particularly in states that are engaged in fatal disputes, governed by military dictators, and large military spenders. By contrast, female defense ministers emerge when expectations about women's role in politics have changed—that is, in states with female chief executives and parliamentarians. Women are also first appointed to the post when its meaning diverges from traditional conceptions of the portfolio, particularly in countries concerned with peacekeeping and in former military states with left‐wing governments.