First or Second Order Referendums? Understanding the Votes on the EU Constitutional Treaty in Four EU Member States

This article uses post-referendum Flash-Eurobarometer surveys to analyse empirically voter attitudes towards the EU Constitution in four member states. The theoretical model used incorporates first and second order variables for voting to ascertain whether the outcome of the vote was a reflection of either first or second order voting behaviour. It is hypothesised that the cleavage politics over integration in the European arena had a major impact on the four votes, as captured by three first order variables: ‘Europhile’ and ‘Constitution-phile’ attitudes and ‘Egocentric Europeanness’, respectively. The quantitative analyses – controlling for a number of dimensions – strongly supports the hypothesis when compared with a model using solely second order party identification variables. These findings establish that how voters understood the EU polity, in particular whether membership is beneficial to one's own country, was a crucial factor in all the referendums. Implications for future research include the need to discover the cues or proxies influencing first order voting within domestic politics.     

The Dynamics of Domestic Coordination of EU Policy in the New Member States: Impossible to Lock In?

This paper examines the evolution of coordination structures for EU policy-making in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The study maps the main features of the established EU coordination machineries, and traces the most important reforms of their organisational structures. It proposes an actor-centred, ‘politics of institutional choice’ approach to explain the rapid and far-reaching changes in EU coordination structures in all the new member states. By contrast, two alternative frameworks focusing on efficiency and historical-institutional arguments emphasising the impact of early institutional lock-in fail to explain the specific institutional forms adopted and the considerable degree of institutional dynamics.     

EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: What Relationship with the Arab Uprisings?

This article analyzes the European Union (EU) policy for democracy assistance toward the Southern Mediterranean countries and tracks changes in the last decade, with a special emphasis on the most recent period. It shows that the EU policy, which goes under the acronym of EIDHR, has evolved, but predominantly in response to internal dynamics rather than to developments in Arab countries. The EU has increasingly provided assistance to local actors on the ground in non-member countries and has differentiated its action in authoritarian countries from countries in transition. When it comes to implementing its own policy, however, the EU is less able to promote democracy than human rights, and most of the funds go to support projects centered on relatively uncontroversial rights such as women's and children's.     

Clawing Back Lost Powers? Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Transposition of EU Social Policy Directives in the Netherlands

For quite some time parliaments were seen as the losers of European integration. As a reaction, several parliaments have sought to exert more control over the executive branch in EU decision-making. An alternative venue for ‘clawing back’ these lost powers is by influencing the domestic transposition of EU policies. Surprisingly, this opportunity for greater parliamentary involvement has not received much scholarly attention. Under what conditions do the parties in parliament engage in ex post scrutiny over transposition? To shed light on this question, this article provides a detailed study of scrutiny by the Dutch parliament over the transposition of two social policy directives, investigating four hypotheses regarding vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking incentives for parliamentary oversight. The analysis shows that the ex post scrutiny that takes place can mostly be summarised as low-profile scrutiny aimed at information-gathering and position-taking, especially by opposition parties.     

Experimentalist governance in the EU: The emperor's new clothes?

Most students of the EU agree by now that it is best described as a governance system. There is far less consensus on what kind of governance the EU actually features: modern, postmodern, network, cooperative, innovative or simply new? Sabel and Zeitlin have advanced yet another concept. This paper discusses the added value of their “experimentalist governance” (EG), as presented in an edited volume published in 2010, for understanding and explaining the nature of EU policymaking, addressing four questions: First, to what extent is EG distinct from existing concepts of governance? Second, how pervasive is EG in the EU when compared to alternative forms of governance? Third, what is the effect of EG on EU policy outcomes, on the one hand, and the overall architecture of the EU, on the other? Finally, does EG solve or exacerbate the EU's democratic deficit?     

Legitimacy through Partnership? EU Policy Diffusion in Britain and Sweden

Partnership has become a central principle of European Union (EU) policies, particularly in relation to the structural funds. This article considers the diffusion of the partnership principle in the EU, focusing on Britain and Sweden. It is concerned with two questions. First, has the partnership principle led to a process of harmonisation across states or to national resistance? Second, to what extent has the partnership principle enhanced the legitimacy of EU decision making? The evidence presented here suggests that though there has not been significant resistance to the partnership principle within Britain and Sweden, the EU’s requirements have been interpreted and implemented differently in the two states. Thus it is more appropriate to speak of ‘adaptation’ to partnership rather than ‘adoption’. This is explained by what we summarise as ‘national democratic traditions’. In terms of democratic legitimacy, the Swedish adaptation to partnership was nominally more democratic in that local politicians were readily involved from the outset, whereas in Britain they were not. However, the importance of this inclusion should not be overstated in relation to substantive democratic legitimacy. The Swedish model was not supported by well‐articulated democratic strategies or principles. Despite the limitations of the Swedish model, recent developments suggest that Britain is following a similar path.     

Blackening Skies for Chinese Investment in the EU?

Journal of Chinese Political Science - Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment (COFDI) in the European Union (EU) has recently increasingly drawn attention because of the opacity of...     

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU?

Why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the EU system? Several examples suggest that bureaucratic corruption exists and that the Commission’s anti-fraud agency, OLAF, is not a fully independent authority. We thus develop a novel interpretation of the principal-supervisor-agent model to cope with non-independent anti-fraud units. This model shows that corruption is likely to occur when the expected value to the client from bribing the agent is larger than the expected value to the principal of truth-telling by the supervisor. Overall, this analysis points to the risks of flawed incentives and the lack of institutional independence among principal, agent, supervisor and client. Our main policy recommendations as a result of these findings are that OLAF should be placed outside the Commission, and that whistleblowers should receive adequate protection.     

Active citizenship through mobility? Students’ perceptions of identity,rights and participation in the EU

Globalisation has begun to transform the processes through which citizens are differentiated and non-citizens are excluded. This article provides an in-depth qualitative interrogation of these processes of differentiation and exclusion, and argues that the transformation in these processes compels us to reconsider the conceptual dichotomy of passive/active citizens along the stayers/mobiles distinction. This transformation is most apparent in Europe, with the introduction of European Union (EU) citizenship. The article builds on Bourdieu’s cultural capital in the cosmopolitan context, existing qualitative studies on citizens’ sense of EU identity and citizenship, and illustrative focus group evidence of visiting EU and home students’ perceptions of EU citizenship across three dimensions – identity, rights and participation. The evidence indicates that we can distinguish between four categories of citizens in the EU: passive EU citizens, including two groups of stayers; the potential EU (i) and member state-oriented (ii) citizens, and active EU citizens, including EU-15 (iii) and Central and Eastern European (iv) mobile citizens. These categories reveal that important distinctions are emerging between the perceptions and behaviour of stayers and mobiles as passive/active citizens.     

Does the UK Have Influence in the EU Legislative Process?

The UK has influenced some major EU policies, such as the creation of the single market and enlargement. But how influential are the UK government and British MEPs in the day‐to‐day EU legislative process? To answer this question, this article analyses recent data from the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The evidence is mixed. In the Council, in recent years the UK government has been outvoted more often than any other EU government, yet UK officials remain well connected ‘behind the scenes’. In the European Parliament, British MEPs are now more likely to be on the losing side than are the MEPs of any other member state, yet British MEPs still win key committee chairs and rapporteurships. The evidence suggests that if the UK votes to remain in the EU, Britain's political elites will need to re‐engage with Brussels politics if the UK is to avoid becoming further marginalised from mainstream EU politics.     

Financial Centre and Monetary Outsider: How Precarious is the UK's Position in the EU?

The UK's negotiating position in the area of ‘economic governance’ started from the assumption that there is a deep dividing line between insiders and outsiders of the ‘euro zone’. To protect the outsiders, the UK government did not ask for a veto, but for a safeguard mechanism that can postpone a decision in the euro area. This is exactly what David Cameron achieved in the negotiations with Council President Tusk. This article explains why the UK demands were so modest. Key is the peculiar situation of the UK being the major financial centre for a currency union to which it does not belong. Hence, the UK taxpayer needs protection from the City, and EU membership has helped to provide this. There is not much else a UK government could ask for.     

Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?

When the study of transitions moved from Latin America and southern Europe scholars initially assumed that transition in these two regions would be regime-based 'double transitions' of democratisation and marketisation. Gradually, it was accepted by scholars that many post-communist states inherited weak states and institutions, thereby adding a third factor to the transition process of stateness. This 'triple transition' has been largely accepted as sufficient to understand post-communist transitions and, in some cases, includes nationality questions. This article builds on the 'triple transition' by separating the national and stateness questions within its third aspect and argues that although both processes are interlinked they should be nevertheless separated into separate components (democratisation and marketisation are treated separately but are also closely related phenomena). This article argues two points. First, stateness and the nationality question were until recently ignored by scholars because these were not factors in earlier transitions. Secondly, they were ignored because the relationship of nationhood to the civic state is still under-theorised.     

Fragile States: A Donor-serving Concept? Issues with Interpretations of Fragile Statehood in Afghanistan

Abstract

The paradox of attempting to (re)construct state institutions without considering the socio-political cohesion of societies recurs throughout the world, most notably today in the Middle East, Africa and the Balkans. This essay tries to shed some light on the debate around the concepts of state and nation-building. Drawing on a sociological understanding of the modern nation-state, it contends that it is impossible to conceive of statebuilding as a process separate from nation-building. This essay identifies two different schools of thought in the discussion concerning the statebuilding process, each of which reflects different sociological understandings of the state. The first one, an ‘institutional approach’ closely related to the Weberian conception of the state, focuses on the importance of institutional reconstruction and postulates that statebuilding activities do not necessarily require a concomitant nation-building effort. The second, a ‘legitimacy approach’ influenced by Durkheimian sociology, recognizes the need to consolidate central state institutions, but puts more emphasis on the importance of socio-political cohesion in the process. Building on this second approach and demonstrating its relevance in contemporary statebuilding, this article concludes with a discussion of recent statebuilding attempts and the ways external actors can effectively contribute to statebuilding processes.     

Eurosceptic Challenger Parties and Political Opposition in European Union Politics: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?

Despite extensive research on Eurosceptic challenger parties, our knowledge of their influence on political opposition has so far been sparse. In this article we make an in‐depth assessment of parliamentary EU opposition, based on 4,264 statements made by national parliamentarians in the European Affairs Committees (EACs) of Denmark and Sweden. Our analysis shows that the presence of Eurosceptic challenger parties in the national parliamentary arena impacts patterns and practices of EU opposition significantly. A greater presence of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties in parliament is associated with more opposition in EU politics. These parties deliver a vast majority of the polity‐oriented opposition towards the EU and present more policy alternatives than mainstream parties. The findings presented have implications for our understanding of national parliamentary EU opposition as well as for the assessment of the impact of Eurosceptic challenger parties on the process of European integration.     

Strategic or Principled? The Engagement of Civil Society Organizations with the EU

This article links the literature on the Europeanization of civil society organizations (CSOs) with the literature on the contribution CSOs can make to democracy in the EU. To do so, it asks which are the pull factors that support CSOs’ Europeanization: are they mostly strategic and linked to where law-making and the money are? Or are they likewise linked to a desire to contribute to EU democracy? To explore this question, the article looks at agricultural, environmental and anti-poverty groups and combines fresh qualitative with quantitative data. The findings suggest that we need to distinguish strategic Europeanization, on the one hand, from the identification with supranational democracy, on the other. They also show that the most Europeanized organizations need not be the most interested in EU democracy, whereas organizations with a comparatively low degree of Europeanization can still be interested in EU democracy.     

The upper part of the earnings distribution in the United States: how has it changed?

This article uses Social Security Administration data to examine changes in the upper end of the earnings distribution over the period 1982-1995. These data provide a unique opportunity for analyzing those changes because they come directly from W-2 forms and are not topcoded--obvious advantages over data typically provided by surveys such as the Current Population Survey. Although they do not provide some of the information necessary to explain what one observes occurring at the top of the earnings distribution (no educational attainment information, for example), these data are sufficient for describing in great detail what happened to high earners through the 1980s and into the 1990s. This analysis clearly demonstrates the extent to which earnings are concentrated at the top of the distribution. The study's findings reinforce those of Feenberg and Poterba (2000) by showing that the very highest earners--those in the upper 1 percent--experienced the largest relative increase in earnings share from 1982 to 1995. Even within that upper 1 percent, those with earnings in the upper 0.1 percent were the ones driving the increase in the group's earnings share. Perhaps not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of the highest earners are white men who are in the middle to latter part of their working lives. Women have made strides toward entering this elite group of earners but still form a very small percentage of the group relative to their size in the working population. Very few blacks are in the extreme upper tail of the earnings distribution, and they have made very little progress (in absolute terms) over the period 1982-1995 in increasing their numbers. In contrast, persons of racial/ethnic backgrounds other than white or black have increased their presence among top earners. They went from being relatively underrepresented in the top 0.1 percent in 1982 to being overrepresented by 1995; that is, they accounted for a larger share of the top 0.1 percent of earners than they did of the entire working population. Finally, the study also finds that the percentage of overall wage and salary earnings from Social Security-covered employment that is not taxed for the purposes of Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance because of the taxable maximum generally increased over the 1982-1995 period. Wage and salary earnings above the taxable maximum rose at a faster rate than is the average wage.