Political economy of agricultural policy

The present paper uses a paneldata estimation technique to combine the time series for individual countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). We postulated the response of central banks in these countries to inflation, economic growth and current account surplus given the constraints to be the same among the sample countries. Differences between central bank independence come forward in a different structural pressure to lower or raise money market rates in these countries. The empirical results in this study coincide remarkably well with the legal indices of central bank independence.     

Asset quality determinants of Indian banks: Empirical evidence and policy issues

The Indian banking industry has been suffering from a huge number of nonperforming loans, and the loan asset quality has been deteriorated over the years. This has led to significant capital erosion of many banks in India. The surge in corporate defaults leading to an enormous rise in nonperforming loan assets has been impairing the performance of Indian banking industry in particular and economic growth in general. Hence, it is intuitive to ask what are the determinants of poor asset quality of Indian banks. To answer this question, using a sample of 47 commercial banks over a sample period of 2000 to 2014, our study examines the bank‐, industry‐, and macroeconomic‐specific determinants of asset quality of Indian banks. Our empirical analysis also accommodates the impact of different ownership structures (public and private sector) and the impact of financial crisis while analysing the determinants of poor asset quality of Indian commercial banks. Results reveal that bank‐, industry‐, and macroeconomic‐specific factors are responsible for the burgeoning nonperforming loan assets of Indian commercial banks. The results are qualitatively similar across different ownership structures. The findings suggest that forecasting models for nonperforming assets should also consider macroecomomic‐ and industry‐specific factors along with the bank‐ specific factors.     

Banking, interest intermediation and political power

Abstract. This article seeks to introduce the concept of political power more explicitly into the discussion of the organizational attributes of societal interests. In pursuit of this objective, it defines a set of empirical indicators of the organisational conditions of interest intermediation systems that enhance the exercise of political power. The indicators are illustrated through a comparative study of the banking sector at the European Community level and in five countries: Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The comparison of the banking sector interest intermediation systems shows that the power of banks in Germany rests not only on their equity participation in large industrial concerns, but also on a highly developed interest intermediation system, the most integrated of the five countries. The analysis demonstrates from still another perspective the close imbrication of the state and finance in France. Finally; the article demonstrates the deep fragmentation of the US associational system, a system that has acted as a serious obstacle to banking system reform in America.     

Stable money and central bank independence: implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany

Germany prides itself in having one of the most successful central banks and national currencies with respect to independence and stability. I show that not only were both imposed on the country after 1945, but that German experts and officials resisted both initially. It thus represents a rare case of the successful imposition of institutions from abroad. Events are discussed in light of Peter Bernholz’s requirements of stable money and an independent central bank.

     

我国商业银行资产业务绩效影响的实证研究

通过对我国上市商业银行资产业务创新与经营绩效的实证研究,发现个人信贷创新业务与商业银行的经营绩效是正相关的,而公司信贷业务以及证券投资业务与商业银行的经营绩效是负相关的。根据研究结果,提出目前我国商业银行应大力发展具有特色的个人信贷产品,注重客户需求、拓宽产品的销售渠道、做好产品的售后服务,走个性化发展道路;同时,要注意风险的防控。     

An Integrative Approach to the Politics of Central Bank Independence: Lessons from Britain,Germany and Italy

This article proposes a three-tier framework for analysing the politics of central bank independence. International factors explain the general trend towards central bank independence. However, they are framed differently by various national systems. At the national level, for heuristic purposes, the analysis can be structured by focusing on ‘suppliers’ and ‘demanders’ of central bank independence. The former are the political authorities, whereas the latter are socioeconomic forces and interest groups, with the central bank positioned in-between. At the micro-institutional level, central banks can be influential economic and political actors situated at the interface between levels of governance. The added value of this integrated framework is appraised using one case study, the Bank of Italy's path to independence, which is compared with the experience of the Bank of England and the Bundesbank. In contrast to many works on central bank independence, the methodology adopted here is qualitative, rather than quantitative, and is grounded in empirical research.     

Variation in central bank independence across countries: Some provisional empirical evidence

In this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested. The predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported: central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability or the larger the government debt. Central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability. We do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks.     

Beyond the Z-score: A novel measure of bank stability for effective policymaking

This article looks beyond Z-score and proposes a novel methodological framework to build an all-encompassing indicator of bank stability for individual banks using the optimisation-based ‘benefit-of-the-doubt (BoD)’ approach. Unlike other available approaches, this approach is totally data-driven and generates endogenous weights to aggregate sub-indicators of bank stability and dimensions. Further, the final outcomes are not limited to a scalar measure of bank stability. The unique optimal weights offer valuable policy-relevant insights and highlight the most precarious areas of stability, which demand the immediate attention of the bank's management and the industry regulators for both micro-and macro-level policymaking. Using the data of Indian public sector banks operating in the year 2018, the study illustrates the proposed framework to obtain a holistic indicator of bank stability, defined on 14 ratio sub-indicators and 5 broad dimensions (soundness, asset quality, profitability, management efficiency, and liquidity) of bank stability.     

Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis

In Weimar Germany, the Catholic Church vehemently warned ordinary parishioners about the dangers of extremist parties. We establish that constituencies' religious composition is a key empirical predictor of Nazi vote shares—dwarfing the explanatory power of any other demographic or socioeconomic variable. Even after carefully accounting for observational differences, Catholics were far less likely to vote for the NSDAP than their Protestant counterparts. The evidence suggests that this disparity was, in large part, due to the sway of the Catholic Church and its dignitaries. At the same time, we show that attempts to immunize Catholics against the radical left failed to achieve the desired result. To explain the puzzling asymmetry in the Church's influence at the ballot box, we develop a simple theoretical framework of elite influence in electoral politics.     

How to change other people's institutions: discursive entrepreneurship and the boundary object of competition/competitiveness in the German banking sector

Abstract

The paper explores recent public debates about the structure of the financial system in Germany. It pays particular attention to their symbolic-strategic dimension, that is, to attempts by several institutional entrepreneurs to reformulate the criteria of organizational legitimacy, concentrating on the sense-making and legitimization processes involved in institutional persistence or change. The paper discourse-analyses a campaign by institutional entrepreneurs – mainly representatives of commercial banks – who attempted to homogenize the criteria of organizational legitimacy in the German banking sector by questioning the fundamentals of the three-pillar system and the non-commercial banks. Institutional entrepreneurs are understood as discursive entrepreneurs whose actions refer to institutionalized generalizations of value. In the case of the financial sector in Germany, it was the generalized value of competition/competitiveness that served as a discursive device to legitimize the attempts of commercial banks to alter the institutional structure.     

Money Talks: The Environmental Impact of China's Green Credit Policy

This study examines the impact of China's green credit policy on the environment. In particular, we consider an initiative that requires all banks to base their loan decisions on corporate environmental performance. This is an important issue since it is globally gaining popularity to leverage bank loans as an avenue to enforce corporate environmental responsibility. Moreover, there are only a handful of empirical investigations in relation to the impacts of credit constraint on corporate environmental behaviors and strategies. This research also provides useful insights on how to enhance environmental regulation enforcement, using the Environmental Protection Bureau in partnership with local banks to exert a creditable threat of financial constraint on unfavorable environmental outcomes. Using the synthetic control method and difference‐in‐differences analysis, we find that this policy has significantly motivated firms, particularly those firms with a higher dependence on external financing, to reduce water pollution. We further discover that the policy compels firms to favor pollution prevention at the source instead of end‐of‐pipe treatments, since the policy imposes a long‐term credit constraint on pollution.     

Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries

This article analyzes the effect of central bank independence on fiscal deficits. Previous literature finds a negative relationship between bank independence and deficits in OECD countries. No such relationship is found for developing countries. We argue that independent and conservative central bankers prefer budget discipline due to the long run connection between deficits and inflation and can enforce their preference through interest rate hikes and refusal to lend to the government. The claim, however, is that the legislated independent status of the central bank is cheap talk in the absence of democratic institutions. We test empirically the conditional effect of central bank independence on a sample of 23 democratic and undemocratic post-communist countries from 1990 to 2002. Results show that independent central banks restrain budget deficits only in democracies. Also, democracies that have not granted independence to their central banks have the worst fiscal discipline.     

Managing the Bank‐System Crisis in Coordinated Market Economies: Institutions and Blame Avoidance Strategies in Sweden and Japan

Sweden and Japan represent two different positions regarding policymaking when faced with similar crises of the bank systems. Different institutional settings led the main actors to different paths of reactions in order to avoid blame. In the Japanese case, the very close relationship between private banks and the Ministry of Finance, in combination with the lesser degree of widespread perceptions of a system crisis, made it more urgent as well as possible to conceal the actual state of affairs for the politicians. Confronted with the threat of losing power over the financial administration to a new agency, the ministry postponed the reforms in order to conceal the deep financial problems. The institutional setting was different in Sweden. Deregulation had separated the government from the administration of banks. Among the public deteriorating economic conditions were easily connected to the banks. This brought about political unity. It was possible to put the blame on the banks and take the credit for the efforts to tidy up the mess without losing credibility.     

Central bank independence and inflation: Corporatism,partisanship, and alternative indices of central bank independence

A well-developed theoretical literature suggests that central bank independence causes low inflation. Empirical work supporting this hypothesis is unsatisfactory, however, for two reasons: statistical analysis has only recently begun to include control variables, and important political variables that are related to inflation have not yet been included; analysis has not yet undertaken a systematic comparison of alternative indices of central bank independence. This paper addresses both weaknesses by testing the explanatory power of eight indices of central bank independence in a political-economic model of inflation. The results suggest that while support for the central bank independence hypothesis survives a relatively inclusive set of control variables, support for the hypothesis is not independent of the particular index upon which analysis relies.     

Lessons from NPAs crisis in Indian banks

Nonperforming assets (NPAs) crisis in Indian public sector banks is one of the biggest challenges before the current government in 2017. The finance ministry, Government of India, and the central bank, the Reserve Bank of India, are worried about the surging NPAs in Indian public sector banks because of their huge macroeconomic impact and systemic risk to the financial system. If not paid timely attention, it can hamper the economic and financial stability of the nation. Rising NPAs in Indian public sector banks are a result of bank specific, macroeconomic, and political factors. In order to control the surging NPAs in Indian public sector banks, the government and the Reserve Bank of India have implemented new crisis management framework which however is not immune to several challenges. This paper looks at NPAs crisis from the lens of crisis management, stakeholder's engagement, government relations, and issue management. Harris and Fleisher ( 2016 ) identify crisis management, stakeholder engagement, government relations, and issues management as important organizational activities that constitute part of public affairs. This paper follows a tripartite structure where it first investigates the causes of NPAs in Indian public sector banks. Second, it examines the crisis management framework developed by the policy makers and highlights the key challenges. Third, in light of these challenges, it makes recommendations to tackle the NPAs crisis in Indian public sector banks.     

Economic performance of 'weak' governments and their interaction with central banks and labour: Deficits, economic growth, unemployment and inflation, 1961–1998

Abstract.   Comparative political economists have conventionally claimed that the strength and stability of governments affect policy making and performance, and that what they call 'weak governments'– multiparty, minority and short-lived governments – show poorer economic performance. This article tests this and related hypotheses on deficits, economic growth, unemployment and inflation by examining data from 17 OECD countries. I find that there is generally little evidence to indicate that so-called 'weak governments', when considered independently, produce poorer performance than strong ones. However, the effects of different government types are partly contingent on central bank independence and labour organization. When central banks are independent, coalition governments exhibit better inflation and economic growth performance than one-party governments, but the opposite happens when central banks are dependent. I attempt an explanation for these relationships. I also find that independent central banks, under certain conditions, lead to lower growth and higher inflation. Thus, some of the benefits of central bank independence are context-specific, depending on other political-economic factors.     

Lobbying and lending by banks around the financial crisis by

Despite the unprecedented levels of liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve to banks during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, lending by banks slowed dramatically during and after that global episode. In this study, we propose that, given capital constraints, the lobbying expenditures by banks to combat Dodd-Frank might have crowded out lending activity. A variety of univariate and multivariate tests show that while lending by banks fell significantly around the financial crisis, lobbying rose dramatically. Our results also show that bank lobbying and lending are imperfect substitutes during non-crisis periods. Such substitutability likely is explained by the value perceived in the political connections gained through lobbying, such as the ability to influence regulation, preferential treatment on supervisory or enforcement decisions, and protection against adverse shocks in the form of government bailouts.

     

中外资银行竞争能力的比较研究

当前,我国正在大力推进社会主义市场经济建设,社会的各个领域正向规范的市场经济迈进。从上世纪90年代中期开始股份制银行的设立,到近年来外资银行的进入,都为中国银行业的改革带来了强盛的活力。但也在银行间引发了前所未有的激烈竞争。因而,针对中外资银行竞争力的比较研究正当其时,本文首先分析了银行竞争力界定及局限性,然后分析中资商业银行竞争力中的优势和劣势,最后提出了几条增强中资商业银行竞争力的对策与建议,在本文的结尾,作者建议借助银行竞争力比较,大力推进中资商业银行改革,开展与外资银行的竞争与合作,不断提升中国银行业的整体竞争力水平。     

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Abstract. The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.     

Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and the Economic Consequences of Monetary Institutions

Debates about the appropriate mix between autonomy and accountability of bureaucrats are relevant to numerous areas of government action. I examine whether there is evidence of a tradeoff between transparency, democratic accountability, and the gains from monetary delegation. I begin by presenting a simple theoretical model which suggests that central banks that are transparent, in the sense of publishing their macroeconomic forecasts, will find it easier to acquire a reputation. Despite making central banks more subject to outside scrutiny then, monetary transparency can lead to improved economic outcomes. I also consider arguments about the effect of accountability provisions involving parliamentary oversight and control over central bankers. The article then uses a new data set to examine these issues empirically, focusing on a natural experiment involving disinflation costs under different central banking institutions during the 1990s. Results suggest that countries with more transparent central banks face lower costs of disinflation while accountability provisions have no clear effect on disinflation costs. My results also concord with earlier findings that the effect of monetary institutions is conditional on other features of the political environment.