Local government in Europe: Retrenchment,restructuring and British exceptionalism

This article compares the strategy of British governments towards elected local government following the onset of fiscal stress in the mid‐1970s with those of two other western European countries with a unitary system of government: France and Sweden. The conclusion reached is that, notwithstanding different national configurations of central‐local government relations and the distinctiveness of the British strategy, there are similar policy and institutional outcomes in each case. In so far as such outcomes are taking place irrespective of the party political or ideological complexion of governments, they are consistent with a neo‐Fordist interpretation of local government restructuring.     

Structure and Process in Consociationalism and Federalism

It is relatively easy to characterize the institutional structureof a country as consociational or federal. The task is muchmore difficult if we turn from structure to the decision process.Within a given structure, there may be a great deal of variationwith regard to the decision process. Data for such variationare given for the decision process in Switzerland for whichthe following four types are distinguished: (1) consociationaland federal, (2) consociational and unitary, (3) competitiveand federal, and (4) competitive and unitary. Difficulties arediscussed in aggregating from such a variation to a measurefor the prevailing decision process in a country as a whole.It is suggested that the problem be disaggregated and that decisionprocesses be compared for particular issues. This can be doneboth across and within countries.     

Business,social responsibility,and corruption

This paper explores the role of corporate social responsibility and the reporting thereof in the fight against corruption. A special focus is laid on the international endeavors to improve transparency through reporting, and the paper elaborates extensively on the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Global Reporting Initiative's (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. Voluntary initiatives, such as the UNGC, the OECD guidelines, and the GRI guidelines, are considered to play an important role in providing the trust‐based informal social norms, without which markets and societies cannot function. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lobbying, corruption and political influence

The paper explores the determinants of generalized trust across countries. The findings suggest that only few variables can be considered significant. Social polarization in the form of income inequality and ethnic diversity reduces trust, Protestantism and having a monarchy increases trust while post-communist societies are less trusting than other. The findings also provide support for the use of a standard indicator as a stable measure of generalized trust and emphasize the importance of taking endogeneity seriously.     

Majesty and mercy: undocumented immigration,deferred removal action,and the spectacle of sovereign exceptionalism

The article casts a critical gaze at the Obama Administration’s decision – articulated in a series of bureaucratic memos and directives issued June 2010–July 2012 – to exercise prosecutorial discretion in processing 300,000 undocumented immigrants slated for deportation from the US Commentators on the partisan left hailed the Administration’s decision as a pragmatic and humane effort to implement federal immigration laws. Commentators on the partisan right argued that prosecutorial discretion constituted an effective – and illegal – abdication of the president’s mandate to execute the letter of immigration law. This article positions the decision, instead, at the nexus of sovereign exceptionalism and political community-building and argues that deferred action constitutes the highest and most controversial deployment of the “majesty” of territorial state sovereignty: the process of selectively meting out “mercy” to those who approximate the set of expectations bound up in the notion of the “good” American. Petitioners for deferred action status, I argue, function, ideologically, to construct the undocumented petitioner’s liminality as help and reify the sovereign power’s exceptionalism. The discussion, in turn, invites us to revisit Schmittian and Agambenian conceptions of sovereign exceptionalism and rethink the work sovereign prerogative does in the everyday.     

Pluralism,corporatism and perception of corruption

When people know who is influencing the elected politicians and they may ‘put the rascals out’ in case they feel that the incumbents are corrupt, ceteris paribus, their perception of the level of corruption should not be affected by lobbying. If on the other hand people are not sure which or how many actors are influencing public policy and they are not able to hold the government truly accountable as interest group influence is constant with different governments, people will be more likely to perceive the government as corrupted. The former system is a characteristic of corporatism and the latter of pluralism. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that interest groups with resources such as business groups or firms in pluralist systems are more influential than groups with few resources. Thus, people may perceive pluralist policy‐making system as more corrupt than corporatist policy‐making system where fewer visible actors have more or less equal weight in the policy‐making process. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Candidate sex,corruption and vote choice

Existing research suggests that voters may view female politicians as less prone to corruption than male politicians. We argue that this voter belief can yield advantages to hypothetical female candidates as voters sometimes punish them less for bribe accusations. We test these propositions with hypothetical vignettes of sub-national executive races in Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. We find that only Uruguayans prefer allegedly corrupt female over male candidates, but when Uruguayans are told that hypothetical corruption is widespread, they do not prefer accused females. Moreover, voters in none of the countries prefer females among candidates who have fought corruption. Our findings thereby demonstrate that voters’ preferences for corrupt female candidates in hypothetical races can vary not only according to the specific justifications for the wrongdoing, but also across countries.     

Consociationalism and its critics: Evidence from the historic Northern Ireland Assembly election 2007

Critics of consociational power-sharing institutional arrangements in deeply divided societies argue that such arrangements solidify the underlying conflict cleavage and render it all-important for party competition and voter behaviour. I find evidence to the contrary in the case of voter behaviour at the historic 2007 Assembly election in Northern Ireland. At least in the unionist bloc, I find the effective disappearance of the ethno-national conflict cleavage as a determinant of voter choice. This suggests that consociational arrangements have led to both inclusion and moderation, rather than polarisation and ‘ethnic outbidding’.     

Clientelism,corruption, and the allocation of resources

Corruption has been shown to have more serious effects upon allocation than simply drawing resources into rent-seeking activities. If politicians anticipate gains from corruption in the policy making process, sub-optimal policies will be the result. Typical examples include excessive nationalization of industry, excessive regulation of the private sector through practices such as licensing and quotas with a view to extract the rent created by these measures. In addition, further misallocation will result at the execution state. It has been shown that the revisionists were wrong in assuming that licenses and contracts will be allocated to the most efficient producers, that rent will be eliminated in government employment, and that corruption increases the efficiency of the bureaucracy. Moreover, differential access to government services leads to additional allocative losses.     

Droughts and corruption

Public Choice - Natural disasters are challenges for good governance. That conclusion follows from recent research investigating the effects of natural disasters on one important force hostile to...     

Believing in national exceptionalism: ideas and economic divergence in Southern Europe

Economic adjustment in Spain, Portugal and Greece prior to the EMU nominal convergence programme is examined in an effort to explain divergence from policy orthodoxy. A notion of national exceptionalism is proposed as an ideational framework through which government policy makers perceive their country's position in the European and global sphere. Three levels of national exceptionalism are distinguished, in ascending order of explanatory importance: a level at which national exceptionalism is rooted in cultural predispositions; a level at which it appears to be empirically and logically plausible; and a level at which it offers a politically beneficial ideological strategy. When all three levels concur, national exceptionalism carries notable ancillary explanatory power. That is the case with post-authoritarian Greece through the 1980s, but not with Spain or Portugal.     

More politicians,more corruption: evidence from Swedish municipalities

In the literature on political economy and public choice, it is typically assumed that government size correlates positively with public corruption. The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive, owing to both measurement problems and endogeneity. This paper creates a corruption index based on original data from a survey covering top politicians and civil servants in all Swedish municipalities. The effect of more politicians on corruption problems is analyzed using discontinuities in the required minimum size of local councils. Despite the fact that Sweden consistently has been ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world, the survey suggest that non-trivial corruption problems are present in Sweden. Municipalities with more local council seats have more reported corruption problems, and the regression discontinuity design suggests that the effect is causal.     

Electoral rules,corruption, inequality and evaluations of democracy

Features of electoral systems have been found to have positive effects on evaluations of democracy. This article proposes that there are larger social forces that must be accounted for in such analyses. Using European Social Survey measures of democratic expectations and the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ item, this study tests for effects of electoral rules on perceptions of democracy. It is found that multipartyism/proportionality and preferential ballot structure appear to correspond with positive evaluations of elections and parties, and with greater satisfaction with how democracy is functioning. However, these relationships dissipate when corruption and income inequality are accounted for. This suggests substantial limits to the capacity of electoral reforms to enhance democratic legitimacy. It also suggests that studies of mass perceptions of democratic performance may over‐estimate effects of electoral rules if country‐level corruption and income inequality are not accounted for.     

Belgian federalism: Towards complexity and asymmetry

From the beginning of the twentieth century, tendencies towards decentralisation began to take shape in the Belgian unitary state. They resulted in a federal concept in 1988. The constitutional reformers of 1988 worked out a strikingly original concept. Not only do the constituent parts differ thoroughly at the economic, social, ideological and linguistic‐cultural levels, but there is also an incredible degree of complexity and asymmetry among the newly‐created institutions themselves, as witness the extreme case of the political structures in the Brussels region. This sui generis can be understood only by looking at it against a background of the complex political evolution of the last few decades and in particular the equally complex process by which the 1988 government was formed.     

Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption

We conducted an experimental analysis of the causes of corruption, varying the ease of hiding corrupt gains, officials’ wages, and the method of choosing the law enforcement officer. Voters rarely re-elect chief executives found to be corrupt and tend to choose presidents who had good luck. Directly elected law enforcement officers work more vigilantly at exposing corruption than those who are appointed. Increasing government wages and increasing the difficulty of hiding corrupt gains both reduce corruption.     

Privatization and corruption: Patronage vs. spoils

We examine the issue of privatization of those public goods that can be provided in-house or contracted out. Such privatization appears straightforward, yet history shows otherwise. For example, the private contracting system for street cleaning in 19^th-century New York City was a failure, despite the safeguards instituted to ensure competition. The contract system was criticized for corruption, while in-house provision suffered from patronage abuses. We present two variations of the “rotten apple” theory to capture the salient features of the New York experience. The public officials and contractors were both operating under high-powered incentives, which invited opportunism. When players act strategically, the adverse effect of opportunism increases. Since the amounts of spoils can be larger than political contributions, contracting-out ends up being more costly, even though competition promotes productive efficiency. Another advantage of in-house provision is that incentives can be made low-powered by depoliticizing of the system.     

The economy,corruption, and the vote: Evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova

How does corruption affect voting behavior when economic conditions are poor? Using a novel experimental design and two original survey experiments, we offer four important conclusions. First, in a low corruption country (Sweden), voters react negatively to corruption regardless of the state of the economy. Second, in a high corruption country (Moldova), voters react negatively to corruption only when the state of the economy is also poor; when economic conditions are good, corruption is less important. Third, respondents in Sweden react more strongly to corruption stimuli than respondents in Moldova. Finally, in the low corruption country, sociotropic corruption voting (or voting based on corruption among political leaders) is relatively more important, whereas in our high corruption country, pocketbook corruption voting (or voting based on one's own personal experience with corruption, i.e., being asked to pay bribes) is equally prevalent. Our findings are consistent with multiple stable corruption equilibria, as well as with a world where voters are more responsive to corruption signals more common in their environment.     

Party systems,electoral systems and constraints on corruption

This article explores the relationship between the party system, electoral formulas and corruption. Previous research has focused on the various incentives for political actors to monitor, or engage in corruption based on variations in the electoral formula. However, the electoral formula has mainly served as a proxy for the party system – whether multi-party or two-party. In this analysis, I test directly the relationship between party systems and corruption and in addition, add a degree of nuance to the established line of thinking within this literature. I argue that two-party systems in countries with predominantly single-member district (SMD) electoral formulas will demonstrate lower corruption on average than multi-party systems in SMD countries. However, I argue that this interaction effect does not play out in countries with proportional representation (PR). I test this hypothesis on 70 democratic and semi-democratic countries from 1987 to 2005 and find strong empirical support for the claim that multipartism in SMD countries is associated with higher levels of corruption, while the party system’s relationship with corruption plays no role in PR countries.