The European Council and The Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation

The European Council and the Council of the European Union playkey roles in the European Union. The European Council is largelyconcerned with system-steering, while the Council of the EUundertakes sectoral policymaking. What is common to these rolesis the balancing act carried out by both institutions. Bothhave to mediate the centripetal dynamics of integration, termedcooperative confederalism here, and the centrifugal dynamicswhich are found in the strongly entrenched territorial natureof power, centered on the member states. Using new institutionalistanalysis, the article illuminates different facets of the twoinstitutions1 functioning in mediating the two dynamics.     

The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution

Recent research has tried to uncover the political space in which the Council of Ministers of the European Union decides. Rather than the left-right conflict or a cleavage between governments with national and supranational attitudes, this article shows that a redistributive dimension, decisively shapes the interactions in this most important legislative body of the European Union. In contrast to extant studies, we employ ex ante rather than ex post preference data and rely on correspondence analysis as a means to identify the underlying dimensions of contestation. The article concludes with an empirical investigation of how enlargement will affect the emerging political space within the European Union. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the gulf between net-contributors and net-receivers will further deepen.     

EU public affairs and the White Paper on Governance

The White Paper on Governance process[This analysis covers the period up to and including the publication of COM (2001) 428 of 25.7.2001, ‘European Governance: A White Paper’.] began life as a search for an issue by a new Commission President. The issue is packaged as enhancing/modernising democracy in the EU and legitimising EU institutions, and searches for further avenues of civil participation. The process ‘sells’ the concept of ‘democratic deficit’, though reveals a highly open and accessible system which is already severely overloaded by interest representation. Rather than escalating a ‘lobby free for all’, the opportunity could be taken to strengthen governance by organising EU interest representation. This could be done by accrediting associations that are able to meet strict criteria of representativity as ‘governance partners’, making them sufficiently attractive to their members to work through them rather than bypassing them, and which would strengthen their ability to contribute to EU governance as policy capable organisations. These associations could find a place in a revamped and reorganised Economic and Social Committee, which would be engaged at a much earlier stage in the EU policy process. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Metagovernance and Control of Multi-level Governance Frameworks: The Case of the EU Structural Funds Financial Execution

Using as an empirical base the 2006–08 reform of the European Union Structural Funds financial execution, this paper explores control mechanisms of multi-level governance frameworks. The empirical evidence provides a representative case of initial metagovernance deficit and the subsequent, relatively successful, institutional response reinforcing metagovernance. The purpose is to clarify the conceptual dimensions of metagovernance, setting it in a categorical scheme that identifies forms of exercise of political power: government, governance and multi-level governance. Specifically, the paper argues for a conceptualization of metagovernance that highlights a sense of sovereignty by which governmental entities vested with legal legitimacy advance public interests.     

Governance in the European union

Governance in the EU. Edited by GARY MARKS, FRITZ W.SCHARPF, PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER and WOLFGANG STREECK. London: Sage, 1996. Pp.192, biblio, index. £37.50 (cloth); £12.95 (paper). ISBN 0–7619–5134–2 and ‐5135–0.

Elitism, Populism, and European Politics, Edited by JACK HAYWARD. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp.265, index. £35 (cloth). ISBN 0–19–828035–1.

Adjusting to Europe. The Impact of the EU on National Institutions and Policies. Edited by Y. MÉNY, PIERRE MULLER and JEAN‐LOUIS QUERMONNE. London and NY: Routledge, 1996. Pp.181, index. £40 (cloth); £13.99 (paper). ISBN 0–415–14410–8 and ‐14409–4.

Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi‐Level Governance. Edited by LIESBET HOOGHE. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp.458, biblio., index. £40 (cloth). ISBN 0–19–828064–5.

The European Union and Members States. Towards Institutional Fusion? Edited by DIETRICH ROMETSCH and WOLFGANG WESSELS. Manchester and NY: Manchester University Press, 1996. Pp.382, index. £45 (cloth). ISBN 0–7190–4809–5.

The Impact of European Integration. Political, Sociological and Economic Changes. Edited by GEORGE A. KOURVETARIS and ANDREAS MOSCHONAS. Westport and London: Praeger, 1996. Pp.335, index, annotated biblio. £51.95 (cloth). ISBN 0–275–94952–4.

European Welfare Policy. Squaring the Welfare Circle. Edited by VIC GEORGE and PETER TAYLOR‐GOOBY. Pp.224, tables, index. Macmillan, 1996. £11.99 (paper). ISBN 0–333–60917–4.

European Integration and Disintegration. East and West. Edited by ROBERT BIDELEUX and RICHARD TAYLOR. London and NY: Routledge, 1996. Pp.298, index. £45 (cloth); £13.99 (paper). ISBN 0–415–13740–3 and ‐13741–1.

The European Union: How Democratic Is It? Edited by SVEIN ANDERSEN and KJELL A.ELIASSEN, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage, 1996. Pp.295, biblio, index. £13.95 (paper). ISBN 0–7‐619–5113‐X.

Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union. By MICHAEL NEWMAN. London: Hurst, 1996. Pp.236. £30 (cloth); £10.95 (paper). ISBN 1–85065–256–2 and 255–4.     

Media relations in the Council of the European Union: insights into the Council press officers' professional practices

Government communication plays a key role in democratic societies as it helps public understanding of government policies and raises awareness of the roles and actions of decision makers. Within the European Union (EU) polity, communication plays a crucial role for citizens' support for the European integration process. Despite the increasing relevance of communication about major activities of the EU, studies on the EU institutions' communications are scarce, and very little is currently known about the external communication of the Council of the EU. Focusing on the media relations activities of the Council, this paper investigates the communication practices and roles of press officers working in the Council's General Secretariat as perceived by these government communicators themselves. Qualitative interviews with the press officers, analysis of Council documents, participation in their work processes and observations of their professional behaviour were used to establish the empirical basis of the study. The findings highlight the apolitical and reactive nature of these European civil servants' communication activities and identify some of the institutional and political challenges that they face in the performance of their professional duties. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

National interest versus the common good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting

The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or Governments of the European Union (EU) Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.     

The Role of the European Union Budget in View of EU Enlargement

What is the role of the European Union (EU) budget in the upcoming EU enlargement? This article attempts to answer this question by focusing on the EU budgetary system before and after the enlargement. The analysis of the EU budget helps us understand the political and economic philosophy as well as the practical achievements of the European construction. The upcoming enlargement urges the elaboration of a new vision of Europe, its missions and democratic institutions, and the power sharing between the EU and its member states, with a consequent major reform of EU fiscal and budgetary discipline.     

The institution of 'consensus' in the European Union: Formal versus informal decision-making in the Council

Abstract.  Although many have studied European Union (EU) decision-making in order to evaluate where the locus of power is, most studies have relied on the formal decision-making rules in the first pillar to theorize the workings of the EU. This assumption is somewhat problematic given that the informal norms of consensus are the primary mode of decision-making (81 per cent of decisions are made by consensus). This article examines the institution of consensus in the EU. It argues that the informal norm of consensus renders implausible the fundamental assumption of the rational institutionalist literature, challenging the validity of its claims. Finally, the costs and benefits to the EU's perceived legitimacy are examined with the argument that the putative benefits of consensual decision-making do not obtain in the EU and that the institution of consensus – the lack of voting and thus accountability – actually contributes to the perception of a democratic deficit in the Council.     

EU issue voting and the 2014 European Parliament elections: a dynamic perspective

EU issue voting in European Parliament elections has been shown to be highly conditional upon levels of EU politicization. The present study analyzes this conditionality over time, hypothesizing that the effect of EU attitudes on EP vote preferences is catalyzed as EP elections draw closer. In contrast to extant cross-sectional post-election studies, we use a four-wave panel study covering the six months leading up to the Dutch EP elections of 2014, differentiating between party groups (pro, anti, mixed) and five EU attitude dimensions. We find that EU issue voting occurs for both anti- and pro-EU parties, but only increases for the latter. For mixed parties we find no effect of EU attitudes, yet their support base shifts in the anti-EU direction as the elections draw closer. The overarching image, however, is one of surprising stability: EU attitudes form a consistent part of EP voting motivations even outside EP election times.     

Coalition formation on major policy dimensions: The Council of the European Union 1998 to 2004

Using data of contested decisions in the Council of the European Union, combined with data on the position of member states on the left-right and support for European integration dimensions, this paper provides an overview of winning coalitions formed in the council in the 1998 to 2004 time span. It shows distance between the combined policy positions of winning coalitions to individual EU states within these coalitions and demonstrates that most winning coalitions in the Council have a large combined voting weight, minimal winning coalitions are rare, and ideological connectedness plays a much smaller role than expected.     

Striking a pose: Transparency and position taking in the Council of the European Union

In recent years, transparency (or the lack thereof) has become a central concern of the European Union and its attempts to increase the democratic legitimacy of the legislative decision‐making process. The claim regularly made is that increasing transparency increases the potential for holding decision makers to account. This study investigates the manner in which transparency in the decision‐making process affects the policy positions taken by negotiators at the outset of negotiations. The findings presented suggest that increasing transparency tends to lead to polarisation of negotiations, with negotiators taking more extreme positions when they know that their positions can be observed by outside parties. The implication of this result is that advocates of transparency should be aware that there is an inherent trade‐off between increasing transparency, on the one hand, and increasing the incentives to grandstand during negotiations, on the other.     

European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship?

Since the end of the 1990s, 'new modes of governance' have been presented by academics and political actors as an answer to the EU's 'democratic deficit'. Analysing the intellectual roots of this idea, and the concrete proposals made by those who, like the European Commission, support it, this paper argues that it is very unlikely to reach this ambitious purpose. Far from breaking with the Community method, these participatory mechanisms constitute extensions of existing practices, and are underpinned by the same élitist and functionalist philosophy. They remain limited to 'stakeholders' and will not improve the 'enlighted understanding' of ordinary citizens and the general level of participation. The paper examines the obstacles to the politicisation of the EU inherent in its institutional model, and discusses other options which might help bypass the limits of 'governance'.     

National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union

This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game-theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more likely to express dissent. However, when they do express dissent, they vote ‘No’ more often. Parliamentary control depends on the presence of formal oversight institutions as well as the motivation of parliamentarians to hold their governments accountable. Empirical support is found in an analysis of votes on 1,387 legislative proposals that represent more than a decade of Council decision making in the period 2004–2014. This article contributes to the discussion on the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs, and clearly distinguishes the different forms of dissent in Council decision making.     

Immigration and the new politics of inclusion and exclusion in the European Union: The effect of elites and the EU on individual-level opinions regarding European and non-European immigrants

Abstract. Within European politics, a distinction is currently being made at the elite level between internal and external immigration, with individuals from EU countries being given special rights and privileges when they migrate within the EU. This paper addresses the question of whether individual EU citizens also view the two types of immigrants differently and what structures their beliefs regarding these two sources of migration. The findings indicate that (a) the vast majority of EU citizens view internal and external migration as identical and (b) elite cues and debates regarding immigration within each of the countries are helping individuals form their opinions regarding the two different types of immigration. These findings and their implications are discussed in the body of the paper.     

EU Simulations and Engagement: Motivating Greater Interest in European Union Politics

While the effects of simulation-based courses on the knowledge of participating students may be marginal in relation to standard lecture and discussion-based courses, this article argues that the greatest leverage is gained by increasing participating students’ level of interest in the subject of study and in politics more broadly. Participants tend to become increasingly absorbed in their roles and in the politics of the institutions at the center of the simulation. To better consider this possibility, we conducted a survey of students participating in the 2015 Mid-Atlantic European Union Simulation and of appropriate control populations. The survey results indeed suggest that, much more than simply acquiring knowledge about the EU, the simulation experience serves to generate more robust interest in the subject of study.     

National Representation in International Organizations: The Seat Allocation Model Implicit in the European Union Council and Parliament

What determines the allocation of voting weights to member states in international organizations? What drives the seat and voting weight allocation in the European Parliament (EP) and in the Council of the European Union (EU)? Our objective in this article is to develop a universal logical model and to demonstrate that the resulting equation indeed captures negotiated outcomes on seat and voting weight allocations in EU institutions from their beginning. We predict seat and voting weight allocations for both the EP and the Council of the EU within one general model. Hence, we do not employ actual data on seat allocations or voting weights in either the EP or the Council of the EU, but instead, use logical constraints exclusively, as posed by the following elements: the total number of seats/voting weights ( S ), the number of member states ( N ) and, finally, their respective population size ( P_i ). Only our final model selection among several theoretical options is guided by empirical information. With no post hoc parameters used, our model fits both the Council of the EU and the EP rather well, over a time span of nearly 40 years. Inspired by the 'seat–vote equation' ( Taagepera, 1973 ) for seat allocation in national legislatures, the new 'seat–population equation' calculates the number ( S _i) of EP seats or Council voting weights of member state i as follows:     , where n =(1/log  N − 1/log  S )/(1/log  N − 1/log  P ), P being the total population (as summed over all member states). We posit that this equation is applicable to predict outcomes in practice whenever voting weight or seat allocations in international organizations are allocated on the basis of the population shares of their component entities.