How Aspiration to Office Conditions the Impact of Government Participation on Party Platform Change

Considerable ambiguity exists regarding the effect of government/opposition status on party platform change. Existing theories predict that (1) it has no effect, (2) opposition parties change more, (3) opposition parties change more after several spells in opposition, and (4) parties’ responses vary because of different goal orientations. We propose that a party's aspiration to office, measured by its historical success or failure in entering office, determines a party's reaction to being in opposition or government. We hypothesize that, because of loss aversion, parties with low office aspiration change more when they are in government than when they are in opposition. Conversely, parties with high office aspiration change more as opposition party than as government party. We find evidence for these hypotheses through a pooled time‐series cross‐sectional analysis of 1,686 platform changes in 21 democracies, using the Comparative Manifesto Data and an innovative measure of party platform change.     

Disentangling the Value of a Ministry: Party Leaders’ Evaluations of German State Ministries

While the role played by ministries in the process of coalition government has been investigated from multiple angles, there is a clear lack of knowledge about which specific ministry features party leaders actually value as they assess different government posts. This paper aims at discovering whether, next to office considerations, the policy influence resting with a ministry does affect its value. A new survey of party leaders in the German states enables us to estimate the relative importance of specific office (e.g. public standing) and policy considerations (e.g. influence via legislation) for ministries’ values as well as to directly investigate differences between parties. The results show that both office and policy considerations matter for ministry evaluation generally, but also that different aspects have different weights. Furthermore, while all parties value the policy influence of a ministry, there is variation as to which type of policy influence (cross-sectional vs. within-jurisdictional) parties emphasise.     

Re‐electing the Culprits of the Crisis? Elections in the Aftermath of a Recession

Theories of economic voting and electoral accountability suggest that voters punish incumbent governments for poor economic conditions. Incumbents are thus expected to suffer substantially during significant economic crisis but their successor in office will face the difficult task of reviving the economy. The economic crisis may, therefore, negatively affect government parties in subsequent elections even though the economic conditions may, to a large degree, have been inherited from the previous government. It is argued in this article that economic conditions play an important role in such circumstances as they place specific issues on the agenda, which structure the strategies available to the parties. Therefore, the article studies the 2013 Icelandic parliamentary election in which the incumbent government parties suffered a big loss despite having steered the country through an economic recovery. While perceptions of competence and past performance influenced party support, three specific issues thrust on the agenda by the economic crisis – mortgage relief, Icesave and European Union accession/negotiations – help explain why the centre‐right parties were successful in returning to the cabinet.     

Political parties and public investments: a comparative analysis of 22 Western democracies

When do political parties push for public investments in education, research, and infrastructure? Existing literature has mainly answered this question by pointing to parties’ state?market ideology. In contrast, this article presents a novel argument highlighting the role of parties’ aspirations to office and their ambitions to maximize votes. It builds on the idea that investments not only constitute redistributive tools for politicians, but also work as public means to foster economic growth in the long run. This unique feature makes investments attractive for parties with high office and vote aspirations, because they anticipate government responsibility in the future and can use investments’ dispersed growth effects to appeal broadly to a large, heterogeneous pool of voters. Support for this claim is found through time-series cross-sectional analyses of party manifestos from 22 Western democracies between 1947 and 2013. Results also indicate that parties’ positions on the second social value dimension matter.     

“The Immigration Problem” and Norwegian Right-Wing Politicians

In this article, we explore Norwegian Progress Party politicians’ change of their rhetoric of immigration after the party for the first time became part of a coalition government in 2013. Equal to other right-wing populist parties in Europe, immigration has been the main reason for voters to support the Progress Party. How then does their immigration rhetoric change after entering office? This is important, as an intolerant immigration rhetoric has far-reaching consequences for the political climate in Europe. Right-wing populist parties can achieve much regarding migration policies merely because there is broad consensus on a strict migration policy today. However, to succeed remaining in office, they must remain being acceptable to other parties in the parliament and their coalition partner and therefore they need to moderate the way they go about communicating their message. Too much moderation however might lead to a split within the party, or losing core voters.     

Electoral promises and minority governments: An empirical study

Abstract.  This article studies the relationship between electoral policy proposals and subsequent government actions in the case of minority governments. Content analysis of electoral pledges of Spanish parties is utilised to study the gains that a relatively small party obtains when it helps to sustain the governing party in office without entering a coalition government. According to the authors' results, cooperating in parliament to maintain the minority government in office can be a rational choice for a party because it allows it to obtain significant gains in terms of programme fulfillment.     

Changing Patterns of Party Competition in Austria: From Multipolar to Bipolar System

The Austrian party system has entered a new phase since the controversial ÖVP-FPÖ coalition came into office in February 2000. The party system literature offers two contradicting expectations about party system mechanics in multi-party systems without relevant extremist parties: competition structured by party alliances and strictly competitive relations between government and opposition parties (as suggested by <citeref rid="b30">Sartori 1976</citeref>) versus competition structured by individual parties and some mix of competition and co-operation and perhaps even power-sharing in extra-governmental arenas between government and opposition parties (as suggested by <citeref rid="b3">Dahl 1966</citeref>). Our empirical analysis of party system competitiveness in the electoral, parliamentary and other arenas (in particular, the corporatist arena) between 2000 and 2003 shows that the relations between the government and opposition parties were strictly competitive (i.e. of a zero-sum character) in the electoral arena. Likewise, there was no trading between government and opposition in the parliamentary arena. Finally, the government substantially increased its impact on the official sites (i.e. arenas controlled by the government) and used fire and hire methods more than any of its predecessors to build up its positions in public sector institutions. The opposition parties, in turn, perceived the government parties as a bloc and were united in their goal of undermining the government parties' majority. Yet, while relations between the government and opposition parties remained highly competitive throughout the entire period, relations between the parties on each side of the government-opposition divide became more fluid, partly for tactical considerations and partly for reasons of genuine preferences. In sum, the post-2000 Austrian party system is a weak version of a two-bloc system.     

Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies

Existing studies of government duration in parliamentary democracies typically measure the length of a government's tenure in office without accounting for delays in the government formation process. By assuming that a cabinet leaves office on the day prior to the new cabinet taking office, these measures ignore periods during which a government has lost its mandate but is still legally in power as a caretaker government. A consequence is that governments that are actually stable and governments that only appear stable because replacement governments take a long time to form are observationally equivalent. This suggests that some existing studies of government stability are potentially flawed. It also means that a number of interesting research questions cannot be answered with existing data. Many of these questions address the various consequences of caretaker governments. The answers to these questions are relevant for scholars interested in representation and accountability. This article presents a new dataset collected on government duration in eleven Central Eastern European democracies from 1990 to 2008 that specifically takes account of caretaker periods and delays in the government formation process. These data will provide scholars with more flexibility to choose the measure that best reflects their underlying conception of government stability.     

Is government good for Greens? Comparing the electoral effects of government participation in Western and East-Central Europe

Abstract.  Examining the record of Green parties that have been involved in government at national level, two distinct pictures emerge. While the electoral fortunes of Green parties in East-Central Europe sharply declined after their stint in government, Green parties in Western Europe on the whole have not fared badly, with most experiencing gains in support. This article seeks to address the variety of factors that could account for different Green electoral fortunes. Among the approaches considered are economic voting, environmental issue salience, portfolio allocation, policy impact and strategic voting. While economic and environmental background factors clearly were important in the East-Central European cases, they are less useful in explaining variation between the West European experiences. The ability of Greens to improve their perceived policy competence and the profile of their leading politicians has helped them benefit from a period in office. Most crucially, Greens can benefit from strategic voting where a Green vote comes to represent support for the government as a whole. The main conclusion is that there are two paths to post-incumbency success: either Greens try to remain distant from taking full government responsibility, thus deflecting any electoral costs of incumbency, or they embrace government and the chance of demonstrating their competence fully to survive or fall with the government as a whole.     

Variation in policy success: radical right populism and migration policy

How do radical right populist parties influence government policies in their core issue of immigration? This article provides a systematic analysis of the direct and indirect effects of radical right anti-immigration parties on migration policy reforms in 17 West European countries from 1990 to 2014. Insights from migration policy theory serve to explain variations in the migration policy success of the radical right. While previous studies mostly treat migration policy as uniform, it is argued that this approach neglects the distinct political logics of immigration and integration policy. This article reveals significant variations in policy success by policy area. While immigration policies have become more liberal despite the electoral success of the radical right, when the radical right is in government office it enacts more restrictions in integration policies. Accordingly, anti-immigrant mobilisation is more likely to influence immigrants’ rights than their actual numbers.     

Success in opposition – failure in government: explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office

Drawing on a conceptual distinction between traditional right-wing extremist and right-wing populist parties, this article examines the performance of the latter in public office. The central argument is that the specific populist aspects of such parties allow them to succeed in opposition and to do well at the game of elections. Once in government, their unique strengths turn into disadvantages. Significant structural weaknesses inherent in populist parties pose nearly insurmountable problems that make their long-term success in government questionable. The analysis also shows that the rise of right-wing populism has substantially increased the opportunity structures of conservative parties. Following the theoretical discussion, the article examines the case of the Austrian Freedom Party and draws parallels with the Italian and Dutch cases.     

Do Voters’ Coalition Preferences Affect Government Formation?

Studies on coalition formation assume that political parties have two major goals: they aim to maximise office and policy payoffs. This paper shows that decision-making in the government formation game is also determined by the voters’ coalition preferences. Since the coalition formation process is not a one-shot game, parties have to take the coalition preferences of the electorate into account when they evaluate the utility of potential coalitions. If parties fail to comply with the coalition preferences of voters, they are likely to be penalised in future elections. The argument is tested by an analysis of government formation in the 16 German states between 1990 and 2009. The results support the argument: the formation of coalitions – at least in the German states – is not only determined by office- and policy-seeking behaviour of political parties, but also by the preferences of voters regarding their preferred outcome of the coalition game.     

Reconciling 'Voice' and 'Exit': Swiss and Italian Populists in Power

This article focuses on the strategic communication of four populist parties which have served in national and/or sub-national governments during the last two decades: the Lega Nord (LN) and Forza Italia (FI) in Italy, as well as the Lega dei Ticinesi (LDT) and the Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union Démocratique du Centre (SVP/UDC) in Switzerland. The analysis identifies two strategies which have been adopted by these parties (i.e. the 'opposition within government' and 'role playing'), as they try to maintain their identity and balance their recourse to 'spectacular politics' with the responsibilities of office. Unlike others, this study provides little support for the idea that government participation must bring with it the 'moderation' of populists, at least as far as their strategic communication is concerned.     

Local leaders and the distribution of central government funds: Evidence from 18 European democracies

This article looks at the relationship between the political affiliation of local leaders and the distribution of government funds with the help of a new dataset on local elections from 18 European countries between 2000 and 2013. It finds that central governments are more likely to target regions with high density of local councils affiliated with the parties in government only under certain institutional arrangements. The relationship exists where local councils enjoy little power and thus are less able to claim credit for the funds independent of the central government. The relationship is also present where local leaders are involved in the selection of candidates for national office.     

The West German social democrats in opposition 1982–86

Entering opposition, political parties face tasks of renewal and regeneration, the success of which is usually a prerequisite of their return to government office. For the SPD (1982–86), these tasks were: programmatic renewal, the consolidation of internal party cohesion, the restoration of relations with organised labour and élite regeneration. In addition to these tasks of structural renewal, opposition parties must evolve a parliamentary strategy and undertake a realignment towards key groups in the electorale. It is argued here that the SPD embarked on the exercise of renewal and regeneration with more emphasis on continuity than on change. Adopting a short‐term perspective on a return to government, the party looked to makeshift expedients instead of long‐term solutions, postponing change and sidestepping controversial or divisive questions. Consequently, in the wake of its electoral defeat in January 1987, the party faces a ‘crisis of opposition’ as acute as in 1983, if not more so.     

Office and Policy at the Expense of Votes: Plaid Cymru and the One Wales Government

This paper will examine Plaid Cymru's experience in government from 2007 to 2011. Drawing on literature on autonomist parties, parties in government for the first time, and Strøm and Müller's policy/office/votes framework, the paper examines where strategic 'trade-offs’ were made and what the consequences of such trade-offs were. The paper takes a qualitative approach, using semi-structured interview and documentary data. The paper finds that Plaid Cymru valued the policy-seeking potential of office at the expense of vote-seeking ones because of the importance of 'autonomist' goals, namely the 2011 referendum which saw primary law-making powers granted to the Welsh Assembly. Furthermore, the experience of governmental office exposed organizational vulnerabilities in the party's leadership structures which undermined the ability to construct an effective vote-winning strategy at the 2011 Welsh election, where the party lost four seats.     

Bargaining in legislatures,portfolio allocation,and the electoral costs of governing

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties’ office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. This article adds to the portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalised by voters for participating in government, increasing the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This ‘cost of governing’ shifts their seat reservation price – the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomised survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties’ behaviour between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters’ reactions.     

Multi-level muddling: Candidate strategies to “nationalize” local elections

Comparative literature has identified how political parties at subnational levels strategically refer to the performance of parties or policy issues at national level to varying degrees. Building upon these studies on multi-level electoral dynamics, the article demonstrates how individual legislative candidates, and not just parties, selectively adopt what we call “cross-level electoral appeals”(CLEAs): campaign messages which emphasize issues, performances, and actors in levels of government other than that which the candidate or party is seeking office. Advancing existing conceptualizations of nationalization, we posit that there are mainly three types of such CLEAs, those in which local candidates: 1) praise or criticize a specific national policy or 2) performance of the national government; or 3) emphasize personal linkages to national-level parties or politicians. The article investigates the potential factors which lead to more frequent CLEAs by observing candidate manifestos for local legislative elections in Japan. We use an original dataset from a sample of prefectures differently affected by specific national policies, candidates affiliated to parties differing in organizational centralization and from districts varying in seat magnitude as well as incumbent party popularity. To test hypotheses about national and local level party popularity as well as district-level variables on the frequency of such appeals, the article analyzed the data set using the novel methodology of not just counting, but also measuring the surface area of specific appeals in candidate manifestos. Through regression analysis, we find evidence of national government party popularity leading to more frequency of local candidate CLEAs. We also find that local candidates who are more dependent on the party vote (i.e. those in smaller district magnitudes and in centralized party organizations) are more prone to certain types of CLEAs.     

The Effect of Associative Issue Ownership on Parties’ Presence in the News Media

Some studies suggest that challenger parties push new issues onto the agenda, especially when they ‘own’ these issues. Others claim that established parties largely determine how prominent issues appear on the agenda. This article contributes to this debate by focusing on an issue on which challenger parties have most ‘ownership’: immigration. Political claims on this issue made by political parties in newspapers in seven West European countries after three events that could potentially trigger attention to immigration were studied. Large and government parties appear most prominent in the news. However, findings show a significant, positive effect of associative issue ownership on claims-making in the news, while controlling for party size and government status. So, when challengers have issue ownership they appear as claim-makers on the issue. These results paint a balanced picture of the role that challenger and established parties have in setting the agenda.     

From Qualified Majority to Simple Majority: The Effects of the 1992 Change in the Finnish Constitution

This paper analyzes the consequences of the 1992 change in the voting rule in the Finnish Parliament. Before this reform, one third of all Parliament members could delay a law proposal for reconsideration by the Parliament. This rule was abolished in 1992 which meant that the Finnish Parliament finally adopted a simple majority rule to decide on new legislation. The empirical part of this article analyzes the effects of the reform on the parliamentary parties voting power. The voting power of the big parties increased compared to that of the small parties. However, the variation among smaller parties was greater. The biggest losers were medium size parties. Considering the government and the parliament as institutions, the emphasis clearly moved to the government. Considering parties in the government coalitions as a whole (adding up their share in the government and in the Parliament), the picture was quite clear. The opposition lost at least some of its voting power. This change was clearest in the case of the party government model in which the opposition lost its voting power completely.