The Slovenian EU Accession Referendum: A Cat-and-Mouse Game

This account reviews the background to, the campaign and the result of the Slovenian EU accession referendum. The authors ascertain that the ‘yes’ campaign was outstandingly well organised and synchronised, in stark contrast to the ‘no’ campaign, which was poorly organised and came across as representative of a narrow set of interests. Irrespective of this contrast, the large victory (almost 90 per cent) of the ‘yes’ camp was unexpected (as well as the relatively low turnout of 60.4 per cent). The two most important reasons for such a high level of support for the EU in the accession referendum can be traced back to the broad consensus among the political and social elite and the reorientation of the most well-known anti-EU actors to the NATO accession referendum which was held simultaneously. For this reason, account is taken of the Slovenian NATO accession referendum, but only to the extent that it influenced the campaign and result of the EU referendum.     

Culture,Institutions and Campaign Effects: Explaining the Outcome of Malta's EU Accession Referendum

This survey examines the background to and the campaign preceding Malta's EU accession referendum. The result of the referendum, which was held on 8 March 2003, and which was the first of the EU accession referendums of 2003, was a 53.65% vote in support of membership, on a turnout of close to 91%. Explaining both the relatively low support for EU accession and the high turnout on referendum day involves weighing up the relative impact of distinctive features of Malta's political culture and institutional framework against more immediate campaign effects. While the conclusion is that the high turnout in the Maltese EU accession referendum can be traced to Malta's political culture, the relatively low but positive vote in favour of membership can only be fully understood by focusing on a range of factors, including campaign-related factors, such as the credibility of the arguments presented by the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ camps and the balance of resources available. The most important factor explaining the result of the Maltese referendum are, however, the cues provided by the political parties prior to and over the course of the referendum campaign.     

The 1994 EU Referendum in Norway: Continuity and Change

In the 1994 EU referendum a majority of Norwegian voters rejected membership in the European Union. The outcome contrasts with victories for membership in the corresponding referendums in Austria, Finland and Sweden. The article reports a preliminary investigation of factors relating to the support for "no". Analysis of aggregate data (representing 435 municipalities) and survey data demonstrates the importance of traditional cleavages as well as new cleavages for the vote. The no-vote was strongest in northern Norway, among supporters of the traditional "counter-cultures" and among those employed in the primary sector. Women were more likely to vote no as were public sector employees. The major parties took relatively clear stands on the issue, and we find that party identification shows a strong correlation with the vote in the referendum. With a turnout of 89 percent, the 1994 referendum represents an all-time high for elections in Norway. Compared with the previous referendum on the EC in 1972, we find that the increase in mobilization was particularly strong in the no-dominated periphery, but the shift in mobilization patterns was not decisive for the outcome of the referendum.     

Elite Collusion and Public Defiance: Sweden's Euro Referendum in 2003

In a referendum held on Sunday, 14 September 2003, the Swedish electorate rejected membership of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). After a campaign characterised as heated by Swedish standards, and the murder of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, the referendum delivered a clear ‘No’ majority. In this article, it is argued that while the 2003 EMU referendum may not have compromised the use of referendums as an occasional complement to representative democracy, it did indicate a substantial gap between citizens and the political elite.     

The Welfare State in Transition Economies and Accession to the EU

Welfare state reform in East-Central Europe can be divided into two phases: in the first phase, when liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation were of primary importance, only minor or absolutely necessary reform steps were taken. This soon led many countries into fiscal problems that triggered the second phase of substantial pension and health system reforms. Having been already part of the European welfare state tradition in the pre-communist period, the countries of East-Central Europe were not prepared to take over the essentially private three pillar model of the World Bank. Instead the forerunners of reform, such as Hungary, Poland and Latvia, are developing, together with some incumbent EU members, a new European four pillar model with a specific public-private mix. Even if the social acquis communautaire is not very restrictive for the candidate states, they seem keen to join the European welfare state culture.     

The Durability of EU Civil Service Policy in Central and Eastern Europe after Accession

This article examines the post‐accession durability of EU civil service policy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs). Civil service professionalization was a condition for EU membership but the European Commission has no particular sanctions available if CEECs reverse pre‐accession reforms after gaining membership. Comparing eight CEECs that joined the EU in 2004, the article finds that post‐accession civil service developments are characterized by great diversity. The three Baltic States continued civil service reforms, while Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia are classified as cases of post‐accession reform reversal. The post‐accession pathway of Hungary is identified as a case of reform reorientation. The diversity in post‐accession pathways was almost exclusively the result of domestic political constellations, in particular, patterns of government alternation after accession. There were hardly any factors that could have locked in the level of professionalization that had been reached at the time of accession.     

The Cambusters: The Conservative European Union Referendum Rebellion of October 2011

The backbench rebellion that hit the Coalition government in October 2011 was one of the largest Commons revolts of the postwar era, on any issue. But it was not just its size that was noteworthy. This article outlines ten points about the origins of the vote, its timing, its composition, and the nature of the divisions it revealed. Facilitated by recent procedural innovations in the Commons, the rebellion was both evidence of a longer‐term rise in dissent amongst MPs of all parties, as well as other medium‐and short‐term factors within the Conservative party. It leaves the Prime Minister caught in an impossible triangle, attempting to satisfy his pro‐European Liberal Democrat partners in the Coalition, while keeping his Euro‐sceptic rebels happy, and yet retaining enough credibility in European capitals to negotiate successfully.     

Voting on Europe: The Potential Pitfalls of a British Referendum

As Britain prepares for a possible referendum on continued membership of the European Union, it is essential that more careful thought is paid to the dynamics of referendums. Polling data reveal the existence of a substantial knowledge deficit in the UK and other parts of the EU: large numbers of voters simply do not understand the EU. There is also reason to question the conventional view that voters can correct for such a deficit by using cues from opinion leaders and the media. The experience of recent referendums in other EU member states suggests that many voters will take part in the proposed British referendum without independent and informed knowledge of the issues at stake, that many will have been swayed by partisan elite opinion, and that many will decide on the basis of their views about domestic politics rather than their views about Europe.     

The Politics of European Referendum Outcomes and Turnout: Two Models

This survey briefly examines the EU accession process for the countries included in this collection and considers the distinctive features of this set of referendums, particularly the comparatively high levels of Yes vote and low levels of turnout. It argues that, although they represent a distinctive sub-type of European referendum, they can be used as a basis to draw at least tentative comparative and theoretical conclusions. Consequently, it then posits causal models that both provide an analytical framework for this collection and, more broadly, attempt to explain the results and turnout in these and, potentially, other (European) referendums.