Immigration,asylum and citizenship in Germany: The impact of unification and the Berlin republic

In recent years, there has been much debate over whether post‐unification Germany, often termed the ‘Berlin Republic’, represents a substantive change from the ‘Bonn Republic ‘, that is, West Germany. This article analyses Germany's immigration and citizenship policy against this background by examining various dimensions of immigration before and after unification. The article argues that both unification itself and Germany's changed international environment have resulted in far‐reaching changes in policy, which have forced a reappraisal of Germany's traditional self‐image as a ‘non‐immigration country’.     

Hitler's opening gambit: Intelligence,encirclement, and the decision to Ally with Poland

This article asks why the German Foreign Ministry supported Hitler's radical reconstruction of Germany's eastern policy. Already by the fall of 1933, Germany was turning to an alignment with Poland against Soviet Russia ‐ the reverse of Germany's decade‐long Rapallo policy. The author identifies three principal factors that influenced the conservative, typically anti‐Polish diplomats in the Foreign Ministry to support the scheme: fear of a Polish‐Soviet alliance hinted at by recurrent intelligence reports; internal pressure from army and state police officials; and the constraints of the international system.     

Genscher and what lies behind ‘Genscherism’

This article analyses the factors which have contributed to West Germany's decision to oppose the modernisation of short‐range nuclear missilesin 1989 and focuses on the likely impact Hans‐Dietrich Genscher had on this decision. By considering both West German domestic conditions (value changes, mass perceptions of détente, and party‐political consensus on Ostpolitik) and external factors (changing superpower relations, reforms in Eastern Europe, and European Community progress), it is argued that Genscher is neither the single architect of, nor the sole influence on, West Germany's security policy‐making.     

Coping with economic integration: Corporatist strategies in Germany and Austria in the 1990s

While Germany is facing the wholesale disorganisation of sectoral collective bargaining, the Austrian social partnership has gained new strength in the 1990s. Comparatively, Austro‐corporatism proved able to undergo a process of skilful adaptation. This divergence in performance poses a puzzle, given Germany's commanding presence both in international markets and in the European Union, and given Austria's traditional hostility to modernisation. This article explains German—Austrian differences in the performance and resilience of corporatist governance in the face of modernisation and market integration in terms of (i) the organisational differences between German and Austrian corporatism (sectoral concentration versus vertical centralisation and little horizontal formalisation); (ii) the long term policy strategies employed by labour unions in either system (co‐determination versus macro‐level policy influence); and (Hi) by the different responses to modernisation chosen by German and Austrian corporatist actors (internal organisational reforms verus becoming modernisation brokers).     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.     

Between state and society: Green political ideology in the mid‐1980s

This article discusses the political ideology of the Greens in the Federal Republic of Germany in the mid‐1980s. Finding limitations in both the survey research and ‘new social movement’ literatures, it argues that Germany's particular institutional and ideological traditions inform the Green alternative and that the powerful tradition of German statism affects Green ideology in two contradictory ways: positively, in that Greens employ statist imagery in both their critique of West German politics and their alternative vision; and negatively, in that Green ideology adopts and reflexively transposes the values of the concepts of German statism.     

The German Federal Election of 2017: How the Wedge Issue of Refugees and Migration Took the Shine off Chancellor Merkel and Transformed the Party System

The 2017 German federal election delivered dramatic electoral decline of the two traditional main parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), who had governed Germany in a ‘grand coalition’ government since 2013. The main reason for this outcome was the decision by Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany's borders for refugees and migrants, an unprecedented policy that abandoned border controls and remained in place between September 2015 and March 2016. This article focuses on how the refugee and migration problem subsequently turned into a wedge issue, splitting most German political parties and handing a major election victory to the main critics of Merkel's decision, namely the rightist Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the right‐wing liberals of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Rather than explaining these developments in isolation, the article highlights how past welfare state retrenchment and fear over future economic prosperity make significant groups of the electorate, including former supporters of left‐of‐centre parties, lose confidence in the ability of the political system to deliver stability and social integration.     

The decontamination of German history: Jürgen Habermas and the ‘Historikerstreit’ in West Germany

The ‘Historikerstreit’ in West Germany was opened by the non-historian Habermas who sought to expose what he saw as a ‘scandalous’ revision of aspects of the history of German fascism on the part of leading conservative historians like Nolte, Hillgruber and Stürmer. Habermas sees this revisionism in the wider context of the perceived need to foster a new German nationalism as a means of legitimation. The attempt to decontaminate German history would seem to derive from the need to resist the demands for political realignment in West Germany and to establish a strong pedigree of German anti-communism which takes in National Socialism and its membership of the Anti-Comintern Pact as well as West Germany's membership of NATO. Habermas's critique of conservative historians and the non-rational assumptions of their philosophy of history is essentially linked to his critique of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault and his identification of a common paralyzing influence on discourse.     

German Intelligence History: A Field in Search of Scholars

German historians have so far shown little interest in the history of intelligence services and in the role the craft of intelligence played in national and international politics. The sole exception is found in the historical writings on East Germany between 1945 and 1990, where the Ministry for State Security - or Stasi - has become the subject of dozens of highly valuable studies. This neglect cannot be explained simply by pointing to the difficulties in getting access to relevant source materials. A more plausible explanation is found in the reluctance on the part of most German intellectuals to study the broader questions of war and peace in international politics. Military history has been marginalised in post-1945 German universities. The same is largely true of international security studies, defence studies, studies of insurgency, terrorism and various related subjects. Peace and conflict studies, a discipline established sometime in the 1970s, has mostly avoided both war or intelligence. The deeper reasons for this neglect lie both in Germany's psychological atmosphere and in academic politics. Spy novels and spy movies are as popular in Germany as anywhere but their heroes almost never are Germans. Even those German intelligence officers and spies who worked against Hitler and might therefore be regarded as heroes are barely known in present-day Germany. Those few scholars who are now trying to build up the field of intelligence studies get little help from their government or from private funders. While East Germany publicly revered communist spies like Richard Sorge and Klaus Fuchs, the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst did and does nothing to publicise its achievements.     

Europeanization and the “Needle's Eye”: The Transformation of Employment Policy in Germany1

What have been the impacts of Europeanization in European Union (EU) member states in the domain of employment policy from a gender perspective? The essay explores this question for one of the traditional “male breadwinner–female caretaker” gender policy regimes in the EU—the case of Germany. Since German women's employment status is behind the status of women in many other EU countries, it has been expected that the impact of European (EC) equal opportunity and equal treatment norms on domestic policy change has remained minimal (Ostner & Lewis, 1995). This, however, is not the case any more. On the contrary, it is argued that Europeanization, although against considerable domestic resistances and with delays, helps to “gender” German public employment policy, namely in three respects: with respect to underlying gender norms, regarding the distinction of gender specific target groups and scope, and the introduction of innovative gender‐sensitive policy instruments. This claim is illustrated by three examples. An explanation for these shifts is developed that accounts for member state change despite misfits with EU norms, not as a consequence of legal compliance mechanisms, but as an outcome of a combination of three mechanisms—the politicization of controversial issues, shifts in dominant discourses, and political advocacy building—conducive to the “gendering” of Europeanization.     

Clarity of responsibility and foreign policy performance voting

Do voters’ assessments of the government's foreign policy performance influence their vote intentions? Does the ‘clarity of responsibility’ in government moderate this relationship? Existing research on the United States demonstrates that the electorate's foreign policy evaluations influence voting behaviour. Whether a similar relationship exists across the advanced democracies in Europe remains understudied, as does the role of domestic political institutions that might generate responsibility diffusion and dampen the effect of foreign policy evaluations on vote choice. Using the attitudinal measures of performance from the 2011 Transatlantic Trends survey collected across 13 European countries, these questions are answered in this study through testing on incumbent vote the diffusion‐inducing effects of five key domestic factors frequently used in the foreign policy analysis literature. Multilevel regression analyses conclude that the electorate's ability to assign punishment decreases at higher levels of responsibility diffusion, allowing policy makers to circumvent the electoral costs of unpopular foreign policy. Specifically, coalition governments, semi‐presidential systems, ideological dispersion among the governing parties and the diverse allocation of the prime ministerial and foreign policy portfolios generate diffusion, dampening the negative effects of foreign policy disapproval on vote choice. This article contributes not only to the debate on the role of foreign policy in electoral politics, but also illustrates the consequential effects of domestic institutions on this relationship.     

Iran's active neutrality during the Kuwaiti crisis: Reasons and ramifications

Abstract

Since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Iranian foreign policy has become increasingly moderate. Iran's active neutrality during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is symptomatic of this moderation. The policy of active neutrality became possible because Rafsanjani centralized the foreign policy decision‐making process before the start of the crisis and introduced his “new‐thinking” in the Persian Gulf. This new thinking was a part of his strategy to rebuild Iran's shattered economy and to improve relations with the West and with the Arabs of the Persian Gulf.

Without a single shot and without any casualty, Iran benefited enormously from the Kuwaiti war. Rafsanjani's domestic opponents were weakened. Iranian financial gains were significant. Iran's negative image improved. Relations improved with the West and with the Arab nations of the region. And the military and economic infrastructures of Iraq, Iran's archenemy, were seriously damaged, making Iran the region's most powerful indigenous force.

This article is partially based on interviews with Iranian policy‐makers conducted in 1991.     

Iceland's Economic Crash and Integration Takeoff: An End to European Union Scepticism?

Iceland's application for European Union (EU) membership in summer 2009 suggests that the country's political parties had reconsidered their longstanding scepticism towards European integration and opted for closer engagement with the EU after the financial crisis. Applying Moravcsik's liberal theory of preference formation, this article investigates the European policies of Iceland's political parties from 2007 to 2010, focusing on four related European issues which have been prominent in the Icelandic EU debate: an application to join the EU with no reservations; the unilateral adoption of the euro; the inclusion of a clause in the constitution allowing a transfer of sovereignty; and the holding of a referendum on an EU application. It analyses whether the economic crash actually led to a change in the political parties' economic preferences and to a subsequent reformulation and adaptation of their long‐term European policy goals and, if not, then how Iceland's decision to apply for EU membership is to be understood. The article concludes that the parties' European policies have remained remarkably stable despite the EU application. This indicates that Iceland's EU membership application can only be understood through a thorough examination of domestic politics, to which liberal intergovernmentalism pays insufficient attention.     

Actor alignments in the European Union before and after enlargement

What impact has the 2004 enlargement had on legislative decision making in the European Union (EU)? This study answers this question by examining the controversies raised by a broad selection of legislative proposals from before and after the 2004 enlargement. The analyses focus on the alignments of decision‐making actors found on those controversies. Member State representatives, the European Commission and the European Parliament vary considerably in the positions they take on controversial issues before and after enlargement. Consistent patterns in actor alignments are found for only a minority of controversial issues. To the extent that consistent patterns are found, the most common involve differences in the positions of Northern and Southern Member States and old and new Member States. The North‐South alignment was more common in the EU‐15 and reflected Northern Member States' preference for low levels of regulatory intervention. The new‐old alignment that has been evident in the post‐2004 EU reflects new Member States' preference for higher levels of financial subsidies. This study argues that the persistent diversity in actor alignments contributes to the EU's capacity to cope with enlargement.     

Labour market flexibility in West Germany,Britain and France

To resolve the high unemployment rates in many Western European countries, the notion of labour market flexibility has been gaining favour with academics and policy‐makers. This article examines the notion of labour market flexibility in detail and assesses the extent to which it has been implemented in West Germany, Britain and France. It is argued that the most significant developments towards flexibility have occurred in Britain because of the Thatcher government's commitment to neo‐liberal economic policies and because the ‘voluntarist’ British industrial relations system does not represent a barrier to the pursuit of such a policy. By contrast, there has been only a partial incorporation of flexibility initiatives within Germany and France largely because no government in either country has been committed to a full neo‐liberal assault in the existing dense array of national industrial relations institutions, norms and legislation. The article also assesses the extent to which labour market flexibility represents a coherent and workable approach to the challenge of resolving unemployment. In several important respects, we find it an inadequate policy to help restore employment growth in Western Europe.     

Good governance and differentiated integration: Graded membership in the European Union

The study of European integration has traditionally focused on organisational growth: the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU). By contrast, this article analyses organisational differentiation, a process in which states refuse, or are being refused, full integration but find value in establishing in‐between grades of membership. It describes how the EU's system of graded membership has developed, and it explains the positioning of states in this system. The core countries of the EU set a standard of ‘good governance’. The closer European countries are to this standard, the closer their membership grade is to the core. Some countries fall short of this standard and are refused further integration by the core: their membership grade increases with better governance. Other countries refuse further integration because they outperform the standards of the core countries: their membership grade decreases as governance improves. These conjectures are corroborated in a panel analysis of European countries.     

The Foreign Relations of European Regions: Competences and Strategies

The article traces the foreign relations of 81 European regions by looking first at the constitutional competences which these regions enjoy within their nation-states. We discover that the regions in federal states have expanded their competences in two directions: conducting autonomous foreign activities and influencing national foreign policy. How far the Belgian regions, as well as the German and the Austrian Länder go in both directions depends very much on the scope of their competences in domestic politics. In non-federal states (France, GB, Italy), regionalisation brought rather more leeway to conduct a certain level of autonomous foreign activity than regional influence in national foreign policy. When we – in a second step – trace the strategies or directions of international activities which the regions pursue it becomes obvious that setting up an office in Brussels in order to adapt to political integration is very common among West European regions. In contrast, much more variety can be observed when examining the regions' strategies to adapt to fundamental economic and cultural transformations. Some European regions invest heavily in economic promotion offices and in transnational partnerships while others lack the motivation or ability to invest in these forms of foreign relations.     

Overlapping games and cross‐cutting coalitions in the European Union

Despite hopes of theoretical convergence between the disciplines of comparative politics and international relations, the integration of explanations of the European policy‐making process and of the process of European integration is yet to be accomplished. This article looks at how decision‐making crises could be the focal points with which to explore the no‐man's land where comparative politics and international relations could meet each other. The article will highlight the structural ambivalence of the EU policy process and the collision of functional areas and territorial politics over multidimensional decisions. It will also show that the interplay of overlapping policy games, cross‐cutting coalitions and poor coordination mechanisms at all levels can go a long way to explaining the oscillations between path‐dependency and policy instability.     

The German Federal Constitutional Court and European Judicial Politics

With its decision on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has handed over another landmark ruling on European integration. The ruling made Germany's ratification of the Treaty conditional upon the passage of a new law giving the Bundestag greater oversight of European affairs. This and the consequences of stronger parliamentary oversight for the German government and the way it conducts negotiations at European level have been the focus of most early comments on the decision. No less important, however, are the ruling's potential repercussions on European judicial politics. Coming after a series of highly controversial judgments by the European Court of Justice, the FCC's Lisbon decision is clearly meant as a warning to Brussels and, above all, Luxembourg. The decision could undermine the Court of Justice's authority and encourage non-compliance on the part of national courts, thus bringing about a constitutional crisis at European level. Alternatively, the decision may compel the Court of Justice to reconsider some of the most controversial aspects of its activist jurisprudence and to exert more restraint in the foreseeable future.     

In the Shadow of Brexit: The 2019 European Parliament Elections as First‐Order Polity Elections?

European Parliament (EP) elections have traditionally been described as ‘second‐order national elections' in which campaigns are fought by national parties on national issues. We argue that the 2019 elections should instead be considered ‘first‐order polity' elections. It is not EU‐level party politics or policy issues that are debated, but rather the legitimacy of the EU itself. Firstly, the EP elections have transformed into an EU ‘blame game' in which national governments are punished or rewarded over their stance on European integration. Secondly, the 2019 election was about the EU's fundamental values, not only with respect to multiculturalism, but also gender equality and LGBTQ rights. Finally, these first‐order polity elections are driven in large part by traditional news and social media platforms. While this is a long way from the patterns of the early EP elections, they still fail in fulfilling the function of holding MEPs and European party groupings adequately to account.